

**THE 9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS ON
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: DEFENDING IDEALS AND
DEFINING THE MESSAGE**

HEARING

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

OF THE

**COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

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THE 9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: DEFENDING IDEALS AND DEFINING THE MESSAGE

MONDAY, AUGUST 23, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING
THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1 p.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Shays, Turner, LaTourette, Platts, Kucinich, Maloney, and Tierney.

Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and counsel; Thomas Costa, professional staff member; Sarah D'Orsie, deputy clerk; Andrew Su, minority professional staff member; and Earley Green, minority chief clerk.

Mr. SHAYS. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations hearing entitled, "The 9/11 Commission Recommendations on Public Diplomacy: Defending Ideals and Defining the Message," is called to order.

In the war against trans-national terrorism, we are losing ground on a crucial front: The battle of ideas. Words, not just weapons, fuel revolutions; and the language of political liberty and economic opportunity can inspire the victory of life over death, faith over fatalism and progress over stagnation throughout the Muslim world.

The next generation of potential terrorists can be stopped with books rather than bombs, if we help empower and mobilize the moderate majority with the vocabulary of hope.

Public diplomacy, the cultural exchanges, educational programs and broadcasts used to convey U.S. interests and ideals to foreign audiences, helped win the cold war. But according to the State Department's advisory group on public diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim world, "the United States today lacks the capabilities in public diplomacy to meet the national security threat emanating from political instability, economic deprivation and extremism."

In the rhetorical arms race for the hearts and minds of the Muslim world, some ask how the most technologically advanced Nation on earth is being outgunned by a movement largely based in caves.

In our previous hearings on public diplomacy, witnesses described a lack of strategic coherence in U.S. efforts to communicate

with global audiences. Successful cold war structures have been stripped bare and scattered throughout a State Department bureaucracy with other priorities. Since September 11, 2001, the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors have increased the reach and frequency of communications on U.S. policies. New, more aggressive approaches, seek to counter anti-American stereo types and caricatures dominating the news cycles.

But the 9/11 Commission found those efforts still inadequate to meet the threat. They called for “short term action on a long range strategy” to compete as vigorously on the ideological battlefield as we do on the military and intelligence fronts. The Commission recommended a clearer message in support of the rule of law, human rights, expanded opportunity and political reform, and they said we needed to expand regional satellite broadcasting and rebuild scholarship, exchange and library programs targeted to young people.

The Commission’s call for reinvigorated public diplomacy adds urgency to the debate already underway over the appropriate mix of U.S. communication tools. Some say mass audience programming based on popular music and other modern advertising techniques lacks necessary depth. Others say the old, more academic methods targeting societal elites will not reach the larger body politic. The Commission calls for expansion of both approaches.

So we meet this afternoon to examine those recommendations more fully, determine which can be done by the executive branch alone and which require legislative implementation, and to assess the strengths and weaknesses of public diplomacy as a tool against future terrorist attacks.

We are aided in that discussion today by Governor Thomas Kean, chairman of National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Commission member Jamie Gorelick, and two other panels of extremely qualified and experienced witnesses. We thank them all for participating and we look forward to their testimony.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

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Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays
August 23, 2004

In the war against transnational terrorism, we are losing ground on a crucial front: the battle of ideas. Words, not just weapons, fuel revolutions; and the language of political liberty and economic opportunity can inspire the victory of life over death, faith over fatalism, and progress over stagnation throughout the Muslim world.

The next generation of potential terrorists can be stopped with books rather than bombs, if we help empower and mobilize the moderate majority with the vocabulary of hope.

Public diplomacy – the cultural exchanges, educational programs and broadcasts used to convey United States interests and ideals to foreign audiences – helped win the Cold War. But, according to the State Department’s Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, “The United States today lacks the capabilities in public diplomacy to meet the national security threat emanating from political instability, economic deprivation and extremism....”

In the rhetorical arms race for the hearts and minds of the Muslim world, some ask how the most technologically advanced nation on earth is being outgunned by a movement largely based in caves.

In our previous hearings on public diplomacy, witnesses described a lack of strategic coherence in U.S. efforts to communicate with global audiences. Successful Cold War structures have been stripped bare and scattered throughout a State Department bureaucracy with other priorities. Since September 11, 2001, the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors have increased the reach and frequency of communications on U.S. policies. New, more aggressive approaches seek to counter anti-American stereotypes and caricatures dominating the news cycles.

But the 9/11 Commission found those efforts still inadequate to meet the threat. They called for "short term action on a long-range strategy" to compete as vigorously on the ideological battlefield as we do on the military and intelligence fronts. The Commission recommended a clearer message in support of the rule of law, human rights, expanded opportunity and political reform. And they said we needed to expand regional satellite broadcasting and rebuild scholarship, exchange and library programs targeted to young people.

The Commission's call for reinvigorated public diplomacy adds urgency to the debate already underway over the appropriate mix of U.S. communication tools. Some say mass audience programming based on popular music and other modern advertising techniques lack necessary depth. Others say the old, more academic methods targeting societal elites will not reach the larger body politic. The Commission calls for expansion of both approaches.

So we meet this afternoon to examine those recommendations more fully, determine which can be done by the executive branch alone and which require legislative implementation, and to assess the strengths and weaknesses of public diplomacy as a tool against future terrorist attacks.

We are aided in that discussion today by Governor Thomas Kean, Chairman of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Commission member Jamie Gorelick, and two other panels of extremely qualified and experienced witnesses. We thank them all for participating and we look forward to their testimony.

Mr. SHAYS. At this time, the Chair would recognize the ranking member, Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to Governor Kean and also to Ms. Gorelick.

Today's hearing is the third hearing this subcommittee has held on public diplomacy in the Middle East. We've heard from numerous State Department officials, media experts, academics, and representatives from various advisory commissions. We've heard repeatedly that the hatred of the Muslim world toward the United States is growing.

However, the truth is that no matter how many hearings we hold on this topic, our public diplomacy in the Middle East is a failure and will continue to fail without changes in our foreign policy.

The problem is not that there are cultural differences or different value systems. It is not a failure of the quantity or quality of our message. Our public diplomacy fails because it is derived from failed foreign policy. We must change our foreign policy if we're going to have credibility in talking about changing hearts and minds.

In its final report, the 9/11 Commission made the following recommendation, "when Muslim governments, even those who are friends, do not respect these principles, the United States must stand for a better future. One of the lessons of the long cold war was that short term gains in cooperating with the most repressive and brutal governments were too often outweighed by long-term setbacks by America's stature and interests."

The Commission is correct in that our foreign policy strategy continues to reflect cold war mentalities. During the cold war, the United States supported brutal dictatorial governments throughout the world because they were strategic allies. Democratic and Republican administrations both supported with military aid regimes in Iraq and Iran where those regimes were torturing citizens and suppressing democratic aspirations.

Our policy of arming Mujahedin before and during Soviet invasion in Afghanistan led to the Taliban having the ability to flourish that afterwards. The people of the Muslim world remember that the United States chose to support these brutal regimes against them. Recent polls such as those conducted by Zogby international show that Arab respondents do understand and do respect American values. But they do not see American policy reflecting those values. They saw the horrible picture of pictures at Abu Ghraib prison. They read about the treatment of detained prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, so why are we surprised that there's harsh feelings toward the United States?

Perhaps we have a credibility problem in the Muslim world because people there believe that we have treated them poorly. If we say there's a gathering threat of weapons of mass destruction and we launch an unprovoked attack on another country to capture those weapons and it turns out that no vast stockpiles were found, our actions look highly questionable at best and our credibility as a Nation is undermined.

Who's going to believe America the next time a U.S. Secretary of State makes a presentation at the United Nations calling for the world community to participate in a plan for war? No amount of

American pop music Fulbright scholars or athlete exchange programs is going to conceal the false pretences of a war. Today we'll hear again how much more money and attention should be spent to influence public opinion in the Arab world and to carry a message of hope to Muslims.

Mr. Chairman, I think that our national policymakers have to match words and deeds or pretty soon the United States will lose all credibility, not just in the Middle East but throughout the entire world.

Let's figure out what the message is before we discuss how best to beam it across satellites to the Middle East. Let's have the makers of our foreign policy come testify and be held accountable for their decisions.

I want to thank the witnesses here today and I want to thank Governor Kean and Ms. Gorelick for the honest assessment they've made of our Nation's vulnerabilities in the 9/11 Commission Report, and I hope that your testimony today and continued advocacy will help to spearhead serious deliberation and reform by this and future generations and Congresses.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich follows:]

Statement of Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich
Ranking Minority Member
House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations

Hearing on “The 9/11 Commission Recommendations on
Public Diplomacy: Defending Ideals and Defining the Message”

August 23, 2004

Good afternoon. Today’s hearing is the third hearing this Subcommittee has held on public diplomacy in the Middle East. We have heard from numerous State Department officials, media experts, academics, and representatives from various advisory commissions. We have heard repeatedly that the hatred of the Muslim world towards the United States is growing.

However, the truth is that no matter how many hearings we hold on this topic, our public diplomacy in the Middle East is a failure, and will continue to fail, without changes in our foreign policy. The problem is not that there are cultural differences or different value systems. It is not a failure of the quantity or quality of our message. Our public diplomacy fails because it is derived

from a failed foreign policy. We must change our foreign policy first if we are to change Arab hearts and minds.

In its final report, the 9/11 Commission made the following recommendation:

“Recommendation: Where Muslim governments, even those who are friends, do not respect these principles, the United States must stand for a better future. One of the lessons of the long Cold War was that short-term gains in cooperating with the most repressive and brutal governments were too often outweighed by long-term setbacks for America’s stature and interests.

The Commission is correct in that our foreign policy strategy continues to reflect Cold War mentalities. During the Cold War, we supported brutal, dictatorial, governments throughout the world because they were strategic allies. Republican and Democratic Administrations both supported, with military aid, the regimes in Iraq and Iran, while they were torturing citizens and suppressing democratic aspirations.

Our policy of arming the Mujahadeen before and during the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan led to the Taliban having the ability to flourish there afterwards.

The people of the Muslim world remember that the U.S. chose to support these brutal regimes against them, and they see it again today. Recent polls, such as those conducted by Zogby International, show that Arab respondents do understand, and do respect American values, but they do not see American policy reflect those values. They saw the horrible pictures of abuses at Abu Ghraib prison. They read about the treatment of detained prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. So why are we so surprised that so many hate us? Perhaps we have lost credibility in the Muslim world because the people there believe that we treat them poorly, and they are right in this belief.

If we say there's a gathering threat of weapons of mass destruction, and we launch an unprovoked attack on another country to capture those weapons, and it turns out that no vast stockpiles are found, then we look like hypocrites and U.S.

credibility is undermined. Who will believe us the next time a U.S. Secretary of State makes a presentation at the United Nations? No amount of American pop music, Fulbright scholars, or athlete exchange programs are going to conceal the false pretenses of the war.

Today, we will hear again how more money and more attention should be spent to influence Arab public opinion and carry our message of hope to Muslims.

Mr. Chairman, let's get serious and hold a real hearing. Let's have the makers of our foreign policy come testify, and be held accountable for their decisions. Let's figure out what the message is before we discuss how best to beam it across satellites to the Middle East. Let's match our words and our deeds together, or pretty soon we will lose all of our credibility – not just in the Middle East, but throughout the entire world.

I would like to welcome our witnesses here today, and in particular, thank Governor Kean and Ms. Gorelick for the honest assessment they have made of our nation's vulnerabilities in the

9/11 Commission report. I hope that their testimony today and continued advocacy will spearhead serious deliberation and reform by this and by future Administrations and Congresses. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman. Governor Kean and Commissioner Gorelick, the subcommittee has less members, so I'm going to have each of them make statements. Then we will get to you real quick. Thank you. At this time, the Chair would recognize the vice chairman, Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your efforts at having what is the first hearing on examining the need for a clear and coordinated public diplomacy strategy. The 9/11 Commission Report contains numerous recommendations to change both within the government structure and government policy, and one key aspect of the report deals with public diplomacy or the ability of the United States to project its public image and accurately portray our Nation to people around the world.

Public diplomacy is a campaign of words and images and it can be easily lost. To portray the United States as the great Nation that it is, we must set the tone and message or more radical groups will define our message. In the 9/11 Commission Report, it States that to Muslim parents, terrorists like bin Laden have nothing to offer their children but visions of violence and death. In this war of diplomacy and public policy, we have to recognize that the Islamic extremists in which we are defending ourselves promote a culture of celebrating and glorifying death both of innocent lives of suicide bombers, and certainly that means our task is just greater than just defining who we are.

I look forward today to hearing from the witnesses and hearing their recommendations on public policy and reform. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. At this time, the Chair would recognize the gentlewoman from New York, Mrs. Maloney.

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you. And welcome to Governor Kean and Ms. Gorelick. I just left another hearing on financial institutions where Vice Chairman Hamilton is testifying. I join my colleagues, and really, the American public, in thanking you for your bipartisan, thoughtful work.

The 9/11 Commission Report is more popular than Harry Potter. So I hope people not only read the Commission report, but will work to implement all of its suggestions, and along with my colleague Chris Shays and others, we have formed a caucus that will be working together to really support the implementation of the recommendations.

I, for one, believe that the Commission should be extended with legislation and it will be the first bill that I introduce when we go back into session in a bipartisan way.

I know that you're fund-raising, but I do not believe that your important work should depend on bake sales. I would prefer Governor Kean and Ms. Gorelick, for you to be spending your time testifying and not having to fundraise with private money. Your work is tremendously important. Nothing is more important than securing America and taking every step to prevent terrorist attacks.

So I hope that this will be as successful as the legislation that Chris Shays and I authored creating the Commission and really supporting the legislation to extend the operation of the Commission until you've got all of your work done.

Again, I thank you for an excellent job and I look forward to your testimony today. Your Commission report really mirrors what the

advisory group on public diplomacy, the General Accounting Office, the Heritage Foundation and the Council on foreign relations, they all issued reports stating that a greater emphasis is needed by our government on public diplomacy, that we cannot allow the terrorists to define who we are and what we stand for.

So I would request permission to place in my long opening statement but I look more forward to hearing your comments today and thank you for your many contributions so far.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney follows:]

Statement of Congresswoman Carolyn B. Maloney (NY-14)
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations
August 23, 2004

I would like to thank
Chairman Shays and Ranking Member Kucinich
for holding this important hearing today,
which gives us an opportunity
to hear from the experts
about the effectiveness
of the United States's public diplomacy
both before and after 9/11.

Since the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001,
we have been examining
our policies for conducting diplomacy abroad
and what we can do to improve relations
with our allies and with nations of concern.

As we all know, the 9/11 Commission
recently completed an exhaustive study
of the events leading up to 9/11

and made its recommendations for what must be done **now** to prevent another attack.

First, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government do a better job of defining the message it is trying to send to the world and to the Middle East.

Second, the United States must stand for principals that contribute to a better way of life . . . tolerance, political participation, and an end to violence.

Finally, the Commission cites a need for more cultural and exchange programs with countries in the Middle East as well as a greater use of media to reach Arab and Muslim audiences.

Since 2002, the Advisory Group

on Public Diplomacy,
the General Accounting Office,
the Heritage Foundation,
and the Council on Foreign Relations
have issued reports stating
that a greater emphasis on public diplomacy
is needed.

We know that more needs to be done,
and it's time we took action.

We need to take an honest look
at our current policies
to determine what we should do
to reach out to nations and populations
around the world
who have animosity toward the United States.

* We cannot allow the terrorists to define
who we are and what we stand for.

I strongly support

the Commission's recommendations and, along with my friend and colleague Mr. Shays, have created the bipartisan 9/11 Commission Caucus which will monitor the commitment of members of Congress to advancing the Commission's recommendations.

We must act now.

By considering cultural differences when conducting public diplomacy, we will make progress in breaking down the barriers that exist between some nations and our own.

I look forward to the testimony and the opportunity to work with my colleagues on this critical issue.

Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentlelady. I need to confess that we don't have four witnesses before us today. Starting out mispronouncing both your names here could set a bad precedent, Governor Kean and Gorelick, so we'll call them that and nothing else.

Mr. LaTourette.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was going to call them that any way.

But I want to first begin by praising you and Ranking Member Kucinich for holding this hearing. One of the most intriguing things about the 9/11 report has been all the different assets and different things that the United States has done and needs to do since September 11, and I, like Mrs. Maloney, Governor Kean, I was just down at the Financial Services Committee with your sidekick, Congressman Hamilton, and I wanted to praise not only the both of you, but all of the Commission members for all of the good work you have done in the last month not only in getting the tough work done and doing your work in a bipartisan way, but also taking all of your valuable time to explain it to us and to the American people, and I really think that you have been on television probably more than the summer Olympics and you've done I think a really good, workman-like job.

Mr. Chairman, I think it's important that we talk about the public policy considerations in the Middle East. I just want to harken back to Congressman Hamilton and what we learned in the Financial Services Committee meeting that you were at, Mr. Chairman, and Mrs. Maloney was at as well.

One of the astounding things as I read the 9/11 report was the fact that this whole enterprise on September 11th cost less than \$500,000; that it took less than \$500,000 for 19 madmen to create such terror and devastation in the United States of America, and what we learned and what you learned and was shared with us today is that even this paltry sum of half a million dollars wasn't financed, as many believe, by Osama bin Laden. It didn't come from his personal wealth or inherited wealth. It came from charities, Islamic charities, both witting and unwitting, I think the report indicates.

As we look at the ramifications of particularly Title III of the Patriot Act, as we try to ramp down and get handle on some of the finance that goes into terrorism, we now have partnership agreements with 94 countries in an attempt to control the flow of money to terrorists, and I think your report gives us further evidence and ammunition as we pursue that.

But its relevance to this hearing is that when you're dealing with 94 other separate and sovereign States, a number of them have Islamic majorities, and if we are going to be successful, we can go about it the old way and just go out and catch the bad guys and follow the paper trail and find their money, or we can attempt to do it a different way, and that's where public diplomacy comes in, and I'm very hopeful and I'm looking forward to your testimony today, again, all of the outstanding work you've done already.

But our challenge needs to be not only to deal with this generation of terrorists in an effective way, but to make sure that the next generation of terrorists at least as a competing message that

is believed by the United States of America, and I thank you very much for being here today and I yield back.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman. At this time, the Chair would recognize Mr. Platts before going on to our witnesses.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to add my words of thanks for your very important and very substantive work. We're a grateful Nation because of your efforts, and hopefully we'll be successful in moving forward and embracing your ideas.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman. Before swearing the witnesses in, I ask unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in the record and that the record remain open 3 days for that purpose. Without objection, so ordered.

I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted to include their written statement in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

As is the practice of this committee, the full committee and subcommittee, we swear in all our witnesses. I only chickened out once in umpteen number of years with, Senator Byrd, but if you all would stand, raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Note for the record our witnesses have responded in the affirmative. One of the nice things about our subcommittee work is we can give the Members 10 minutes to question. We can get into an issue a little more in-depth, and we will do that, and Governor Kean, thank you and we would love to hear your statement.

STATEMENTS OF THOMAS H. KEAN, CHAIR, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (THE 9/11 COMMISSION); AND JAMIE S. GORELICK, COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (THE 9/11 COMMISSION)

Mr. KEAN. Chairman Shays and Ranking Member Kucinich, and distinguished Members, I want to thank, by the way, the chairman and the ranking member and the other committee members for their very thoughtful statements. I might say that the chairman and other members of this committee were some of the first to spot the seriousness of the problem that finally resulted in September 11, and I thank them for their foresight on this matter. There weren't many people out there with you at the time. Thank you.

We are honored to appear before you today. We want to thank you and the leadership of the House of Representatives for the prompt consideration you are giving to our recommendations. We're grateful to you and the leadership of the entire House. The findings of this Commission were endorsed by all members, five Republicans and five Democrats.

You see we share a unity of purpose on the Commission, and we'd like to call upon Congress and the administration, even in this very difficult season, to display the same spirit of bipartisanship as we collectively seek to make all our country and our people safer and more secure.

Terrorism is the No. 1 threat to the national security of the United States. Counterterrorism policy must be the No. 1 priority for the President, and as any President and that's any President and this Congress, or perhaps any Congress and that's going to go for the foreseeable future.

We cannot succeed against terrorism by Islamic extremist groups unless we use all elements of national power: That means military power, it means diplomacy, it means intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, homeland defense, and yes, of course the subject of today, public diplomacy. If we favor any of those tools while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort and by the way that's just not our view. That is the view of every single policymaker we interviewed. You cannot then succeed against terrorism with one tool alone.

I give you an example. When Secretary Rumsfeld testified before us he said he can't get the job done with the military alone. For every terrorist we kill or capture, he said, more can rise up to take their place. He told us the cost benefit ratio is simply against us.

Cofer Black told us: You can't get the job done with the CIA alone.

What became clear to us as we heard these leaders answered so many other is that the U.S. Government remains geared to cold war threats who are—we're still, in many cases, talking about great power threats. Our government still today is not geared to deal with the threat from transnational Islamic terrorism. The threat to us today is not from great armies anymore. The threat to us comes from the beliefs, those beliefs that propelled the 19 young men to take their lives simply to do the greatest possible harm to us.

The military struggle is part of that struggle we face, but if you think about it, far more important is the struggle for the war of ideas. As much as we worried about bin Laden and al Qaeda, and we do worry about that, we should worry far more about the attitudes of tens of millions of young Arabs and hundreds of millions of young Muslims.

Those who sympathize with bin Laden represent, in the long term, a far greater threat to us. They represent the well spring to refresh the doctrine of hate and destruction, no matter how many al Qaeda members we capture or kill. For those reasons, Mr. Chairman, we welcome the opportunity to this afternoon to address this question of public diplomacy.

The United States is heavily engaged in the Muslim world and will be for many, many years to come. The American engagement is resented. Polls in 2002 found that among America's friends, I'll take Egypt for example, Egypt is the recipient of more USAID for the past 20 years than any Muslim country by far. Only 15 percent of the people in Egypt have a favorable opinion of the United States of America. In Saudi Arabia, another friend, that number goes down to 12 percent and two-thirds of those surveyed in 2003 in countries from Indonesia to Turkey were very or somewhat fearful and they were fearful that they feared the United States might attack them, they really believe this.

At this time, the support for the United States has plummeted. Polls taken in Islamic countries just after September 11 suggested something quite different. At that point, people felt we were doing something right and there was a lot of support for us at that point, even in the Arab world, for our fight against terrorism. But by 2003, the bottom had fallen out of that support in most of the Muslim world. Negative views of the United States among Muslims which had been largely limited to the countries in the Middle East have spread. Since last summer, favorable ratings for the United States have fallen from 61 percent to 15 percent in Indonesia and from 71 percent to 38 percent among Muslims in Nigeria.

Now, what we know is that many of these views are uninformed. At worst, some of these views of course are informed by cartoonish stereotypes, the coarse expression of fashionable Occidentalism among intellectuals who caricature U.S. values and policies. Local newspapers and a few influential satellite broadcasters like al Jazeera often reinforce such Jihadist theme that portrays the United States again and again as simply anti-Muslim.

The small number of Muslims who are committed to Osama bin Laden's version of Islam, we can't dissuade them. We've got to jail them or we've got to kill them. That's the bottom line. But, the large majority of Arabs and Muslims are opposed to violence, and with those people, we must encourage reform, freedom, democracy and perhaps, above everything else, opportunity, even though our own promotion of these messages will, for a while, be limited in its effectiveness simply, because we are the one carrying the message.

Muslims themselves often reflect on such basic issues as the concept of Jihad, the position of women in their societies, the place of non-Muslim minorities. We can promote moderation. We can ensure its ascendancy. Only Muslims themselves in their own countries can do that.

So the setting is difficult. Forty percent of adult Arabs are illiterate. Two-thirds of them are women. One third of the broader Middle East lives on less than \$2 a day. Less than 2 percent of the population has access to the Internet. The majority of older Arab youths who express the desire to emigrate, particularly to Europe.

So this is fertile ground. This is fertile ground for any ideology which is dedicated to hate. This is the kind of soil in which it can grow best.

So in short, the United States has to defeat an ideology, not just a group of people, and we must do so under very difficult circumstances. How can the United States and its friends help moderate Muslims combat these extremist ideas?

As a Commission, we believe the United States must define its message. We believe that we have to define what we stand for and we believe that simply have to offer an example of moral leadership. We've got to be committed and show we're committed to treating people humanely to abiding by the rule of law and being generous and caring about our neighbors. You see, America and its Muslim friends can agree on respect for human dignity and the belief in opportunity.

To Muslim parents, terrorists like bin Laden have nothing to offer their children, as I've said, except violence and death. America and its friends have a crucial advantage. As we can offer if you're

a parent in the Muslim world, we can offer you a vision, and that vision can give their children a better future. If we heed the views of thoughtful leaders in the Arab and Muslim world, we believe we can seek a moderate consensus.

Our vision of the future should stress individual educational and economic opportunity. Our vision includes widespread political participation and contempt for indiscriminate violence. It includes respect for the rule of law, openness in discussing differences, and tolerance for opposing points of view.

Where Muslim governments, and this even those goes for Muslim governments that happen to be friends, when they do not respect these principles, the United States must stand for a better future. One of the lessons of the cold war was that the short term gains in cooperating with the most repressive and brutal governments was sooner-or-later outweighed by long-term setbacks for America's stature and interests.

Above all, we as Americans must not be hypocrites about our own values. American foreign policy is part of this message. America's policy choices have consequences. Right or wrong, it is simply a fact that American policy regarding the Israeli Palestinian conflict and American actions in Iraq are dominant staples of popular commentary across the Arab and Muslim world.

Now it doesn't mean that the United States choices have been wrong. It means those choices must be integrated with America's message of opportunity to the Arab and Muslim world. Neither Israel, or hopefully a new Iraq, will be safer if worldwide Islamic terrorism grows any stronger.

So the United States has to do a lot more to communicate its message. Reflecting on bin Laden's success in reaching Muslim audiences, as the chairman mentioned this, Richard Holbrooke wondered how can a man in a cave out-communicate the world's leading communications society? Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage worried to us that Americans have been exporting our fears and our anger, not our vision of opportunity and hope.

Just as we did in the cold war, we need to defend our ideals abroad and we need to defend them vigorously. America does stand for values. And at our best, we always have stood up for those values. If the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists are going to define us instead.

Recognizing that Arab and Muslim audiences rely on satellite television and radio, the government has begun some promising initiatives in television and radio broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran and Afghanistan. These efforts are just now beginning to reach some large audiences. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has asked for larger resources. They ought to get them.

The United States should rebuild the scholarship, exchange and library programs that reach out to young people and offers them knowledge and hope and where such assistance, by the way, is provided, it should be identified as coming from the citizens of this United States.

At this point, I'll turn to my colleague and one of the most productive and intelligent and hardworking members of the Commission, Jamie Gorelick.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Ms. Gorelick, you have the floor.

Ms. GORELICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. I think that your mic may not be on.

Ms. GORELICK. There we go. As I said, thank you to both chairmen. Let me reiterate just a few points and then address the rest of our agenda. As Chairman Kean said, we are losing the war of ideas. We clearly need to kill or capture those who are most hardened against us, but the challenge for us here and the subject that we are addressing today is how to separate out the vast majority of Muslims who are currently providing support and affirmation to those who are the hardened extremists. That is the challenge and we have concentrated on the first category at the expense of the second.

The message I hope you take away and that we hope you take away from our report is that if we do not address the second challenge, the threat that we face, will pale in comparison to the one that we face today because we will have created and sustained tremendous hostility against us across the Muslim world.

We have lost the high regard of most of the world, and that is a stunning conclusion of our report and we have to regain it.

Our national security depends on this as much as it does on the might of our military and on the capability of our intelligence community. The problem is that we, as Secretary Armitage said, we are exporting our fears and our anger. We are not seen through any lens but the lens of our military and the lens of corporate America—we are more multifaceted than that. We have fought to protect the lives of Muslims. We have helped in innumerable ways in the Muslim world and that message has not gotten through.

We have receded in so many ways from the work that we did in the 1990's and before.

So what can we do? First of all, to Congressman Kucinich's point, we have to do the right thing. We have to be moral. We have to be generous. We have to be right-thinking. We have to abide by the rule of law. We have to communicate the very best values of our country that have been such a source of strength for us in our foreign policy before this. It is astounding and striking how the support for us has hemorrhaged in the last few years. The world was behind us after September 11. Even the Muslim world sustained support for us invading Afghanistan, and that support has hemorrhaged. This has real consequences for our national security.

We need to do the right thing.

Second, as Chairman Kean said, we have to offer an alternative vision of hope and opportunity. I'm going to address the specifics of that in a moment. Third, we have to communicate or we will be defined by others and we have unilaterally disarmed in our communication. We have receded from the world. We have slashed the budgets of libraries. We have cut our speaker's bureaus. We have canceled book subscriptions. We have cut our staff at the very time when we need to be building up our presence and our outreach to the Muslim world.

The United States and its friends have to stress educational and economic opportunity. The United Nations, we say, has rightly equated literacy as freedom. The international community is mov-

ing toward a concrete goal to cut the Middle East region's illiteracy rate in half by 2010 and it targeting particularly women and girls, and it is supporting programs in adult literacy. Help is needed to support even the basics like textbooks to translate more of the world's knowledge into local languages and libraries to house such materials.

Education about the outside world and other culture is extremely weak. For example, there is very little emphasis in Arab education systems about American history, European history or Chinese history. There needs to be a broader understanding of cultures outside the world of Islam. We should add, of course, that Americans too need to better understand the world of Islam. Our own education system in this respect will need improvement.

More vocational education is needed in trades and business skills. The young people of the Muslim world need to have a vision of opportunity. Right now, most young Muslims are in the hands of madrassas, many of which teach hate and don't communicate or teach usable skills. You can hardly fault a parent for sending a child to one of those schools when there is absolutely no alternative and we have not helped to create those alternatives.

We need education that teaches tolerance, the dignity and value of individuals, respect for different beliefs across the board.

We recommend specifically that the U.S. Government offer to join with other Nations in funding what we call an International Youth Opportunity Fund, where funds would be spent directly for building and operating primary and secondary schools in those Muslim States that show their own commitment to be sensibly investing in public education.

A second agenda is opportunity and jobs. Economic openness is essential. Terrorism is not caused by poverty. Indeed, many terrorists come from fairly well-to-do families. Yet, when people lose hope, when societies break down, when communities fragment, those are the breeding grounds for terrorism. Backward economic policies and repressive political regimes slip into societies that are without hope where ambition and passions have no constructive outlet.

The policies that support economic development and reform have political implications. Economic and political liberties, after all, tend to be linked. Commerce, especially international commerce, requires ongoing cooperation and compromise, the exchange of ideas across cultures and peaceful resolution of differences through negotiation and the rule of law.

Economic growth expands the middle class which can be a constituency for further reform. Successful economies rely on vibrant private sectors, which have an interest in curbing indiscriminate government power. The bottom line is those who control their own economic destiny soon desire a voice in their communities and in their political societies.

We have very specific recommendations about free trade, which you will see reflected in our written statement, but we believe that a comprehensive U.S. strategy to counter-terrorism has to include economic policies that encourage development, more open societies and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their families and enhance prospects for their children's future.

Mr. Chairman, let me sum up for both of us and for the 10 members of our Commission by coming back to the question that you put to us about the successes achieved by and the challenges facing U.S. public diplomacy efforts.

The issues surrounding public diplomacy have been with us since September 12, 2001. It has not gone without notice in the policy community, among commentators, among pollsters, among individuals familiar with the Muslim world itself that public diplomacy is critical, and yet our assessment of where we are in this regard is not a good one.

Public diplomacy is hard. It faces enormous challenges and has had few successes in recent years, but we are convinced that we cannot win this war on Islamist terrorism unless we win the war of ideas. We need to win the hearts and minds of a great swath of the globe, from Morocco to Malaysia. We need to understand public diplomacy in the proper sense of the word. It's not just how you deliver the message. It is the message itself. It is the message of our values which have been such a strength for this country over centuries.

We have to communicate that America is on the side of the Muslim world, that we stand for political participation, personal freedom, the rule of law, and that we stand for education and economic opportunity.

Of course, we cannot take on the responsibility for transforming the Arab and Muslim world. It's up to courageous Muslims to change their own societies, but they need to know that we are on their side. They need to know that we are there to help. They need to know that we offer a competing vision. They need to know about us and what we have in common with them.

And with that we would be pleased to respond to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kean and Ms. Gorelick follows:]

**Prepared Statement of
Chairman Thomas Kean and Commissioner Jamie Gorelick
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
before the Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats and International Relations
Committee on Government Reform
U.S. House of Representatives
August 23, 2004**

Chairman Shays, Ranking Member Kucinich, distinguished members of the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations: We are honored to appear before you today. We want to thank you and the leadership of the House of Representatives for the prompt consideration you are giving to the recommendations of the Commission. We are grateful to you, and to the leadership of the House.

The Commission's findings and recommendations were strongly endorsed by all Commissioners—five Democrats and five Republicans. We share a unity of purpose. We call upon Congress and the Administration to display the same spirit of bipartisanship as we collectively seek to make our country and all Americans safer and more secure.

We cannot succeed with one tool alone

Terrorism is the number one threat today to the national security of the United States. Counterterrorism policy must be the number one priority for this President, and for any President, for the foreseeable future.

We cannot succeed against terrorism by Islamist extremist groups unless we use all the elements of national power: military power, diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, homeland defense, and —yes—public diplomacy. If we favor one tool while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort. This is not just our view: it is the view of all policymakers. We cannot succeed against terrorism with one tool alone.

- Secretary Rumsfeld testified and told us: He can't get the job done with the military alone. For every terrorist we kill or capture, more rise up to take their place. He told us the cost-benefit ratio is against us.
- Cofer Black told us: You can't get the job done with the CIA alone.

What became clear to us is that the U.S. government remains geared to cold-war threats, great power threats. Our government – still today – is not geared to deal with the threat from transnational Islamist terrorism. The threat to us today is not from great armies. The threat to us comes from the beliefs that propel 19 young men to take their own lives in a desire to inflict grave harm upon us.

The military struggle is part of the struggle we face, but the far greater struggle we face is the war of ideas. As much as we worry about Bin Ladin and al Qaeda – and we do – we worry far more about the attitudes of tens of millions of young Arabs and hundreds of millions of young Muslims.

Those who sympathize with Bin Ladin represent, in the long-term, a far greater threat to us. They represent the well-spring to refresh the doctrine of hate and destruction, no matter how many al-Qaeda members we capture or kill. For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, we welcome the opportunity this afternoon to address the question of public diplomacy.

Engage the Struggle of Ideas

The United States is heavily engaged in the Muslim world and will be for many years to come. This American engagement is resented. Polls in 2002 found that among America's friends, like Egypt—the recipient of more U.S. aid for the past 20 years than any other Muslim country—only 15 percent of the population had a favorable opinion of the United States. In Saudi Arabia the number was 12 percent. And two-thirds of those surveyed in 2003 in countries from Indonesia to Turkey (a NATO ally) were very or somewhat fearful that the United States may attack them.

Support for the United States has plummeted. Polls taken in Islamic countries after 9/11 suggested that many or most people thought the United States was doing the right thing in its fight against terrorism. By 2003, polls showed that “the bottom has fallen out of support for America in most of the

Muslim world. Negative views of the U.S. among Muslims, which had been largely limited to countries in the Middle East, have spread. . . . Since last summer, favorable ratings for the U.S. have fallen from 61% to 15% in Indonesia and from 71% to 38% among Muslims in Nigeria.”

Many of these views are at best uninformed about the United States. At worst, they were informed by cartoonish stereotypes, the coarse expression of a fashionable “Occidentalism” among intellectuals who caricature U.S. values and policies. Local newspapers and the few influential satellite broadcasters—like al Jazeera—often reinforce the jihadist theme that portrays the United States as anti-Muslim.

The small numbers of Muslims who are fully committed to Usama Bin Ladin’s version of Islam are impervious to persuasion. It is among the large majority of Arabs and Muslims that we must encourage reform, freedom, democracy, and opportunity—even though our own promotion of these messages is limited in its effectiveness simply because we are its carriers. Muslims themselves will have to reflect upon such basic issues as the concept of jihad, the position of women, and the place of non-Muslim minorities. We can promote moderation, but cannot ensure its ascendancy. Only Muslims can do this.

The setting is difficult. Forty percent of adult Arabs are illiterate, two-thirds of them women. One-third of the broader Middle East lives on less than two dollars a day. Less than 2 percent of the population has access to the Internet. The majority of older Arab youths have expressed a desire to emigrate, particularly to Europe.

In short, the United States has to help defeat an ideology, not just a group of people, and we must do so under difficult circumstances. How can the United States and its friends help moderate Muslims combat the extremist ideas?

Defining our message

As a Commission, we believe the United States must define its message. We believe we must define what we stand for. We should offer an example of moral leadership

in the world, committed to treat people humanely, abide by the rule of law, and be generous and caring to our neighbors. America and Muslim friends can agree on respect for human dignity and opportunity.

To Muslim parents, terrorists like Bin Ladin have nothing to offer their children but visions of violence and death. America and its friends have a crucial advantage—we can offer these parents a vision that might give their children a better future. If we heed the views of thoughtful leaders in the Arab and Muslim world, a moderate consensus can be found.

Our vision of the future should stress individual educational and economic opportunity. Our vision includes widespread political participation and contempt for indiscriminate violence. It includes respect for the rule of law, openness in discussing differences, and tolerance for opposing points of view.

Where Muslim governments, even those who are friends, do not respect these principles, the United States must stand for a better future. One of the lessons of the long Cold War was that short-term gains in cooperating with the most repressive and brutal governments were too often outweighed by long-term setbacks for America's stature and interests.

American foreign policy is part of the message. America's policy choices have consequences. Right or wrong, it is simply a fact that American policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and American actions in Iraq are dominant staples of popular commentary across the Arab and Muslim world. That does not mean U.S. choices have been wrong. It means those choices must be integrated with America's message of opportunity to the Arab and Muslim world. Neither Israel nor the new Iraq will be safer if worldwide Islamist terrorism grows stronger.

The United States must do more to communicate its message. Reflecting on Bin Ladin's success in reaching Muslim audiences, Richard Holbrooke wondered, "How can a man in a cave out-communicate the world's leading communications society?" Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage worried to us that Americans have been "exporting our fears and our anger," not our vision of opportunity and hope.

Just as we did in the Cold War, we need to defend our ideals abroad vigorously. America does stand up for its values. If the United States does

not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us.

Recognizing that Arab and Muslim audiences rely on satellite television and radio, the government has begun some promising initiatives in television and radio broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran, and Afghanistan. These efforts are beginning to reach large audiences. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has asked for much larger resources. It should get them.

The United States should rebuild the scholarship, exchange, and library programs that reach out to young people and offer them knowledge and hope. Where such assistance is provided, it should be identified as coming from the citizens of the United States.

An Agenda of Opportunity – Education

The United States and its friends must stress educational and economic opportunity.

The United Nations has rightly equated “literacy as freedom.” The international community is moving toward setting a concrete goal—to cut the Middle East region’s illiteracy rate in half by 2010, targeting women and girls and supporting programs for adult literacy.

Help is needed to support the basics, such as textbooks that translate more of the world’s knowledge into local languages and libraries to house such materials. Education about the outside world, or other cultures, is weak.

For example, there is very little emphasis in Arab education systems on American history, European history, or Chinese history. There needs to be a broader understanding of cultures outside the world of Islam. (We should add that Americans, too, need to understand better the world of Islam. Our own education system in this respect also needs improvement.)

More vocational education is needed, too, in trades and business skills. The Middle East can also benefit from some of the programs to bridge the digital divide and increase Internet access that have already been developed for other regions of the world.

Education that teaches tolerance, the dignity and value of each individual, and respect for different beliefs is a key element in any global strategy to eliminate Islamist terrorism.

We recommend that the U.S. government should offer to join with other nations in generously supporting a new International Youth Opportunity Fund. Funds should be spent directly for building and operating primary and secondary schools in those Muslim states that commit to sensibly investing their own money in public education.

An Agenda for Opportunity – Economics

Economic openness is essential. Terrorism is not caused by poverty. Indeed, many terrorists come from relatively well-off families. Yet when people lose hope, when societies break down, when countries fragment, the breeding grounds for terrorism are created. Backward economic policies and repressive political regimes slip into societies that are without hope, where ambition and passions have no constructive outlet.

The policies that support economic development and reform also have political implications. Economic and political liberties tend to be linked. Commerce, especially international commerce, requires ongoing cooperation and compromise, the exchange of ideas across cultures, and the peaceful resolution of differences through negotiation or the rule of law.

Economic growth expands the middle class, a constituency for further reform. Successful economies rely on vibrant private sectors, which have an interest in curbing indiscriminate government power. Those who control their own economic destiny soon desire a voice in their communities and political societies.

The U.S. government has announced the goal of working toward a Middle East Free Trade Area by 2013. The United States has been seeking comprehensive free trade agreements (FTAs) with the Middle Eastern nations most firmly on the path to reform. The U.S.-Israeli FTA was enacted in 1985, and Congress implemented an FTA with Jordan in 2001. Both agreements have expanded trade and investment, thereby supporting domestic economic reform. In 2004, new FTAs were signed with Morocco and Bahrain, and are awaiting congressional approval. These models are drawing the interest of their neighbors. Muslim countries can become full

participants in the rules-based global trading system, as the United States considers lowering its trade barriers with the poorest Arab nations.

A comprehensive U.S. strategy to counter terrorism should include economic policies that encourage development, more open societies, and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their families and to enhance prospects for their children's future.

Conclusions

Mr. Chairman, we want to sum up by coming back the question you put to us, about the successes achieved by, and the challenges facing, U.S. public diplomacy efforts.

In short, public diplomacy faces enormous challenges and, frankly, has had few successes in recent years.

We are convinced that we cannot win the war on terrorism unless we also win the war of ideas. We need to win hearts and minds across the great swath of the globe, from Morocco to Malaysia.

We need to understand public diplomacy in the proper sense of the word. Public diplomacy is not just the mechanics of how we deliver the message. What matters most, by far, is the message itself. People in the Arab and Muslim world need to know that America is on their side – that America stands for political participation, personal freedom, and the rule of law; that America stands for educational and economic opportunity.

We cannot take on the responsibility for transforming the Arab and Muslim world. It is up to courageous Muslims to change their own societies. But the people of the Arab and Muslim world need to know that we are on their side, that we want better lives for them and their children and grandchildren. America's message to the Arab and Muslim world must be a message of hope.

We would be pleased to respond to your questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. Before turning it over to Mr. Turner to ask the first set of questions, I thought I would basically see your three points in a statement, so I got a little lazy and didn't write down the specifics. The last one was communication. The first two?

Ms. GORELICK. The first two were "do the right thing," that is, be what we know we can be.

Mr. SHAYS. And the second was?

Ms. GORELICK. The second was "offer an alternative vision, and that is about education and hope."

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. The vice chairman has 10 minutes, Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. I want to thank both the Commissioners for all of our work and delivering a wonderful bipartisan report that gives us a road map of some great recommendations and raises some very important issues that we have to address as a country, and I appreciated the Commission's availability as the Congress has sought to have hearings throughout August to be able to learn more about the recommendations so that action can be taken.

Many times, when people talk about the war on terrorism they talk about the cold war, and one benefit that we had in the cold war is that communism never declared itself a religion. Communism claimed to be for the same things we were for.

In the war of ideas they claimed that their people had freedom, that they were leading them to prosperity, that they were, in fact, enjoying equality, and the failure of communism was in the reality that they were not delivering as an ideology those things they were claiming they were providing their people. Our system, though, surpassed it.

In this instance, we have a much difference situation in that we must not have battles of ideology and ideas. We have a group that has taken a religion and a religious aspect in its promotion of its ideas.

I'm very leery of the discussions of polls of the United States—of how the United States is perceived because I would venture in my understanding is if you looked at the polls of not just September 12th, but September 11th that the United States would have had a great deal of more support in the Middle East and among Muslims be viewed more favorably on September 11th than we are now, and yet September 11th on the day that it occurred, our positive perception was probably better than it is now and yet it occurred. We were attacked by 19 young men who killed 3,000 Americans. So the goal has to go beyond just the issue of polls and how we're perceived because when we're perceived positively, we can still be subject to attack.

Governor Kean, you said how can a man in a cave outcommunicate us, and that was a great quote that you repeated, and our task though is difficult in that we're trying to change ideas instead of just trying to communicate ideas that are in line with beliefs that may be held.

In my opening statement I referenced that in the 9/11 Commission Report, you identify the culture of celebrating death of innocents and of suicide bombers, the emergence of global terrorism and how that feeds together.

Our task is much greater than just defining who we are in doing the right thing and declaring that we do the right thing. You note in your report that the United States has liberated Kuwait, fed Somalies, protected Kosovo, Muslims in Bosnia, and yet we are perceived as being anti-Muslim, but at the same time, even if it's not an issue of hate, we have this issue in the Middle East that we're up against of the glorification and celebration of death.

And Ms. Gorelick, you talked about the issue of and we can't do this alone.

So my question goes to who are going to be our partners, even if we're communicating who we are and we're actively using diplomacy so that the opinion polls show us more positively. The support for the emergence of global terrorism and Islamic extremism comes from the cultural issue of this glorification of death of killing of innocents and killing through suicides which, in our culture, is outrageous, considered unthinkable. Where do you see that we can get our help?

Mr. KEAN. Well, the first place, you know, it's such a perversion of the Muslim religion. To hurt innocents in Muslim, in the Koran is a great sin. These are people who have taken part of a great religion, perverted it to their own purposes and are trying to use it in that way, and it only finds fertile ground where there are areas of total despair and hate and all of that. It's a very small group of people.

I guess what we're saying today is that as long as, one, we don't want it to get any longer, and two, we don't want these people who currently sympathize with them to go any further. In fact, we'd like them to understand what a perversion this is.

People don't know that we've helped Muslims around the world in that part of the world. We haven't told them and nobody else is going to tell them. We haven't told our story.

You reference quite correctly the cold war. Well, in the cold war you know how much this country spent on information agencies and cultural exchanges and education opportunities and? I mean we were very, very concerned how people thought of us because we recognized in that battle it was a battle for ideas and so when Communism got ready to fall, the people in Eastern Europe wanted to emulate the United States because they thought so much more of our values and ideals which we had communicated to them this one way or another than they did of the ideals of the former Soviet Union.

I think we have to go back to some of those communication techniques, recognizing the fact that libraries are important, that schools are important, that cultural exchanges are important, that we have to have one consistent message of who we are. Spending money in communications doesn't do much good unless you have a consistent message. I don't think we've developed that yet of who we are. But I think your point is well taken and I think we can, but we can move ahead and I think we can communicate. We've done that in the past. We have.

If there's any revolutionary force in this world, it is and always has been democracy. If we communicate that and show these people that democracy can give their children the kind of lives that

they can't even dream about now in the society they live in, I think that's what we're about.

Ms. GORELICK. Concretely, I would answer your question this way. You might think about reversing some of the changes we made in the 1990's where we literally shut down our support for libraries. We actually threw people out of very, very popular outlets that reflected on Western society. We cut back exchange programs. We cut back scholarship programs. We had a very substantial cadre of public information officers that we cut back.

We shut down the U.S. Information Agency. My suggestion to you would be to look at the tools that we used so successfully in the cold war to communicate albeit a different message, to see how we might use those tools in this context.

Second would be education. We have ceded the one vehicle that can affect the hearts and minds of young people to those who are filled with hate. The school systems are spewing out hate and hate-filled information so that by the time a young person graduates from these schools, he has no skills, no hope and believes that everyone who is defined as the enemy by someone else—and that would include everyone in this room and everyone in this country just about—has no right to live.

We recognize that this is a daunting task and the fact that it is mixed up in religion does not make it different or easier.

On the other hand, we aren't doing the most fundamental things to address the problem. This is why we recommend challenging Muslim countries to invest in public education and helping them.

You ask who our partners would be in this. If we create essentially a challenge fund for education, that could be an enormous help in showing a vision of hope and opportunity.

Mr. SHAYS. At this time, the Chair would recognize Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Governor Kean and Ms. Gorelick, thank you for your testimony. I found your statement, your written statement, very compelling and, there's a lot of questions that I have as a result of reading it and so I'll begin.

The 9/11 Commission Report states that, "one of the lessons of the cold war was that the short term gains in cooperating with the most repressive and brutal governments were too often outweighed by long-term setbacks for America's stature and interests, on page 376. The report will note on page 376, American foreign policy was part of the message. America's policy choices have consequences."

In light of that, to the Governor and to Ms. Gorelick, it doesn't make sense to focus on public diplomacy before reevaluating American foreign policy.

Mr. KEAN. Well, I think what we've suggested is we have to start elevating American foreign policy in these areas and promoting things we all believe in as a country. I honestly believe that democracy is the most revolutionary concept. As long as we promote it, as we understand it, and have always practiced it in this country, and when we don't try to moderate governments that are seen by their own people as antidemocratic and oppressive, it doesn't mean we're going to go attack somebody as a friend of ours in a number of days who is helping us militarily or whatever, but we can use our influence in those governments quite openly to try and moderate them.

We've got to do that, for instance, in Saudi Arabia. It just can't be about oil anymore. It's got to be about something very different. It's got to be about how to change that society and bring a lot of the people in, all those thousands and hundreds of thousands of young people who are under 18 and are roaming the streets without an education. We've got to do something about that, and we've got to encourage the government of Saudi Arabia to do something about that. I think we can as a government—not do it overnight, but start moving people in hopefully the right direction. Some of these leaders I hope will see that it's not only in our State's interest, but very much in their interest if they're going to eventually survive as a family or as a government.

Mr. KUCINICH. So there is, of course, different ways to communicate that message. One is force. Another one is diplomacy. Some people mistake force for diplomacy. Do you have anything to say about that?

Mr. KEAN. Well, my own view is force is not diplomacy, and we are seen now as—when we gave the statistics and said that people in other countries, namely countries dominated by Muslim populations, a large percentage of the population feels the United States is going to attack their country.

Mr. KUCINICH. I thought that was a telling part of your testimony. As a matter of fact, I underlined it. Why do you suppose there are so many nations around the world where people are fearful the United States is going to attack them? What's that about?

Mr. KEAN. Well, it strikes me that we have not communicated our values or our message or our purposes very clearly to those people, and that's what I hope one of the things we're talking about today.

Ms. GORELICK. We begin our recommendations, as you know, with a chapter called "What To Do: A Global Strategy," and, while much of the focus of public reaction has been on how to do it, which is the next chapter—and that has to do with how we organize ourselves in the United States—we thought it was very important to begin with a look at our foreign policy in key countries around the world, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, for an example.

We also note that the places where terrorism will flourish are the failed states of the world. And, therefore, a major emphasis of our foreign policy has to be the prevention of failed states.

Mr. KUCINICH. Back to Governor Kean, one of the things that I've been concerned about is that the reason why we may now have so many countries that fear us is because the message that was received in many of those countries is that the United States did not have a proper justification for attacking Iraq. I'm not asking you to make an evaluation of that, but I know that's, you know, beyond the scope of the committee's work, but I just wanted to share with you that one of the difficulties that this country will have is that if you go back to September 11 with so many people in America believing then and believing now that Iraq had something to do with September 11, that perception then fed into support for military action against Iraq. Those perceptions remain today and also in other countries, they perceive it differently.

It's my thinking that if we do not really have a kind of a clear understanding in this country of what the very basis of our policy

is, how in the world are we going to be able to construct a foreign policy which has some kind of symmetry? It's actually called coherence.

So I just offer that for your consideration. I mean, I think that what the Commission has done is to lay out some of the challenges which this country faces, but all too often in our national experience we look at image problems as being public relations problems and not having deeper-rooted policy derivatives. And so a book by Boorstin called "The Image" speaks directly to that. We think that somehow if we can change the way things appear, that we have addressed the underlying realities, and I think that we're still in that, in terms of our national experience with respect to how September 11 is interpreted by a large segment of the American public.

And it's very difficult, Mr. Chairman, to do what the members of this Commission have done, because what you've done is to bring together people who have differences of opinion, different partisan backgrounds. You've been able to meld kind of a statement of where we need to go, and I think that you're addressing the issue of public diplomacy and calling for an inspection of it, of essentially the historical roots of what we're talking about. It sets us on the path toward resolution, and it's really terrific that you've been able to do what.

Now, I'll just try to ask one more question, if I have a moment here, and that is that U.S. Muslim groups have argued they should have had more input into the Commission's final report. Were Arab American groups consulted during the Commission's investigation? And do you think that U.S. Muslim organizations should be involved in U.S. public diplomacy in the Middle East?

Mr. KEAN. I think unless we make use of the diversity of this country, we lose one of our greatest weapons, and Arab Americans obviously, as Muslim Americans even more, are now very, very important part of the fabric of this country. We should use them in every way possible.

Ms. GORELICK. I would second that and just say for the record that we consulted very widely. I'm sure that time constraints did not permit us to consult with every possible group, but many Muslim American groups were on our list of consultants. I would second what Tom Kean has said, which is one of our great strengths is our diversity. That is, we are uniquely—among all the countries in the world—because of our immigrant background, able to reach out people of different types, ethnicities, races, much more effectively, or we should be. We need to counsel with those who can help us in framing our message, because the substance of our message should be a good one. Yet, we have failed to communicate to the rest of the world our highest values.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

At this time the Chair would recognize Mr. Platts.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, my appreciation for your work and your participation here today with our Commission members.

We certainly have a lot of work to do, and as you reflect the good work of our Nation over many years, not just in liberating 50 million Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan but Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia,

that message isn't being understood or fully appreciated in the Muslim community, and somehow to get the message that I personally receive when I visit Iraq, with about seven other members, we were up in Kirkuk and meeting with the city mayor and counsel, and in the opening statement, the mayor of Kirkuk, his opening statement to us to bring back to our constituents was please go home and thank the mothers and fathers of America who are willing to send their children, our soldiers, to Iraq to liberate his people.

Mayor Mustafu understood that we were willing to put the lives of our courageous men and women on the line to protect ourselves and to liberate him and his people. Clearly, that's not a message, though, that's understood and appreciated.

One of your recommendations is about us doing good work, like the library and scholarship programs, exchanges. We continue to fund, maybe not in those direct programs, the level—we fund a lot of money through the United Nations, and do you think it's something we need to evaluate, because in making your recommendation that we should do these things and then say where such assistance is provided, it should be identified as coming from the citizens of the United States, that we give a lot of money for school books for Palestinians, but it's not necessarily seen as from America.

Maybe it's through, you know, the U.N. and UNESCO, whether it be education, health care, food. Do you think we need to reevaluate how we fund programs through the United Nations, which then is seen as the help versus directly, you know, engaging in these nations so it's clearly an American initiative and not a U.N. initiative?

Mr. KEAN. Well, as we have seen among our enemies, the U.N. is viewed almost as badly as we are, and they blow up the headquarters and they would like to destroy the U.N. and the community of nations as well. I'm sure it's important we keep on working through the United Nations, but we also have a number of programs in our government that don't have anything to do with the United Nations, and very often, whether it's charities or whatever, we give a lot of aid, and American people are extraordinarily generous, and we don't identify as such. People don't know that's where the aid came from. We find that out. I mean, people don't know that the food they got and the emergency and the help or the medical care, whatever, comes from the United States of America, and we're saying, you know, fine, we'd like to expand that kind of help, but people ought to know where it comes from. People ought to know this is because of the generosity of the people in this democracy and that we have an outreach around the world for people who are in need and always have had. And we just should not, at this point in our history, hide our light under a bushel.

Ms. GORELICK. If I could add two comments to that. If you look at our recommendations with regard to Afghanistan, we make a couple of observations that might be of help in addressing the question that you just asked. First of all, we note that the State Department presence in Afghanistan is woefully understaffed and that we don't really fully utilize all the resources of our government but mainly rely on our military resources there.

Second, we heard when we visited CENTCOM from the war fighters that in both Iraq and Afghanistan what they find most effective is their ability to deliver assistance. They were proudest of and thought they'd made the most progress with clinics that they'd opened. We heard again and again that money for assistance is rigidly allocated on the ground. Somebody who is on the ground, in a community—with the face of an American—can only give money for a certain purpose and not for another. Individual initiatives are blocked almost entirely.

I think if you are interested in trying to address this question, I would dive down to the ground. I would ask the war fighters who are on the ground in communities in Iraq and Afghanistan how do you bridge the gap? How do you relate to the mayor of Kirkuk? What can you do for that community? What are the resources at your disposal? How much flexibility do you have to present a good face of America, to be of real concrete help?

I think that we are too hide-bound and too inflexible and we are not using all the tools that we have when we have wonderful Americans on the ground in communities that are war-torn and that need our help. I think we have those tools and we're just not using them.

Mr. PLATTS. I concur with your observation that direct assistance—and heard that as well—in Afghanistan and Iraq, in Iraq where our soldiers were able to use some of the confiscated funds to then go back and have the flexibility unit by unit to give \$1,000 to help improve a drainage ditch, whatever it may be, that direct impact, and that kind of relates to one of the challenges for us here in Congress in achieving this effort of better public diplomacy. It's something that the military, the war fighters told us when we voted on the supplemental last fall and about \$18½ billion of that—I think \$87 billion or so, if I remember my numbers, was humanitarian assistance, nonmilitary-related, and that was some of the really most criticized part of us for political reasons.

And we're helping to, you know, rebuild fire companies or firehouses in Iraq, but we're not doing it for our own. Yet, your recommendation is then what the war fighters are telling us, that humanitarian assistance that would make a difference in the everyday lives of those Iraqis or Afghans, that is as important to winning the war on terror as the military effort.

And so if I take that message that internally Congress needs to stop politicizing public diplomacy efforts versus military and diplomatic efforts, but it's also a part of the same effort and truly approaching it in a more statesman approach and putting the partisan politics aside and just doing the right thing.

A followup question—I think we're still OK on time—is in doing the right thing, a challenging—one of your recommendations is leading by example and being the moral nation that we are and not including in our relations around the world—including with some of our allies, and I specifically am interested in your comments regarding Saudi Arabia and how—are there—is the Commission—is there specific things that we should do differently with Saudi Arabia given their internal challenges and how they treat their own citizens that we should consider as someone who is an ally of that nation?

Mr. KEAN. Well, we do make a number of recommendations specifically about Saudi Arabia in our report, and the basic bottom line is it just can't be about oil anymore. I mean, oil is a very important part of it. It's got to be, because the need of the industrialized world for oil is still so great, but that can't be all it's about, because if anything—we identified countries, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, that if any of those three areas went their own way, that would become a terrible breeding ground for terrorists.

So what we suggest is helping the leaders of Saudi Arabia to move in the direction that many members of the Royal Family would now like to move anyway and giving them a little push and helping them to move in a direction which is in their best interest and which will give their citizens greater freedom, will move women in an area toward being a greater part of the overall economy and the overall country and to help them move in those directions with our rhetoric, with our policy, with our people on the ground. If we do that, we believe we have a much better chance of having a stable Saudi Arabia to work with in the future, and if we don't, we fear the consequences.

Ms. GORELICK. I would only add this: We call Saudi Arabia a problematic ally, and the problems, we say, are on both sides. We have a great deal of mutual mistrust right now between these two countries and our peoples, and that has to be dealt with in a very straightforward way.

First, as Chairman Kean said, it can't be about oil. It has to be about a mutually adopted and shared set of goals, economic opportunity, a commitment to political and economic reform. We tried to do our part by clearing the air of some of the rubbish that was out there about what the Saudi Government had and had not done, what the Saudi Royal Family had and had not done. But the fact of the matter is that 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi.

The fact of the matter is that a great deal of the charitable money or money that has flowed to bin Laden comes from Saudi sources. The fact of the matter is that the support of the madrassas and other school systems around the world that are harmful, a lot of it comes from Saudi Arabia.

Since the attacks on their soil, as Chairman Kean said, they have gotten religion, if you will, and we are much more closely aligned, but we need to do what we can to create incentives for the leadership of Saudi Arabia to stay on a path toward greater democracy and toward reform. Otherwise, we will have a huge failed state in Saudi Arabia, and the dangers there could be enormous.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Mrs. Maloney.

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your testimony.

As a former teacher, I was most interested in your focus on education, and I truly believe we can win any military war, but as long as madrassahs are teaching hatred and raising well-educated young people who are willing to be suicide bombers, we will never be safe.

I'm most interested in how you foresee or how you predict or how do you suggest that we create alternative educational systems in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan, Pakistan and other Muslim coun-

tries. Do you see this as a—you said, an international effort? But as you mentioned, the coalition of the willing, whether it's the United Nations or the commitment to Afghanistan, it becomes primarily an American focus. How do we stop Saudi Arabia from funding these madrassahs? How much money do we now spend in our foreign aid for education? Do you think we should shift our entire foreign aid package toward education and providing young people with an education? You really cannot fault a Muslim mother for sending her child to a madrassah if that's the only form of educational system that is there for her to approach.

Also Governor Kean and Ms. Gorelick, you focused a great deal in your original report, 9/11 Commission Report, on coordinated responses. How do you see the educational coordinated response from the United States? Should it be under the State Department, under the education department? Where would this be? How would we implement what we obviously need to do? Thank you.

Mr. KEAN. Well, first of all, as another former teacher, I think we come from the same place. You can't do it alone. There's no question about it, and these countries have to see it in their own interest to do it. I mean, part of our job is to convince them of that. By the way, not all madrassas teach hate. It would be a mistake to say that. But some of them still do, and those are the ones of course who are most at fault, but even the madrassas who don't teach hate don't teach much else. People don't get the kind of skills that they need to have to earn a living at these schools.

Therefore, we've got to make these countries understand that to have a trained work force of intelligent young people is the best thing they can do to give their whole society a better life, and certainly to give their young people usable skills for the modern world. That's in their interest, even more than it's in our interest. It's the right argument, so it should be an argument that we can make with conviction. That's the only way I think we're going to move on this one is to really convince these countries—we can help. I hope we've got moneys out there that we can use to help them, but they've got to be committed to it and it's got to be their initiative and it's got to come from their governments, because we can't do it otherwise.

Ms. GORELICK. The Saudis already spend a great deal of money on schooling, and the pressure from us has to be for them to examine what their output is from those schools, measured in what the skills are that the young people are learning and in the values that they're coming out of those skills with.

There's been, I would say, a Faustian bargain struck, which is that the schools have been given over as if their output had no effect on the Saudi way of life. You can't produce unskilled people filled with hate and not expect that to have a consequence for the stability of your country. And we make that observation, and we would encourage the Saudis to examine their own education system.

We're now giving a tremendous amount of aid to Pakistan, and we would like to see some incentives there to create an education system that shifts direction. As you would know better than anyone, this is a generational challenge. The problems that we've iden-

tified have been in place for decades, and they're not going to be turned around in a minute. This is a generational challenge.

Mrs. MALONEY. You testified that you would support an international youth opportunity fund, an educational fund. Do you foresee this, for example, in Pakistan, to use one example, as working with the government to set up a youth opportunity educational system that a parent then could decide whether they go to a madrassah or go to the youth educational opportunity system? Do you see literally creating an alternative to the madrassah educational system?

Mr. KEAN. Yes, we do. I mean what we're pushing for basically is that there should be choice of a public school. I mean, that's served our democracy extraordinarily well, the public school, and what we're suggesting is that these states have to be encouraged to have a system of their own public schools where there would be an alternative to the madrassas.

Mrs. MALONEY. Do you have a sense of how much of our tax dollars in foreign aid goes to education now in developing countries? And how much of a foreign exchange program do we have for higher education for Muslims? Do we have a specific program to promote exchange between American and Muslim students?

Mr. KEAN. I'll say as a college president, I don't know of one.

Mrs. MALONEY. You don't know of one.

Mr. KEAN. There may be one out there, but nothing I'm aware of, and I think as a college president, I would be aware, certainly, if there was anything large.

Ms. GORELICK. We do say that the changes that were made in the 1990's in our education programs, in our scholarship programs, in our exchange programs to essentially withdraw from the field have had a deleterious effect on our ability to help in this most critical area. You could double our public diplomacy budget, for example, for the cost of a B-1 bomber, and it would probably be a good investment. I don't know the specific answer to your question, although I'm sure it's readily available, but our general assessment is that we need greater emphasis on education funding.

Mrs. MALONEY. I'd like to know how you see this being coordinated. We have many different departments in our government doing diplomacy. We have the State Department. We have USAID. We have our U.N. commitments. We have many commitments and many different areas, none of which is coordinated.

One of your themes is that we needed a coordinated intelligence effort. Do you believe we need a coordinated diplomacy effort? All of these various budget lines are independent, and they make their decisions independently. And it's not coordinated. Do you feel that in the public diplomacy area we should come together under one heading and have a discretion under one person to focus more on the goals that you outlined, specifically education and diplomacy?

Mr. KEAN. Well, I assume—and Commissioner Gorelick knows a lot more about it than I do—but I assume the public diplomacy area should be coordinated under the State Department. I would think that's part of their job.

But as far as the education goes, not for each area of government to know what the area is doing would be a great mistake, and that would have to be coordinated. We didn't make recommendations as

to how to coordinate it. We sort of set out what we thought the ideals were, and we thought the administration in Congress—we'd find out the ways to do it.

Ms. GORELICK. I think it's an excellent question. As Chairman Kean said, certainly we didn't address this issue specifically in our report, but it would be in line with the kinds of recommendations that we made elsewhere to align responsibility and authority in one person, to coordinate the many pots of money that operate against the same goal. I would make sure that you add to the list the considerable funds that are spent for humanitarian aid through the Defense Department. They are, in fact, the people on the ground in many respects. I would look at the different sources of funding and who controls them, and I would try to make sure that they are working together in a coordinated fashion, and I would imagine the administration would want to do that as well.

Mrs. MALONEY. But at it stands now, each of these departments have control over their budgets and their decisionmaking, and they may be duplicating or not working together. And, therefore, our message of what America is doing and doing to help becomes—

Ms. GORELICK. We honestly did not look at the specific question that you are raising, and I know that you have other helpful panelists here today. One of the reasons that we suggested and made as a key recommendation a very high-level national counterterrorism center run by someone at essentially a deputy secretary level is that this person would bring together all the tools available across the government in a coordinated plan. While we did not suggest, for example, that all of the budgets relating to education be vested in the National Counterterrorism Center, we do say that all of the planning against the challenges of Islamist terrorism be vested in one place.

As you may recall in our hearings, when I sat where you are, I kept asking who our quarterback is, and we found no one with responsibility across the board for focusing all of the tools of our government against this challenge. If I were creating this position, as you have the opportunity to do, I would say this person should also look across the board at these kinds of aid programs to advance education in Muslim countries as one of the key important tools.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentlelady.

Before claiming my time, I just want to introduce into the record a statement offered by the Muslim public affairs council and read two to two-and-a-half paragraphs. It says "Thank you, Congressman Shays, and your staff, for asking the Muslim public affairs council to submit written testimony in response to the 9/11 Commission's recommendations from public diplomacy in the Muslim world. The goals of the Muslim Affairs Council comprise two equally important and parallel tasks, to promote peaceful relations with the United States and the Muslim world and to make Islam a positive component of American pluralism. The Council views these goals as independent."

Then further down they say "public diplomacy among non-military goals made by the 9/11 Commission is the vehicle that will be utilized effectively and with leadership to enhance dialog with the United States and the Muslim world and to create a global constituency to advocate on behalf of our interests, namely by the fol-

lowing: Elimination of terrorism as an instrument of political influence in the region, movement toward Middle East peace; three, advancement of a nuclear nonproliferation for development of stable democratic governance; and five, restoration of human rights, including rights of minorities and emancipation of women. In short, public diplomacy means to achieve these goals and not a goal itself.”

I’ll just make reference to the fact that they do then question the term Islamism in terms of the Commission’s report. So why don’t I start my questions by taking that up. I was struck by the fact that if I had done that, I might have been called the racist, even though it’s a little different. Obviously it’s not about racism, but making that reference that Islamic terrorism, did you all have a debate on this? And in the end you say, listen, we’re not being attacked by the Norwegians, Christians? I mean, what ultimately made you want to state that term, and what should we infer from that?

[The information referred to follows:]

Congressman Christopher Shays (R-CT), Chairman of the
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations

Thank you, Congressman Shays and your staff, for asking the Muslim Public Affairs Council to submit written testimony in response to the 9/11 Commission's recommendations on public diplomacy in the Muslim world. The goals of the Muslim Public Affairs Council comprise two equally important and parallel tasks: to promote peaceful relations between the United States and the Muslim World; and to make Islam a positive, integral component of American pluralism. The Council views these goals as interdependent.

The 9/11 Commission correctly stated (p. 363) in its report that the struggle against terrorism is a struggle that requires political as well as military strategies. Moreover, military victories and military solutions will not be sufficient for our country to win the war on terrorism. Public diplomacy, among other non-military goals made by the 9/11 Commission, is a vehicle that must be utilized effectively and with leadership, to enhance dialogue between the United States and the Muslim world, and to create a global constituency to advocate on behalf of our interests, namely by the following:

- 1) Elimination of terrorism as an instrument of political influence in the region;
- 2) Movement towards Middle East peace;
- 3) Advancement of nuclear non-proliferation;
- 4) Development of stable, democratic governance; and
- 5) Restoration of human rights, including rights of minorities and emancipation of women

In short, public diplomacy is a means to achieving these goals and not a goal in itself. At times, it appears that marketing the message of the United States government through glossy brochures and flashy television ads are the benchmarks for changing public opinion in the Muslim world. The question before us is how to move beyond marketing the message towards processing the message.

One important factor is the source of our information. The 9/11 Commission members have provided an important opportunity for us to discuss the means of developing inroads into the Muslim mainstream. While U.S. government officials meet with ambassadors

and the elite of the Muslim world, they remain unaware of the sentiments of ordinary citizens. Increasing access to the streets of Muslim capitals will enhance our collective understanding in assessing both challenges and opportunities in the Muslim world.

The problem with the term "Islamism"

Terminology is important in defining our goals as well as removing roadblocks into hearts and minds. The 9/11 Commission identifies Islamist terrorism as the threat. The Muslim Public Affairs Council recommends that the US government find other terminology.

The average person cannot understand distinctions among the terms Islam, Islamist and Islamic. The 9/11 Commission unsuccessfully attempts to make a distinction between Islamic and Islamist (p. 562). The commission defines Islamism as an "Islamic militant" movement "bearing a holistic vision of Islam...with the ultimate goal of restoring the caliphate." Characterizing the al Qaeda threat in Islamic terminology, while attempting to distinguish Islamic from Islamism, is not only confusing and filled with contradictions, but it also affords al Qaeda the Islamic label it desperately invokes to gain popularity in the Muslim world and to exploit legitimate grievances of Muslim peoples. If the Commission asserts that al Qaeda is perverting Islam, then there is no strategic value to affording al Qaeda any Islamic label, especially one such as Islamism that is vague and does not crystallize our understanding of the al Qaeda threat. Furthermore, the concept of a caliphate, i.e. one state with one leader that encompasses over 50 Muslim countries, is not on the minds of the Muslim mainstream. US policy makers should not waste valuable resources of the American people by raising the caliphate concept as a threat to our national security.

Islam's opposition to terrorism

Throughout the world, hundreds of millions of Muslims have condemned terrorism and have rejected any violence against civilians as a legitimate instrument for political gains. The President of the United States and the Secretary of State have stated repeatedly that Islam is a religion of peace. That is helpful, but the image of the United States continues to be hampered with the misconception that it is anti-Islam. A deeper understanding of Islam's opposition to terrorism will serve as a useful tool in debunking these myths and take the discussion beyond the "Islam is a religion of peace" remarks. While it is a responsibility of Muslims to make the anti-terrorism arguments, it is the responsibility of the political leadership of the United States to acknowledge and embrace Muslims who make such stands, even if they disagree with current U.S. policies.

The Moderate Voice

The perception within Muslim communities is that the Muslim moderate must first accept current US policies in order to be regarded as a moderate. A moderate, however, should not be one who comes to Washington to tell our policy-makers what they want to hear; instead, he or she should be one who comes to tell them what they need to know. A moderate is one who denounces terrorism as an instrument of change and one who can clearly delineate to us what disagreements exist within Muslim countries on US policies. Then an in-depth discussion on policies can ensue.

American Muslims can play a key role in acting as bridges of understanding between US policy-makers and the Muslim world. On page 363, the subsection entitled, "More Than a War on Terrorism," raises our interest: "America's strategy should be a coalition strategy that includes Muslim nations as partners in its development and implementation." We agree wholeheartedly, and we should begin by tapping into America's pluralism that includes a representation of the Muslim World, making American Muslims partners in the policy-making discourse and helping our political leaders gain a better understanding of politics in the Muslim World. We could start by including American Muslims in the policymaking arena. We are concerned that no American Muslim representing mainstream thought occupies a policy making position in key agencies that deal with the Muslim world.

A discussion on policies

While nearly all discussion in the report was given to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan, we feel that some discussion about United States policies toward the Palestinian occupied territories and Iraq deserved more consideration given the fact that the United States has committed significant military and financial resources in these areas. The United States public diplomacy program will be ineffective if policy discussions are not a main feature of our interaction with the Muslim World.

Terrorists have exploited legitimate grievances of the Muslim people to advance illegitimate causes. In order for the United States to gain a stronger foothold in the region, US policy-makers must address these grievances outside the context of terrorism.

Education in the Muslim World and in America

The 9/11 Commission made education in Pakistan a priority in its recommendations (p.369). Combating illiteracy is a welcome initiative. We must keep in mind one key point: according to reports, none of the 19 hijackers on 9/11 attended a "madrasah" in Pakistan. Nonetheless, developing better schools in Pakistan is embraced by humanitarian activists in the US and the Muslim world. Reform in the Pakistani schools will help to ensure that those who are disenfranchised in Muslim societies will not be ripe

recruits for extremist movements. A bridge must develop between US and Pakistani educators, one that is based on mutual respect.

The recommendation on Saudi Arabia is also important for comment (p. 374). The Saudi people should not be blamed for the mistakes of their government or for the behavior of al Qaeda. Saudi critics of religious extremism are numerous. Saudis themselves have been victims of terror attacks, and their support for American interests in the region has been invaluable. A respectful tone towards their culture and their legacy could help to advance our public diplomacy programs. Furthermore, distinctions between governments and peoples should be a given when US policy-makers discuss Muslim World affairs, and the affairs of other regions as well. Just as we the American people detest what happened at Abu Ghraib prison by a handful of abusers, and our president repeatedly stated that those criminals who abused Iraqi prisoners do not represent us or represent America, we should afford the same right to other people as well. That orientation requires more education in America about the Muslim world.

Humanitarian Assistance as a major goal

For the United States government to succeed in offering “an example of moral leadership in the world” (p. 376), it is imperative to allow for humanitarian assistance to flourish in areas of immediate need, such as Kashmir, the Palestinian territories, Chechnya and Bosnia. While terrorism financing has focused on these areas, the US Treasury Department has in effect stifled humanitarian aid. US policy-makers should therefore discuss means of developing partnerships between relief agencies and US agencies to help the needy in those regions.

The Muslim Public Affairs Council appreciates the opportunity to provide this testimony to your committee, Congressman Shays, and we are eager to serve our country in any capacity. Thank you for your consideration.

MPAC is a progressive American Muslim organization with 12 chapters throughout the United States. MPAC is dedicated to promoting an accurate portrayal of American Muslim values and views on national and state policy issues. We accept funding only from donors in the United States and have a policy that prohibits the acceptance of foreign funds. For more information about MPAC visit http://www.mpac.org

Mr. KEAN. Well, we really wanted to define the enemy. We said at the Commission—and we debated this for long hours, talked about it a lot. Simply the word “terrorism” as a war against terrorism didn’t do us a lot of sense. It’s a war against one particular variety of terrorism as practiced by a certain group of people, and they are Islamic terrorists. So we came really to define who the enemy is by using that term so it wouldn’t be too undefined or too vague.

You were a part of that debate.

Ms. GORELICK. Oh, yes, I was part of that debate. Let me say a couple of things. One, we read the national counterterrorism strategy and were astonished to find no mention of Islamist religion in parts of the globe. It was as if the enemy were this inchoate tool called terrorism, and we honestly don’t believe that you can address the threat in that way. You have to identify the fact that we have an enemy. The enemy that we have identified is Islamist terrorism, Islamist extremism. It is not the Muslim religion. It is not Islam. It is not Islamic terrorism. It is Islamists, and we take some care in defining what that is, but it is basically a very radical group. As Chairman Kean said, sort of hijacked element of the religion, which defines anyone that they don’t agree with as infidels worthy of murder.

Mr. SHAYS. See, the challenge that we have, I think is—in trying to win the hearts and minds of “the Islamic world and others,” I happen to believe, for instance, and everything I’ve read about Wahabism, that it is a fairly aggressive, almost violent, approach and extraordinarily intolerant, and yet that defines a nation. It defines Saudi Arabia, quite frankly.

So I think what you did was extraordinarily important, but I don’t think you made the job any easier now in terms of winning the hearts and minds, because we’re being honest with each other, and that honesty I think says we’d better confront it. And I would view your use of the polls, Governor Kean, as real, but I’m not quite sure how I’m to interpret it, because I think when you strip open the carpet and you see the bag that’s underneath there, you have stirred things. You have created anger and so on that has to be dealt with. I would make the argument that we’ve got to go through this process, and we aren’t going to be so popular right now.

I happen to look at Churchill and think he wasn’t too popular in the 1930’s. Nevil Chamberlain was a hero, and Nevil Chamberlain was wrong. So were the French, obviously, and so were the Germans and so on, and I’m not so sure that having bad polls isn’t an indication of something, frankly—and I’d have constituents who would take issue with this—really an indication that we are finally standing up to a reality of fundamentalism within a particular faith that is widespread and promoted, frankly, even by governments.

I’d have you comment.

Mr. KEAN. Well, as long as you narrow these people down, because you can’t say, oh, Wahabism is Islamic terrorists. A lot of it is not. It’s a very, very small group of people who have taken that extra step and said that in order to promote their particular philos-

ophy, you've got to murder a lot of innocent civilians. That is not even what the majority of Wahabists believe.

Now, some of the climate that's created by those schools, Wahabism, sets the necessary climate that this particular small group of people can exist within.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. I would think, frankly, that's almost an understatement. I mean, we have Saudi Arabia in former Yugoslavia, their contribution economically is, frankly, more mosques, teaching their brand of the Islamic faith. That's what they are doing. Instead of doing what we would like them to do, which is provide economic assistance and preach tolerance and so on. So it just strikes me that we've got a real big task.

I salute you for bringing this up, but I believe that—three commissions told us, before you ever existed, before September 11 ever took place, they said you have a terrorist threat out there; you need to develop a strategy to deal with it, and you need to reorganize your government. They only disagreed on the reorganizing government, but I will say to you they weren't as explicit as you were to narrow the threat in the way you did, and I think that it was important that you did that.

I would like to ask you in terms of the three categories, do the right thing, let me just mention about do the right thing. Jimmy Carter wanted to do the right thing, and he said, I'm just going to work overtime to negotiate the release of, and what he said to the Iranians, America, what a world, we can keep them for 20 years; all we have to do, the Iranian government, is negotiate, and you did have a President who said we're going to treat this as what it is, an act of war. Usually when you have even a war, you exchange your diplomats, and here we had a government now holding American diplomats. It was an act of war. Immediately they were returned, and I'd like you to just comment. I don't want to leave on the table this concept that somehow force is useful, diplomacy is the answer. It strikes me that diplomacy without the potential to use force is useful.

Ms. GORELICK. If I've left the impression in any way that I think that force is useless, I want to correct that impression right now. We are very clear about this, that there are people bound and determined to kill us and that the only way to deal with them is to kill or capture them and to be most aggressive about it.

What we have tried to say is that you have this hardened, committed, zealous group of people that have to be dealt with in a swift and clear manner. You have, however, a looming danger, which is the greater public support for this type of activity across the Muslim world. We want to drive a wedge between the committed zealot on the one hand and the person living in the Muslim world who is right now much more sympathetic to Osama bin Laden than he is to George Bush, and that's wrong.

We cannot condemn and we do not wish to condemn the entire Islamic world. We do not do that. The fact is that we are harmed and our national security is harmed when we have as little support as we have in Egypt, in Saudi Arabia, in Jordan, in Turkey, of all places, in the countries that have been a bulwark of support for us. We need them. We need their support for basing. We need their support for the education reforms we were talking about. We need

their support for covert action. We need their support for the sharing of information. We need them, and we need them to understand us. We need them to respect us. And so this is difficult. It is not all one or the other.

Mr. SHAYS. I'm happy that you've made it very clear the position of the Commission. The sad fact is that Saddam Hussein never thought we would remove him from Kuwait, or he never would have gone in, and he never thought we would do a regime change, or he would have cooperated. He never wanted to be hunted like an animal. He never wanted his kids killed. He never wanted his daughters in Jordan. We know that. He never thought we would attack him. He misread us twice, which strikes me that a deterrence that people don't think you're going to use becomes a meaningless instrument, and as a result, we've had a loss of life. A tremendous loss of lives.

I'd like you to speak on one issue. I have a red light, and I'll let Members come back with one or more questions and then get to our next panel, but I do want you to tell me the pluses and minuses of your recognition that there is a way that we appeal to people in the Third World. That's important, I would think, schools, speeches, I mean, forums, come to the United States, but that generally impacts the elite within society, those that basically have an opportunity to study in this country become the elite. Let me put it that way. Whereas, the other approaches mask communication with the downtrodden who live there.

Tell me the pluses and minuses of each. I know that you're suggesting we do both.

Mr. KEAN. Well, we're doing a less effective job on both at the moment. I mean, I'll tell you in my present world as a college president that we're getting less of those exchanges now than any time in a long, long time. I mean, the future leaders of the world, we have benefited because they have come to this country for education. For whatever reason, in the present atmosphere, they're deciding not to come, in very large numbers, and those people from Africa and Asia and other places are finding other places to get their education, and I think that will hurt us over the long haul.

It's hard to differentiate between the two. Obviously you've got to appeal to the educated people, the people who will be hopefully the future leaders of the country, and you need to do everything you can to appeal to them. One of the best ways was getting them to see this country themselves, and then go back and most of them understood the benefits of our society and economy and promoted it in their own country in various ways, but that does not come at the exclusion, particularly these days, of trying to communicate with larger numbers, and we have the ability to do that now. There's no reason that Al-Jazeera should be unchallenged, that there should be no other means of communication that these people hear in this part of the world, whether we fund part of that, whether we do that with the combination of others, but that shouldn't be challenged, the method of communication, particularly what they put on the air is not in our interest.

So, yes, I think we've got to do both. I mean, you can't just say I think deal with the elites and you can't just say deal with the

masses. We have different ways of doing both, and I think your point is correct. We've got to do it.

Mr. SHAYS. Does any other Member have a closing comment? I'm just thinking that Mayor Lindsey who was losing the election won the election when the Mets won the World Series. I wonder the impact if the Iraqis get the gold medal.

Mr. KEAN. It would be nothing but good.

Mr. SHAYS. Is there any question we should have asked that we didn't, any question that you prepared for that we should have realized or any statement you want to make?

Mr. KEAN. Thank you very much for the opportunity.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just thank both of you for honoring this subcommittee and all of Congress by your extensive time spent with so many of us. It will pay off. Your work will pay off.

Mr. KEAN. We want to thank you and the Congress for coming back during the month of August. I know how extraordinary that is, and I think when most of us in the Commission cheered the fact that you were willing to do that because of your understanding of the crisis this country is facing, I don't think members of the Commission realized that meant we were going to be here in August too.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just ask you right now, though, your staff members are no longer paid. Is that correct?

Mr. KEAN. That's correct.

Mr. SHAYS. Because what we have, one more hearing tomorrow, and we were asking the Commission member, a staff member to come, and we realize they're out around the countryside, but if you find a staff member loitering around Washington, I hope you send them to our subcommittee tomorrow.

Mr. KEAN. We'll do your best to get them here. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you both very much. We appreciate it a lot.

The Chair will now recognize our next panel, and thank them for their patience. Patricia de Stacy Harrison, acting Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Department of State; Kenneth Tomlinson, chairman, Broadcasting Board of Governors. Charles "Tre" Evers III, Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Commissioner; and Jess T. Ford, Director of International Affairs and Trade, Government Accountability Office. We recognize all four. If they would remain standing, and we will swear them in.

If you'd raise your right hands, I'd like to swear you in.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Note for the record our witnesses have responded in the affirmative.

We'll start with you, Madam Secretary. We appreciate your being here today. We appreciate your service as acting secretary on two occasions here now. We just know that a lot of work is required, and thank you for that, and thank all the other witnesses as well.

So you have the floor.

STATEMENTS OF PATRICIA DE STACY HARRISON, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; KENNETH TOMLINSON, CHAIRMAN, BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS; CHARLES "TRE" EVERS III, ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, COMMISSIONER; AND JESS T. FORD, DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Ms. HARRISON. Thank you, Chairman Shays, members of the committee.

Mr. SHAYS. I don't think your mic is on, Madam Secretary. Is that it?

Ms. HARRISON. Can you hear me now?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Ms. HARRISON. Thank you for this opportunity.

Mr. SHAYS. Just do me a favor and I'll start you over. Just tap the—yes. That's all right. Thank you.

Ms. HARRISON. Well, first, I do want to thank all of you for this opportunity. I can't think of anything more important that we could be doing today. Mr. Chairman, my written statement for the record provides a comprehensive report on public diplomacy initiatives since September 11th, and with your permission, I will just make a few brief remarks.

Mr. SHAYS. Absolutely.

Ms. HARRISON. Thank you so much.

The recommendations of the 9/11 Commission underscore challenges to public diplomacy as we seek to engage with audiences in the Arab and Muslim world.

The Commission calls upon us to define our message to take a strong stand in support of a better future, to defend our ideas, ideals and values and to offer opportunity to youth. I agree strongly with these recommendations.

Following the attack on our country, we began to execute a public diplomacy strategy that aligns with these directives, with the understanding, as Dr. Rice said recently, there was much more that must be done.

We have accelerated our effort to communicate with and engage Arab and Muslim audiences advocating both values and policy, affirming what we have in common and the mutual benefit of working together for peace, prosperity and freedom.

The essence of America's message to the world is the hope implicit in our commitment to individual freedom, the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity and economic opportunity, and despite the negative polls, we find that these values resonate. They are enduring, especially with the young, an important and rapidly growing demographic.

Our missions abroad are actively engaged in advocating values and policy through a wide variety of programs, tailored to specific cultures and taking into account the way people receive or trust information. We are working more closely than ever with USAID to ensure recipients of our assistance recognize that this help does come from the American people, and the new policy coordinating committee on Muslim outreach, which I cochair with the NSC, will further strengthen coordination with DOD and other agencies.

As we work within an environment of instant global communication, we are using all the tools of technology through the Internet, television print and broadcast, video and film, and I'm very pleased to be here today with Ken Tomlinson, the BBG under his leadership has been vigorous and creative, through Radio Sawa and Alhurra TV, we are reaching increasingly larger audiences with the preeminent mass media channels of radio and television.

The Department's Bureau of International Information programs, through its expanded Web presence, utilizes the other critical channel of mass media, the Internet, and also helps us connect at a grass-roots level through American Corners.

The Bureau of Public Affairs has expanded its outreach to new media outlets to connect, to inform and counter this information within a 24-7 global news cycle and is inviting journalists to expose them to American life in all of its diversity.

Through exchange programs, we are reaching younger and more diverse audiences, and we have refocused our programs to engage a group I call youth influencers: university professors, classroom teachers, clerics, ministers of education, journalists, community leaders.

Almost 3 years ago we launched Partnerships for Learning. It's a collaborative effort with men and women from the region who want to work with us on behalf of the succession generation, many of whom lack a solid education, and they face a future of chronic unemployment and underemployment.

Partnerships for Learning is delivering hope and opportunity through Fulbright and other scholarships, through exchanges and English teaching. We have just completed the first year of our country's first ever government-sponsored high school program with the Middle East, more than a dozen Muslim countries, and we did this with the support of hundreds of Muslim American host families, and may I just interject that at a time when the polls, the tsunami of polls is so negative, we have families in these countries on a waiting list who desperately want to send their young people to our country for 1 full year to interact with Americans and have a little bit more opportunity for their own future, and in fact we know that one of the greatest assets in public diplomacy is the American people themselves.

Through our partnership with the private sector, which includes a network of more than 1,500 organizations and 80,000 volunteers who welcome and host thousands of people from other countries to the United States, we are communicating values in the most direct and enduring way.

Within the Department of State, we have taken steps to strengthen coordination of public diplomacy and have sent to Congress notification of our intent to establish an office of policy planning and resources in the office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

There are many lessons that we are still learning from September 11th, but one overarching theme remains, getting our message out in words and images is only part of the job. We must commit to working in partnership with the vast majority of people who want a better future for themselves and their children.

Commission member John Lehman is right. Soft options are as important as the hard ones. In both peaceful times and times of conflict, our mission is to ensure a positive, vigorous American presence in the world, declaring our policies, demonstrating and communicating our values, forging links of mutual understanding and respect between peoples on a continuous and sustained basis. This is not the work of weeks or months. It is the work of years and generations, and the mission of soft power is a vital part, not only of our homeland security but everyone's homeland, everyone's security. Thank you very much.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Harrison follows:]

**Statement by
Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs
Patricia S. Harrison**

**“The 9/11 Commission Recommendations on Public Diplomacy:
Defending Ideals and Defining the Message”**

**House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations**

August 23, 2004

Chairman Shays and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting us here today to testify on the recommendations of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Your subcommittee has long been interested in public diplomacy, and I welcome the opportunity to participate in this discussion.

Mr. Chairman, the findings and recommendations of the 9/11 Commission’s Report present challenges for all of us. In the realm of public diplomacy, the report calls on us to define our message and ourselves, to stand for a better future, to defend our ideals and values, and to offer opportunity to youth.

We know that our greatest strength lies in our values. Whether as a new nation struggling for independence more than two centuries ago or now, when we have all the privileges and burdens of a global power – the heart of the American message to the world is one of values. We also understand that if we do not define ourselves, others will do it for us.

Following September 11, 2001, in discussions with the Administration and Congress, and in conjunction with our embassies, the Broadcasting Board of Governors and others, we began to move forward with a strategy for America’s public diplomacy. The foundation of our public diplomacy strategy is to engage, inform and influence foreign publics in order to increase understanding for American values, policies and initiatives. Through traditional programs and all the tools of technology, involving both the public and private sectors, we are communicating the principles and values that underpin our policies and define us as a nation. At

the same time, we are working to increase mutual understanding and respect between the people of the United States and those of other countries.

After 9/11, we redirected funds to enable us to move quickly and reach beyond elites to strategic communities comprising young people, religious leaders, as well as the universe of people responsible for the education and development of young people – “youth influencers” from education ministers to classroom teachers to clerics, coaches and parents. We developed programs to reach people of good will, moderate groups working for the development of tolerant civil societies, journalists, women’s groups, local leaders, clerics, community activists and more.

We have communicated our policy message through daily press briefings and public outreach by our missions around the world, as well as through our expanded web presence, speakers and publications. And, we communicate America’s message through more than statements and speeches. In fact, one of the most powerful components of our public diplomacy programs are the 80,000 Americans who are reaching out to host our more than 30,000 academic, cultural and professional exchanges annually. We are working with 1,500 public-private organizations to improve lives in communities throughout the world. We know that one of our great assets in public diplomacy is the American people themselves, as they really are, not as they are caricatured. Programs that bring Americans and foreign citizens in direct contact can and do have tremendous positive impact.

We have formed partnerships with local institutions overseas, media and NGO’s and others to extend our reach. We are funding English language programs, the language of opportunity for young people worldwide and, in the process, conveying information about U.S. society and values.

We continue to seek new ways to maintain important connections at a global grassroots level. For example, at a time when security concerns can constrain our ability to engage, one of our programs, American Corners provides a unique opportunity to maintain our involvement.

Media in all of its forms, from the Internet to print and broadcast, is an important component of public diplomacy. Our investment in training for journalists and cooperative television provides influential professionals with an entree to American society, where they can see for themselves how media

in a free society works and observe for themselves that America is a free country with citizens of many faiths worshiping in their own way and coexisting equally. In other words, they can see how a civil society enhances the lives of all its citizens.

The vast majority of people around the world, including people in the Arab and Muslim world, share our values of freedom, human rights, opportunity and optimism, but many do not recognize America as champion of those values. We must compete to get our message across in an increasingly crowded and difficult competitive information environment, and Mr. Chairman, we do compete. We are working with the U.S. Agency for International Development to ensure recipients of our assistance recognize that assistance does come from the American people. The new Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on Muslim Outreach will strengthen coordination with the Department of Defense and other agencies. Our websites in Arabic and other critical languages communicate values as well as policy. Our partners in broadcasting, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, are dedicated to this objective.

Mr. Chairman, I believe our public diplomacy efforts are working in the right direction but there is a need to do more.

The Commission recommends that we work with moderate Arabs and Muslims to develop an "Agenda of Opportunity" built around education and economic development, a critical component of public diplomacy outreach. The report also advised that we must "rebuild the scholarship, exchange, and library programs that reach out to young people and offer them knowledge and hope." It is only through education and true communication that, as the 9/11 Commission Report puts it, "a moderate consensus can be found." We began to address this challenge, immediately following September 11, 2001, but this is not the work of weeks or months. It is the work of years and generations.

As a government, we must commit to a long-term and sustainable investment, engaging with people of good will at all levels of society, and especially to youth and those who influence youth. We must commit to increasing the numbers of people who can experience America beyond the headlines and misconceptions, through a visit to the U.S., interactions with Americans in their own country, through American Centers and through print and broadcast media and the internet. We must demonstrate our many

positive values as a society – such as rule of law, civil society, women’s rights, religious tolerance and freedom of the media – to as many foreign individuals as possible, so that they can be advocates within their own countries for a civil and sustainable future.

We welcomed the 9/11 Commission Report as it has affirmed the many important steps we have taken since 9/11, including refocused funding to priority regions, especially the Middle East and South Asia, which now account for 25 percent of all Department funding for exchanges. Through our International Visitor and other public diplomacy programs, we have prioritized themes such as religious tolerance, ethnic diversity, the value of an independent media, NGO management, civil society and governance, elections and educational reform in the Muslim world. We have also increased our foreign journalist tours and television cooperative productions in these regions. The primary audiences are young student and political leaders, women and journalists.

We launched CultureConnect, the cornerstone of our cultural diplomacy, a program that selects American men and women who have achieved prominence in literature, the performing arts, sports, and other areas and serve as Cultural Ambassadors overseas with a focus on non-elite youth. We have also launched Citizen Diplomats, another new initiative, that allows everyday Americans the opportunity to share their skills and expertise with people in other countries. We are also sending 900 American speakers to foreign posts each year; and have held over 450 digital video conferences.

Public Diplomacy Officers from our South Asia and Near Eastern Affairs Bureaus were on the ground immediately following the military campaigns in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Our 30 public diplomacy officers in Iraq constitute the largest public diplomacy operation in the world. By the end of FY 2004, the International Visitor Program will have developed a range of programs for Iraqi mayors, educators, spokespeople, NGO representatives and women. Throughout the world, and especially in the those countries with significant Muslim populations, our public diplomacy staffs are focused and working to reach those communities with an American message of hope and opportunity.

In the wake of 9/11, we began to produce a stream of print and electronic materials describing for foreign audiences, in their own languages,

the events of 9/11 and the need to fight against those who have committed or wish to commit terrorist acts, as well as the achievements made in that struggle, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq. More than 3,000 articles on terrorism have been published in the daily Washington File since 9/11. In the year following 9/11, the increase was 250 percent.

The Bureau of International Information Programs' (IIP's) print materials in Arabic are used by our embassies who share the material daily with press, academic, political and economic contacts either directly or indirectly through targeted mailing lists. The materials are available to foreign publics directly on the internet on our IIP sites, which receive over 3,100 page views per day. Also, over 1,200 Arabic users have signed up independently to receive our material each day on the Arabic listserv. Use is monitored and reported through our embassies in weekly reports citing placement of Arabic material from IIP's Washington File.

We have established Arabic websites: Our USINFO Middle East web page, <http://usinfo.state.gov>, is linked to 470 other Arabic sites. Since 9/11, we have quadrupled the number of pages that we have been producing in Arabic. Before 9/11, we translated 3,000 to 4,000 words per day; now we translate between 12,000 and 15,000 per day. Our policy focus on the region, the President's vision for Middle East peace, policy emphasis on the proposed Middle East Free Trade Area and Middle East Partnership Initiative provide new material for daily Arabic translation. Critical audiences identified by our Missions abroad include government officials, scholars, university professors, researchers, media representatives, and self-selected listserv recipients. Our statistical reporting on Arabic language web sites indicates that 85% of our web users are based overseas with more than 50% from the Middle East, notably Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, Kuwait and Syria as leading users.

Since 9/11, we have also increased by one-third our Arabic translation staff and opened a Persian language capacity. In May of 2003, we opened a Persian language website, engaging Iranian youth and youth influencers. Working with the Coalition Provisional Authority and the new Embassy in Baghdad, we introduced Arabic papers on the "Principles of Democracy" to inform Iraqis as their new government is shaped.

One of our most visible and effective public diplomacy tools is American Corners. A visitor to an American Corner, which can be housed

in a university or an office building, finds computers, books, magazines, and information about life in the United States, our government and our culture. More than 140 American Corners are now in operation around the world, and our goal is to establish another 60 this year, with an emphasis on the Muslim world. In South Asia and other regions, our missions continue to operate American Centers – significant community institutions that serve as platforms for public outreach and as models of shared commitments to models of educational excellence.

Under the Bureau of Public Affairs (PA), both the Foreign Press Centers for print and radio and Office of Broadcast Services for television have increased substantially the number of journalist tours to our country, and 50 percent are with journalists from Arab and Muslim-majority countries. Since 9/11, the Foreign Press Center has included in its programming a set of special briefings specifically designed for Arab and Muslim media, including briefings by senior-level officials like Secretaries Powell, Rumsfeld and Ridge, as well as Dr. Rice. During this time, there has been unprecedented access by the foreign media to U.S. Government officials.

After 9/11, we created the Media Outreach Center in London, which is actively reaching out to Arab media in London, many of which have wide exposure throughout the Middle East.

Television and video products continue to be powerful strategic tools for bringing America's foreign policy message to worldwide audiences. PA has engaged international audiences with television pieces and documentary productions through television Co-Ops – filmed domestically by foreign broadcasters – and reverse Co-Ops in host countries. We are helping Arab and Muslim journalists produce balanced reports and documentaries on topics from policy to culture. We continue to produce “good news” stories on reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan that American and foreign news editors have incorporated in their programs, and we are distributing Department-oriented videos to foreign media outlets worldwide. We have purchased the re-broadcast and educational rights to over 100 commercial documentaries showing America's government, society and values for broadcast on the American Embassy Television Network. The most popular series has been the American history program, “Freedom: A History of the U.S.” The other most requested titles include “American Cinema”,

“Searching for the Roots of 9/11 with Thomas Friedman” and “Frontline: Muslims.”

Nearly every post in every region of the world has requested tapes and reported on the exceptional results. For example, two Indonesian stations broadcast the 26-part series “Framework for Democracy,” a documentary series about the reality of how a democratic government works. A Chinese audience viewed “Hollywood and the Muslim World,” raising the confidence that peaceful resolutions could be achieved between the Muslim world and the U.S.

To measure the effectiveness of our video products, we have partnered with *NewsMarket*, an internet-based worldwide video distribution service, which markets and distributes our products to more than 2,000 broadcasters and news agencies worldwide and provides routine monitoring and placement reports.

Our public diplomacy bureaus, in partnership with our regional bureaus around the world, have worked together to allay fears about domestic security and to educate foreign travelers about the revamped US visa process through the “Secure Borders, Open Doors” campaign, an interagency effort involving the Department of Homeland Security and others as well as State. Features of this initiative include a special website – www.unitedstatesvisas.gov – promotional materials and speaking points. Other materials on changes in our visa policy have been developed and promoted, with an educational video to be released in six languages this fall.

The Middle East Partnership Initiative, funded at almost \$250 million, fosters reforms to expand political participation and increase the economic and educational opportunities available to the people of the Middle East and North Africa, with an emphasis on opportunities for women and youth.

Within our broad programs in the Arab and Muslim world, we have as a strategic priority a focus on younger audiences within these regions. Following September 11, 2001, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) launched Partnerships for Learning (P4L), which directs ECA exchanges towards youth and youth influencers in the Arab and Muslim world to build long-term sustainable relationships. P4L is based on the premise that if terror is the common enemy, education is the common value. The ultimate goal of P4L is the establishment of close and sustained

partnerships with other nations that help provide young people with quality education and opportunities in life that will deter them from despair and hate.

Since FY 2002, ECA has dedicated over \$40 million dollars to this new initiative. In FY 2005, ECA has requested an additional \$25 million for P4L, which would increase funding for the P4L initiative to over \$65 million. All of this will go to the Arab and Muslim world.

With this funding, we have initiated our country's first-ever government-sponsored high school program with the Arab and Muslim world. Last year, we had 170 students living with American families and attending U.S. high schools. This year, we will have 480, including students from Iraq and Afghanistan. By the 06-07 school year, we plan to have 1,000 high school students from the Arab and Muslim world studying side-by-side with our youth. This program was made possible through the volunteerism of hundreds of Muslim-American host families.

We have also created a new, undergraduate program specifically targeted at the non-elite, gifted young men and women from the Arab world who would otherwise have no opportunity for foreign study and first-hand exposure to the United States.

Under P4L, we also resumed the long-suspended Fulbright programs in Afghanistan and Iraq. We have directed \$3.1 million to fund a microscholarship initiative for English language instruction to more than 3,400 youth from disadvantaged backgrounds in the Muslim world. In July 2003, we also initiated a monthly Arabic youth magazine, "Hi", which now is available throughout the Arab world and has led to an interactive "web-zine" that last month attracted 30,000 visitors and well over 700,000 page views. What we are actively doing dovetails exactly with the recommendation from the 9/11 commission that our scholarship and exchange programs "reach out to young people and offer them knowledge and hope."

There is much more that needs to be done, and we are working now to put in place initiatives that I believe will strengthen public diplomacy for the years ahead.

The need to improve oversight and coordination of public diplomacy was identified in the report from the Public Diplomacy Advisory Group for the Arab and Muslim World, the “Djerejian Group.” A specific recommendation in this and other reports was the establishment of an Office of Policy, Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs within the Office of the Under Secretary. We have identified people and resources necessary to create this office, which will assist the Under Secretary in developing a wide-ranging strategic vision for public diplomacy, oversight for resource allocation, and performance evaluation capacities that previously did not exist. I know public diplomacy performance measurement has been a concern, and though many public diplomacy activities are difficult to measure, I am pleased that this new office will be taking on this important task. Subject to a congressional notification letter, we hope to have the office up and running by September.

Another recommendation of the Djerejian Report was to reinvigorate an interagency Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC). We have done that, concentrating initially on Muslim outreach. I am now co-chairing this PCC, with the NSC, and we are examining ways to engage and support potential allies, opinion leaders, NGO’s and youth influencers such as religious leaders, teachers and journalists in countries worldwide with significant Muslim populations. Our challenge is to move beyond quick-fix solutions to improve America’s image, to create long-term sustainable relationships among people of good will at every level, especially in emerging and strategic communities.

Working with the Department’s regional bureaus, the PCC has requested and received reports from our embassies on their specific strategies for Muslim outreach, the programs they are implementing which are working and those programs not yet in place they believe would be effective. Embassies are already heavily involved in Muslim outreach. The PCC will help us to take a broader view of the challenges and develop strategic approaches that can be applied to specific countries and regions.

Another priority endeavor is our engagement of the private sector in public diplomacy. Secretary Powell, an advocate of public-private partnerships, has asked the Office of the Under Secretary to take the lead in engaging with the private sector in support of a wide-range of programs and initiatives. We launched the first Sister Cities International Partners for Peace Initiative between Iraq and the U.S., an initiative announced by the

First Lady at the G-8 Summit. We worked with private sector partners to support the performance of the Iraqi National Symphony at Kennedy Center, and we are working with the Wheelchair Foundation to establish a new Middle East initiative to donate thousands of wheelchairs to Iraq, Morocco, Jordan, Oman and other areas in the Arab world.

Our outreach to the business community taps into America's strength: volunteerism. To enhance the scope of current programming and deliver our country's strategic public diplomacy and public affairs messages, we are working with the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs and the U.S. Department of Commerce and have reached out to U.S. corporations and associations such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Center for Corporate Citizenship, the Business Roundtable, National Foreign Trade Council, Business for Diplomatic Action, Council on Competitiveness and the Young Entrepreneur Organization. We are evaluating corporate stewardship and corporate social responsibility trends demonstrated by U.S. companies throughout the Arab and Muslim world and working to expand our outreach to complement and highlight America's generous private sector contributions.

Interagency coordination is active, as described earlier with regard to the PCC, in addition to other interagency working groups. I would also like to note that the Department continues its close working relationship with the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Secretary Powell is a board member, and I represent him at the board meetings in my role as the acting Under Secretary. The 9/11 Commission's report commends the BBG for its new initiatives to reach out to the Arab and Muslim world. Radio Sawa and Radio Farda, along with the Middle East Television station Alhurra, and the new Urdu and Indonesian VOA services are reaching broader audiences with innovative and unbiased programming. Because of these initiatives, our country is now being presented in a much more honest context in regions where our media presence is vital.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, September 11, 2001 was a wake-up call for public diplomacy as for all of America. In the almost three years since that horrendous day, we have channeled much of our public diplomacy program toward the Arab and Muslim world. We are developing new programs and refining our strategy, and I believe we are making progress. Recent steps, including our new Office of Policy, Planning and Resources as well as the new Policy Coordinating Committee, will contribute

substantially to our ability to carry out our mission and meet the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and others. We are undertaking a new, comprehensive process of measurement to determine that our strategy and programs are effective.

As we continue to work toward a more robust and effective public diplomacy effort, we welcome the interest and continued support we have received from the administration and Congress. I appreciate the opportunity you have given me to discuss public diplomacy with you today, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Tomlinson.

Mr. TOMLINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Kucinich, members of the committee. We thank you so much for this important hearing on the 9/11 Commission recommendations on public diplomacy.

Earlier this year, with the enthusiastic support of President Bush and Members of Congress, the Broadcasting Board of Governors launched Alhurra, "The Free One," our new 24-hour-a-day Arab language television network. Through direct-to-home satellite communications and terrestrial transmission to Iraq, we are able to broadcast directly to the people in the Middle East over five time zones in 22 countries, from Morocco to Iraq to Yemen.

Our broadcasts will not overnight eliminate the effects of generations of intellectual isolation and neglect so vividly outlined in the classic U.N. report of 2003, the report on knowledge dissemination in the Arab world. In contemplating what we have to overcome to establish real and substantive dialog with our neighbors in the Arab world, it's daunting to consider the fact that the aggregate of western books translated into Arabic since the dawn of publishing amounts to little more than 10,000 books, equivalent to what Spain translates in a single year.

Indeed, the United Nations report concluded what we have to overcome in the region is the absence of a strategic vision that provides a solid foundation for knowledge dissemination through education, media, publishing and translation. The knowledge base for the people in the Arab world is further limited by the indisputable fact that the news and information they have received from several popular satellite television outlets like Al-Jazeera have given them a picture of the world which is frequently distorted by institutional prejudices and sensationalism.

Against this backdrop, consider what the people in the Arab world have been able to watch in recent weeks on Alhurra television. For 3 consecutive days last week, Alhurra broadcast live sessions of the Iraqi National Congress in Baghdad. Iraqis observed their representatives freely debating the future of their nation, democracy in action, in stark contrast to the repression they had experienced before.

These broadcasts were not restricted to the people of Iraq. Throughout the Arab world, people were able to see that freedom and democracy can exist within a Muslim country, that universal values can be embraced by Muslim societies.

Daily talk shows on Alhurra which present points of view across the political spectrum, including positions unsympathetic to our own, mean that for the first time people in the Arab world see, hear and participate in the foundations of democracy. We present. You decide.

Alhurra is helping to frame the debate and the focus on issues facing this region. We will not win every argument on every political talk show, but as President Bush has said time and again, in the long run, truth is on our side. Moreover, we believe the very existence of free-flowing debate on Alhurra will encourage people to demand free and open and objective presentations on indigenous Arab outlets throughout that region.

Consider the effects of in-depth Alhurra coverage of the genocide in the Darfur region of the Sudan. Long before the world had come to focus on this tragedy, Alhurra reporting teams were on the scene, which led other Arab media outlets to follow suit and make the events of Darfur a matter of serious concern to all people. The ability to debunk anti-American conspiracy theories by credible Arab thinkers alone were worth the price of U.S.-financed satellite broadcasting. The truth is on our side.

In the midst of all this broadcasting, it is critical that accuracy be our standard. The people of the region aren't stupid. If we're slanting the news, they will figure it out, but if we establish long-term credibility on these broadcasts, people will begin asking questions: What went wrong? What slowed the development of a civilization that was once far ahead of the west? What were the factors behind the crushing absence of economic opportunities for youth in the Arab world? And we will be there to answer them.

Let me turn to Radio Sawa briefly. To me the most striking success of Sawa has been the widespread acceptance of Sawa news and public affairs programming as credible.

We realize the draw to this youth-oriented station is popular music, and when we started, people said, they'll never listen to your news and they'll never take it seriously. Well, according to surveys conducted earlier this year by A.C. Nielsen, Radio Sawa was found to be a reliable source of news and information by 73 percent of its weekly listenership.

In an era when Arab youth systematically boycott American products, they not only have widely accepted U.S.-sponsored entertainment radio, they have accepted its news as accurate and dependable.

I do want to pay tribute to a fellow board member, Democrat Norman Pattiz, the father of Radio Sawa, and an irrepressible force for international broadcasting. Thanks to his spirit and a dedicated core of journalists led by news director Mouafac Harb, Radio Sawa has made a truly historic breakthrough in the Middle East.

And Mr. Chairman, we deeply appreciate the favorable focus on what we've been doing in the 9/11 Commission Report. The report said: "recognizing that Arab and Muslim audiences rely on satellite television and radio, the government has begun some promising initiatives in television and radio broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran, and Afghanistan. These efforts are beginning to reach large audiences. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has asked for much larger resources. It should get them."

We are currently working with the administration on potential radio and television strategies that would give us the same type of impact in the non-Arabic-speaking Muslim world as we're having in the Arabic-speaking Muslim world. We have made a good start.

In Iran, we've built on the popularity of VOA radio with a new 24/7 Radio Farda for the youth which combines the talents of VOA and RFE/RL. We've also had, thanks in no small part to the leadership of board member Blanquita Cullum, a tremendous breakthrough with the Voice of America 30-minute daily TV show in Persian carried by satellite to Iran.

In Pakistan, thanks to the leadership of board member Steve Simmons, one of your constituents, Mr. Chairman, we have ex-

panded Urdu radio from 3 hours a day via a shortwave to 12 hours a day with an AM signal from the region. This 12-hour stream is designed to attract and inform younger listeners.

But we all recognize this is not enough. Our long-term plans include new transmitters and satellite television broadcasting in Pakistan so our programming can be heard in this critical country.

In Afghanistan, BBG entities broadcast 24/7 in Pashto and Dari, the languages of those countries. Research shows that half the people in Afghanistan are listening to us. In Kabul, we have two-third of adults, but as is the case elsewhere in the Islamic world, television is becoming an important medium there.

Iran television is available 24/7 in Afghanistan. We need a television presence there. In other areas of the non-Arabic-speaking world, places like Indonesia and sub-Saharan Africa, the Horn of Africa, we're working to expand our radio and television presence for obvious reasons.

In reflecting on where we want to go with public diplomacy and international broadcasting, we have to understand why we, in so many areas, have found ourselves lacking.

In the decade following the end of the cold war, many believed expenditures for international broadcasting were no longer necessary. U.S. spending for international broadcasting were slashed a very real 40 percent. I would like to provide for the record a copy of this chart that shows what happened to us at the end of the cold war and, very fortunately, what's happened to us because of the Bush administration and Congress in the last 3 years.

Despite the generous support we've received in the past 3 years, however, we are fighting to rebuild from a depleted base. We're struggling to catch up to what we should be doing in these strategic parts of the world.

And we at the BBG have benefited by the creation inside the White House of the Office of Global Communications, as well as an understanding inside the National Security Council of the importance of our broadcast initiatives. There would be no Alhurra Television today had it not been for enthusiastic support from this office and from the NSC for BBG initiatives. Support is critical for our mission, and I cannot stress how much.

Mr. SHAYS. If you can wind up.

Mr. TOMLINSON. I stress the importance of credibility of what we broadcast, and we look forward to answering your questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much for your nice statement as well.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tomlinson follows:]

**Testimony of
Kenneth Y. Tomlinson,
Chairman
Broadcasting Board of Governors before the
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats
and International Relations
Committee on Government Reform
August 23, 2004**

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this important hearing on the 9/11 Commission recommendations on public diplomacy. We welcome your examination of U.S. Government efforts to conduct public diplomacy and to determine the status of efforts to adapt public diplomacy to the post 9/11 world.

Earlier this year, with the enthusiastic support of President Bush and Members of Congress, the Broadcasting Board of Governors launched Alhurra, "The Free One," our new 24-hour-a-day Arabic language television network.

Through direct-to-home satellite communication and terrestrial transmission in Iraq, we are able to broadcast directly to the people of the Middle East over five time zones in 22 countries, from Morocco to Iraq to Yemen.

Our broadcasts will not overnight eliminate the effects of generations of intellectual isolation and neglect so vividly outlined in the classic 2003 United Nations report, [Arab Human Development Report: Building a Knowledge Society] on the dissemination of knowledge in the Arab world. In contemplating what we have to overcome to establish real and substantive dialogue with our neighbors in the Arab world, it is daunting to consider the fact that the aggregate of Western books translated into Arabic since the dawn of publishing amounts to little more than 10,000 books – equivalent to what Spain translates in a single year.

Indeed, the United Nations report concluded that what we have to overcome in the region "is the absence of a strategic vision and societal incentives that provide a solid foundation for knowledge dissemination through education, media, publishing and translation."

The knowledge base for people in the Arab world is further limited by the indisputable fact that the news and information they have received from several popular satellite television – outlets like Al Jazeera – have given them a picture of the world which is frequently distorted by institutional prejudices and sensationalism. Against this backdrop, consider what people in the Arab world have been able to watch in recent weeks on Alhurra television.

For three consecutive days last week, Alhurra broadcast live sessions of the Iraqi National Congress in Baghdad. Iraqis observed their representatives freely debating the future of their nation – democracy in action – in stark contrast to the repression of the regime of Saddam Hussein. These broadcasts were not restricted to the people of Iraq. Throughout the Arab world,

people were able to see that freedom and democracy can exist within a Muslim country, that universal values can be embraced by Muslim societies.

Daily talk shows on Alhurra which present points of view across the political spectrum, including positions unsympathetic to our own, mean that for the first time, people in the Arab world see, hear, and participate in the foundations of democracy: we present, you decide. Alhurra is helping to frame the debate and the focus on issues facing the region. We will not win every argument on every political talk show, but as President Bush has said time and again, in the long run the truth is on our side. Moreover, we believe the very existence of free flowing debate on Alhurra will encourage the people to demand free, open, and objective presentations on indigenous Arab media outlets.

Consider the effects of in-depth Alhurra coverage of the genocide in the Darfur region in the Sudan. Long before the world had come to focus on this tragedy, Alhurra reporting teams were on the scene, which led other Arab media outlets to follow suit and make the events of Darfur a matter of serious concern to all people.

The ability to debunk anti-American conspiracy theories by credible Arab thinkers is worth the price of U.S.-financed satellite broadcasting. The truth is on our side.

In the midst of all this broadcasting, it is critical that accuracy be our standard. The people of the region aren't stupid. If we are slanting the news, they will figure it out. But if we establish long-term credibility on these broadcasts, people will begin to ask questions: What went wrong? What slowed the development of a civilization that once was far ahead of the West? What factors were behind the crushing absence of economic opportunities for youth in the Arab world? And we will be there to answer them.

Let me turn to Radio Sawa. To me, the most striking success of Sawa has been the widespread acceptance of Sawa news and public affairs programming as credible. According to surveys conducted earlier this year by ACNielsen, Radio Sawa was found to be a reliable source of news and information by 73 percent of its weekly listenership. In an era when Arab youth systematically boycott American products, they not only have widely accepted U.S.-sponsored radio, but they also accept its news as accurate and dependable.

I must pay tribute to fellow Board member Norman Pattiz, the father of Radio Sawa and an irrepressible force for international broadcasting. When Mr. Pattiz was in the process of creating Radio Sawa, he traveled throughout the Middle East to negotiate heretofore unattainable agreements for American AM and FM transmitters in Middle Eastern countries so that we could be heard on the radios of choice in the region. Thanks to his spirit – and a dedicated core of journalists led by news director Mouafac Harb – Radio Sawa has made a historic breakthrough in the Middle East.

Mr. Chairman, we deeply appreciate the favorable focus on what we've done in the 9/11 Commission report. The report said: "Recognizing that Arab and Muslim audiences rely on satellite television and radio, the government has begun some promising initiatives in television and radio broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran, and Afghanistan. These efforts are beginning to

reach large audiences. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has asked for much larger resources. It should get them.”

We are currently working with the Administration on potential radio and television strategies that will give us the same type of impact in the non-Arabic-speaking Muslim world as we are having in the Arabic-speaking Muslim world. We have made a good start. In Iran we’ve built on the popularity of VOA radio with the new 24/7 Radio Farda, which combines the talents of RFE/RL and VOA in the region. We have also had, thanks in no small part to the leadership of Board member Blanquita Cullum, a tremendous breakthrough with a new 30-minute daily TV show in Persian carried on VOA to Iran.

In Pakistan, thanks to the leadership of Board member Steve Simmons, we have expanded Urdu radio from three hours a day via shortwave, to 12 hours a day with an AM signal from the region. Called Radio Aap ki Duniya, this 12-hour-daily stream is designed to attract and inform younger radio listeners.

But we all recognize this is not enough. Our long-term plans include seeking new transmitters and satellite television broadcasting in Pakistan, so that our programming can be heard in this critical country. As you know, Pakistan is a leading ally in the Global War on Terrorism, while posing geopolitical challenges through the presence and development of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. In addition, a considerable portion of the population remains sympathetic to Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other religious fundamentalist forces.

In Afghanistan, BBG broadcast entities – Voice of America and Radio Free Europe – broadcast 24/7 in the Pashto and Dari languages. Research shows that half the people in Afghanistan are listening to us. In Kabul, we reach two-thirds of adults.

But as elsewhere in the Islamic world, television is becoming an important medium. Iranian TV is available 24/7 in Afghanistan. We need a television presence there.

In other areas of the non-Arabic speaking Muslim world – places like Indonesia, sub Saharan Africa, the horn of Africa – we’re working to expand our radio and television presence. The 9/11 Commission Report states: “To Muslim parents, terrorists like Bin Laden have nothing to offer their children but visions of violence and death ... we can offer these parents a vision that might give their children a better future.”

In reflecting on where we want to go with public diplomacy and international broadcasting, we have to understand why we, in so many areas, have found ourselves lacking.

In the decade following the end of the Cold War, many believed expenditures for U.S. international broadcasting were no longer necessary. U.S. spending for international broadcasting was slashed a very real 40%. Despite the generous support we have received in the last three years from the Bush administration and the Congress, we are fighting to rebuild from a depleted base. We are struggling to catch up to what we should be doing in strategic parts of the world.

We at the BBG have benefited from the creation inside the White House of the Office of Global Communications, as well as an understanding inside the National Security Council of the importance of our broadcasting initiatives. There would be no Alhurra today had it not been for the early enthusiastic support of the OGC for BBG initiatives. The support, acceptance, and understanding from the leadership of the OGC and the NSC is critical for our mission.

I cannot conclude this testimony without stressing the need for continued journalistic independence for BBG broadcast entities.


I have served in four Administrations in the realm of international broadcasting and this is the first time I have not seen attempts from senior government officials to interfere with our reporting of the news. We're in this for the long haul, not simply to score short-term points.

Thirty years ago, RFE/RL and VOA began broadcasting the Watergate hearings. Those broadcasts caused heartburn for many in Washington, but looking back we see they constituted a veritable civics lesson on the importance of separation of powers and rule of law. Over the years I have heard so many citizens of post-communist countries tell how those broadcasts helped them understand the real meaning of freedom and democracy.

We in America are fortunate that telling the truth works to our long-term advantage. That is why international broadcasting is so important to this country.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my formal statement. I will be happy to answer any questions that your Subcommittee might have.

BBG Funding Overview (\$ thousands)



Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Evers.

Mr. EVERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kucinich, Mr. Turner and Mr. Platts. I want to thank you on behalf of our chairman, Barbara Barrett, and the five other members of the bipartisan U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy for this opportunity to share my thoughts on the successes achieved by and the challenges facing U.S. public diplomacy.

The members of our commission are currently preparing the final version of our annual report for its release on September 28th. The report reviews areas of public diplomacy previously identified as challenges, recent progresses and areas that still need to be addressed.

Today I hope to present some of these challenges and advances to you and to address the recommendations presented in the 9/11 Commission Report.

Specifically, I'll focus on five areas.

The first is broadcasting, and Mr. Tomlinson here gave a very good rundown of what they're doing. The 9/11 Commission Report recommends that they get more resources. Radio Sawa was launched in March 2002 and is already achieving large listening audiences. In addition, Alhurra is doing the same and it's a great advancement in the satellite network arena that we were previously not competing in.

We also believe that broadcasting English language programs establishes a mutually beneficial relationship with audiences that few other public diplomacy programs can match. Learning American English through programs like VOA Special English builds physiological bonds and deeper cultural understanding while giving listeners tools they need to succeed in the world.

Yet these programs, despite being popular and efficient, are restricted by budget constraints. We would echo the 9/11 Commission Report that they receive more funding.

The 9/11 Commission Report remarked on the sad state of our exchange and library programs. American exchange and library programs, though they may not show results for years, are essential to fostering support of the United States among opinion leaders.

Physical public diplomacy outposts staffed and owned by the United States present prime targets for terrorists throughout the globe. The Pallazzo Corpi, a former American consulate and library in Istanbul, Turkey, located in the city center, was targeted at least six times by terrorists until it was closed last year.

Newer programs, like American Corners, Virtual Presence Posts, Information Resource Centers and others, provide similar functions while addressing security concerns.

Over the past year, the Department of State has significantly ramped up its investment in American Corners and Virtual Presence Posts. There are now 143 American Corners in Africa, south Asia, east Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East and plans to open another 130 in 2004.

The e-Diplomacy Office administers the Virtual Presence Posts while the Bureau of International Information Programs administers American Corners. American Presence Posts are designated by individual missions and must receive approval from Congress.

We believe these programs should be assembled under one cohesive and comprehensive task force, and cumbersome procedures such as congressional approval should be streamlined.

As it comes to the message and how we coordinate America's message, we believe that in this global 24-hour communications environment, messages from the U.S. Government to the world are not all communicated by the State Department. We have messages from the White House, DOD, the CIA, FBI, Homeland Security and Congress. Without coordination of these communications, the U.S. Government misses the magnifying effect that a unified message could have on overseas publics or, worse, shows inconsistencies that cause credibility.

No comprehensive inventory across agencies of all government public diplomacy programs and activities has ever been conducted. The sum of the public diplomacy budgets of these various agencies is probably in the billions of dollars. Such an evaluation might show where efforts should be expanded, combined or eliminated, particularly useful in an environment of scarce resources.

There are several initiatives that have attempted to better coordinate public diplomacy efforts recently. The International Public Information Core team, better known as Fusion Team, provides information-sharing capabilities for the varied government agencies involved in public diplomacy through a list serve and weekly meetings. Another coordinating body, the Office of Global Communications, or OGC, was established in January 2003 within the White House to coordinate strategic daily messages for distribution abroad with the long-term goal of developing a national communications strategy. The OGC works with several hundred foreign journalists in Washington, providing them with access to the White House events and briefings, as well as interviews with the President and other top officials.

The Public Diplomacy Policy Coordination Committee [PCC], was established in September 2002 and is cochaired by the National Security Council and State Department. It ensures that all agencies work together to develop and disseminate America's messages across the globe. These two groups work together on strategic communications activities such as outreach to the Muslim world.

The creation of these mechanisms is not enough. They must also be fully utilized and developed through an interagency strategic communication plan that clearly identifies messages, priorities, and target audiences.

We also agree with an important recommendation of the Commission that we test these programs, all programs. We believe that focus groups and public opinion research needs to be involved at the beginning and at the end of exchange programs and in how we deliver our message.

In conclusion, as numerous reports including the 9/11 report have attested, public diplomacy needs to be a national security priority. International public opinion is influential in the success of public policy objectives, and adequate resource allocation for public diplomacy will determine success in the areas I have mentioned today.

The commission is pleased to see this concept being recognized and looks forward to working with the administration and Con-

gress toward achieving a better American dialog with the world.
Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Evers.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Evers follows:]

Tré Evers

Commissioner
United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy

Testimony
to the Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations
United States House of Representatives

Monday, August 23, 2004

Chairman Shays and distinguished members of this subcommittee, I want to thank you on behalf of our Chairman Barbara Barrett, and the five other members of the bipartisan U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy for this opportunity to share my thoughts on the successes achieved by and the challenges facing U.S. public diplomacy.

The members of my commission are currently preparing the final version of our annual report for its release on September 28th. The report reviews areas of public diplomacy previously identified as challenges, recent progress, and areas that still need to be addressed. Today, I hope to present some of these challenges and advances to you and to address the recommendations presented in the 9/11 Commission report. Specifically, I will focus on five areas: broadcasting, exchanges and libraries, international youth opportunity fund, coordination of America's message, and how to measure success.

Broadcasting

The 9/11 Commission report made the following recommendation on international broadcasting: "Recognizing that Arab and Muslim audiences rely on satellite television and radio, the government has begun some promising initiatives in television and radio broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran, and Afghanistan. These efforts are beginning to reach large audiences. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has asked for much larger resources. It should get them."

Bringing accurate and objective news and information to audiences in the Middle East is vital to counter myths about the United States and provide alternatives to Islamic extremism in the region. The U.S. held no effective presence in Middle Eastern media until recently. Broadcasting in the region was largely unprofitable for the private sector and undervalued by government agencies. Thus, media organizations with attitudes unfavorable to U.S. policies largely dominated the public sphere in countries where such sentiments were already widespread.

My friend Ken Tomlinson will certainly address the important issues in international broadcasting for you. I will simply highlight a few areas where the Commission has noted progress and challenges.

Radio Sawa was launched in March of 2002. Recent surveys have shown that the percentage of adults listening to Sawa on a weekly basis are: 73 percent in Morocco, 42 percent in Kuwait, 35 percent in UAE, 27 percent in Jordan, 11 percent in Egypt, and 41 percent in Qatar.¹ In addition, Alhurra, the new Middle East satellite network is a great advancement. Despite accusations that American broadcasting in the region was unlikely to succeed, initial surveys regarding the network are promising.

Satellite broadcasting has changed the international media landscape. Satellite technology now allows broadcasters to instantly reach audiences all over the globe even in areas that lack terrestrial broadcast infrastructures. Satellite broadcasting has seen exponential growth in the Middle East. Nilesat, the most popular satellite distributor in the Middle East doubled

¹ http://www.bbg.gov/bbg_news.cfm?articleID=112&mode=general

its household reach from 2003 to 2004. Where appropriate, these technologies should be further developed and employed.

Broadcasting English language programs establishes a mutually beneficial relationship with audiences that few other public diplomacy programs can match. Learning American English through programs like VOA's Special English builds psychological bonds and deeper cultural understanding while giving listeners tools they need to succeed in the world.

Yet these programs, despite being popular and efficient, are restricted by budget constraints. Despite increases in programming from 20 hours to 23.5 hours a week from FY2003 to FY2004, their budget increased only marginally.

Highly efficient initiatives, like Radio Sawa, Alhurra, and VOA English programs, should certainly receive adequate funding.

Exchanges and Libraries

The 9/11 Commission report has also remarked on the sad state of our exchange and library programs, noting, "The United States should rebuild the scholarship, exchange, and library programs that reach out to young people and offer them knowledge and hope."

American exchange and library programs, though they may not show results for years, are essential to fostering support for the United States. Exchanges seek to establish the trust, confidence, and international cooperation with other countries that sustain and advance the full range of American national interests. Prominent alumni of these programs, such as Tony Blair and Hamid Karzai, are a testimony to the programs' importance.

There is an increased perception that U.S. borders are no longer open to friendly students and visitors. Populations overseas believe that waiting time for visas has increased while in reality they have decreased. Last year, the wait time for students and scholars who require special clearances averaged two months. Now, 80 percent of these visas are issued within three weeks. The U.S. needs to streamline procedures while communicating the "secure borders, open doors" message.

Physical, face-to-face exchange is also conducted through five types of American information centers: American Corners, Virtual Presence Posts, Information Resource Centers, American Presence Posts, and a few remaining American Centers or Libraries.

The remaining American Centers or Libraries are slated for closure due to heightened security concerns. In Mexico City and Casablanca, these centers see tremendous success by hosting English language programs, American films and Internet access. By reaching out to non-elite youth populations, these centers have been transformed from mere libraries into truly modern day "American dialogue centers."

Physical public diplomacy outposts staffed and owned by the United States present prime targets for terrorists throughout the globe. The Pallazzo Corpi, a former American Consulate and Library in Istanbul, Turkey, located in the city center, was targeted at least six times by terrorists until it closed last year.

Newer programs— American Corners, Virtual Presence Posts, Information Resource Centers, and American Presence Posts— provide similar functions while addressing security concerns. Over the past year, the Department of State has significantly ramped up its investment in American Corners and Virtual Presence Posts. There are now 143 American Corners in Africa, South Asia, East Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East and plans to open another 130 in 2004.

Each of these programs is the result of entrepreneurship of different State Department offices. The e-Diplomacy office administers the Virtual Presence Posts while the bureau of International Information Programs administers American Corners. American Presence Posts are designated by individual missions and must receive approval from Congress. To direct these programs with maximum effectiveness, they should be assembled under one cohesive and comprehensive task force and cumbersome procedures such as Congressional approval should be streamlined.

International Youth Opportunity Fund

The 9/11 Commission also recommended that, "The U.S. government should offer to join with other nations in generously supporting a new International Youth Opportunity Fund. Funds will be spent directly for building and operating primary and secondary schools in those Muslim states that commit to sensibly investing their own money in public education."

Education in the Middle East is a tremendous challenge. Lack of teacher training, high pupil/teacher ratio and lack of access all contribute to the widespread illiteracy in the region. Deficiencies in skills and education can lead to large numbers of unemployed and unemployable, which, in turn, can lead to unstable situations that breed hate and terrorism.

USAID is the primary U.S. government agency that funds schools and teacher training. Because an American presence is not welcomed or presents too great a security risk, USAID only provides educational support in Iraq, Egypt, Yemen, Morocco, and Afghanistan. The international youth opportunity fund could overcome these challenges and may well present a great opportunity for America to work with other nations to improve educational opportunities in the Middle East.

Coordination and Message

In this global, 24-hour communications environment, messages from the U.S. government to the world are not all communicated by the State Department. Messages emanate from the White House, the Department of Defense, the CIA, the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and even Congress. Without coordination of these communications, the U.S. government misses the magnifying effect that a unified message could have on overseas publics, or worse, shows inconsistencies that cost credibility.

No comprehensive inventory across agencies of all government public diplomacy programs and activities has ever been conducted. The sum of the public diplomacy budgets of these various agencies is probably in the billions of dollars. Such an evaluation might show where efforts should be expanded, combined or eliminated, particularly useful in an environment of scarce resources.

Several initiatives have attempted to better coordinate public diplomacy efforts. International Public Information Core Group, better known as the Fusion Team, provides information sharing capabilities for the varied government agencies involved in public diplomacy through a list serve and weekly meetings. Another coordinating body, the Office of Global Communications or OGC was established in January 2003 within the White House to coordinate strategic daily messages for distribution abroad, with the long-term goal of developing a National Communications Strategy. The OGC works with several hundred foreign journalists in Washington, providing them with access to White House events and briefings as well as interviews with the president and other top officials.

The public diplomacy Policy Coordination Committee or PCC was established in September of 2002 and is co-chaired by the National Security Council and the State Department. It ensures that all agencies work together to develop and disseminate America's messages across the globe. These two groups work together on strategic communications activities such as outreach to the Muslim world.

The creation of these mechanisms is not enough. They must also be more fully utilized and developed through an interagency strategic communications plan that clearly identifies messages, priorities, and target audiences.

Measurement

One of the most important recommendations from the 9/11 Commission is their observations on the need for measurement in public diplomacy. "Agencies need to be able to measure success. Targets should be specific enough so that reasonable observers—in the White House, Congress, the media, or the general public—can judge whether or not the objectives have been obtained."

Understanding audiences and their views through measurement is essential to crafting effective messages. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. government spends only a tiny fraction of what the private sector does on public opinion polling: \$5 million compared to \$6 billion.

One way to assess program effectiveness might be through an evaluation of a test region. The selected region would receive increased funding for a variety of public diplomacy programs structured around a cohesive strategy and funded through supplemental funding from Congress. Using standard polling procedures as well as qualitative analysis, public perceptions would be measured at regular intervals and at the beginning and end of the initiative. If perceptions moved in a positive trajectory, the approach could be replicated in other areas and eventually expanded globally.

Conclusion

As numerous reports including the 9/11 report have attested, public diplomacy needs to be a national security priority. International public opinion is influential in the success of foreign policy objectives and adequate resource allocation for public diplomacy will determine success in the areas I've mentioned today. The Commission is pleased to see this concept being recognized and looks forward to working with the Administration and Congress toward achieving a better American dialogue with the world.

Thank you, and I am now pleased to answer any of your questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Ford.

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. I'm pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's recent work on U.S. public diplomacy and international broadcasting with a specific focus on the Middle East and the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.

The terrorist attacks of September 11 were a dramatic reminder of the importance of cultivating a favorable public opinion of the United States abroad. Recent opinion research indicates that foreign publics, especially in countries with large Muslim populations, view the United States unfavorably.

Today my testimony will highlight our findings that are relevant to the specific 9/11 Commission recommendations to increase the support for broadcasting to Arabs and Muslims and to rebuild our scholarship, exchange, and library programs overseas and to better define U.S. public diplomacy message.

Since September 11, 2001, both the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, have expanded their public diplomacy efforts in Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in the war on terrorism. In the two fiscal years since the terrorist attacks, the State Department has increased its public diplomacy funding and staffing and expanded its programs in two regions with significant Muslim populations, south Asia and the Near East.

Among other efforts, the State Department is emphasizing exchange programs targeting young and diverse audiences, including high school students. State is also expanding its American Corners program which provides information about the United States to foreign audiences through partnerships between U.S. Embassies and local institutions. These efforts are consistent with the 9/11 Commission Report recommendation that the United States build this scholarship, exchange and library programs for young people.

In addition, since September 11, the Broadcasting Board of Governors has initiated several new programs focusing on attracting large audiences in priority markets, including Radio Sawa in the Middle East, the Afghanistan Radio Network, Radio Farda in Iran, and recently the Arab language satellite network called Alhurra.

The 9/11 Commission Report endorses the Board's request for additional resources to expand its broadcast efforts targeted to Arabs and Muslims. However, although board research indicates that these initiatives have garnered sizable audiences, it's unclear whether the program content is changing audience attitudes or increasing knowledge and awareness of issues of strategic interest to the United States.

In September 2003, we reported that the U.S. Government lacked an interagency public diplomacy strategy that defines the message and means for governmentwide communication efforts targeted at overseas audiences. The 9/11 Commission Report recommended that the United States do a better job of defining its public diplomacy message. Because of their differing roles and missions, the State Department, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and others often focus on different audiences and use varying means to communicate with them.

An interagency strategy would provide a framework for considering the foreign publics in key countries and regions relevant to U.S. national security interests. The U.S. Government communication channel is available in the optimal ways to convey communication themes and messages.

We also reported that the State Department does not have a strategy to integrate its diverse public diplomacy activities and directs them toward common objectives, and that neither the State nor the BBG had focused on measuring progress toward long-term goals.

The absence of an integrated strategy may hinder State's ability to channel its multifaceted programs toward concrete, measurable progress. We made several recommendations addressing planning and performance issues that the Secretary of State and the Board of Broadcasting Governors had agreed to implement. We recommended that the State Department develop a strategy that considers the use of public sector/private relations techniques to integrate its public diplomacy efforts, improve performance measurements, and strengthen efforts to train Foreign Service officers in foreign languages and public diplomacy.

Among GAO's recommendations to the BBG were that the board revise its strategic plan to include audience size and other key measurable program objectives. In response to our recommendations, the State Department has recently established a new Office of Strategic Planning for Public Diplomacy and is considering how to adopt the public sector techniques in its programs.

Regarding our recommendation to strengthen performance measurement efforts, State Department officials have indicated that they're exploring ways to do so, and that among other things, they hoped to do more pre- and post-testing of their exchange programs.

The State Department acknowledged the need to strengthen the training of Foreign Service officers and told us that the primary obstacle to doing so was insufficient staffing to allow for training. Officials said they have already begun to address staffing gaps by stepping up recruitment efforts.

In response to our recommendations to the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the board has revised its strategic plan to create a single strategic goal of maximizing impact in priority areas, including the Middle East.

In conclusion, the 9/11 Commission Report recommendations designed to better integrate and focus U.S. public diplomacy efforts are consistent with our past findings and conclusions and recommendations, and they should be fully considered by the executive branch and the Congress.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, House Committee
on Government Reform

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U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

**State Department and
Broadcasting Board of
Governors Expand Post-
9/11 Efforts but Challenges
Remain**

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director
International Affairs and Trade



August 23, 2004

U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

State Department and Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Post-9/11 Efforts but Challenges Remain



Highlights of GAO-04-1061T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations; Committee on Government Reform; House of Representatives

Why GAO Did This Study

Polls taken in Islamic countries after 9/11 suggested that many or most people had a favorable view of the United States and its fight against terrorism. By 2003, opinion research indicated that foreign publics, especially in countries with large Muslim populations, viewed the United States unfavorably. GAO issued two studies in 2003 that examined (1) changes in U.S. public diplomacy resources and programs since September 11, 2001, within the State Department (State) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG); (2) the U.S. government's strategies for its public diplomacy programs and measures of effectiveness; and (3) the challenges that remain in executing U.S. public diplomacy efforts.

GAO made several recommendations to State and the BBG to address planning and performance issues. Both agencies agreed with these recommendations and have made some progress in implementing them.

On July 22, 2004, the 9/11 Commission released its report and recommendations. Two of the Commission's recommendations relate to the management of U.S. public diplomacy. For this testimony, GAO was asked to discuss its prior work as it relates to these recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1061T.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found

Since September 11, 2001, State has expanded its public diplomacy efforts in Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in the war on terrorism. It significantly increased resources in South Asia and the Near East and launched new initiatives targeting broader, younger audiences—particularly in predominantly Muslim countries. These initiatives are consistent with the 9/11 Commission's recommendation that the United States rebuild its scholarship, library, and exchange programs overseas. Since 9/11, the BBG has initiated several new programs focused on attracting larger audiences in priority markets, including Radio Sawa and Arabic language television in the Middle East, the Afghanistan Radio Network, and Radio Farda in Iran. The 9/11 Commission report highlights these broadcast efforts and recommends that funding for such efforts be expanded.

While State and BBG have increased their efforts to support the war on terrorism, we found that there is no interagency strategy to guide State's, BBG's, and other federal agencies' communication efforts. The absence of such a strategy complicates the task of conveying consistent messages to overseas audiences. Likewise, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the United States do a better job defining its public diplomacy message. In addition, we found that State does not have a strategy that integrates and aligns all its diverse public diplomacy activities. State, noting the need to fix the problem, recently established a new office of strategic planning for public diplomacy. The BBG did have a strategic plan, but the plan lacked a long-term strategic goal or related program objective to gauge the Board's success in increasing audience size, the key focus of its plan. We also found that State and the BBG were not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward the goals of reaching broader audiences and increasing publics' understanding about the United States. The BBG subsequently made audience size a key performance goal and added broadcaster credibility and plans to add other performance measures that GAO recommended.

In addition, State and BBG face several internal challenges in carrying out their programs. Challenges at State include insufficient public diplomacy resources and a lack of officers with foreign language proficiency. State officials are trying to address staffing gaps through increased recruitment. The BBG also faces a number of media market, organizational, and resource challenges that may hamper its efforts to generate large audiences in priority markets. It has developed a number of solutions to address these challenges.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's issued work on U.S. public diplomacy efforts and to focus specifically on the Middle East and related recommendations by the 9/11 Commission report. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were a dramatic reminder of the importance of cultivating a favorable public opinion of the United States abroad. Recent opinion research indicates that foreign publics, especially in countries with large Muslim populations, view the United States unfavorably. Last September, we reported to the House International Relations Committee on the State Department's public diplomacy efforts.¹ In July 2003, we issued a report for that committee on the progress that the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)—the agency responsible for nonmilitary U.S. international broadcasting—has made in developing a new strategic approach to reverse declining audience trends and support U.S. strategic objectives such as the war on terrorism.² The Department of State and the BBG share an annual budget of more than \$1 billion for public diplomacy activities. While neither of our reports focused exclusively on the Middle East, each identified systemic problems that would apply to public diplomacy activities there.

Mr. Chairman, on February 10, 2004, I testified before you and this Subcommittee on public diplomacy.³ Today, I will present a similar statement updated in light of the 9/11 Commission recommendations on public diplomacy. I will address (1) changes in U.S. public diplomacy resources and programs since September 11, 2001; (2) the government's strategies for its public diplomacy programs and measures of effectiveness; and (3) the challenges that remain in executing U.S. public diplomacy efforts. My testimony will highlight our findings that are relevant to specific 9/11 Commission recommendations to (1) rebuild our scholarship, exchange, and library programs overseas, and increase

¹GAO, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges*, GAO-03-951 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2003).

²GAO, *U.S. International Broadcasting: New Strategic Approach Focuses on Reaching Large Audience but Lacks Measurable Program Objectives*, GAO-03-772 (Washington, D.C.: July 2003).

³GAO, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Efforts in the Middle East but Face Significant Challenges*, GAO-04-438T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 2004).

support for broadcasting to Arabs and Muslims; and (2) better define the U.S.'s public diplomacy message.

As part of our past work underpinning our issued reports, we surveyed top officials of public affairs sections at U.S. embassies worldwide on such issues as guidance from various State Department offices; sufficiency of budgetary, staff, and other resources; and ability to adequately measure performance.⁴ We met with relevant State officials, members of the BBG, and senior members of each broadcast entity to discuss management issues. We also met with academics specializing in public diplomacy and international affairs issues, and private sector officials from U.S. public relations and opinion research firms with international operations. While several government entities conduct public diplomacy activities, my comments will focus on State's and BBG's efforts since they were the subject of our work.

Summary

Since September 11, 2001, both State and the BBG have expanded their public diplomacy efforts in Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in the war on terrorism. In the 2 fiscal years since the terrorist attacks, State has increased its public diplomacy funding and staffing and expanded its programs in two regions with significant Muslim populations—South Asia and the Near East. Among other efforts, State is emphasizing exchange programs targeting young and diverse audiences, including high school students. State is also expanding its American Corners program, which provides information about the United States to foreign audiences through partnerships between U.S. embassies and local institutions. These efforts are consistent with the 9/11 Commission report recommendation that the United States rebuild its scholarship, exchange, and library programs for young people. In addition, since September 11, 2001, the Broadcasting Board of Governors has initiated several new programs focusing on attracting larger audiences in priority markets, including Radio Sawa in the Middle East, the Afghanistan Radio Network, and Radio Farda in Iran. Estimated start-up and recurring costs for these three projects through fiscal year 2003 totaled about \$116 million. The Board also launched an Arabic language television network (Alhurra) in mid-February 2004. The 9/11 Commission report endorses Board requests for additional resources to expand its broadcast efforts targeted at Arabs

⁴GAO surveyed 156 public affairs officers from March through May 2003; of these, 118 responded for a 76-percent response rate.

and Muslims. However, although Board research indicates that these initiatives have garnered sizeable audiences, it is unclear whether program content is changing audience attitudes or increasing knowledge and awareness of issues of strategic interest to the United States.

In September 2003, GAO reported that the U.S. government lacks an interagency public diplomacy strategy that defines the messages and means for governmentwide communication efforts targeted at overseas audiences. Likewise, the 9/11 Commission report recommended that the United States do a better job of defining its public diplomacy message. Because of their differing roles and missions, the State Department, Department of Defense, USAID, and others often focus on different audiences and use varying means to communicate with them. An interagency strategy would provide a framework for considering the foreign publics in key countries and regions, the relevant U.S. national security interests there, the U.S. government communication channels available, and optimal ways to convey the desired communication themes and messages. We also reported that State does not have a strategy that integrates its diverse public diplomacy activities and directs them toward common objectives, and that neither State nor the BBG has focused on measuring progress toward long-term goals. The absence of an integrated strategy may hinder State's ability to channel its multifaceted programs toward concrete and measurable progress. Finally, State is not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward its public diplomacy goals and thus has a limited ability to correct its course of action or direct resources toward activities that offer a greater likelihood of success. In comparison, the Broadcasting Board of Governors in July 2001 initiated a 5-year strategic approach to international broadcasting known as "Marrying the Mission to the Market," which emphasizes the need to reach large audiences by applying modern broadcast techniques and strategically allocating resources to focus on high-priority broadcast markets, such as the Middle East. However, we found that this plan lacked a long-term strategic goal or related program objective to gauge the Board's success in increasing audience size. Further, there were no measurable program objectives to support the plan's strategic goals or to provide a basis for assessing the Board's performance with regard to changing audience views toward the United States.

In addition, State and BBG face several internal challenges in carrying out their programs. According to public affairs officers at the State Department, these challenges include insufficient resources to effectively conduct public diplomacy and a lack of public diplomacy officers with foreign language proficiency. More than 40 percent of the public affairs

officers we surveyed said that the time available to devote exclusively to public diplomacy tasks was insufficient, and more than 50 percent reported that the number of Foreign Service officers available to perform such tasks was inadequate. Further, about 21 percent of the officers posted overseas in language designated positions have not attained the level of language speaking proficiency required for their positions, hampering their ability to engage with foreign publics. In addition, about 58 percent of the heads of embassy public affairs sections reported that Foreign Service officers do not have adequate time for training in the skills required to effectively conduct public diplomacy. The Broadcasting Board of Governors also faces resource issues, as well as a number of media market, organizational, and resource challenges that may hamper its efforts to generate large audiences in priority markets. These challenges include outmoded programs and poor signal quality; the disparate structure of the agency, which consists of seven separate broadcast entities and a mix of federal and grantee organizations collectively managed by a part-time Board; and the resource-intensive job of broadcasting 97 language services to more than 125 broadcast markets worldwide. The Board has developed a number of solutions to address these challenges.

GAO made several recommendations addressing planning and performance issues that the Secretary of State and the BBG have agreed to implement. GAO recommended that State develop a strategy that considers the use of private sector public relations techniques to integrate its public diplomacy efforts, improve performance measurement, and strengthen efforts to train Foreign Service officers in foreign languages and public diplomacy. Among GAO's recommendations to the BBG were that the Board revise its strategic plan to include audience size and other key measurable program objectives, implementation strategies, resource requirements, and project time frames, as well as a clear vision of the Board's intended scope of operations, particularly plans to reduce overlap.⁹ In response to our recommendation that State develop a strategy that considers private sector techniques, State agreed, but no such strategy has been developed to date. However, State has begun the process of establishing a new office of strategic planning for public diplomacy. Regarding our recommendation to strengthen performance measurement efforts, State officials said that they are exploring ways to do so and

⁹We reported overlap in 55 percent of the BBG's language services, meaning more than one service was reaching the same target audience in the same language.

State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs has, among other things, begun conducting limited pre- and post-testing of its program participants' understanding of the United States. State acknowledged the need to strengthen training of Foreign Service officers and told us that the primary obstacle to doing so is insufficient staffing to allow time for training. Officials said they have already begun to address staffing gaps by stepping up recruitment efforts as part of the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative. In response to our recommendations to the BBG, the Board has revised its strategic plan to create a single strategic goal of maximizing impact in priority areas of interest and has made audience size a key performance measure. The Board has added broadcast credibility and audience awareness to its array of performance measures and plans to add a measure to determine whether its broadcasting entities are achieving their mission. Finally, the Board recently completed a review of language service overlap that identified about \$9.7 million in potential savings. However, the Board has yet to revise its strategic plan to include details on implementation strategies, resource requirements, and project time frames for the various initiatives supporting its strategic goal of maximizing program impact.


Background

The key objectives of U.S. public diplomacy are to engage, inform, and influence overseas audiences. Public diplomacy is carried out through a wide range of programs that employ person-to-person contacts; print, broadcast, and electronic media; and other means. Traditionally, U.S. public diplomacy focused on foreign elites—current and future overseas opinion leaders, agenda setters, and decision makers. However, the dramatic growth in global mass communications and other trends have forced a rethinking of this approach, and State has begun to consider techniques for communicating with broader foreign audiences. The BBG, as the overseer of U.S. international broadcasting efforts, supports U.S. public diplomacy's key objectives by broadcasting fair and accurate information about the United States, while maintaining its journalistic independence as a news organization. The BBG manages and oversees the Voice of America (VOA), WorldNet Television, Radio/TV Marti, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Farda, the Middle East Television Network (which consists of Radio Sawa and Alhurra, the Board's new Arabic language television station), the Afghanistan Radio Network, and Radio Free Asia. Radio Sawa, Alhurra, and Radio Farda (Iran), provide regional and local news to countries in the Middle East.

Together, State and the BBG spend in excess of \$1 billion on public diplomacy programs each year. State's public diplomacy budget totaled an

estimated \$628 million in fiscal year 2004. About 51 percent, or \$320 million, is slated for the Fulbright and other educational and cultural exchange programs. The remainder covers mostly salaries and expenses incurred by State and embassy officers engaged in information dissemination, media relations, cultural affairs, speaker programs, publications, and other activities. BBG's budget for fiscal year 2004 is \$546 million. This includes more than \$42 million for radio and television broadcasting to the Middle East. Since initiating the language service review process in 1999, the Board has reduced the scope of operations of more than 25 language services and reallocated about \$19.7 million in funds, with the majority redirected toward Central Asia and the Middle East, including \$3 million for Radio Farda service to Iran.

Figure 1: Key Uses of U.S. Public Diplomacy Budget Resources for State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Fiscal Year 2003 Estimates



Source: State Department and BBG.

*Estimate includes \$11 million for Radio Sawa.

^bEstimate includes \$3 million for Radio Farda.

More Public Diplomacy Resources Shifting to Muslim- Majority Countries

Since September 11, 2001, State has expanded its efforts in Muslim-majority countries that are considered strategically important in the war on terrorism. State significantly increased the program funding and number of Foreign Service officers in its bureaus of South Asian and Near Eastern Affairs. State has also launched a number of new initiatives targeting broader, younger audiences—particularly in predominantly Muslim countries—that include expanding exchange programs targeting citizens of Muslim countries, informing foreign publics about U.S. policies in the war on terrorism, and demonstrating that Americans and Muslims share certain values. The BBG has also targeted recent initiatives to support the war on terrorism, including Radio Sawa in the Middle East; the Afghanistan Radio Network; and the new Radio Farda service to Iran. In addition, the Board expanded its presence in the Middle East through the launch of the Alhurra satellite television network in mid-February 2004. The 9/11 Commission recommended that the United States rely on such programs and activities to vigorously defend our ideals abroad, just as the United States did during the Cold War.

State Has Increased Resources and Programs in the Middle East

Since September 11, 2001, the State Department has increased its resources and launched various new initiatives in predominantly Muslim countries. For example, while State's bureau of Europe and Eurasia still receives the largest overall share of overseas public diplomacy resources, the largest percentage increases in such resources since September 11 occurred in State's bureaus of South Asian and Near Eastern Affairs, where many countries have significant Muslim populations.⁶ Public diplomacy funding increased in South Asia from \$24 million to \$39 million and in the Near East from \$39 million to \$62 million, or by 63 and 58 percent, respectively, from fiscal year 2001 through 2003. During the same period, authorized American Foreign Service officers in South Asia increased from 27 to 31 and in the Near East from 45 to 57, or by 15 percent and 27 percent, respectively.

Furthermore, in 2002, State redirected 5 percent of its exchange resources to better support the war on terrorism and to strengthen U.S. engagement with Muslim countries. In 2003, State has continued to emphasize exchanges with Muslim countries through its Partnership for Learning

⁶These countries include Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

Program—designed to target young and diverse audiences through academic and professional exchanges such as the Fulbright, International Visitor, and Citizen Exchange programs. According to State, under this program, 170 high school students from predominantly Islamic countries have already arrived and are living with American families and studying at local high schools. State has also carried out increased exchanges through its Middle East Partnership Initiative, which includes computer and English language training for women newly employed by the Afghan government and a program to assist women from Arab countries and elsewhere in observing and discussing the U.S. electoral process. In addition, State is expanding its American Corners program, as recommended by the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy in October 2003.⁷ This program uses space in public libraries and other public buildings abroad to provide information about the United States. In fiscal year 2004, State is planning to establish 58 American Corners in the East and South Asia. In fiscal year 2005, State plans to open 10 in Afghanistan and 15 in Iraq.

State's Office of International Information Programs has also developed new initiatives to support the war on terrorism, including a print and electronic pamphlet titled *The Network of Terrorism*, distributed in 36 languages via hard copy, the Web, and media throughout the world, which documented the direct link between the September 11 perpetrators and al Qaeda; and a publication titled *Iraq: From Fear to Freedom* to inform foreign audiences of the administration's policies toward Iraq.

New BBG Initiatives Target Large Audiences in Priority Markets

Several of the BBG's new initiatives focus on reaching large audiences in priority markets and supporting the war on terrorism. The first of these programs, Radio Sawa in the Middle East, was launched in March 2002 using modern, market-tested broadcasting techniques and practices, such as the extensive use of music formats. Radio Sawa replaced the poorly performing VOA Arabic service, which had listening rates at around 2 percent of the population. According to BBG survey research, Radio Sawa is reaching 51 percent of its target audience and is ranked highest for news and news trustworthiness in Amman, Jordan. Despite such results, it remains unclear how many people Radio Sawa reaches throughout the entire Middle East because audience research has been performed only in

⁷Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, *Changing Minds Winning Peace* (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2003).

selected markets. Further, the State Inspector General and the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have raised questions about whether Radio Sawa has focused more on audience size and composition than on potential impact on attitudes in the region. The BBG has also launched the Afghanistan Radio Network and a language service to Iran called Radio Farda. Estimated costs for these three initiatives through fiscal year 2003 are about \$116 million. In addition, the Board started Alhurra, an Arabic language television network in the Middle East, in mid-February 2004.

**Planning Deficiencies,
Inability to Gauge
Progress Toward
Goals Hinder U.S.
Public Diplomacy
Efforts**

While the growth in programs to the Muslim world marks the recognition of the need to increase diplomatic channels to this population, there still is no interagency strategy to guide State's and all federal agencies' communication efforts and ensure consistent messages to overseas audiences. In addition, as of June 2004, State still lacked a comprehensive and commonly understood public diplomacy strategy to guide its programs. We agree with the 9/11 Commission recommendation that the U.S. government must define its message. State also is not systematically or comprehensively measuring progress toward its public diplomacy goals. In addition, we found that, although BBG has a strategic plan, the plan lacks a long-term strategic goal or related program objective to gauge the Board's success in increasing audience size. Further, the BBG's plan contains no measurable program objectives to support the plan's strategic goals or to provide a basis for assessing the Board's performance. Since our report, however, the Board revised its strategic plan and has improved its ability to gauge its program effectiveness measures by adding broadcast credibility and audience awareness measures. The Board also plans to add additional performance measures, such as whether broadcast entities are achieving their mandated missions.

**Interagency Public
Diplomacy Strategy Has
Not Been Established**

No interagency public diplomacy strategy has been implemented that lays out the messages and means for governmentwide communication efforts to overseas audiences. The absence of an interagency strategy complicates the task of conveying consistent messages and thus achieving mutually reinforcing benefits. State officials told us that, without such a strategy, the risk of making communication mistakes that are damaging to U.S. public diplomacy efforts is high. They also said that the lack of a strategy diminishes the efficiency and effectiveness of governmentwide public diplomacy efforts.

Our fieldwork in Egypt and Morocco underlined the importance of interagency coordination. Embassy officers there told us that only a very small percentage of the population was aware of the magnitude of U.S. assistance provided to their countries. Egypt is the second largest recipient of U.S. assistance in the world, with assistance totaling more than an estimated \$1.9 billion in 2003. Assistance to Morocco totaled more than \$13 million in 2003.

Most interagency communication coordination efforts have been ad hoc in recent years. Immediately after September 11, 2001, the White House, State Department, Department of Defense, and other agencies coordinated various public diplomacy efforts on a day-to-day basis, and the White House established a number of interim coordination mechanisms. One such mechanism was the joint operation of the Coalition Information Centers in Washington, London, and Islamabad, set up during the early stages of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan in 2001. The centers were designed to provide a rapid response capability for correcting inaccurate news stories, proactively dealing with news items likely to generate negative responses overseas, and optimizing reporting of news favorable to U.S. efforts.

In January 2003, the President established a more permanent coordination mechanism, the White House Office of Global Communications, which is intended to coordinate strategic communications from the U.S. government to overseas audiences. The President also established the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee, co-chaired by the State Department and the National Security Council and to work closely with the Office of Global Communications, to ensure interagency coordination in disseminating the U.S. message across the globe. Although it is the committee's long-term objective to develop a National Communications Strategy, according to recent conversations with U.S. officials, the committee has not met since March 2003.⁹

⁹In July 2004, the State Department established the Policy Coordinating Committee on Muslim World Outreach, according to State officials. This Committee has taken on much of the role of the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee.

State Does Not Have an Integrated Strategy to Guide Public Diplomacy Operations

After September 11, State acknowledged the need for a strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities and directs them toward common objectives, but to date, that strategy is still in the development stage. State officials told us that such a strategy is particularly important because State's public diplomacy operation is fragmented among the various organizational entities within the agency. Public affairs officers who responded to our survey indicated that the lack of a strategy has hindered their ability to effectively execute public diplomacy efforts overseas. More than 66 percent of public affairs officers in one region reported that the quality of strategic guidance from the Office of the Undersecretary at the time of our review (10/01-3/03) was generally insufficient or very insufficient. More than 40 percent in another region reported the same. We encountered similar complaints during our overseas fieldwork. For example, in Morocco, the former public affairs officer stated that so little information had been provided from Washington on State's post-September 11 public diplomacy strategy that he had to rely on newspaper articles and guesswork to formulate his in-country public diplomacy plans.

During our audit work, we learned that private sector public relations efforts and political campaigns use sophisticated strategies to integrate complex communication efforts involving multiple players. Although State's public diplomacy efforts extend beyond the activities of public relations firms, many of the strategic tools that such firms employ are relevant to State's situation. While it is difficult to establish direct links between public diplomacy programs and results, other U.S. government agencies and the private sector have best practices for assessing information disseminating campaigns, including the need to define success and how it should be measured. Executives from some of the largest public relations firms in the United States told us that initial strategic decisions involve establishing the scope and nature of the problem, identifying the target audience, determining the core messages, and defining both success and failure. Subsequent steps include conducting research to validate the initial decisions, testing the core messages, carrying out pre-launch activities, and developing information materials. Each of these elements contains numerous other steps that must be completed before implementing a tactical program. Further, progress must be measured continuously and tactics adjusted accordingly.

State Lacks Measures of Progress Toward Public Diplomacy Goals

We also found that State is not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward its public diplomacy goals. Its overseas performance measurement efforts focus on anecdotal evidence and program outputs, rather than gauging progress toward changing foreign publics' understanding and attitudes about the United States. Some posts judge the effectiveness of their public diplomacy efforts by simply counting the number of public diplomacy activities that occur in their host country—for example, the number of speeches given by the ambassador or the number of news articles placed in the host-country media. While such measures shed light on the level of public diplomacy activity, they reveal little in the way of overall program effectiveness.

State currently has no reporting requirements in place to determine whether posts' performance targets are actually met. At one overseas post we visited, the post had identified polling data showing that only 22 percent of the host country's citizens had a favorable view of the United States—a figure the post used as a baseline with yearly percentage increases set as targets. However, a former public affairs officer at the post told us that he did not attempt to determine or report on whether the post had actually achieved these targets because there was no requirement to do so. Officials at the other two overseas posts we visited also cited the lack of any formal reporting requirement for following up on whether they met their annual performance targets. An official in State's Office of Strategic and Performance Planning said that they have now begun to require posts to report on whether they have met performance targets.

Furthermore, public affairs officers at U.S. embassies generally do not conduct systematic program evaluations. About 79 percent of the respondents to our survey reported that staffing at their missions was insufficient to conduct systematic program evaluations. Many officers also reported that staffing at posts was insufficient to carry out the long-range monitoring required to adequately measure program effectiveness. Even if sufficient staffing were available, State would still have difficulty conducting long-range tracking of exchange participants because it lacks a database with comprehensive information on its various exchange program alumni. State had planned to begin building a new worldwide alumni database with comprehensive data linking all of its various exchange programs. However, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs officials told us they had received insufficient funds to do so, and thus are seeking to improve existing information systems for individual exchange programs.

BBG Has Strategy for International Broadcasting and Has Made Progress in Measuring Performance

In contrast to State's lack of strategy, BBG has introduced a market-based approach to international broadcasting that aims to generate large listening audiences in priority markets that the Board believes it must reach to effectively meet its mission. Early implementation of this strategy has focused on markets relevant to the war on terrorism, in particular the Middle East. The Board's vision is to create a flexible, multimedia, research-driven U.S. international broadcasting system that addresses the many challenges we noted in our report, including an organizational structure that consists of several broadcast entities with differing missions, broadcast approaches, and constituencies.

In conducting our work on the BBG strategic plan, we found that the plan did not include a single goal or related program objective designed to gauge progress toward increasing audience size, even though its strategy focuses on the need to reach large audiences in priority markets. We also found that the plan lacked measurable program objectives to support its strategic goals, including a broadcaster credibility measure. The Board has taken several steps to address the recommendations we made in our report. First, the Board created a single strategic goal to focus on the key objective of maximizing impact in priority areas of interest to the United States and made audience size a key performance measure. Second, the Board has added broadcast credibility and plans to add the additional performance measures we recommended, including audience awareness and whether broadcast entities are achieving their mandated missions.

A Number of Internal Challenges Hamper U.S. Public Diplomacy Activities

Mr. Chairman, I have discussed the expansion of U.S. public diplomacy resources to areas of the world thought to breed terrorist activities and the need for a more cohesive, integrated U.S. public diplomacy strategy with measurable indicators of progress. There are other challenges our government faces in executing successful public diplomacy activities. According to public affairs officers, these challenges include insufficient time and staffing resources to conduct public diplomacy tasks. In addition, many public affairs officers reported that the time available to attend public diplomacy training is inadequate. Furthermore, a significant number of Foreign Service officers involved in public diplomacy efforts overseas lack sufficient foreign language skills. The Board's key challenge in executing its strategy is how to generate large audiences while dealing with a number of media market, organizational, and resources issues.

Insufficient Time and Staff

More than 40 percent of the public affairs officers we surveyed reported that the amount of time they had to devote exclusively to executing public

diplomacy tasks was insufficient. During our overseas fieldwork, officers told us that, while they manage to attend U.S. and other foreign embassy receptions and functions within their host country capitals, it was particularly difficult to find time to travel outside the capitals to interact with ordinary citizens. More than 50 percent of those responding to our survey reported that the number of Foreign Service officers available to perform public diplomacy duties was inadequate. Although State increased the actual number of Americans in public diplomacy positions overseas from 414 in fiscal year 2000 to 448 in fiscal year 2002, State still had a shortfall of public diplomacy staff in 2002, based on the projected needs identified in State's 2002 overseas staffing model. In 2002, State's overseas staffing model projected the need for 512 staff in these positions; however, 64 of these positions, or 13 percent, were not filled.⁵ In addition, about 58 percent of the heads of embassy public affairs sections reported that Foreign Service officers do not have adequate time for training in the skills required to effectively conduct public diplomacy.

We reported in 2002⁶ that as part of its Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, State has launched an aggressive recruiting program to rebuild the department's total workforce. Under this initiative, State requested 1,158 new employees above attrition over the 3-year period for fiscal years 2002 through 2004, and according to State officials, the department has met its hiring goals under this initiative for fiscal years 2002 and 2003. However, it does not have numerical targets for specific skill requirements such as language proficiency or regional expertise. Although State officials are optimistic that enough new hires are being brought in to address the overall staffing shortage, there are no assurances that the recruiting efforts will result in the right people with the right skills needed to meet specific critical shortfalls.

Shortfalls in Foreign Language Skills

Insufficient foreign language skills pose another problem for many officers. As of December 31, 2002, 21 percent of the 332 Foreign Service officers filling "language-designated" public diplomacy positions overseas did not meet the foreign language speaking requirements of their

⁵State's overseas staffing model operates on a 2-year cycle. Fiscal year 2002 was the latest year for which data were available on the numbers of positions filled.

⁶GAO, *State Department: Staffing Shortfalls and Ineffective Assignment System Compromise Diplomatic Readiness at Hardship Posts*, GAO-02-626 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2002).

positions.¹¹ The highest percentages not meeting the requirements were in the Near East, where 30 percent of the officers did not meet the requirement. Although State had no language-designated positions for South Asia, it had eight language-preferred¹² positions, none of which was filled by officers who had reading or speaking capability in those languages. It is important to note that most of the foreign languages required in these two regions, such as Arabic and Urdu, are considered difficult to master. In contrast, 85 percent of the officers filling French language-designated positions and 97 percent of those filling Spanish language-designated ones met the requirements. Officers' opinions on the quality of the foreign language training they received also varied greatly by region. The Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy noted this challenge and recommended an increase in public diplomacy staff dedicated to issues of the Arab and Muslim world, with specific emphasis on enhancing fluency in local languages.

Foreign Service officers posted at the overseas embassies we visited and other State officials told us that having fluency in a host country's language is important for effectively conducting public diplomacy. The foreign government officials with whom we met in Egypt, Morocco, and the United Kingdom agreed. They noted that, even in countries where English is widely understood, speaking the host country's language demonstrates respect for its people and its culture. In Morocco, officers in the public affairs and other sections of the embassy told us that, because their ability to speak Arabic was poor, they conducted most embassy business in French. French is widely used in that country, especially in business and government. However, embassy officers told us that speaking Arabic would provide superior entrée to the Moroccan public. The ability to speak country-specific forms of Arabic and other more obscure dialects would generate even more goodwill, especially outside the major cities.

According to the department, the largest and most significant factor limiting its ability to fill language-designated positions is its long-standing staffing shortfall, which State's Diplomatic Readiness Initiative is designed

¹¹Language-designated positions are graded for both speaking and reading proficiency. Most officers who do not meet one requirement do not meet the other one either, so the percentages are similar. For purposes of clarity, our figures refer only to the requirements for speaking proficiency.

¹²These are positions for which language capability is preferred but not required.

to fill. Other planned actions include bolstering efforts to recruit job candidates with target language skills, sending language training supervisors to posts to determine ways to improve training offerings, and developing a new "language continuum" plan to guide efforts to meet the need for higher levels of competency in all languages, especially those critical to national security concerns.

Outdated Broadcast Services and Structure Pose Challenges to Expanding in Priority Markets

The Broadcasting Board of Governors has its own set of public diplomacy challenges, key among them is how to gain large audiences in priority markets while dealing with (1) a collection of outdated and noncompetitive language services, (2) a disparate organizational structure consisting of seven separate broadcast entities and a mix of federal agency and grantee organizations that are managed by a part-time Board of Governors, and (3) the resource challenge of broadcasting in 97 language services to more than 125 broadcast markets worldwide. Although its strategic plan identifies a number of solutions to the competitive challenges the Board faces and provides a new organizational model for U.S. international broadcasting,¹² we found that the Board's plan did not include specifics on implementation strategies, resource requirements, project time frames, or a clear vision of the Board's intended scope of operations. The Board recently completed a review of the overlap issue and identified six approaches to addressing the problem while still meeting the discrete missions of the Voice of America and other broadcast entities. All of the Board's overlapping services were assessed against this analytical framework, and more than \$9.7 million in potential savings for priority initiatives were identified. However, the Board has yet to revise its strategic plan to include details on implementation strategies, resource requirements, and project timeframes for the various initiatives supporting its overarching strategic goal of increasing program impact.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have at this time.

¹²The Board views the separate entities as part of a "single system" under the Board's direct control and authority.

**Contacts and
Acknowledgments**

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford or Diana Glod at (202) 512-4128. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Robert Ball, Lynn Cothorn, and Michael ten Kate.

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Mr. TURNER [presiding]. Thank you. Obviously this has been a very important discussion, and when you read the 9/11 Commission Report and you look at their recommendations with respect to intelligence gathering and restructuring of our ability to respond, one of the elements of their recommendations that really goes to the future of our ability to have a relationship in the Middle East and to be successful long term is the issue on public diplomacy.

And Secretary Harrison, in listening to your description of some of things that were undertaken and still some of the questions as to our effectiveness, what do you see as the message of the U.S. public diplomacy in the Middle East? I mean, we've talked certainly about the issues in trying to define more of who we are, trying to talk more about the values of democracy, but what do you see as the message of public diplomacy?

Ms. HARRISON. Right now, as we are working in an environment of what I would call constant snapshot polling, I think it's important to move beyond the initial questions which I would characterize as one, two, three: Do you hate us; how much do you hate us; do you hate us more today than you did yesterday?

As one woman who was part of our exchange program from the region—these were journalists, publishers, editors. She was from Egypt. She said I just wish the American people would stop asking us all the time how much we hate you. First of all, it makes us feel bad; and second, we are forced then to answer a question instead of a real question. A real question might be how can we work together? And then she said, "When you ask the question, please be prepared to listen."

So as we talk about outgoing messages, we also have to talk about incoming. And the part we seem to forget sometimes as we seek to influence and inform, part of engagement is listening. I know the polls are negative, but I think, though, that there are some bright spots on the horizon.

We have to work with people within these communities who understand that their young people want a better life as well. We have to stand for individual freedom and economic opportunity and then take those lofty words and put them into practice. And that's why I was saying it's not just the message. It's some of the things we can do.

And where are the opportunities? Well, in Malaysia, Prime Minister Badawi—and this is his quote and that's why I'm reading it—he said, as a practicing Muslim. We are in deep crisis. Muslim youth is vulnerable to extremist ideas. We must recover the hallmarks of peace, prosperity and dignity. Then he said, I believe that now more than ever, we need to find a moderate center. We need to bridge the great divide that has been created between the Muslim world and the West.

Our message, in addition to who we are as a people and our values—and it is what our message has always been from the beginning of time—we do not seek to stay in any country. We seek to help people find their personal freedom, and we have enough ways to demonstrate that. When you demonstrate it, then the message becomes one of trust.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Tomlinson, do you have any comments you would like to add to that?

Mr. TOMLINSON. I would like to associate myself with the remarks of the able acting Under Secretary, Pat Harrison. I knew you were good. That's a superb answer.

We at the Broadcasting Board of Governors, consider ourselves, as most people in journalism, as being in the truth business. We're trying to produce an informed citizenry out there wherever we broadcast. We want people to know what's actually going on in the world.

I sometimes think that there may be an overemphasis on this thing of coordination. I was for many years editor-in-chief at Reader's Digest, a great magazine. We didn't worry about coordination at Reader's Digest, we worried about excellence. We worried about making people want to read us. We worried about making people want to hear our message.

That's what I think we've been able to do using good journalistic and broadcasting strategies at BBG and the entities that are under us. We want people to hear us. We want people to hear what's actually going on in the world. We want people to understand the fruits of freedom. We want people to understand the great benefits of the kind of opportunities that we offer, and we want people to observe the universal values of the rights for women and opportunity for youth. Thank you.

Mr. TURNER. Secretary Harrison, I agree with you on the issue of the polls. I think the polls don't necessarily give us an understanding really of the fabric, of the context in which we need to have this discussion.

The issue of, as you described it, of how we're perceived is also very separate from the issue of values and the Islamic extremist message of glorifying death and of the acceptable killing of innocents and the acceptable killing through suicide bombers.

What do you see as, one, our ability to impact that message and that cultural issue that makes this that much more of a dangerous conversation, and second, who are our allies in the Middle East to help achieve this discussion of values that would celebrate life and a relationship based upon that?

Ms. HARRISON. It's an excellent question, and one would think we have no allies. The fact is, in this war of words and images, we have a lot of allies, but we have to work with them in a way that they find productive. That means in some cases, through NGO's, through religious schools, through secular schools, through community leaders, with new strategic emerging communities.

I'm going to emphasize what I said earlier. We need to listen to how they want to work with us. For example, when I went to Pakistan, I met with the Minister of Education, and she said we're not going to take on the madrassas; we're going to offer more choices. Here's how we would like to work with you; we need more of our teachers coming to the United States to learn how to teach.

When we had the first opportunity to engage with Afghanistan, the first thing we did was create the U.S.-Afghan Women's Council. We brought over teachers so that they could be trained and go back and train other teachers. And I just feel I must honor the response to a question I asked this one Afghan teacher who had taught young children, despite torture threats from the Taliban, she kept moving these children from place to place. I said, how did you find

the courage to do that? She said, it wasn't courage, it was the right thing to do.

When we work with people in partnership on behalf of their young people, that's the message. We are doing the right thing, and that's when the trust is in the message.

I think truly, if I can answer you frankly, we should forget about talking about image. Image is only about us. We should be building long-term relationships with people, who even in these polls, if you go below the fourth or fifth question where, finally, one polster asks, is there anything you admire about America? The first answer is, "yes, education, opportunity and how can I get there."

I'm not minimizing the terrible environment in which we live, but the fact is this is our environment and we've just got to do what we can do now.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Tomlinson, do you have any other comments? Mr. Evers, Mr. Ford, anyone like to add to that?

Mr. EVERS. The only thing I would add is on messages, we just teach our American values which are equality, tolerance, individual rights, democracy, rule of law. And I think as we do that, especially in Alhurras, they see the journalistic ethics as it compares to some of the indigenous journalism, these types of ethics that we have and our values, because these are the same values that people hold all over the world.

Mr. TOMLINSON. If you look at the pupils, some of the pupils had some of the worst messages for us in terms of popularity of Americans. When you ask the people, as the Under Secretary said, what systems do you want, throughout the world they admired the freedom of America. Throughout the world, they wanted our economic system. Throughout the world, they wanted opportunity-based systems. So I think we're building that now.

Ms. HARRISON. I was just going to say that I am very biased because, as you know, I'm wearing two hats, and one is as Assistant Secretary of Educational and Cultural Affairs, and what this means is I get to rediscover America through the eyes of people who come here for the first time and tell me, "Do you know you really do have the freedom to practice religion? Do you know that your media really is free?" And one woman after September 11, says she wanted to be here to find out one thing, do we still say after September 11th, "have a nice day?"

That was a profound question because she was trying to find out if the basic nature of the American people, in terms of how she understood us, generosity, humanity, all of the values we're talking about, had fundamentally changed. When she came back from her 3-week tour, I asked her what did you find out? She said it's amazing. I was welcomed by communities. She talked about our volunteerism, and here is the catch-22, they don't expect to find that. And that's our challenge. They don't expect to find the generosity. They are being shaped by messages that are distorted, and we don't have enough Americans going to these countries. As someone said fax to fax is never going to replace face to face.

We need to engage as citizen diplomats. In this war on terrorism, everyone needs to do what they can do, and that means engaging a lot with the private sector which I am focused on right now.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much. To the panelists, thank you for your work and for your presence here.

I want to pick up on this discussion because I think what I sense from Ms. Harrison is kind of a puzzlement or perplexing dilemma when we know there are people who do like America but at the same time we're seeing these polls reflect what Commission member Gorelick just called an astonishing hemorrhage of support for the United States, and the polls that have been the subject of discussion in the previous panel pointed out that two-thirds of countries surveyed in 2003 from Indonesia to Turkey were somewhat or very fearful the United States may attack them. Support for the United States has plummeted—this is testimony from Commission members—and that the bottom has fallen out of support for America in most of the Muslim world. Negative views of the United States among Muslims has spread and they go on and give statistics.

How does that square with what you know and all of us know to be true, that people—there still is a desire for people to connect with America but there is this broad negativity toward America right now? How do you explain that contradiction?

Ms. HARRISON. I think, sir, there are many elements. For the first time, there is only one global power in the world, and that has great ramifications on how people view us. I also think that we are in an environment right now that is very volatile, and people are being asked what they think when things are happening in Iraq that haven't yet been resolved.

For example, from my standpoint and if I were polled, the Iraqis I meet come here and say, thank you so much. One Fulbrighter said, "you've given me the keys to my future; I will go back and build a perfect society." So I might answer a poll a little bit differently from those who haven't heard Iraqis talk about what they can achieve, or the Iraqi soccer players who said, "we're going to do the best we can, but we know if we lose we will not be killed and our family harmed."

I think polling is almost a cottage industry almost at this point. We've probably all read the examples of movies and plays and various things going on that provide an outlet for people attacking the United States, and that certainly is significant. And one always has to ask in business, is the trend your friend or not? And we would say, no, the trend isn't our friend.

Mr. KUCINICH. In your experience, have you seen any actions that you can think of that the United States may have commenced with that could have caused some kind of an undermining in support for the United States? How do you account for this?

Ms. HARRISON. I account for the fact that we did not have a strong public diplomacy presence in the region for a long time. September 11th was a wake-up call. Now it seems what we're doing is saying why haven't we fixed it in 3 years? I think that's short-sighted.

I think we have a lot to do in the region, and it's tedious and it's labor intensive, and it requires a lot more engagement with Americans on a very local level, at a university level, at a business level. We have to communicate and define who we are over and over again. We can't rely on a generation being grateful to us even

for what we've done for Muslims. We can't rely on the fact that we feel X, Y and Z group should be grateful, even after what we did in World War II.

And I think the lesson, one of the lessons of September 11 is we have to make a commitment to engage, not declare it's the end of history, as Fukiyama did, and decide we've won and there's no need to have exchanges because we've got the Internet, we've got e-mail.

So I think we're in the process, sir, of learning a lot of hard lessons about what it means to build relationships.

Mr. KUCINICH. So you're talking about a dialog?

Ms. HARRISON. Yes, I am, and I know in my native New York, conversation is characterized as talking and waiting for the other person to stop. Dialogue means listening.

Mr. KUCINICH. I didn't know you were from New York.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS [presiding]. Thank you. Basically, Mr. Evers triggers this comment in measurement. I'd like you all to define "success" for me. What is success? How do we measure it? How do we know we're doing a good job?

Ms. HARRISON. Yes, sir. Measurement.

Mr. SHAYS. I'm going to give you a rest for a second. I'm going to have Mr. Evers start off. Then we'll have all of you respond.

Mr. EVERS. I don't know what the exact answer is, but it's probably somewhere north of where we are now. It seems to me, picking up on the comments, Mr. Chairman, that you made earlier about the difference between diplomacy and force and sometimes if people don't think you're going to use force, as Saddam Hussein, they keep pushing you around, that—and then this age-old question of whether we should be loved or hated or respected or feared, that until—on September 10, 2001, my suspicion is we were a lot more loved and respected in the world, and I'm not sure what type of safety that provided us.

So I think there's a medium between where we are now and where we need to be. We don't need people blowing up buildings and flying planes into them, but I don't think we need to be universally loved. I think as Americans we feel the need to be loved by everybody, but we need to be respected, and we need to be known as an honest partner, but we don't need to be dancing in the streets together.

Some of these poll numbers, I don't agree with everything that polling's done because, if you ask me to go do a poll, I could probably give you the answer you wanted, too, depending on how I worded the question. But I think that we do need to have some respect and a little bit more understanding from people, and I think that one of the things—when I talk about measurement, especially as it relates to exchanges, it's a very small sample of people, hundreds that come, not tens of millions; and that is, that when they come to America they ought to leave with the understanding that we have tolerance and equality and that we're honest, just like Under Secretary Harrison said the lady who came here left with. And so they ought to come to America with their questions, and when they leave we ought to know that they got their questions answered, and if they didn't we ought to reengineer the programs.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, I'm tempted to have a bigger discussion with you here, because it's not going to be necessarily what polls say, but you're the one that basically triggered some type of measurement. Just give me the sense of what are the various kinds of measurements, and if you want time to think about it, I can go to someone else. I mean, let me go to Mr. Ford. I'd like you to just think, Mr. Evers, of whether it's polls or whether it is that they—I told someone if I lost the election, I want to lose having people know how I voted and not like how I voted than to vote against me thinking that I voted differently than I actually did, and even if the result is still the same, even if I still lose. I want to know it's based on good information that we just happened to disagree on.

Mr. EVERS. Sure.

Mr. SHAYS. Maybe you can think a little more about this. I'd like to come back. Mr. Ford, measurements.

Mr. FORD. Yes, I think there's several different ways that we can obtain information to help us try to sort out the answers to questions we're trying to get, and it's not just polling. There's lots of different types of surveys.

Mr. SHAYS. No. What are the questions that we're trying to get answered?

Mr. FORD. Well, I think that's the first thing is you have to define what that is. In many cases in the past on an exchange program, we merely asked the individual things like did they have a good experience in the United States. They were designed to give a short-term answer to an experience they just had. They weren't necessarily geared toward answering a broader question about how they really felt about U.S. values, democratic principles and how they might translate those into their own country.

So I think that first you have to define what questions you want to answer, and I think there are a lot of tools out there that can be employed to try to get those answers, not just polls. You can do different types of survey research. You can do focus groups. You can do pre-and post-questionnaires. There are a lot of different research instruments out there, many of which are used by academics and private research outfits.

So I think those are the kind of things you can use as tools to get the answers to the questions, but first you have to define what the question is.

Mr. TOMLINSON. Mr. Chairman, our son is in the Navy. He's an officer on the USS McInerney, but when he was a little boy in Chappaqua, New York, we couldn't go more than 10 or 15 minutes on a trip without him saying, are we there yet, are we there yet? And I think in many ways the question of how do we judge whether we're meeting our goals is like that question.

Of course, we need to know are they listening to us. We're in this to have an informed citizenry abroad. We're in this so that people will share our values, universal values, and in many ways, it's just a never-ending process. Sure, we should check to see if our programs are effective, but I don't think we want to be so survey conscious that we stop telling the truth or we try to change our message to be effective. I think the truth will out in the end.

Mr. SHAYS. Madam Secretary.

Ms. HARRISON. Yes. First, let me say that we have a culture in the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs that is one of measurement and evaluation. As someone said, anecdote is not data, and the bureau, ECA, if I can use the initials, received OMB's program assessment rating at the highest score of 92 percent. Now, this means they rated our exchange programs in NEA and SA, and how did they evaluate them? They used a series of questions. It is to see if attitudes have changed in any significant way on several levels.

As a result of coming to the United States as either part of Fulbright program, International Visitor, or Humphrey program, citizen exchange, did you learn more about the United States than you knew before; did your attitude change? And then there's a list of indicators that go through policy and other things about the American people.

The other way that we measure is regular reporting that comes in from our nonprofit organizations, our partner organizations, and that's part of every grant agreement, the evaluation of the specific exchange program, and then we have reports and stories from our missions. Then we have a results data base. Then we have use of demographic indicators, and some of them I know you're familiar with: How many people are now heads of state, or did that experience in the United States shape and inform them. Hamid Karzai, for example, or Tony Blair; another one is Megawati Sukarroputri and others; and then we have formal independent program evaluations that are conducted by outside professional evaluators.

This system of measurement and evaluation is carried out through our new Office of Policy and ECA's evaluation office. We want to take this system that is successful in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and apply it to public diplomacy programs and products across the board. We haven't done that in as systematic a way as ECA has been doing for the last several years.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Any further comment? I'm just curious, what do you think the United States did or didn't do to help the Iraqi soccer team? I'll tell you why I'm wondering. I'm wondering because Iraqis turned the Al-Jazeera to watch the Iraqi team play. Did Alhurra televise?

Mr. TOMLINSON. We did.

Mr. SHAYS. You did as well, live?

Mr. TOMLINSON. We didn't have a contract to do it live, but we certainly have covered it massively.

Mr. SHAYS. So the only reason we didn't do it is we didn't have a contract to do it live?

Mr. TOMLINSON. Right.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Has anyone done a report on who helped them and so on? The reason I have this little bit of concern is when I was in Iraq a week and a half ago, I saw the team being flown by, I think, the Australians, because we have somehow a rule that we can't use a military plane in this capacity, and it just bothered me if that were the case. I mean, what a huge opportunity for us to celebrate what is, I think, one of the greatest stories of the Olympics. This team that was involved in this huge war, I mean, was having the effects of a huge war, they didn't have the capacity to

play other teams, and yet they're in the semifinals, one of four teams standing, and I'm just curious.

Mr. TOMLINSON. It's a great story.

Mr. SHAYS. It is a great story.

Ms. HARRISON. Yes. One of the things we haven't talked about in terms of public diplomacy is cultural diplomacy and how important it is that it be supported. I went to Iraq a year ago, and at that time we worked with the Iraqi National Symphony Orchestra to have them come here and play, as culture is an important part that was restored after Saddam Hussein. But we also worked with the athletes through our sports programming division. They came to Atlanta. We had archers and wrestlers, and we worked with the soccer players, and we are in the process of not having just a one-off relationship but a long-term training program.

At the same time, the unknown story or the story that needs to be told is this group of soccer players are Kurds and Shiite and Sunni, and they all play together as a team, all held hands at the end. If a team can do it, I think a country can. Oops, I'm starting into another speech, I apologize.

Mr. TOMLINSON. It's good. It's good speaking.

Ms. HARRISON. Anyway it's a powerful story, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. It's a hugely powerful story.

Mr. TOMLINSON. I thank you for raising it, Mr. Chairman. Daniel Henninger of the Wall Street Journal did a column last Friday on this very subject. I'll pass it on to you.

Mr. SHAYS. I'm just wondering, though, if we've really done what we need to do just to that one story alone.

Mr. TOMLINSON. We can't do too much.

Mr. SHAYS. I still am very unclear, though, as to what your answers are as to the issue of measurement, so let me ask it this way. What are the questions we should be asking and then how do we measure?

Ms. HARRISON. In terms of are our programs and products working. What way has your attitude changed as a result of a trip? Or as a result of a program. We have, I would say, information that would fill books that support the validity of the exchange process, that minds have changed, the needle moves. It does increase mutual understanding and respect which—

Mr. SHAYS. Let's deal with that. That deals more with what I would call the elites within the society, those whose lives alternately—I mean, they have gotten an opportunity to be in a sports program. They have gotten an opportunity to be in a cultural exchange. It's not the everyday Iraqi that happens to. How about with the everyday Iraqis?

Ms. HARRISON. Within the last 3 years we have made a concerted effort to move beyond the elites, to work with our missions and go beyond what I call the traditional Rolodex to get out into different areas where we know talent resides, but which are economically disadvantaged. This is what our PLUS—P for L PLUS program is about.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me put it this way, but ultimately, it's reaching a tenth of a percent, or a percent. About the 99 percent who are left over? That is what? How do we deal with that?

Ms. HARRISON. We're dealing with that through other forms of communication. We're going to be dealing with that—measuring that through the Internet. Now, right now the way to measure through the Internet is how many hits. For example, we have a new Web site in Persian, and what we're seeing is increasing numbers of people who are going to that Web site. And we also know that in Iran there is a proliferation of Web sites where they discuss freedom. And right now the evaluation is that people are reading what's on our Web site. They're coming back and reading more. We're measuring a new product called Hi Magazine that also has a Web site.

So the measurement and evaluation move beyond how many people just viewed something, that doesn't mean they agree with it, but then how many people come back to it over and over and over? Then you have the chat rooms that go along with that. Then there are ways to monitor in terms of audience share for radio and television.

Mr. TOMLINSON. For us, it's are you listening to us and do you believe what we're saying.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Evers, do you want to do another crack at this?

Mr. EVERS. Sure, thank you. I just wanted to read what the 9/11 Commission Report said about this. They said agencies need to be able to measure success. Targets should be specific enough so that reasonable observers in the White House, the Congress, the media, and the general public can judge whether or not the objectives have been attained, which is what you continue to ask us here. And I think that the target is different for different countries.

It seems to me that one of our objectives ought to be that the political leaders of countries have the courage to support America and not fear that they'll either be thrown out of office if they're in a democracy, or overthrown if they're not in a democracy. And I think if you look at a country like Pakistan, where you have a president who's had the courage to stand with us in spite of public opinion that's against him, he's been able to figure out a way to make it seem logical in his country to work. And so whatever that model is, maybe that would work somewhere else.

One of the ideas that we're going to have in our report is that we're going to propose a way to assess program effectiveness might be through the evaluation of a test region. The selected region would receive increased funding for a variety of public diplomacy programs structured around a cohesive strategy and funded through supplemental funding from Congress, where you would take public diplomacy programs, education programs, Department of Commerce programs and go into a region or a country and really try to make a difference in that area and come out and see whether it works or not.

This isn't a novel idea. The British do this right now every year. They have a different country that they go to and they coordinate their government around what they're going to do. And they go in, they do advertising, they do job fairs, and they do all sorts of things to move people toward them.

Mr. SHAYS. I think what I'm probably wrestling with is if I define public diplomacy as ultimately doing the right thing, however we define that, as presenting an alternative, and that how we commu-

nicate is part of the public diplomacy but isn't the extent of public diplomacy, I mean I realize, Mr. Tomlinson, this goes well beyond you. You're the third part of this effort. How would you define public diplomacy? And then I would get on to the next panel. Maybe I'm having an incorrect view of public diplomacy here.

Mr. TOMLINSON. I would define it as conveying our values to people around the world, conveying what we are, what our goals are for the world.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. See, I added more. I added economic assistance as part of public diplomacy.

Mr. TOMLINSON. That's a part. That's a part. A part of what we are is giving people the opportunity to work hard through a free economic system and produce benefits and a better future for their children.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you, Secretary Harrison.

Ms. HARRISON. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. If we are pursuing goals as a country that make your job in portraying our country well difficult, is that part of your job, to convey to others like we are headed in the wrong direction, no matter what we tell them, as long as we keep doing these things, we're going to be digging a deeper hole in terms of public diplomacy; is that part of your job?

Ms. HARRISON. Yes, it is, and if I can—my definition, which I use in a lot of speeches, is basically people-to-people diplomacy, and people-to-people impact has become much more important. We talk about the Arab strength. We talk about strategic communities. They have the ability to topple governments, to change perceptions. We can look at a recent election in India which was a surprise, and when you look at how that happened you see the power invested in people beyond urban centers and rural centers.

This Secretary has brought public diplomacy to the policy table and literally to the table every morning. Every single morning at 8:30 he meets with his Assistant Secretaries and Under Secretaries, and it is a quick trip around the world where you can hear what's going on in every region. You can hear what his focus is, and he also listens to us. So we do have a seat at the table. We're not over in a stovepipe somewhere coming up with these things.

He and the Deputy Secretary are committed and understand the value of public diplomacy, even as governments are engaged in necessary traditional diplomacy, and he puts high value on these programs, and he is very supportive of what public diplomacy can do.

Mr. SHAYS. President Kennedy invited the leader of the African states to the White House. He had a cultural sense that very few Presidents had, or somebody in his staff did. He said, when that leader comes, invite him not to the East Room and the West Room for a State dinner; invite him up into your personal headquarters, because that's how you honor people in so many societies. When I was in the Peace Corps, there were two rooms. One was the public and one was what was the sleeping part, the quarters, and if you were invited to interact with a chief in that room there, he was paying you a tremendous respect that he would invite you into a kind of inner sanctum.

Well, when President Kennedy did that, it electrified Africa because the word got around that he had invited this leader into his

personal home. And there are still, believe it or not—or there were when I was in the Peace Corps in the South Pacific—pictures of Kennedy, still remembering this culturally sensitive President who electrified the Third World.

I have been to Iraq now six times, and four times outside the umbrella of the military. Every Iraqi told me that why are we disbanding the military, the police and the civil service, the government? Whatever you portray, Mr. Tomlinson, in your media, that policy was so flawed you could never undo it because it basically said to those who were in Iraq, who had been involved, they had no future there. So I'm just kind of thinking that we've got to make sure the policy is something you can promote and we have the best way to promote the policy. At any rate, it's a work in process, isn't it?

Ms. HARRISON. Well, as Edward R. Murrow said, public diplomacy should be on the takeoffs and not just in the landings.

Mr. TOMLINSON. He said crash landings.

Ms. HARRISON. Oh, I edited that.

Mr. SHAYS. No, but that's a huge point.

Ms. HARRISON. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. It's a huge point. We need to be a lot more culturally sensitive, and we do a lot better job, then, when we project our public diplomacy in the media.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TURNER. In looking at the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, we talked about this when the two commissioners were in front of us. On page 377 it says recommendation: Just as we did in the cold war, we need to defend our ideas abroad vigorously. America does not stand up for its values. The United States defended and still defends Muslims against tyrants and criminals in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. If the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us.

Now, what I found interesting about this recommendation is that it talks about the United States defended Muslims and it talks about the actions in Bosnia and Kosovo. And many times we will talk about the actions of defending Kuwait and liberating Kuwait, but in a lot of the language and how it has interpreted what was done in Kuwait, and it refers to war with Iraq.

We have the Bureau Chief of Al-Jazeera's Washington office who's here, and I was reading an interview that he had in September 2003, and in that one of the things that he talks about as a possible contributor to the September 11th event is the first Iraq war.

And so I wanted to ask you, one, about the issue of our policies, and don't we have one of the conflicts being how we view our policies and how others are viewed? And second, I would like you to comment on—the report says recognizing that Arab and Muslim audiences rely on satellite television, and Al-Jazeera certainly being so prominent, I'd love your thoughts and questions as to your competition.

Ms. HARRISON. Well, I think I will let Ken talk about the competition.

And in terms of your first question and how our policies are interpreted, if I could push a button, I would have many, many more speakers, many more people engaging, Americans going to the region. We can't do this just one-way, even as powerful as exchanges are.

And what I hear from our Ambassadors and our people in the posts, when they put together, as they do, these seminars, and in many of the cultures and Muslim and Arab countries, they would rather have dialog one on one, a long period of time where you sit—and I realize this isn't thousands of people, but it can be televised, as was this Indonesian town hall meeting, as a result of former Under Secretary Beers' shared-values initiative.

Anything that leads to dialog. After these seminars, we asked them to evaluate it on a lot of different levels in terms of policy, mostly policy.

I'm not going to tell you, that they then agreed with America's policy, but we did find a majority say, if you consider the needle moving, we now understand what the policy was based on. We may not agree with it, but we no longer are indulging in conspiracy theories, or we're not ascribing it to something that's negative; we may not agree with you, but we now believe that America isn't going to take over our country and stay forever. The challenge of these kinds of dialogs is that they are one on one, and we have to find a way to magnify them in a way that doesn't undermine the very essence that allows people to speak freely.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Tomlinson.

Mr. TOMLINSON. Mr. Chairman, this Washington bureau chief of Al Jazeera, he's nice and all, and I like his wife a lot—she is an employee of VDA—and I don't mean to say ugly things about his publication with his being present here with us, but I think he'll understand.

Imagine if people in the United States had their view of the world based on the National Enquirer or the worst of our tabloids. That would be the way people, Arabic-speaking people in the Middle East have received—

Mr. SHAYS. I have a hard time hearing you, Mr. Tomlinson.

Mr. TOMLINSON. I'm sorry. I said, after saying all of these nice things about my journalistic colleague back here—

Mr. SHAYS. I got that part.

Mr. TOMLINSON [continuing]. Imagine if people in the United States had their view of the world based on the National Enquirer or the worst of tabloids, that would give you a sense of what the people of the world have received through the broadcasting of Al Jazeera.

They call American troops "occupiers." They sensationalize. I hear that Al Jazeera has issued a new standard or code of conduct, and I look forward to the impact that Al-hurra is going to have on the satellite broadcasters. Because the great thing we found about Radio Sawa news during the war is, we were accurate.

When the news was good from our side, we gave it to people. When the news wasn't, we gave it to people, and people came to turn to Sawa News because they wanted to know what was happening in the world and they wanted to know what the happening right then and there.

You know, if you tailor your news, it takes a while to put it together. So I'm very pleased that we're finally in the Arabic satellite game, because I think we're going to have a significant impact on our competition, and I think we may even help them clean up their shows.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Evers, Mr. Ford, do you have any comment?

Mr. EVERS. Mr. Chairman, your question at the very beginning, your first part, Is it hard to talk about American policies when people don't agree with them? And I think the classic is—when you talk to Muslim-Arabs, is our relationship with Israel as it relates to Palestine; and the fact is, this falls under the “do the right thing.”

I mean, we support Israel because we have a special relationship with them, a moral obligation to see them succeed. They're one of the only democracies in the area. They are a huge ally of ours, and it is our policy—I believe, is the right policy—which you would not find a terrible lot of Arab-Muslims that would agree with us on that. And so it is the right thing for us to continue to talk about that, but it is a very hard obstacle for us to get over, because they do not believe like we do on that.

We have the first President, Republican or Democrat, ever, to call for a Palestinian state. You've got Ariel Sharon, who is calling to move settlements and being attacked by his own party for doing so, but yet we don't really get credit for any of that.

But the answer is, yes, it's very hard sometimes with our policies, whether you agree or disagree with them; if the people you're talking to don't agree with them, it's hard to get through that.

Mr. FORD. I don't have much to say about the policy end, but I can say that I think that our research indicates that we can do a better job of touting things that we're doing that are positive in nature.

When we did a survey for—last year in Egypt, for example, we found many Egyptians were not aware of the sizable amount of foreign aid that we provide to that country, and we've been providing it for 2 decades now. So I think there are things that we can do to better show some of the positive things that we're doing out there.

I know in the case of AID, they have some restrictions on what they can do, but there's room for improvement in those areas.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Do any of you have anything you would like to add in closing from the discussion?

If not, we thank you for your time.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you all very much.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you for your participation.

We'll turn, then, to our next panel, panel No. 3. It will include Keith Reinhard, who is the president, Business For Diplomatic Action, and chairman, DDB Worldwide. He's accompanied by Gary Knell, president and CEO of Sesame Workshop.

Also, we'll hear testimony from Charlotte Beers, former Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Department of State. Also, we'll have testimony from Dr. Rhonda S. Zaharna, associate professor of Public Communication, American

University. Finally, we have testimony from Hafez Al-Mirazi, Bureau Chief, Al Jazeera, Washington office.

Mr. SHAYS. Please stand and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TURNER. Please note for the record that the witnesses responded in the affirmative.

We'll begin with Charlotte Beers.

STATEMENTS OF CHARLOTTE BEERS, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; KEITH REINHARD, PRESIDENT, BUSINESS FOR DIPLOMATIC ACTION, AND CHAIRMAN, DDB WORLDWIDE; GARY KNELL, PRESIDENT AND CEO, SESAME WORKSHOP; DR. RHONDA S. ZAHARNA, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY; AND HAFEZ AL-MIRAZI, BUREAU CHIEF, AL JAZEERA WASHINGTON OFFICE

Ms. BEERS. Thank you. This is my first hearing as a private sector person.

I think public diplomacy has kind of had a diminishing in terms of the people's perception of what it means, not only in our own press, but in our government and maybe in our country. It has a connotation of propaganda, which in this country is sometimes very negative. It can be seen as a pitch, an example of arrogant advocacy. And what I like so much about the opportunity of being here today is that you have really raised the eyes off that page and described and defined the job in a much more comprehensive way. It's worth repeating.

You have asked us to consider something no less than moral leadership, a demonstration of generosity and caring, to defend and define our core values and to create an environment for moderates for reform and freedom. That's all.

That's a pretty big job, but I have a feeling that the American people are hoping we can pull this off and would approve of these goals, because it's time for us to think of ourselves as bridge-builders, as well as all the other facets of who we are in the world.

But because we've been so isolated and because our enemies are seen as heroes in the countries in the Middle East, I think we have to start with a modest goal.

You ask often, what is the message, and I think that the beginning of the communication effort has to be only a simple goal of mutual understanding. That's the place we have to start, and then we can advance to those subjects on which we can agree. The end result of that will promote national interest, but you can't start the other way around, because there's not enough humility in it.

The message: The message has to be words verified by deeds and programs and experiences, people to people, over time and consistently, which is not easy to do and is not anything we've done in the recent past.

The elements of the strategy, as far as I'm concerned, are that core values are crucial, and it's very fascinating to me that a number of the core values we rate tops are shared by Arab and Muslim families, and they would be stunned to hear it. And as conflicted as they are about the United States, they are very openly eager to

learn science, to give us credit for math expertise, to take English, because it's the language of the computer world.

So we have plenty of opportunities. The problem is, we're not equipped today to deliver on these kind of large-scale tasks.

I personally think there's a clear problem in not having a central leadership. I felt it greatly when I was—

Mr. SHAYS. I'm sorry. Not having a what?

Ms. BEERS. A central leadership to guide, as a team, the strategic direction of public diplomacy and then have the power to cause it to happen in all the constituencies.

There's not a company in the world who would agree to run fragmented businesses without a central leadership, and any time they did, they got in terrible trouble.

We have too many uneven and diverse messages taking place, sometime quite inadvertently. There's a dearth of skills in the State Department and in some of our other efforts to do modern communication content and delivery and research. Research is not poll taking. Research is a very sophisticated game done by experts that understand insight, feelings, emotions and content and can help predict attitudes and then behavior.

So it's not a game for people who don't really understand how to do it. And you're asking us to consider measurement, and that's a very important aspect to it.

The purpose of all of these kinds of skills is to build relationships that will last longer than any foreign policy issue, so that they are absolutely crucial to our well-being.

Now, with the very best of intentions, it seems to me that USIA's integration into State has caused certain aspects of that organization to be weakened. It is limited in its ability to adapt, to take initiatives and to create new solutions. Even with Secretary Powell's clear support, it has been difficult to get new initiatives and follow through with separate funding for work we need to do to answer those goals you've laid out. The public diplomacy field staff often reports to three different bosses, because the structure has been cobbled together, and most of those bosses are focused on traditional diplomacy.

There is little training. The first annual meeting of the public diplomacy field staff was the first year that I was in that office, and it was a very controversial decision that had never come together. And you can't bring in new people, as we could have done, because the security clearances in the State Department are so difficult.

It's not really a lack of goodwill. It is simply divergent tasks.

The traditional diplomacy, which I'm calling the main work of the State Department, has exceptionally qualified people who are creating a vital dialog with our key governments. They interpret and define with their counterparts the very meaning and context of foreign policy. It's hard to imagine a more important job, but it is by its definition discreet, slow-moving and secretive.

On the other hand, public diplomacy makes this group of people quite nervous. It's very public. Its job is to engage a whole bunch of people with widely diverse interests and topics, and we're after long-term relationships that have emotional and tangible subjects, such as religion and trust and freedom, involved.

Given the totally different task that traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy have, it's hard to see that this is the right place for you to take us to task for all kinds of what you call "reinvigoration" under the present structure at the very least.

Now, there is a lot we have to work with. I mean, you can't listen to that last panel without being, I think, admiring of the work that's gone forward in terms of all of the public diplomacy efforts that are taking place at State in terms of these new adventures, and also at the BBG.

And we learn from the exchanges. We know that anyone who comes to the United States has a transforming experience here, but there's only 25,000 of them a year, and we have to deal with the issue of scale. If we do not take this story and our ability to cause exchanges with one another to the countries in large enough numbers to make a difference, I don't think we can answer the request for the job description you laid out.

So it isn't enough to just expand the programs that we have. You're going to hear some very interesting stories about the private sector, and I think that somehow the public diplomacy center that you will eventually, I hope, devise will need to be very powerful partners with the private sector. You can't expect them to get this done without that kind of important arm in the service.

We have in the United States amazing musicians, athletes, teachers, business people who will be very interested in going to do their part. They are willing to go to countries to stay there, to teach, to take part in much more complicated ways than we've ever devised, but we don't have the means, the fund or the system to activate them.

But there's a lot of that work done on a small basis today in the State Department. There are charming and efficient ways to teach science, computer skills and English on the local TV channels in the key countries. There are departments of American studies that we could ask universities throughout the Middle East to take.

Our own Library of Congress has the largest collection of Arab books in the world. Why aren't we translating those, putting them beside a comparable American history and putting that in an American studies class? Think how many people would come through there as compared to the painstaking one-person-at-a-time contact that we have been doing in the past.

It's possible digitally to connect a teen in Idaho with a teen in Cairo. It is possible to take partnerships with local TV and radio stations in these countries and run stories about what USAID is doing.

The reason the people in Egypt don't know about the programs is, everyone agreed we wouldn't tell them, and USAID, when asked to take part in communicating the brand of the United States, said, We have no people or mandate to do that. But in spite of that, they've done some impressive coprogramming with local TV shows in the country to say, Look, there's this little brand-new water system we have in Cairo which has literally transformed a region of that city.

It's unacceptable, I think, to be silent about American generosity. We could do much more innovative things if we felt free to take the initiative.

It's possible to make a virtual reality room where we build not a library which is kind of old form, frankly, or an American corner, but we create one in a virtual reality. We make it so much fun to go into, and we put in it a shopping mall in Rabat. And at one time we had the Smithsonian Institution working on that sort of thing.

So I'm actually——

Mr. TURNER. Secretary Beers, we'll need you to wrap up your— just conclude your comments.

Ms. BEERS. May I conclude? Thank you for signaling me. This is the danger of being enthusiastic and running amuck.

Mr. SHAYS. We love it. We love it.

Ms. BEERS. One thing I don't want to leave without saying— please don't buy the idea that the United States can't be the messenger. We do not have a choice. There are ways that smart, talented people can get that across. And furthermore, we can't afford to stand for just foreign policy and military might.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Beers follows:]

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS,
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
*Hearing on The 9/11 Commission Recommendations on Public Diplomacy:
Defending Ideals and Defining the Message*

By
Charlotte Beers

Monday, August 23, 2004
1:00 p.m.
Room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

The unparalleled focus and serious recommendations this Subcommittee brings to Public Diplomacy can materially change our relationship with the Arab and Muslim people. These are people from whom we've been isolated; and, people to whom we must defend our values and beliefs in order to ensure the safety of our own people. Thank you for inviting me to participate. I consider it an honor.

The recommendations in every case should be implemented. But, I will suggest you separate certain issues, require more innovation, and consider a new structure. The thoughtful conclusions preceding those recommendations you lay out, after only a few intense months, are very much where the Public Diplomacy team at State came out in some two long years of evaluation after September 11, 2001.

What's the message, you ask? We had emerged in those two years with only two primary objectives: Empower the women and Educate the young. There is no question in my mind the women of these Muslim/Arab countries will be the agents for change as they fight for certain individual freedoms, but more importantly for opportunities for their children.

You painted, thankfully, a much larger canvas. "Defend ideals;" "Encourage reform, freedom, democracy and opportunity;" "Act aggressively to define Americans;" "Moral Leadership;" "Generous and Caring to our neighbors;" "Encourage the moderates;" and the one that resonates with all we know about positive communication, "Arab and Muslim friends can agree on respect for human dignity and (the importance of) economic opportunity."

These are elegant, difficult and necessarily long term tasks. This work requires in-depth understanding of the people in these countries, so that the messages can be heard. To confront intangible issues such as tolerance, the concept of freedom to a Muslim, to find a way to be the messenger without apology, are all jobs that require a set of skills and a degree of determination, not presently available or organized to be effective at this time. Let me explain.

There are in the State Department exceptionally qualified people who create a vital dialog with key governments around the world. This traditional diplomacy is supported by a talented public affairs team in State and at the embassies, who deliver swiftly, accurately and in over 30 languages, the messages relating to our foreign policies. They interpret and define to their government counterparts and local leaders the meaning and context of such policies. The skill, talent and loyalty of those who practice this essential role of diplomacy are often unsung heroes and largely unknown to the outside world. It is work, by its very nature, that is discreet, slow moving and secretive.

Public Diplomacy is a whole different skill set with completely different objectives, having as its intended audience many diverse groups of people in the country, as well as its government or leaders. This work of Public Diplomacy has as its charter to create mutual understanding country-to-country, people-to-people. The capacity to do the work of public diplomacy, today, is severely fragmented by different and competing units with no central leadership; by not having the right people who know how to develop modern communication content and delivery; and, by not being able to foster and fund a long term diplomacy effort of messages and programs.

Because public diplomacy is just that -- public -- with the goal of engaging many diverse audiences, it is quite unlike traditional diplomacy. Further, the messages and programs require skills in communications designed to influence as well as inform. Such tasks are not well placed in the State Department, whose main focus has to be more traditional diplomacy, though public diplomacy has to be coordinated with the work of our embassies. The goal is mutual understanding; bridges based on a common ground of universal values which will be longer lived than even the most urgent foreign policy. This can be a source of frustration, even controversy to those in the government and the press who believe that foreign policy must take the forefront in every communication.

The BBG and its new media channels have a somewhat more restricted charter than public diplomacy has, but critically important. They communicate the truth of

our foreign policies and help to interpret them to a hostile and indifferent audience. We can do a better job of putting policy messages in context in all forms of communication. The reach of the BBG's new initiatives to a much broader audience, because it is not filtered, is a vital foundation for an honest dialog. Much of the media from the BBG and its content, however, does not often address the larger canvas you've recommended.

Strategically, we must start with those areas of agreement we do have -- people-to-people, not necessarily government-to-government. It was partly sensitivity to the Government of Egypt that has kept the stunning story of our aid to that country the world's best kept secret. Because there is widespread and deliberate distortion of the values believed to be held by the people of the United States, it is essential we deliver a truer picture, to the Muslim and Arab world. At the moment, the Moderates cannot defend against the demonization of our society -- successfully summarized by our enemies as decadent and faithless -- and anti-Muslim.

But, being better and more truthfully understood is not nearly enough though it is a fundamental starting point. We have to clearly offer to others the dignity of the individual starting with personal freedom and the rule of law that we claim for ourselves. Economic opportunity, which is an almost bias-free goal, can and should focus on the women and the young. So the messages and the programs will to some extent dictate the audience. The message must be verified by our deeds and our programs.

The question still remains how -- how to engage people who don't trust us; how to take agreed messages to them; and, how to create a meaningful dialog.

The good news is that we have a powerful data bank of experience in exchanges, book translations, libraries in country and other forms of dialog. We have a huge private sector that operates as important and trusted citizens of these countries. But we will have to examine new methods of exchanging ideas and understanding. Our embassies have become fortresses and libraries and information centers are not always user friendly and accessible.

We have no choice but to innovate, to test new models -- to reach millions and to touch them in their countries. It's true, whenever anyone visits the United States as an exchange student, scholar, or teacher, they are transformed. But we will not get enough of these youth here. There are charming, involving, and efficient ways to teach science, computer skills and English on their own TV channels. We have many generous musicians, artists, business people, athletes and teachers who will

go to countries as mentors or speakers. Our own Library of Congress has the largest collection of Arab language books in the world.

It is possible to do a virtual reality “room” or a typical American street and put in a shopping mall in Rabat. It is possible to connect a teenager in America with one in Cairo digitally. It is possible to build messages of dialog and understanding with an interactive component and run them on Arab TV. It is possible to make magazines and how to books between our people and the Muslim people.

To do this bolder, broader canvas you request, we will need a freestanding organization and people of very specific skills. We will need a leader who can stay in place with the power to set the strategic direction centrally and a mandate to harness all the many messages we are sending people through USAID, the Pentagon, State and the BBG as well as other government units which deliver messages and programs. We will need to encourage a climate of innovation. We cannot agree that our acts of generosity through USAID and other avenues, can be made invisible. We also cannot agree to separate the values and beliefs of the American people from our policies, but we can recognize that these are different objectives, audiences and messages that call for different solutions.

Thank you.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Reinhard.

Mr. REINHARD. Thank you, Chairman Shays, members of the subcommittee. Thanks for inviting me here today. It's an honor.

Mr. Chairman, I brought a few slides to help me summarize my very long written testimony so, DJ, if we're ready back there.

Let me begin with a statement you included in your invitation, "If the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, extremists will gladly do it for us."

I respectfully suggest that we step back a bit and view the Middle East as part of a much larger problem. The problem of America's reputation is not confined to the Islamic world, which means it would not be wrong to paraphrase the Commission's statement. If the United States does not act quickly and intelligently to define itself in the post-September 11 world, our detractors across the globe will do it for us. Two recent, if small, examples were this illustration on the front page of the German edition of the Financial Times and this image from Middle East Online just last Friday.

I claim no expertise in government or foreign policy, but as a concerned U.S. citizen and international businessman, I enlisted some of the most preeminent professionals in the fields of global communications, marketing, research and media to form business for diplomatic action, a nonpartisan, not-for-profit organization whose purpose is to mobilize and harness the private sector in a separate but parallel effort to augment whatever the government is doing to reverse the alarming decline in America's reputation.

Let me be clear. This effort is not about ads or selling. BDA does not stand for "business for diplomatic advertising"; it stands for "diplomatic action." Because my background is advertising, I frequently take these paddles with me to remind it's not about ads, it's about actions.

Because listening is the most important part of any communications process—and not, by the way, an attribute normally associated with Americans—the first brief we gave to ourselves was a line from the Scottish poet, "O would that God the gift might give us, to see ourselves as others see us." And our listening confirmed that the image of America, as you know, is a montage of our foreign policy, our global brands and our entertainment product. It's a mix which you are we sometimes refer to as a "Rummy and Coke with Madonna on the side."

Should there be any doubt that government and commercial actions are inextricably linked, one need only review the political cartoons in the foreign press the day after Saddam was toppled. A careful analysis of all our listening efforts revealed four important root causes for the rise in anti-American sentiment around the world—U.S. foreign policy, as we've been discussing, but there are others: the effects of globalization, so many people are feeling left out or left behind, the pervasiveness of American popular culture and our collective personality.

BDA believes that an activated U.S. business community can effectively address the last three. This slide shows some of the most prominent positives and negatives that we have found in how others see us; and to paraphrase Johnny Mercer, we see BDA's job then as one of "accentuating the positive and eliminating the nega-

tive.” To do both means engaging people in both the United States and abroad.

Let me just touch on a few projects we have underway. PepsiCo has paid for the initial distribution of this little World Citizens Guide to the 200,000 young Americans who will study abroad next semester. The content was provided by respondents in the 130 countries we asked for advice for Americans traveling abroad. The response was robust, candid and prescriptive. This little booklet, an advanced copy we’ve given you, is not a travel guide for young Americans. Rather, it’s a compendium of insights that arouse their interest in the world and move them a little closer to a global mind-set.

This page says, It might be better if you don’t compare everything we do here in this country to how it is back home in America. We also plan an abridged version of the guide for 50 to 60 million Americans who travel outside the United States each year.

Everyone acknowledges the importance of exchange programs. We hope to find new ways of bringing the value of these programs to life and share them in with mainstream mass audiences. One approach to this notion is a treatment we’ve developed for a reality show featuring interns from Iran, perhaps, working inside a U.S. multinational corporation here and then Americans interning in foreign offices of the same multinational. In the final episode, the CEO of that company may even say, You’re hired.

Now, to the Middle East, I am bothered by the emphasis on exporting American values. These people have values of their own, and as Secretary Beers said, we can connect with some shared values. I agree with the witness who was formerly with Reader’s Digest, or at least I agree with their old headline writer’s rule which said, Always start where the reader is; don’t start where you are.

In the Middle East especially, we need messages that inspire hope and promise to youth at a very early age. Gary Knell, President and CEO of Sesame Workshop, is an active BDA board member. He’s here with me today. He has vast experience in enabling locally produced children’s programming, especially in the Arab world. I know you’ll have questions for him. This is an activity BDA is supporting.

Although you may be anxious to create effective messages from the U.S. Government to the Middle East, I respectfully suggest that even with careful planning, such efforts at this time are likely to meet with failure. Based on everything we know and hear from the region, the U.S. Government is simply not a credible messenger. The implication for this committee, Mr. Chairman, is to guide the U.S. Government to give real support and incentives to empower and activate credible messengers who can begin the process of bridge-building, even as the government embraces and enacts previous recommendations to dramatically overhaul the management of our public diplomacy efforts.

Other BDA projects are included in your handout.

Mr. Chairman, in crafting a response to the challenge posed by the 9/11 Commission, BDA would recommend you use the same strategy development process that we in the marketing world use for any major global brand in trouble or any company being attacked by a competitor wishing to destroy it or diminish it.

The process is outlined in my written testimony. I've provided one of the representative worksheets from that process for your consideration.

I'd like to close my remarks with a simple way to portray this state of America's reputation and a way we might think about it. This is the sigmoid for identification curve. We often use it to diagram the life of a product or a corporation or our careers or our very lives.

We wobble a bit getting started. Then we flourish and grow, and then at the end of the life cycle we start to wane again. The good news is that for organizations, states and reputations, there is life beyond the curve if we are smart enough, astute enough to start a curve.

The integrity of an organization is maintained by making sure that core values are preserved, perhaps even reemphasized as a new curve begins. But not everything stays the same. Typically, what got you from A to B will not get you from B to C. In the business world, the nature of the competition may have changed. In our larger world, the nature of our struggle has changed.

At the risk of oversimplifying, it seems to me that while in the years preceding September 11, we could lead the world by force, in the days to come, we must learn to lead the world by influence and example.

Mr. Chairman, Business for Diplomatic Action stands ready to help in whatever way we can. Thank you.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Reinhard follows:]

**TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS,
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

*Hearing on the 9/11 Commission Recommendations on Public Diplomacy:
Defending Ideals and Defining the Message*


Oral Remarks By

**Keith Reinhard
President, Business for Diplomatic Action, Inc.
Chairman, DDB Worldwide**


**Monday, August 23, 2004
1:00pm
Room 2154 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515**

Good afternoon. Chairman Shays and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here today. It's an honor to appear before you.


Let me begin with a statement you included in your invitation.



As you know, the problem of America's reputation is not confined to the Islamic world, which means it would not be wrong to paraphrase the commission's statement:




Two recent, if small examples, were...




...this illustration on the front page of the German edition of the Financial Times, and this image from Middle East Online from last Friday.

I claim no expertise in government or foreign policy. But as a concerned U.S. citizen and international business man, I enlisted some of the most preeminent professionals from the fields of global communications, marketing, research and media to form....




...Business for Diplomatic Action, a non-partisan, not for profit organization whose purpose is to...



Let me be clear -- This effort is not about ads or 'selling'. BDA does not stand for Business for Diplomatic Advertising. It's Business for Diplomatic Action.

Because listening is the most important part of any communications process, the brief we gave to ourselves was a line from the Scottish poet:




BUSINESS FOR DIPLOMATIC ACTION
A New Brand of American Diplomacy ★★

Our listening confirmed that the image of America is a montage of our foreign policy, our global brands and our entertainment product.



BUSINESS FOR DIPLOMATIC ACTION
A New Brand of American Diplomacy ★★

It's a mixture we sometimes refer to as a "Rummy and Coke, with Madonna on the side." Should there be doubt that government and commercial actions are inextricably linked, one need only to review...



...the political cartoons in the foreign press the day after Saddam was toppled.

A careful analysis of all of our listening efforts revealed four important root causes for the rise in anti-American sentiment around the world.

Four Root Causes of Anti-Americanism

- *U.S. Foreign Policy
- *Effects of globalization
- *Pervasiveness of American popular culture
- *Our Collective Personality


BDA believes that an activated U.S. business community can effectively address the last three.

“As others see us”

<u>Positives</u>	<u>Negatives</u>
*Opportunity	*Arrogant
*Freedom	*Ignorant
*Diversity	*Insensitive
*Creativity	*Disrespectful
*Innovation	*Unilingual
*Benevolence	*Self-centered

This slide shows some of the most prominent positives and negatives we have found in how others see us. To paraphrase Johnny Mercer, we see BDA’s job as one of... “accentuating the positive and eliminating the negative.” To do both means engaging people both at home and abroad. Let me just touch on a few projects we have underway.

PepsiCo has paid for the initial distribution of this World Citizens Guide to the 200,000 young Americans who will study abroad next semester. The content for this passport sized booklet was provided by respondents in 130 countries who answered our question: What advice would you give to Americans on how they could be better global citizens. The response was robust, candid, and prescriptive. This little passport-sized booklet, an advance copy we have here for you today, is not a travel guide for young Americans, rather a compendium of insights that arouse their interest in the world and move them closer to a global mindset.



LENS IS FOR OBSERVING. WE SEE.


LENS IS FOR REFLECTING. ACTION.

We also plan an abridged version for the 50-60 million Americans who travel outside the United States each year.

Everyone acknowledges the importance of exchange programs. We hope to find new ways of bringing the transformations that occur in exchange programs to life and share them with mainstream mass audiences. One approach to this notion is a treatment we've developed for a reality show featuring interns from abroad working inside US corporations and Americans interning in foreign offices of the same multi-national. In the final episode, the CEO of the company may even say... **"You're hired!"**



In the Middle East especially, we need messages that inspire hope and promise to youth at a very early age. Gary Knell, President and CEO of Sesame Workshop and an active BDA Board Member is here with me today. He has vast experience in enabling locally produced children's programming especially in the Arab world. This is an activity BDA is actively supporting.



Although you may be anxious to create effective messages from the US Government to the Middle East, I respectfully suggest that even with careful planning, such an effort is likely to meet with failure at this time. Based on everything we know and have heard from the regions, the US Government is simply not a credible messenger.

The implication for this committee, Mr. Chairman, is to guide the US Government to give real support and incentives to empower and activate credible messengers who can begin the process of bridge building.

This slide shows just three additional BDA projects currently on the drawing board. A comprehensive list of additional programs and initiatives has been attached to my written testimony:


Representative BDA projects

- **Collecting, Sharing, and Building upon best practices of U.S. multinational companies**
- **World citizenship briefings for top U.S. business executives and curriculum for schools**
- **Academic conference and authoritative book on the role of the private sector in public diplomacy**

Mr. Chairman, I claim no expertise in government. But in crafting a response to the challenge posed by the 9/11 Commission, BDA would recommend the same strategy development process we, in the marketing world use to address any major global brand in trouble or any company being attacked by a competitor wishing to destroy or diminish it. The process is outlined in my written testimony.

I'd like to close with a simple way to portray the state of America's reputation and a way we might think about it.

This is the sigmoid curve, which we often use to diagram the life of a product or a corporation, our careers and our very lives. We wobble a bit getting started, then we flourish and grow and then, at the end of the life cycle, we start to wane again. The good news is that, for organizations, states, and reputations, there is life beyond the curve...if we start a new curve soon enough. The integrity of the organization, or nation for that matter is maintained...by making sure that core values are preserved – perhaps even re-emphasized – as a new curve begins. But not everything stays the same.



Typically what got you from A to B, will not get you from B to C. In the business world, the nature of the competition may have changed. In our larger world, the nature of our struggle has changed. At the risk of oversimplifying, it seems to me that, while in the years preceding 9/11 we could lead the world by force, in the days to come we must learn to lead the world by influence and example.



Mr. Chairman, Business for Diplomatic Action stands ready to help you do so.

Thank you.

**TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS,
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

*Hearing on the 9/11 Commission Recommendations on Public Diplomacy:
Defending Ideals and Defining the Message*

By .

**Keith Reinhard
President, Business for Diplomatic Action, Inc.
Chairman, DDB Worldwide**

Monday, August 23, 2004

1:00pm

**Room 2154 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515**

Good afternoon. Chairman Shays and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you here today.

I would first like to emphasize that I claim no expertise in government, foreign policy or international affairs. My field is marketing and communications. My professional life has been dedicated to the building of brands and their reputations. I grew up in Indiana, I live in New York City, and I travel extensively throughout the world. I am a U.S. citizen and I love my country, and it sickens me to realize that the decline in the reputation of America, "brand that I love," has reached the point that it has now become fashionable, in many if not most regions of the world, to dump on the United States of America.

But if such a realization sickens many of us, it also inspired some of us to form and incorporate a nonpartisan, not-for-profit organization called Business for Diplomatic Action, subtitled "a new brand of American diplomacy." Let me emphasize at the outset that this effort is not about making ads or "selling" America. It's about actions, and during my testimony today, I will be presenting a specific five-step process for your consideration.

We believe there is an urgent need for Congress to act now to dramatically overhaul the management of our public diplomacy efforts so that we as a nation can work not only to rebuild bridges of trust abroad, but also to help defuse the hatred that spawns terrorism. As bleak as the outlook seems, we believe positive change can be achieved and we believe the U.S. business community can play an important role.

Why Public Diplomacy is the Business of Business.

Business for Diplomatic Action (BDA) is a private sector task force directed by preeminent professionals from the fields of global communications, marketing, political science, research and media. The mission of BDA is to sensitize American companies and individuals to the rise of anti-Americanism, its root causes and its implications, and to enlist the U.S. business community in specific actions aimed at addressing the issue and reducing the problem.

Reasons for U.S. corporations to be concerned about rising anti-American sentiment include the well-documented erosion of trust in American brands, the threat to sales including the risk of boycott, and the rising cost of security.

Beyond purely business reasons, BDA believes that U.S. corporations, especially multinational firms, have a responsibility to leverage their enormous reach and influence to improve the overall reputation of our country.

Further, BDA believes that there are at least four reasons business can augment the work of the government and in some cases speak more credibly and effectively. First, American companies, their representatives and their brands directly touch the lives of more people than government representatives ever could. Second, foreign representatives of U.S. companies abroad are more likely to be representative of local views and perceptions than are Americans working in embassies. Third, once corporations decide to act, for the most part, they can move forward without bureaucratic entanglement, and fourth, in a corporation, policy is not automatically up for grabs every four years. This means, if a program gets up and running, and there is senior corporate leadership behind it, there is a good chance it will be sustained in the long run.

Though the impetus behind it began immediately after 9/11, Business for Diplomatic Action was officially incorporated as a non-profit organization in January 2004. Our effort has received wide support from foreign policy and public diplomacy experts in various organizations, including the Council on Foreign Relations, the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, the United Nations Business Council, and the Public Diplomacy Council, among others. We have also received support and advice from some of the most respected foreign policy experts in academia. Specific actions that are either underway or proposed will be summarized later in this report. BDA is privately funded and is just beginning the process of seeking additional funding from corporations and foundations for specific programs.

Previous Recommendations Should be Embraced and Activated.

Your invitation to testify noted that the purpose of this hearing is to “examine U.S. Government efforts to conduct public diplomacy in the Middle East and to determine the status of efforts to adapt public diplomacy to the post 9/11 world.” You also noted that the 9/11 Commission report recommends that “the U.S. government...define what the

message is and what it stands for.” The invitation further highlighted the commission’s statement, “If the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us.”

The problem of America’s reputation, of course, is significantly larger than the Middle East and I would paraphrase the commission’s statement as follows: “If the United States does not act forcefully and intelligently to define itself in the post 9/11 world, our enemies and detractors across the globe will gladly do it for us.” One small example is the illustration on the front page of a recent issue of the German edition of the *Financial Times*. It showed the Statue of Liberty with a “Do Not Enter” sign in place of the torch of freedom.

In the marketing world, we know that a brand—its positive or negative images and reputation—exists in the minds of consumers. In the same way, the image and reputation of the United States exists in the minds of citizens—our own citizens and the citizens of other nations.

In addition, let me emphasize this is not about ads or catchy slogans, *it’s about actions*.

The task of positioning America in a post 9/11 world is one of great urgency but not a task that can be accomplished overnight. According to experts, anti-American sentiment has been building for at least the last two decades. Geopolitical events have ignited and exacerbated those negative feelings, but it has taken us a long time to get to this point and it will take a long time to restore our country’s reputation and influence in the world. It will require patience, persistence, coordination and consistency of message across all the disparate voices that speak on behalf of the U.S. government and the American people abroad.

That being the case, we strongly agree with many of the recommendations that have already been offered in detail to various government bodies by the GAO, the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Ambassador Edward Djerejian, Helle Dale and Stephen Johnson, Congressman Frank Wolf and the Independent Task Force at the CFR chaired by Pete Peterson, among others who have urged the following in one form or another:

The establishment of an overall U.S. communications strategy and a mechanism for coordinating and administering it.

As the threats to our nation continued to escalate and bifurcate post 9/11, the government responded appropriately by prioritizing, reorganizing and significantly restructuring the management of homeland security.

In our view, we need a similarly bold reorganization of the management of our public diplomacy efforts.

Though BDA is intended to activate business in a parallel effort to government activities, it is in many respects what the Council on Foreign Relations first envisioned as a Corporation for Public Diplomacy. Should the government decide to support and proceed with the CFR's recommendation—and we very much hope that it does—there are tools, methods, expertise, and leadership that we would happily lend to this effort.

Reviewing the various proposals, we believe the idea of a high-level communications counselor supported by experts from the private sector seems the most sensible, but we would agree with those who say the leadership should not go to a political appointee. The person who heads this effort should have extensive experience in global communications and a working knowledge of all tools and resources available.

More support for public diplomacy, both in funding and human resources.

We join the many others who have testified to the need for more funding and more accountability for public diplomacy efforts. Advocates for more support often cite the spending ratios for public diplomacy at about four percent of our international affairs budget, three percent of our intelligence budget, and less than half of one percent of our defense spending.

In the private sector, we can't force people to eat McDonald's hamburgers, drink Coca-Cola or wear Nike shoes. And so we spend money to invite people to engage with our brand and try our products. In fact, both McDonald's and Coke spend more money (approximately \$1.2 billion each) to make friends around the world than does the U.S. government. What's more, both companies have someone in charge of the total expenditure and at both companies, someone is held accountable for every dollar spent.

On the point of accountability, we agree with the statement in the "Report of the Subcommittee on Public-Private Partnerships and Public Diplomacy" to the ACIEP in June of 2003 to the effect, "It would be useful to obtain from the Administration an inventory of current programs in place that are specifically designed to promote the image of the United States abroad. We have found no single source of this information, and programs and initiatives are spread out across multiple agencies."

Enlisting the creativity, expertise and the involvement of the private sector.

It is on this latter point that I will focus today. In particular, I will first center on the actions that BDA has initiated in the private sector and our plans going forward. I will then suggest how some of our findings and proposed actions might directly relate to your questions with respect to the Middle East. And finally, I will suggest a framework within which you might consider the further discussion of how best to position America in the post 9/11 world.

What BDA has Learned and What We Hope to Accomplish.

The founding precepts and principles of BDA are as follows:

1. Much resentment of America results from the misunderstanding of, or disagreement with, U.S. foreign policy. But much does not.
2. Given its reach and resourcefulness, U.S. business is uniquely qualified to address certain root causes of anti-Americanism.
3. Actions speak louder than words.
4. There is nothing wrong with America that can't be cured by what's right with America.
5. Listening is the most important part of the communication process.

Our Research Committee has reviewed every study and recommendation on public diplomacy that we know about and continues to monitor every study related to the issue. I'm sure you are aware of these studies, as many relevant excerpts were attached in our hearing briefing package. In addition, we have conducted qualitative research on our own and have now sent requests for proposals to three prominent research companies to fill in certain gaps in our knowledge.

We further culled and then combed through every recommendation we could find in the public diplomacy realm and divided those recommendations into two columns—those that were clearly in the purview of the federal government and those that we felt could be undertaken by the private sector.

Once having identified recommendations that business could undertake, both in the long and short term, we developed action proposals, which are attached to this report. The wide variety represented by our menu of programs reflects our belief that winning back friends for America will require many actions on many fronts. There is no one remedy that will magically transform negative attitudes to positive. Nor will one approach work in every region.

The negatives are well known. You see and review the same surveys that we do—each survey showing a further decline in America's reputation.

As you know, the image of our country is a montage of our foreign policy, the brands we market, and the entertainment we export. It could be referred to as a cocktail of "Rummy" [Secretary Rumsfeld] and Coke with Madonna on the side.

Should there be any doubt that government and commercial actions are irrevocably linked, one need only to review the political cartoons in the foreign press the day after

Saddam's statue was toppled. In at least half a dozen we saw, Saddam had been replaced by Ronald McDonald.

Root Causes of Anti-American Sentiment.

Based on our careful and continuing analysis of all available information, the four root causes of anti-American sentiment appear to be:

1. **U.S. Foreign Policy.** People either disagree with it or don't identify with it.
2. **Effects of Globalization.** People feel we have been exploitative in our global expansion. Many feel left out. Lacking the basic tools to participate.
3. **Pervasiveness of American Popular Culture.** Research shows a definite cooling to our popular culture and in many regions our cultural product is seen as a threat to the local culture. Many feel that our culture promotes values that are in conflict with local mores or social norms. It is also true that many populations, especially in the Middle East, are inundated with the worst of our entertainment product. A deeper resentment towards American culture, values and society has been persistent and growing in many regions of the world.
4. **Our Collective Personality.** Although Americans are still admired for their openness, their creativity and their can-do approach, we are also broadly seen as arrogant, insensitive, ignorant and loud.

While misunderstanding or disagreement with U.S. foreign policy may represent a significant proportion of the problem at the moment, there are still considerable challenges over the long term presented by the other outlined root causes that the private sector can address.

The American Personality, As Others See Us.

Let's take America's personality quandary as an example. The first step in our process was to truly see ourselves as others see us and to listen on a massive global scale. Listening—a trait Americans are not identified with according to almost every region we surveyed—must be the first step in any communications process. It is, in fact, the most important step. In the commercial world, we know that listening means not only recording what people say, but hearing what is meant by what is said. Hours of listening to insurance prospects, some 25 years ago, revealed that a friendly nearby agent was more important than a low-cost policy. Thus, State Farm changed not only its message but its corporate ethos to back a new promise: "Just like a good neighbor, State Farm is there." Likewise, hours of listening to housewives, as they were called in the late 60's, revealed that what they were looking for wasn't a cheap hamburger, but a respite from the drudgery of meal planning. Thus our permissive response to them, "You Deserve a Break Today."

And so BDA listened closely to every response we received from abroad. We heard positives about America, about the opportunity we offer and the freedoms we provide. There were positives about our wealth and good business sense, our competitiveness, enthusiasm, benevolence, creativity and innovation. But even as early as 2002, we heard disturbing negatives from every region, citing our arrogance, insensitivity, our lack of curiosity and knowledge about other cultures, and our lack of respect for them. We next asked respondents in 130 countries for advice that they would give Americans traveling abroad—guidance they would give Americans on how they could be better global citizens. We listened again. Their response was robust and consistent. *“Learn to listen instead of talking all the time.” “Don’t assume that everyone in the world wants to be exactly like you.” “Stop comparing everything we do to the way you do it.” “If you can’t stop talking, at least turn down the volume.” “You might try learning a few words in our language, and maybe learn a little bit about our culture.” “The Super Bowl doesn’t mean that much to us.” and “If we had an athletic competition called the World Series, it would occur to us to invite other nations.”* And so on. Page after page about what Americans might do to become a little more humble, a little more curious, and a little more knowledgeable about the larger world.

A Global Mindset.

With the intent of sharing this content with American youth in an impactful way, BDA turned it over to a group of students at Southern Methodist University who created a *World Citizens Guide* for students. PepsiCo is paying for the initial printing of this guide, which will be in the hands of 200,000 U.S. young people who will study abroad next September. One page is headlined, “You’re not in Kansas anymore” and suggests to the reader, “It will be better if you don’t spend your entire trip comparing everything to the States. Take the opportunity to love where you are.” There is a visual reminder that if the world were shrunk to 100 people, only five would be Americans. There is a paragraph reminding U.S. travelers that not everyone loves us. The copy reads in part: “Be proud of where you come from. Just try to be a little humble.” There are country-specific tips throughout the guide; e.g., “In Colombia, people may think you are rude if you laugh in public places.”

This little passport-sized booklet, a prototype of which we will make available during the hearing, is not a travel guide for young Americans; rather it’s a compendium of insights that arouse their interest in the world and move them further toward a *global mindset*. It comes complete with a mini-CD that guides the traveler to other sources. It will also be available online at a micro-site where students can not only glean additional information but share experiences with others. Tests of the *World Citizens Guide* with students produced a resounding response—they not only loved what they read but even more important, they *wanted to learn more*.

The next step in our world citizenship program will be the production and distribution of an abridged version of the guide, which we intend to distribute to the 55 million Americans who travel abroad each year. We expect airlines and travel agencies to help us with the distribution. Then, based on the experience we gain from the feedback we get

from users of these guides and from working with experts on the subject, we hope to develop a World Citizens Curriculum for colleges and even secondary schools. Finally, we envision a comprehensive World Citizens briefing program for top executives of U.S. multinational companies. Such a briefing program might also be of interest to new Ambassadors as well as foreign and civil service officers before they leave for service in our embassies abroad.

Global Citizenship, Engaging Americans.

Beyond raising the interest of the small percentage of Americans who travel abroad, we need to be committed to educating American citizens in a mainstream way about anti-American sentiment and why they should care about this issue. When we showed a video of people from around the world expressing negative feelings about America to 900 Americans (100 randomly selected in each of nine cities), only one in ten expressed the feeling that we ought to do something about it. On the other hand, one in four said, “*Who cares,*” or worse. One respondent said: “*These other countries are chicken crap. Let them say whatever they want. Who needs them?*”

As Joe Nye, former Dean of the Kennedy School at Harvard and one of our advisors, noted in his recent book *Soft Power*, “Americans will have to become more aware of differences.... To be effective, we must become less parochial and more sensitive to foreign perceptions. Americans need to listen.”

There is much work to be done and we are actively seeking partners to help build upon the content of the *World Citizens Guide*.

Going Forward: Engaging the Private Sector in Public Diplomacy.

We are intent on having a rigorous intellectual and policy framework for our efforts. We are already engaged in developing a series of academic conferences and publications that would pull together and crystallize the ideas and insights of thought leaders with regard to the issue of engaging the private sector in public diplomacy efforts.

Encouraging and expanding existing exchange programs.

Other BDA projects on the drawing board acknowledge the importance of personal exchange in order to engender understanding and respect. We commend Ambassador Kenton Keith and the Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchange’s leadership in these initiatives. As Ambassador Keith expressed in his testimony before you this past April, “By engaging a very broad array of American individuals and institutions in the conduct of our foreign affairs, exchange programs build both enhanced understanding and a web of productive contacts between Americans and the rest of the world. Changing minds—or merely opening them—is a long, painstaking process. There are no quick fixes. If we are to win the war on terrorism, there will be no avoiding the need to build bridges between the American people and the people of the Muslim world. We must begin this process now.”

We hope to find new ways of bringing the transformations that occur in exchange programs to life and share them with mainstream mass audiences. One approach to this notion is a treatment we developed for a reality-based television program to be aired globally called *The Exchange*.

Additionally, and in the spirit of the Alliance's leadership, we plan to encourage a number of U.S. corporations to sponsor massive intern exchange programs. Letting bright foreign and American young people experience a business exchange on a massive level would go far, we think, toward changing attitudes and perceptions. Such a program would be especially important in light of the current visa environment in which many of the best and brightest minds from abroad are choosing not to study here or are having great difficulty obtaining visas to come to the U.S. As many others have observed, loss of such talent to other nations will eventually erode America's competitive edge.

Sharing best practices.

American multinational companies are actively engaged in a variety of positive public diplomacy efforts to improve the lives of many throughout the world. These efforts are largely unknown, and we feel there is potentially tremendous power in sharing what they have learned with us and with each other. These could then be shared broadly as models for all U.S. companies who do business overseas and wish to engage in public diplomacy efforts.

Private Sector-led Public Diplomacy in the Middle East.

Let me next turn to your specific interest in the Middle East and the statement you highlighted from the 9/11 report "America and its friends have a crucial advantage—we can offer (Muslim) parents a vision that might give their children a better future...the United States must stand for a better future."

From all of our guidance gleaned from the region, we know the way to engage the Muslim mother and her child is not to "teach them American values." The key is to be *responsive* to a need and desire that we can actually meet. As in all actions and especially in all messages, we must follow the old *Reader's Digest* headline writer's rule: "*Always start where the reader is.*" We all have a tendency to start where we are. We want the audience to know what we want to tell them. In the commercial world, we have learned that you can only get them where you want them to be if you start from where they are. Muslim parents wanting a brighter future for their children is the place to start. And the gateway to their child's brighter future is education and learning.

One example of a private sector initiative to facilitate ongoing dialogues and partnerships in educational programming is Sesame Workshop. The goal of *Sesame Street* is not to teach American values but to facilitate learning, which it does in ways that are closely in tune with local culture and concerns. According to Gary Knell, President and CEO of Sesame Workshop and a member of the BDA board who is with me here today, "No

lesson could be more important than learning respect for others. It is a complex and multifaceted issue.” What Sesame has done to apply its technique in countries around the world is to create locally developed versions of *Sesame Street* that are culturally and socially relevant in each locale. The South African production, *Takalani Sesame*, attempts to contribute to educational goals of humanizing and destigmatizing people with HIV/AIDS by introducing a 5-year-old Muppet, Kami, who is HIV positive. In Egypt, *Alam SimSim* addresses the country’s critical need to bolster girls’ education through Khoka, a “full of beans” Muppet who aspires to succeed in myriad professions. Also of note, USAID is a committed partner of Sesame’s who understands the power of media in developing educational platforms in developing countries. They have been strong supporters in Egypt, South Africa, Bangladesh and now India.

Next spring, Sesame is aiming to convene the first annual Arab Educational Media Summit in the region which we fully support and encourage. This summit will bring together broadcasters, business leaders, media professionals, researchers and educators with a single objective in mind, to improve children’s television in the Arab world.

The messenger must be credible.

Much as I suspect you are anxious to create effective messages from the U.S. government to the Middle East, I respectfully suggest that even with careful planning, such an effort is likely to meet with failure at this time. Based on everything we know, the U.S. government is simply not a credible messenger.

I quote from the *Report of the Subcommittee on Public-Private Partnerships and Public Diplomacy*, “In many cases and situations, non-governmental actors may be better placed to achieve a given impact than the government. Official public diplomacy efforts need to be designed against this background. For example, in present circumstances in the Arab and Muslim world, the need to strengthen and elevate the voices of those within the Islamic faith and culture who oppose radical ideas is a task much more effectively performed by non-government actors than by the government. Much the same is true regarding the spread of the message of the advantages of free-market capitalism as a source of prosperity and the foundation for individual liberty. Government policies and resource allocations for public diplomacy should explicitly address and embrace programs and approaches that provide incentives to private sector organizations to perform tasks in which the direct and obvious engagement would be counterproductive.”

In the commercial world, we know that people don’t buy things from people they don’t trust. By and large, in the Muslim world, the U.S. government is not trusted.

When the State Department asked us to comment on its *Hi* magazine, designed for Arab youth, we conducted man on the street interviews in Egypt and in Jordan. We also enlisted a young Egyptian studying in the U.S. to help us gather comments from his Arab friends and family in the U.S. We culled the reactions and responses, noting that credibility issues were at the core of many of the negative reactions.

This is one of the young Egyptian's quotes:

"What makes it difficult to accept is that anything that the American government does is going to be dismissed as propaganda, before we even look at it. Many people [at home in Egypt] say that all this magazine is doing is trying to make the American government look good, when it really isn't." He went on to say, "It's a huge obstacle, even if the magazine was perfect."

The "credibility of the messenger" point is also made by Professor Fawaz Gerges, the Christian A. Johnson Chair in International Affairs and Middle Eastern Studies at Sarah Lawrence College and a frequent guest on ABC "World News Tonight" and CNN. Professor Gerges is a Muslim, a historian and an advisor to Business for Diplomatic Action. He confirms what others have said, that far from being resentful and hateful toward America and Americans, Arabs and Muslims are deeply attracted to and fascinated with the American idea.

Bridges of trust.

Professor Gerges goes on to say: "In the last few years, so much focus has been on foreign relations and on the opposing relations between the United States and the Arab world, that the basic challenge today is how to shift the debate from foreign policy to civil society on the American idea. I believe that regardless of what the American government does, its ability to positively influence public opinion is very limited."

According to Professor Gerges, "American civil society means universities, opinion makers, the media, and business—they have a vital role in rebuilding what I call bridges of trust—the *broken bridges of trust* between the United States and the Arab and Muslim world."

The implication for this committee, then, is to guide the U.S. government to give support and incentives to empower and activate credible messengers who can begin the process of bridge building.

As a mindset for bridge builders, whether in the private or public sector, I commend the eloquent advice of one of our young staffers in Cairo, who said: "In investment, America must be presented as the facilitator, not the patron. In the realm of charity, as the partner and not the philanthropist. In business endeavors, as the courier of progress, and not the preachers of westernization."

A Communication Strategy Post 9/11.

Were BDA given the task of crafting a response to the challenge posed by the 9/11 Commission, we would basically invoke the same strategy-development process we in the marketing world would use to address any major global brand in trouble or any company being attacked by a competitor wishing to destroy or diminish it. Applied to the United States, that five-step process would look something like this:

Step I: Listen, ask questions, and analyze.

Question: How is the United States currently perceived by the world?

"O would that God the gift might give us / To see ourselves as others see us."

-- Robert Burns

Answering this question in the spirit of Scottish poet Robert Burns requires a careful review of all existing data, plus conducting any original research needed to fill remaining knowledge gaps. In truth, there are knowledge gaps with regard to issues of anti-American sentiment and public diplomacy programming—they are difficult issues to evaluate and quantify and we are only in the early stages of really understanding many of the complexities surrounding the issues at hand. A comprehensive answer to this first question, however, broken down by country and region, is essential to correctly answering subsequent questions that we would offer in our process.

Step II: Participate in a foundation-building process for a comprehensive communications strategy.

In this step, a special task force made up of knowledgeable representatives from all key public and private sectors that are responsible for message creation or delivery is assigned to work with us. First, they are given all the research and analysis conducted in Step I, and then asked to gather for two days to participate in what we call a foundation-building process. This is a structured, facilitated and highly participative process by which, through a series of proven exercises, we draw out answers to several specific questions from each participant, answering for the United States as if the U.S. were a person.

Step III: Introduce a "positioning concept" for the U.S. in a post 9/11 world.

Professional planners, expert in the process, analyze the work of the task force members and present back to them a distillation of the foundation they created. Modifications are discussed and agreed to before the concept is disseminated to all who need to know. Often, a positioning concept can be expressed as the right combination of three P's: *A point of view, a promise, and a personality.* Once the special task force approves the "positioning concept" for the U.S. in a post 9/11 world, we would proceed to Step IV.

Step IV: Develop a comprehensive communications plan.

This plan typically takes the form of a multi-audience grid on which each relevant constituent group is given a column. For each group, e.g. Muslim parents, Muslim youth, Chinese business leaders, U.S. citizens, etc., we list existing attitudes, desired attitudes, barriers standing between existing and desired attitudes, best incentive or motivation for achieving desired attitudes, and most relevant communications channels.

Obviously, answers to these questions will vary by the group being addressed, but all must be translations of the agreed upon “positioning concept.” Importantly, all reflect the style or tone of voice determined and agreed to by the multi-agency task force. *The importance of this element of style and tone cannot be overstated.* In the commercial sector, we know that it is not so much what you say, but how you say it. Similarly in diplomacy, style is often substance.

Because the U.S. government has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them “singing off the same sheet” is especially important.

Step V: Put someone in charge.

Once the comprehensive communications plan is agreed to, someone needs to be empowered to make sure all activities, behaviors and messages are aligned to the new positioning concept. This same person, though not a political appointee, should oversee and coordinate the execution of the comprehensive communications plan across the varied stakeholders who are involved with carrying out the message and implementing public service programs. Without this function, the voice of America will be splintered and confused and, perhaps, contradictory.

Business for Diplomatic Action Wants to Help.

I attended a Seeds of Peace gala earlier this year where Tom Friedman, the foreign affairs correspondent of *The New York Times*, observed that “these days, all the creativity and imagination seems to be on the side of the terrorists.”

As someone who has worked in and with American business for 50 years, and traveled the world for many of those years, I can assure you there is a great deal more creativity and imagination in the U.S. business community than could exist in the minds of a thousand terrorists. I invite you to tap into that reservoir of creativity.

Who better than the creative men and women who power the world’s most successful enterprises—the business community of the United States of America.

Business for Diplomatic Action is committed to mobilizing that power.

We’d like to think that if you invite me back here say, 10 or 15 years from now, I could show you a slide confirming that America’s historic positive qualities are still admired, but that a list of new positive perceptions has been added.

America’s most admirable qualities

<u>Historic</u>	<u>New (by 2015?)</u>
“Can Do” spirit	Honesty/Integrity
Enthusiasm to be best	Fairness
Technology	Empathy
Way of doing business	Courier of progress
Land of opportunity	Ethics model
Freedom	Multilingual, multicultural
Creativity	An inspiring world leader
Diversity	The model world citizen

I’d like to close with a quote from the famous founder of DDB Bill Bernbach, who said:

“We are so busy measuring public opinion, we forget we can mold it.
We are so busy listening to statistics, we forget we can create them.”

He went on to say:

“In this real world, good doesn’t replace evil. Evil doesn’t replace good.
But the energetic displaces the passive.”

It’s a mantra that should inspire us all. We stand ready to help in whatever way we can, to lend our energies and our experience to create better standing in the world for the United States of America.



BUSINESS FOR DIPLOMATIC ACTION
 A New Brand of American Diplomacy

Our Mission

To sensitize American companies and individuals to the rise of anti-Americanism in the world and to enlist the U.S. business community in specific actions aimed at addressing the issue and reducing the problem.

Who We Are and What We Do

Business for Diplomatic Action is an initiative directed by a task force of preeminent global communications marketing, political science, research and media professionals. The task force steers a collective of U.S. multinational companies in the development, warehousing, sharing and implementation of ideas, insights and guidance aimed at counteracting the several root causes of anti-American sentiment.

Expressions of support for our efforts have been received from the Council on Foreign Relations, the United Nations Business Council, the National Committee on American Foreign Policy and the Public Diplomacy Council, as well as from some of the most respected foreign policy experts in academia.

Our Message

The alarming rise in anti-American sentiment represents a looming crisis for U.S. businesses, especially for U.S. brands marketed abroad. Even though much resentment of our country currently centers on our foreign policy, much does not. Other root causes include the perception that we are arrogant and insensitive as a people, that our culture has become all-pervasive, and that the global business expansion on the part of U.S. companies has been exploitive.

Research confirms the global erosion of trust and preference for a wide range of American brands. One in four consumers in the Asia-Pacific region says they avoid using U.S. brands. "Power Brand" scores for most U.S. brands measured by Roper were down in 2003 for the first time. The latest research from NOP World shows significant drops in "trust" and "honesty" for four leading U.S. brands over the past year. A number of restaurants in Germany will no longer serve Coke, sell Marlboros or accept American Express cards. Thirty-six thousand people responded to a "Boycott Brand America" Web site in Vancouver, British Columbia. While many U.S. corporations have not yet experienced a direct hit on their bottom lines, attitude always precedes behavior, which means a negative impact on sales is only a matter of time.

Anti-Americanism is, at least in part, a business problem that the U.S. business community, by virtue of its reach and resourcefulness, is uniquely qualified to address. Beyond pure profit concerns, American business leaders have a responsibility to use their influence to improve the overall reputation of the United States.

Strategy and Tactics

After culling and cataloging all available research and reviewing hundreds of recommendations from public diplomacy experts, our overseas offices and members of our initiative, BDA selected programs that could be activated by business in the near and long term. These programs are specifically designed to address the root causes of anti-Americanism. BDA seeks funding for these initiatives from the corporate sector and from private grant-making institutions. Below is a partial list of projects that are already in progress or under consideration.

- **World Citizens Guides** to be distributed free to all Americans who study, work or travel abroad. These guides sensitize the 55 million Americans who travel abroad every year – making them aware of cultural differences and negative perceptions and suggesting corresponding behaviors to create positive impressions.
- **Mass professional exchange programs.** Experts agree that there is nothing better than personal exchange to enhance mutual respect and understanding. BDA proposes that a number of U.S. companies join together to organize and fund massive exchange programs through corporate internships.
- **Hoover Institution Conference** and book publication sponsored by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Experts convene to form and crystallize an authoritative position on the role of business in public diplomacy. Results are published as a book for sale and for distribution to business executives and opinion leaders.
- **Developing research knowledge** by directing a consortium of three leading global research companies (Roper, Zogby and Ipsos Reed) to address, via "listening" research, two of the three root causes of anti-American sentiment that businesses can help correct. The ideas and actionable steps that will result from this research will help provide recommendations to corporations on how to:
 1. Adjust their globalization to better reflect local values and perceptions.
 2. Act more like local citizens and less like visiting tourists.
- **Public diplomacy Web portal** where "best practices" of U.S. companies that have learned to be good local citizens (as opposed to insensitive tourists) can be shared and easily accessed by interested parties. International perspectives and related research studies will also be available on the Web site.

What You Can Do

U.S. corporations can poll their own international employees to seek advice on what their companies can do to improve perceptions of the United States. Corporations can designate an executive to attend BDA roundtable discussions where best practices can be shared, collective actions discussed and new tactics devised. And corporations can sponsor BDA projects such as those listed. Contact us for a complete menu of projects, both short-term and long-term.

Individuals can help by leading us to funding sources, lending their ideas and support, and by making individual financial contributions. Please call Cari Eggspuehler at 415.732.3620 or email cari.eggspuehler@sf.ddb.com for more information.



BUSINESS FOR DIPLOMATIC ACTION
 A New Brand for International Relations

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BUSINESS FOR DIPLOMATIC ACTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BDA Proposed Projects, Programs & Strategies

Addressing business-related root causes of anti-American sentiment

While much of the resentment of the United States is related to perceptions of U.S. foreign policy, research points to three other root causes that relate more to U.S. business expansion. These three root causes could be effectively addressed by efforts on the part of the U.S. business community.

Root Cause I: The effects of globalization

People in many countries feel left out; they feel that they can never be a part of, or enjoy the benefits of, the globalization movement led by U.S. business expansion. They may lack the education, language and hi-tech skills. They may feel that U.S. companies have not truly engaged or partnered with them in a meaningful way.

After culling and cataloging hundreds of recommendations and research from public diplomacy experts, our overseas offices and members of our initiative, BDA selected those programs that could be activated by business in the near and long term.

Business for Diplomatic Action envisions the following projects and programs to address the negative effects of globalization:

- ***Best Practice Sharing.*** Many U.S. multinationals do a good job of becoming good "local citizens" as opposed to "bad tourists." BDA intends to collect the best practices of as many companies as possible and then share them on a Web site that can be accessed and imitated by interested parties.
- ***Stanford CEO Conference & Publication.*** The Hoover Institution at Stanford University stands ready to convene a corporate conference. At this conference, expert opinion on the role of the corporate sector in public diplomacy would be formed into a book for distribution to CEOs and opinion leaders and would be for sale to other interested parties. The book would make the case for widespread corporate engagement and provide a model for multinational corporate behavior.
- ***Telling the "Untold Story."*** Once "best practices" are collected, they can become content for a professionally produced video to be used as a television special both inside and outside the United States. Such material would also be used to brief the many foreign journalists at the State Department's Foreign Press Centers in New York, Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles.

- **Locally produced children's TV series on technology.** One aspect of American achievement that is still universally admired is the area of technology. In some countries, the lack of technology, technological skills and knowledge represents a barrier to participation in the benefits of globalization. BDA intends to enable local broadcasters, beginning in Muslim states, to produce "Sesame Street" like programs for children. Sesame Workshop would enable the local producer from a creative standpoint. We seek support from a U.S. technology company to provide technical input.
- **Global Corporate Listening Campaign.** The first step in this campaign would be for U.S. multinationals to reach out to their international employees. By gathering their employees' insights and suggestions, companies can discover what actions or behaviors on their part might be exacerbating the problem and what they can do to enhance perceptions of the United States.

As a second part of the Corporate Listening Campaign, we hope to stage a global listening event where corporate CEOs can come together to hear candid perspectives on U.S. business from a number of remote locations around the globe.

- **Sector-specific research.** The rise of anti-Americanism will have varying effects on business categories depending on what kinds of products and services are marketed, where they are marketed, and how they are branded. BDA has asked major research firms to design a comprehensive study to assess these variables in order to fill in existing knowledge gaps and support new recommendations for diplomatic initiatives on the part of corporate America.
- **Mass professional exchange programs.** Experts agree that there is nothing better than personal exchange to enhance mutual respect and understanding. BDA proposes that a number of U.S. companies join together to organize and fund massive exchange programs through corporate internships.
- **English language training abroad.** English is the portal to globalization - it is the language of science, medicine, economics and the Internet. The more English speakers we can encourage, the better chance America has of being understood, if not appreciated. With a working knowledge of English, young people around the world can gain access to existing satellite television broadcasts, U.S. newspapers and magazines and U.S. educational opportunities. BDA will identify existing English language programs in need of funding and propose additional, free English language training in strategically important areas in the Muslim world.
- **Proposed Supplementary Projects & Programs.** BDA plans to develop other short-term and long-term programs to address the negative effects of globalization. These may include proposals for tax relief for publishers who donate overruns of books and magazines to resource-poor foreign schools, learning and technology hubs with Internet access, and the eventual development and deployment of an MBA Peace Corps to aid economic development in countries where such assistance is needed.

Root Cause II: *The pervasiveness of American culture*

Many people in other countries believe their local and national cultural values are being threatened by the values promoted by American companies and brands and/or the pervasiveness of our cultural product. The worst of our entertainment product is often most attractive to young people in repressive cultures who are thus led to believe that America is a criminally violent and sexually immoral nation.

BDA proposes a number of steps to address this root cause of anti-Americanism. The first of these relates to our entertainment product.

- **Encourage U.S. media content providers to dub their programming into foreign languages.** At this time, much of the content is broadcast in English throughout the world. Making this content accessible to non-English speakers, especially in the Arab world, would provide a more balanced view of the U.S. and American values.
- **Roundtable dialogues with the entertainment industry.** While BDA does not expect U.S. motion picture and television producers to substantially change the nature of their content, BDA can at least make them aware of the dimensions of the problem, seek their creative input on alternative programming and attempt to be a positive influence.
- **"The Exchange" - a reality television series.** The reality series follows three American students interning for the foreign offices of a multinational corporation and three foreign students interning for its U.S. offices. Six episodes will be devoted to the interns' experiences while working and living abroad. A final seventh episode will bring all six interns together for a discussion of their impressions. The CEO may then decide to hire one or more of them.
- **International Rap Session.** Youth dialogue led by a universally popular hip-hop artist with participants from every region of the world, globally televised every quarter.
- **Expand "cultural diplomacy" programs.** Government funding for cultural diplomacy initiatives has been substantially reduced over the past decade. BDA proposes to identify the kinds of music, dance, art and other intellectual presentations that have the greatest appeal and make the most positive impressions on international audiences. These findings will provide the basis for seeking private-sector sponsorship of tours and performances of America's best cultural ambassadors.

Other short-term and long-term projects relate less directly to the U.S. entertainment industry but do address the perceived corrupting influence of American culture. Below are proposed supplementary projects, programs and events.

- **Identify sponsors for A Call to Action: Sesame Workshop's Arab Educational Media Summit, Spring 2005.** Sesame Workshop, a 35-year veteran and pioneer of educational media for children, will convene the first annual Arab Educational Media Summit in the region next spring. This will bring together broadcasters, business leaders, media professionals,

researchers and educators with a single objective in mind: to improve children's television in the Arab world.

- **Briefing program for international advertisers.** BDA proposes to meet with U.S. multinationals that create advertising for foreign markets. Certain portrayals of American values and lifestyles are negatively received by foreign audiences while other elements of the American culture have near universal appeal. Americans creating advertising for consumption abroad should be aware of these differences, which are often subtle.

Root Cause III: *The perceived collective personality of the U.S. & its citizens*

Research from 130 countries confirms that Americans are broadly perceived by others as arrogant, ignorant, lacking in humility, loud and unwilling to listen.

BDA has identified a number of ways to begin to change this perception by engaging and sensitizing Americans at home and abroad.

- **World Citizens Guide for Young Americans.** BDA has collected advice from around the world for Americans traveling abroad. This content became the basis for a passport-sized World Citizens Guide, which will be introduced in late summer of 2004. Initially, guides will be distributed to the 200,000 young Americans studying abroad and eventually to all young people traveling abroad. The guide alerts young people to how Americans are currently perceived and provides guidelines for sensitive behavior. The guide is accompanied by a mini-CD that directs the user to a host of other sources for related information.
- **World Citizens Guide for all Americans traveling abroad.** A general audience version of the above is being prepared for distribution by airlines and travel agents to the 55 million Americans who travel abroad each year.
- **World Citizens curriculum.** BDA hopes to eventually work with educators to build the principles of world citizenship into the curricula of secondary schools in the U.S.
- **Briefing program for U.S. executives who travel abroad.** BDA plans to develop a one-day briefing program intended for executives of U.S. multinational corporations who travel abroad. This program will serve to sensitize executives to the extent of the anti-American problem and to provide helpful advice for creating positive impressions. Once perfected, this briefing program might be of interest to the U.S. government.
- **Speaking events, articles and corporate roundtables.** Since its inception at the beginning of 2004, BDA has hosted and participated in numerous events, presenting data on the rise of anti-Americanism and its implications for U.S. business. Most of these events have taken place in academic settings or in connection with advertising and marketing conferences. In addition, BDA has made presentations to members of the foreign press at the Foreign Press Center in New York as well as to business executives in Australia and the Netherlands. BDA has also been

interviewed by members of the press from numerous countries. Furthermore, BDA intends to use the press and appropriate public forums to raise awareness of the issue and response among business executives and thought leaders. We also hope to engage key industry executives in more corporate roundtable discussions in order to better shape and execute our programs.

- **Global World Citizenship Campaign.** This is a campaign to sensitize U.S. citizens to the problem, explain why they should care and empower them to engage in discussions on the issue in a variety of creative and dynamic ways. Preliminary research done in nine U.S. cities shows that, when presented with damning comments made by foreigners about the U.S. and its citizens, only one person in ten believes we should be concerned. BDA plans to develop a number of programs to raise awareness of the problem and its short-term and long-term implications. Initial focus would be on youth and could include a Public Service Advertising campaign on the Internet and radio.
- **Multilingual and cross-cultural education in the U.S.** The perception outside the U.S. that American citizens choose to speak only English is still widely held, which continues to cement the notion that America as a nation is self-absorbed and lacks awareness about other cultures. BDA will initiate dialogues with both the U.S. business community and educators to support multilingualism starting at the corporate level and working down to the very foundation of our educational system. The creation of a generation of Americans able to converse in several languages in addition to English is of special importance.

Another aspect of BDA's effort to raise the cultural awareness of Americans will be to encourage private-sector support for *American Studies* programs abroad.

How You Can Become Involved

Business for Diplomatic Action will undoubtedly revise and modify this list of planned initiatives as we enter into new dialogues with interested parties. Nevertheless, the above represents a description of our plans as of mid-year 2004.

Individuals and corporations can help by leading us to funding sources, by lending their ideas and support and by making financial contributions through BDA membership. For further details about these programs and membership, or for further information about Business for Diplomatic Action, contact Cari Eggspuehler, Executive Director, at 415.732.3620, or email cari.eggspuehler@sf.ddb.com.

**Report of the Subcommittee on Public-Private
Partnerships and Public Diplomacy**

Presented to:

**THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
(ACIEP)**

June 4, 2003

**indicates recommendations that a
business group could undertake**

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INTRODUCTION

Over the last several months, the members of the ACIEP Subcommittee on Public-Private Partnerships and Public Diplomacy have met to discuss and review current U.S. efforts in the international public diplomacy arena. As a result of lengthy discussions on this topic, Subcommittee members are convinced that the U.S. private sector *can and should* play an important role in supporting ongoing United States government outreach to foreign audiences in a manner that can help build long-term friendships and advance U.S. interests abroad.

This is a particularly urgent task now, given the delicate position in which the United States currently finds itself – especially with respect to the perceptions among long-time allies and the public abroad. A Pew Center survey of views toward the U.S. abroad published in March 2003 noted that U.S. favorability ratings have plummeted in the past six months among countries that actively opposed the war in Iraq – France, Germany and Russia – as well as in countries that formed part of the “coalition of the willing.” In Great Britain, favorable views of the U.S. have declined from 75 percent to 48 since mid-2002. In Poland, positive views of the U.S. have fallen to 50 percent from nearly 80 percent six months ago; in Italy, the proportion of respondents holding favorable views of the United States has declined by half over the same period, from 70 percent to 34 percent. In Spain, fewer than one-in-five (14 percent) have a favorable opinion of the United States. Views of the U.S. in Russia, which had taken a dramatically positive turn after September 11, 2001, are now more negative than they were prior to the terrorist attacks.

According to a recent Arab American Institute/Zogby International poll, Arab public attitudes toward the United States have declined to dangerously negative levels. Results were based on a survey of 2,600 individuals from key Arab countries, including some of the United States’ strongest allies in the Middle East: Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. According to the report, only 10 percent of Jordanians currently view the United States in a positive light. Similarly, in Morocco, favorability ratings of the United States dropped to 9 percent this year, which is down from 38 percent in 2002. In Egypt, only 13 percent of the population currently holds favorable views toward the U.S.

A 2002 Pew Center survey of 44 countries noted that more than half of Western and Eastern Europeans say the U.S. does not take other countries’ interests into account in carrying out its foreign policy and is fundamentally lacking in awareness of cultural realities that define them, whereas three quarters of U.S. citizens think their government does. Moreover, there was a strong sense among those in most countries surveyed that U.S. policies serve to increase the formidable gap between the rich and the poor.

Of course, not even the most effective public diplomacy campaign can fully address or assuage concerns based on fundamental disagreements with U.S. policy or misunderstandings and/or misperceptions of American intentions. But when the tide of public opinion around the world has turned firmly against U.S. government policies, it is a clarion call for action. In the view of the Subcommittee, existing public diplomacy programs have in recent years failed to effectively communicate the justification for the U.S. policies. Moreover, in many cases, the United States is receiving little or no credit for the introduction and implementation of robust social programs in areas such as healthcare, infrastructure development and demining, even in countries that are

among the largest recipients of U.S. aid. As a result, the members of this Subcommittee believe that new mechanisms must be found and implemented quickly to more effectively deliver the message of U.S. principles and policies abroad.

Public diplomacy cannot rely on image over substance. Indeed, any public diplomacy program is subordinate to the consequences of policy actions. No amount of effort to “spread the word” or “spin the message” can undo in people’s minds the effects of actions that seem to work to the contrary. Any effective public diplomacy campaign must define the United States in clear and recognizable terms that its intended audiences can readily understand and embrace. Such a campaign must accentuate our support of the freedoms that define us: free speech, religion, association and press, and the goals behind the policies we promulgate: security, the sanctity of the individual within a secure community and prosperity. Furthermore, any public diplomacy campaign must be handled in a manner that is not condescending, arrogant, pious or threatening. The U.S. today is too often seen and judged on the basis of being “the world’s only remaining superpower.” Whatever good may come from this concept, it inevitably generates fear, envy and often, hatred in certain quarters. What is needed are policies and communication concepts that convey “world interest” instead of “self interest.” From abroad, our policies must be perceived as fair and just if they are to be accepted and perceived as credible.

Any public diplomacy campaign, like the war against terror itself, will yield few quick victories and limited demonstrable successes. Even with maximum funding, the cumulative impact of the most effective campaign will only be felt over time – underscoring the importance of why U.S. programs in this area must be chosen carefully and purposefully. That being said, public diplomacy also cannot be accomplished effectively on the cheap. The Subcommittee is deeply concerned that President Bush’s budget request for fiscal year 2004 projects a net decrease in public diplomacy spending. The need for a greater allocation of funds for this purpose is more important now than at perhaps anytime in the country’s history.

The image of the United States abroad results from the cumulative impressions left by the actions of many organizations and individuals. In many cases and situations, non-governmental actors may be better placed to achieve a given impact than the government. Official public diplomacy efforts need to be designed against this background. For example, in present circumstances in the Arab and Muslim world, the need to strengthen and elevate the voices of those within the Islamic faith and culture who oppose radical Islamic ideas is a task much more effectively performed by non-government actors than by the government. Much the same is true regarding the spread of the message of the advantages of free market capitalism as a source of prosperity and the foundation for individual liberty. Government policies and resource allocations for public diplomacy should explicitly address and embrace programs and approaches that provide incentives to private sector organizations to perform tasks in which the direct and obvious engagement of the government would be counterproductive.

The work of this Subcommittee has been geared toward the consideration of additional tools that, with the support or participation of the private sector, can help enhance understanding of and build support for the United States and its policies abroad. Subcommittee members believe that the overriding goal of forthcoming initiatives in the public diplomacy arena should be to provide individuals around the world, particularly Arabs and Muslims, with the tools to gain a

dependable understanding of U.S. politics, culture and society. In the words of one Subcommittee member, "our goal should be for America to get a fair hearing in the international court of public opinion." Fundamental disagreements may remain, but if they are based on fair and well-informed judgments, this will still augur well for the United States' image abroad. But this process cannot be a one-way street. An indispensable dimension of crafting more effective public diplomacy initiatives must involve more regularized and intensive efforts to understand the roots of negative attitudes toward U.S. policies. This research should form a critical part of an ever-changing and dynamic public diplomacy effort.

RECOMMENDED INITIATIVES**1. *Launch an Aggressive and Sustained Effort to Increase Funding for Public Diplomacy.***

The private sector, encompassing both corporations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), should band together to organize an effort to improve the climate for enhanced appropriations in the area of public diplomacy. This can be carried out in a manner similar to campaigns on issues such as economic sanctions, funding for Ex-Im Bank, OPIC and support for multilateral institutions such as the World Bank/IMF. Funding for the “soft” side of diplomacy has traditionally not been given a priority, and has had only modest advocacy support from private actors on Capitol Hill. This campaign can and should be assiduously non-partisan.

As part of this effort, it would be useful to obtain from the Administration an inventory of current programs in place that are specifically designed to promote the image of the United States abroad. We have found no single source of this information, and programs and initiatives are spread out across multiple agencies.

2. *Reinstitute Interagency Discipline for Processing Visas for Business and Scientific Travel to the United States within a 30-day “Clock.”*

Since mid-2002, months-long delays and uncertainty have characterized the U.S. visa issuance process. These delays, coupled with unexplained denials and unclear procedures, have caused a major negative impact on U.S. business, scientific and scholarly relations with other countries. This, in turn, threatens to complicate U.S. relations with several strategically important nations, to the detriment of U.S. public diplomacy.

What initially appeared last summer and autumn to be a temporary visa processing delay in the wake of newly imposed security procedures has turned into a continuing problem, with compounding negative impacts. Two visa security programs lie at the heart of this problem. Under VISA MANTIS, increasing numbers of visa applicants require interagency security clearances when seeking to enter the U.S. to interact with U.S. businesses and scientific and research establishments in some 13 broadly drawn technology categories. Delays have continued to run an average of four months, and unexplained denials have increased. Similarly, under VISA CONDOR, visa applications, particularly those submitted by adult males from some 26 predominantly Muslim countries, require an interagency security review, which also has been taking four months on average.

Visa applications are being delayed or denied in such circumstances as individuals seeking to come to the U.S. to take possession of items they have purchased (often having already received an export license from the U.S. government for the item) and to be trained in their use; foreign employees of U.S. companies who seek to bring them here temporarily for training or work on special projects; and potential customers for U.S. goods or services seeking to examine the products and negotiate a purchase. The denials and delays are damaging U.S. companies’ business operations. U.S. scientific and educational institutions report similar difficulties with visiting scholars and researchers and students from overseas.

Beyond immediate damage to U.S. commercial and scientific relationships, there is a more fundamental negative impact on the image of the United States. Travel to the United States by citizens of other nations, particularly those in influential commercial and scientific positions, is a critical element in forming other nations' views of our country. Long delays in processing visas for legitimate travel and seemingly arbitrary and unexplained visa denials, have already damaged American standing with the international community, and the damage will increase geometrically if this situation is not promptly addressed.

Reinstituting a disciplined process for time-limited, reliable and transparent processing of visa applications should be a priority for the U.S. government. VISA MANTIS until July 2002 operated transparently under specific time guidelines (10, 15 or 20 days, depending on the country) that allowed a U.S. company to know when it would receive a decision and to find out where an application was in the process so that potential problems could be identified and addressed in a timely manner. Restoration of a time-limited interagency process in which failure to object by the deadline would move the application forward will allow businesses to plan with confidence U.S. visits of customers or their own employees. From a broader policy point of view, agency officials also need to restore a balanced perspective to visa application reviews that takes into account the damage delays and denials do to our international standing and our commercial objectives. The Committee believes such balance can be achieved without compromising security.

The VISA CONDOR program, while understandably focused on preventing terrorists from entering the United States, should be refined to establish a more disciplined process for making decisions on visa applicants from the targeted countries, while continuing to fulfill its important security function.

3. *Provide Support for Multilingual and Cross-Cultural Education in the U.S.*

Communication style plays a significant role in establishing credibility, trust and rapport with our allies and breaking down barriers among potential allies. The perception outside the U.S. that U.S. citizens speak only English by choice is still widely held and continues to cement the notion that America as a nation is self-absorbed and lacking in awareness about other cultures. By encouraging public and private sector support for multilingualism and cross-cultural education, starting at the corporate level and working down to the very foundation of our educational system, over time the perception that monolingualism is synonymous with U.S. citizens will be a thing of the past. This in turn should help give more credibility to our public diplomacy initiatives.

This is of particular importance for those in the United States government that represent us abroad. Improving the ability of our diplomats to converse in Arabic would bode especially well in this regard.

4. Substantially Increase Funding for English Language Training Abroad, or Provide Incentives for Private Actors to Carry Out This Training.

This may be the most valuable area in which U.S. dollars could be spent for public diplomacy initiatives. English is the portal to globalization – it is the language of science, medicine, economics and the Internet. The more English speakers we can encourage, the better chance America has of being understood – if not appreciated. With a working knowledge of English, young people around the world can gain access to existing U.S. satellite television broadcasts, U.S. newspapers and magazines and U.S. educational opportunities. Improved English language skills can also help people abroad listen to U.S. leaders and ordinary U.S. citizens without the filter of translation. Given that the content of much English teaching material focuses on sympathetic themes such as democracy, free markets and American studies, this provides enhanced value – not only do students equip themselves with an essential language tool to compete in the global economy, but they familiarize themselves with U.S. culture, politics and society in the process.

We believe that English language learning centers in the Muslim world should be encouraged and expanded. These centers should be equipped with appropriate and effective teaching aids and materials. Funding for such centers may be derived in part from members of local American Chambers of Commerce abroad. It is important that foreign students not have to overcome the impediment of gaining entry into American centers at U.S. embassies, which are all too often inaccessible and/or intimidating for average citizens of foreign countries, in order to gain access to English language training and information on American culture and society. Appropriate venues could include schools, libraries or possibly the confines of American Chambers of Commerce in specific countries. (Note: Chambers will need to be contacted in each country independently in order to gauge whether it would be appropriate to consider this as a venue in light of local needs, biases and/or security concerns).

Additional funding for “teaching the teachers” programs, which would allow teachers to go back to their cities and towns to provide English language training, would also be money well spent.

This should be more than just a U.S. effort, but an “English-speaking” peoples’ effort. The federal government should consider sponsoring an initiative involving U.S. businesses with interests abroad, especially in the Muslim world, together with private actors in the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and other English-speaking countries, to consider funding an effort to quadruple the number of students in English as a second language (ESL) classes in Muslim countries. A number of globally active U.S. companies are very heavily committed to development of ESL curricula and teaching materials for international use, and might be included in this effort. The young English speakers who would be recruited as teachers will, of course, learn as much about the Islamic world as their students learn from them.

The U.S. government spent only \$10 million worldwide in support of English-language teaching in 2001, with only about \$1 million targeted at the Middle East. Moreover, the

price of existing U.S.-sponsored English-language training programs is often prohibitive, sometimes amounting to one half or more of a country's per capita income. Instead of pricing English out of the market for the vast majority of individuals in developing nations, the United States should work to make English education affordable to all. The private sector can and should contribute to this effort, and consideration should be given to programs and/or incentives that would promote a greater contribution on the part of the private sector. Consideration should also be given to the possibility of adding language instruction to the range of programs offered by the Peace Corps.

5. *Encourage Private Sector Support for Higher Education and Particularly for American Studies Programs Abroad.*

The vast majority of primary, secondary and university students in the Arab and Muslim world have no opportunity to learn about American government, politics, society, or culture. If the people of the Middle East better understand how U.S. society works, this could help U.S. public diplomacy initiatives achieve success. As a means to address this issue, we believe the U.S. government can and should support the provision of education modules to schools at all education levels that promote the core values and elements of what constitutes the American "model," including democracy and tolerance. These modules would be comprised of curriculum, texts and Internet support materials that could be factored into existing academic programs as either required or elective courses (e.g. "The American Business Model" for MBAs; "The American Constitution" or "Checks and Balances" for political science majors; "The Melting Pot" for sociology or anthropology degrees, etc.). The U.S. government could begin to fund such programs with large grants to establish libraries and multi-year acquisition programs. The private sector could complement those grants with additional funding. Over time, full-scale programs in this arena could be established by leveraging public funds with private foundation grants. Consideration should also be given to federal government and privately funded chairs in American studies at major Arab Universities, with the possibility of faculty exchanges with American scholars going to fill these positions.

As an initial step in this arena, the U.S. should encourage a consortium of U.S. universities to work together to establish a network of distance-education programs (i.e., via the Internet) that focus on core American values that could be linked with local universities abroad. The U.S. government should also seek to work closely with local American Chambers of Commerce and local branches of U.S. non-governmental institutions throughout the Middle East to establish mentoring and internship programs that would help find jobs for the graduates of these types of programs.

6. *The U.S. Government Should Do More to Attract Foreign Students to Colleges and Universities in the United States, Direct Them to Appropriate Programs, and Provide Them with Appropriate Forms of Guidance and Counseling Throughout Their Stay in the U.S.*

This would require developing effective educational advising centers at U.S. embassies throughout the world, establishing full-time postings for regional educational coordinators at

these centers and equipping overseas posts with up-to-date technology to aid in this task. U.S. Chambers abroad could also be encouraged to coordinate with local embassies in such an effort – perhaps by hosting “educational fairs” at regular intervals throughout the year, to which various U.S. university personnel would be invited to showcase the broad array of educational opportunities that exist today in U.S. institutions of higher learning. U.S. Chambers could also act as conduits to put students in touch with particular universities or educational programs of interest in the U.S.

Consideration should also be given to establishing a scholarship fund aimed at bringing a significant numbers of Muslim/Arab students (e.g. 100 per year) to the United States to study at U.S. universities. This would be a process similar to the Fulbright program, but would be funded by private business, not through U.S. government grants. Such a program would help address the growing perception among Arabs and Muslims that the United States simply does not want individuals from the Middle East to come to this country, which has been reinforced by our current visa policy. A well-publicized program that demonstrates not only a tolerance, but a desire, to bring Muslim/Arab students to the U.S., would be a welcome development in the eyes of most individuals in the region.

7. *Provide Resource-Poor Foreign Schools with Books and Magazines by Offering U.S. Publishers and Shippers Tax Breaks to Donate Overruns and to Deliver them Overseas.*

U.S. embassies abroad could work with local authorities to identify recipient libraries to receive materials, and the Department of State web site could catalogue those institutions and provide address information and local Embassy contact information to aid in delivery. Anecdotal evidence from throughout the Muslim world reveals woefully inadequate resources for schools and libraries, with those gaps all-too-often filled with more radical materials supplied by actors with a demonstrable anti-American bias. Publishers contacted by the Subcommittee expressed an interest in this initiative and a willingness to work with the U.S. government to help implement a program that would result in a substantial increase in English-language books and learning materials sent abroad. The Subcommittee recognizes that implementation of this recommendation would require the resolution of some sensitive cultural issues, such as whether the materials are socially appropriate for, and desired by, local communities. Private sector entities have previously addressed and resolved such issues. With U.S. support, these philanthropic efforts could be expanded.

Also worth considering in this area would be supporting the development and expansion of “sister” school or university arrangements. The purpose of such an initiative would be to look for ways in which schools at home and abroad could be linked up, perhaps with the use of new web/streaming media technology, under programs and forums aimed at providing opportunities for students/teachers to talk to and get to know each other in real and substantive ways.

8. *Encourage the Private Sector to Expand Social Investment Programs.*

Public diplomacy, as one Subcommittee member suggested, is “a war of ideas which must be met with ideas.” To be effective, however, those ideas must be grounded in the day-to-day realities faced by people around the world, especially in developing countries. The promise

of democracy or capitalism in these parts of the world has not turned out to be the panacea some had hoped would address issues such as corruption, cronyism or gross mismanagement, and in certain cases poverty and disillusionment has only been magnified. Much of this comes in the wake of massive international aid programs designed to accomplish just the opposite. Thus, cynicism and skepticism are now the response to many similarly inspired efforts.

In that regard, the Subcommittee was of the view that locally based micro-initiatives such as those frequently introduced by American multinational corporations and NGOs can pay more dividends than larger, more ambitious programs. These types of efforts are the kinds of things that the private sector is good at and can make work in partnership with local people, not governments. Moreover, payback in terms of dividends one seeks in public diplomacy is far more direct and immediate.

American companies and the U.S. government generally do not coordinate their social investment/development assistance projects. This often results in a hodge-podge of unrelated and sometimes conflicting activities in many countries. USAID's "Global Development Alliance" (GDA) is a model program that helps address this concern. Indeed, it creates an important degree of synergy between the public and private sectors in the area of social investment. Moreover, the GDA can be leveraged to help both the U.S. government and corporate America's reputations as well as to ensure that funds invested are properly used. GDA is not as well known among businesses and governments as it should be. Additional efforts should be made to heighten awareness of the GDA and to pro-actively identify and encourage greater participation by private actors.

The State Department should also consider expanding the use of the "Corporate Excellence Awards" as a tool of public diplomacy. The awards are presented annually to two U.S. firms for their outstanding corporate citizenship, innovation and exemplary international business practices and for exhibiting qualities of conscience, character and integrity. Businesses are nominated for the award by Chiefs of Missions from the country in which the company operates. Specifically, rather than limiting recognition to only those two companies who win the award, we believe that all companies receiving a nomination should receive some degree of recognition in each country where they were nominated. Indeed, this awards program creates an ideal opportunity for U.S. embassies to invite dignitaries and the media to an annual event honoring the positive social contributions of U.S. businesses, and to highlight the specific good works projects that have taken place with the support of the United States' public and private sectors, as well as NGOs.

9. *Encourage Public/Private Support for Media Initiatives That Would Help Build Understanding.*

The U.S. government should encourage U.S. media outlets such as CNN, MSNBC, DISCOVERY, PBS and others to dub their programming into Arabic, with wide broadcast distribution throughout the Middle East. This could serve as an effective bridge to the ultimate establishment of Arab-language networks capable eventually of competing with Al-Jazeera and other Arab satellite news channels, and would provide an immediate window for

non-English speakers on American perspective on current events and other cultural and education programming. More importantly, this type of direct programming would be less likely to be perceived as a propaganda tool of the United States, a perception that has often undercut the effectiveness of programming by the Voice of America or Radio Sawa.

10. Encourage Exchanges Among Business and Professional Groups.

As a vehicle to increase understanding and broaden personal relationships, doctors, teachers, lawyers, journalists, engineers, managers, IT experts, athletes and lobbyists can change places with counterparts in other countries for short periods of time. The U.S. government, through the Department of Commerce, maintains programs and internship opportunities in this area, but exclusively to place foreigners in the United States within individual companies. Efforts should be undertaken to consider how to expand participation in these programs to include professional organizations, and to consider U.S. funding for reverse exchanges.

11. Launch Initiative to Gather Best Practices by U.S. Businesses and Other NGOs That Impact Non-Governmental Relations Between Countries.

Embassies should work with local American Chambers and NGOs in an effort to summarize best practices in the area of social investment by private actors, and where possible, quantify the impact of trade with and investment from the United States (e.g. direct and indirect jobs created, the amount and type of social investment in local economies). Such information should be utilized regularly by Ambassadors, public affairs officers and other embassy officials as part of any public diplomacy campaign.

12. Conduct Regular Analyses of Overseas Attitudes Toward the U.S.

Any successful public diplomacy campaign must be dynamic and flexible. It is critical that we listen carefully to all that is being said around the world about how the U.S. is viewed, and this then must be critiqued and analyzed to draw conclusions as to accuracy, not only of the reporting, but also of the views reported. Even when such views are erroneous, we should recognize that perceptions are what count. Unfortunately, in this situation, truth is not as important as perception.

As noted earlier, organizations such as the Pew Center have undertaken ad hoc surveys of foreign attitudes toward the United States. The U.S. government should work closely with the private sector to encourage more regularized surveys and analyses of overseas attitudes toward the U.S. This information would be factored into existing and prospective U.S. public diplomacy initiatives.

13. Include Small Business Entrepreneurs in State Department Speakers Programs.

The State Department's "speakers program," which sends U.S. specialists abroad or arranges for them to speak to foreign audiences via digital videoconference technology, could be expanded to include businessmen and women who have succeeded as entrepreneurs "against

the odds.” In particular, women and minorities who have created successful small businesses (especially immigrants from the targeted countries) that can be emulated in some fashion – either as a business model or simply an inspirational story. Dispatching one person abroad is easy to organize and offers a quick response to changing national priorities. Once in the field, speakers can leave a powerful personal imprint on the message they are transmitting and on the people with whom they meet.

14. *Encourage Greater Media Training for Diplomats.*


Regularizing the appearance of senior government officials on major foreign media should be a centerpiece of U.S. public diplomacy. The federal government should assiduously court the scores of Middle East journalists – print and electronic – who are eager to air and publish the comments of U.S. officials. The private sector can play an important role in providing intensive media and message training – through both U.S. professionals and local experts – to U.S. diplomats in the field.

15. *Expand “Cultural Diplomacy” Programs.*

Reviving and expanding the official deployment of culture to boost receptivity to American values has been the subject of much recent debate, both within academia, the arts community and the Congress. In a recent Congressional hearing, the Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations asked, “How is it that the country that invented Hollywood and Madison Avenue has allowed such a destructive and parodied image of itself?”

According to a report issued by Columbia Graduate School of Journalism, over the past decade, funding for U.S. government-sponsored cultural and educational programs abroad has fallen by more than 33 percent. During the Cold War, cultural diplomacy was considered vital to America’s security and countering communism. With the support of the private sector, foundations and educational institutions, the United States flooded Europe with American orchestras, dance groups, art exhibits and touring intellectuals. By the 1960s, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) became a substantial grant-giver in this field as part of an effort to influence foreign elites and societies as a whole, recognizing the value of social/cultural programs to showcase the achievements of democracy.

In the battlefield of ideas, the role of American culture during the Cold War served as an extraordinarily effective tool to compete with radical ideologies of the day. The value of cultural diplomacy is no less relevant and potent today. We believe cultural diplomacy initiatives have been underfunded and underutilized, and with the support of the private sector in the form of grants or in-kind contributions, these programs should be expanded and form a more integral part of future public diplomacy efforts.



**American Brands in the World:
Growing Opportunities or Rising Threats?**

A Roper Reports Worldwide Teleconference
July 1, 2003

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2

American Brands: A Triple Whammy?

- **The Climate:** Globalization continues but at a slowed pace
- **The Causes:**
 - Economic downturn/uncertainty
 - Shifts in cultural affinity
 - Loss in corporate trust
- **The Effect:** A triple whammy on American brands
- **The Response:** Align with economic conditions and be sensitive to cultural values



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3

Roper Reports Worldwide 2003

Listening to nearly 200,000 consumers worldwide since 1995 –
1,000 1-hour+ interviews per country with people aged 13-65 each wave

Field dates Nov.02-Jan.03

Representative of 1.3 billion consumers worldwide

- National sample (North America 17%; West Europe 17%)
- National urban (Developed Asia 10%; Central Europe/Middle East/US 14%)
- National urban w/o lowest SES (Developing Asia 30%; Latin America 11%; Egypt 1%)

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4

The Climate: From Terrorist Attacks to the New Reality of US-Led War

From "We are All New Yorkers."
Le Monde headline 9/12/2001

To sizable anti-war demonstrations in most major markets and
"Boycott Brand America"

World Bank adjusts estimate of 2003 world economy growth:
3.6%, July 2002

2.5% December 2002

2.3% April 2003

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5

Consumers See Globalization: Post-9/11 and Pre-War

More global brands inevitable and welcome



Enthusiastic about Internet access to foreign products and cultures



General wariness about US cultural influence



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6



The World Still Likes Globalization



% who say growing business and trade ties are very/somewhat good for their country and themselves

Vietnam 98	France 88	Turkey 82
Senegal 98	Russia 88	Tanzania 82
Uzbekistan 97	Ghana 88	Italy 79
Ivory Coast 96	South Africa 88	Mexico 79
Nigeria 95	Great Britain 87	United States 78
Mali 95	Indonesia 87	Poland 78
Uganda 95	Canada 86	Pakistan 78
Ukraine 93	Slovak Republic 86	Bolivia 77
Honduras 93	Venezuela 86	Brazil 73
Germany 91	Czech Republic 84	Japan 72
South Korea 90	Bangladesh 84	India 69
China 90	Lebanon 83	Egypt 67
Kenya 90	Guatemala 83	Argentina 60
Bulgaria 88	Peru 83	Jordan 52
Angola 88	Philippines 83	

Data provided from the Pew Research Center, June 3 2003

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13

The Impact of Today's Economy

- Globalization still has an unstoppable momentum
- However, the global economic slowdown has slowed this momentum
 - consumers are less confident
 - and they are wary of spending
- The slowdown is affecting global brands
 - little movement in awareness and other measures
- American brands are not immune to these effects



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14



#2 Shift in Cultural Affinity

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17

Local Affinity Up Nearly Everywhere

- In most markets, people are more likely to feel "very close" to local culture than they did in 1999

	pt change				
	2003	from 1999			
Japan	52%	+20			
Venezuela	84	+13	India	84	+9
Indonesia	73	+13	USA	71	+8
Turkey	78	+13	Korea	68	+8
Australia	70	+12	Philippines	48	+7
Brazil	47	+11	Italy	67	+7
France	66	+11	Spain	77	+7
			Russia	63	+5

*Showing all markets where local affinity increased by more than 3 pts

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18

Meaning of Shifts in Cultural Affinity

- Global consumers are feeling closer to their own culture than they did a few years ago
 - signifying a shift toward self-reliance and local pride
- And they are not feeling as close to American culture as they did
 - could be a combined effect of anti-American sentiment over war in Iraq, and general resistance against American influence
- American brands may be facing a less receptive global audience

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19



#3 The Trust Factor

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20

American Companies: Scandals Running Rampant?



ANDERSEN


Adelphia

WORLD.COM.

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The Decline in Trust

- American companies are under more scrutiny because of the scandals over the past year and a half
 - The US is not the only country to be plagued by corporate misconduct, but it certainly is the most visible one
- This distrust of corporate America may continue if consumers don't perceive changes in the system

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




A Triple Whammy for American Brands?

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
Shifts in American Affinity Linked to Shifts in American Brand Ratings



TAIWAN		THAILAND	
	change		change
Affinity to American Culture	-20pts	Affinity to American Culture	-13pts
Likeability of American Brands	-10 pts	American Brands Rated Best	-7pts
Usage of American Brands	-8pts		
American Brands Rated Best	-7pts		

HONG KONG		GERMANY	
	change		change
Affinity to American Culture	-12pts	Affinity to American Culture	-12pts
Usage of American Brands	-12pts	Usage of American Brands	-5pts
American Brands Rated Best	-7pts	American Brands Rated Best	-13pts

Note: Change in Affinity is from 1999; change in brand ratings from 2002

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U.S. Brands Face Special Challenges

- Global economic conditions are creating challenges for all brands, not just American ones
- But American brands are uniquely vulnerable because of:
 - Growing wariness of American cultural influence
 - Erosion of trust in corporate America
 - Increasing criticism of the United States, driven by sharp political disagreements about the Middle East
- Globalization will continue, but its nature could change
 - From US companies leading expansion to more European and Japanese corporate influence
 - New opportunities for local brands to capitalize on rising nationalist sentiments as well as anti-American sentiments
- Credibility is key, and, if lost, it is very difficult to regain



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
32

One Response? The Coca-Cola Case



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Coca-Cola's "Think/Act Local" Strategy

- Be respectful of local cultures and careful not to tout American origin
- Identify what is relevant...the local values that will lead to increased affinity
- Be seen as global with strong local roots and contribution

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Mr. TURNER. Dr. Zaharna.

Dr. ZAHARNA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you for keeping the spotlight on public diplomacy. I think it's going to lead to making not only America but the world a lot safer.

Sir, you asked us to step back and to view the 9/11 Commission's recommendation within the larger picture. This oral statement provides a brief snapshot. The written statement for the record provides what I see in more detail.

First, the reviews of American public diplomacy over the past 3 years, including the recent 9/11 Commission Report, pin America's communication problem on lack of strategy. They say America needs a strategy so it can focus its message, coordinate efforts and measure results.

Sir, when communication lacks a strategy, the results tend to be random. You win some, you lose some, hit or miss. American public diplomacy, on the other hand, has had a fairly pronounced losing streak. That strongly suggests a strategy.

Second, stepping back and looking at the larger picture, the strategy is clear. Since the terrorist attack, America has aggressively pursued an information battle strategy, borrowed from the cold war. The national security strategy put the war of ideas second to the military war. The battle for the hearts and minds has been a charge reverberating through the political halls of Washington to the front pages of hometown newspapers.

The 9/11 Commission echoed that strategy. Just as we did in the cold war, we need to defend our ideas abroad vigorously.

Three, fighting an information battle was ideally suited for the cold war era. Then you had two identifiable government powers dominating the political as well as the communication landscape. The bipolar context inherently defined the messages. "us versus them" had persuasive power. Governments could control information. Foreign and domestic audiences were separated by an ocean that technology struggled to cross.

Public diplomacy was a product made in America and shipped overseas. Achieving information dominance was key to silencing the opponent. In an information battle, the one with the most information wins.

Four, fighting an information battle has become the equivalent of conventional warfare. The strategy lacks the agility and effectiveness to navigate today's dynamic political and communication terrain. The bipolar political context has proliferated into a multipolar one. Culture has replaced nationalism as the prevailing dynamic, filtering and distorting even the best message that America can design.

Regional conflicts, once masked by the superpower rivalry, have surfaced with a vengeance. For the publics absorbed in these conflicts, American policy is the message of American public diplomacy. America's domestic and foreign publics have become one 24-7 global audience.

Today, communication is about exchanging information. In a world suffering from information overload, disseminating information is spam. Networking is strategic.

Finally, American public diplomacy needs to switch its strategic focus. Forget battles. Think bridges. To win hearts and minds,

American public diplomacy needs to bridge the perception gap between Americans and foreign public. Disseminating information cannot do this. Building bridges can. Aggressively pursued, this strategy can cross the political and cultural hurdles.

This strategy of building bridges is not new. The Fulbright program, the Peace Corps represent America's long tradition of building bridges. What is new is the strategic power of this technique. Building bridges, networking, underlines the growing influence of nonstate actors.

A woman in Maine began with the idea that led to the campaign to ban land mines. She received the Nobel Peace Award. A man in a cave in Afghanistan had another idea. As the 9/11 Commission so thoroughly detailed, al Qaeda is also a network.

In yesterday's information battle, the one with the most information won. Today, the one with the strongest and most extensive network wins. Achieving this strategic goal requires new tactics to identify potential links, create relationships and forge a network. My written statement outlines some of these tactics; undoubtedly, there are more.

Communication research also has emerged to measure the quality of relationships. The quality of America's political relationships impacts America's image. Using these new research tools will help measure American public diplomacy effectiveness more accurately and meaningfully. In its recommendation, the 9/11 Commission began with a call for institutionalizing imagination.

For American public diplomacy to be as effective as it was—for American public diplomacy to be as effective in the war on terrorism as it was during the cold war, America needs to imaginatively explore a new strategic focus. To win the hearts and minds, America needs to forget the battles and think bridges.

Sir, before I close, I must recognize a communication professional who took the reins of American public diplomacy during extraordinary circumstances and led with extraordinary vision and energy. Thank you, Under Secretary Beers.

And Representative Shays, I thank you for your continued pursuit to improve American public diplomacy and urging this on the committee. Your trip last week is the epitome of building bridges, as was your work in the Peace Corps. It's a strategic direction that holds the promise for, as the September 11 committee advocated, making America safer. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Zaharna follows:]

Testimony of
R.S. Zaharna, American University
Before the U.S. House Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations
The Hon. Christopher Shays, Chair

August 23, 2004

Key Points

- Since 9/11, American public diplomacy has pursued an information battle strategy.
- Fighting an information battle was ideal for the Cold War bi-polar context; it no longer fits with the multi-polar political context and global communication era.
- American public diplomacy needs to switch strategies from fighting an information battle to building communication bridges.

With the recent 9/11 Commission Report, America may be back on the public diplomacy treadmill, searching for the “right” message, channels, and policy phrasing when America’s communication problem is strategy – not lack of strategy, but rather inappropriate strategy.

Many have argued that American public diplomacy does not have a strategy. Last year’s Djerejian Commission Report of the State Department called for a “strategic direction.” The Government Accounting Office (GAO) report pointed to “strategic deficiencies” that limit America’s ability to plan and measure public diplomacy objectives. The recent 9/11 Commission Report reiterates the need for “much stronger public diplomacy” through a short-term as well as long term strategy.

On the surface and particularly at a micro-level analysis that focuses on messages, channels and audience polling, “lack of strategy” could be causing America’s communication problem. American public diplomacy is not producing the desired, or even expected results. Additionally, America’s inter-agency efforts and messages are described as “uncoordinated,” even though the White House Office of Global Communication tends to that task on a daily basis. Finally, lack of strategy, the GAO argues, makes measuring the cost/benefits ratio of public diplomacy initiatives difficult.

However, stepping back to view the larger, or macro-level picture suggests that America is pursuing an inappropriate, rather than non-existent, strategy. A non-existent strategy tends to yield random, hit-or-miss results. Win some, lose some. An inappropriate strategy, on the other hand, tends to produce a pattern of negative or unanticipated results. American public diplomacy has had a fairly pronounced losing

streak. The Pew Charitable Trust has followed the trajectory of anti-American sentiment as it has steadily intensified and spread around the globe. The 9/11 Commission's observation is particularly telling: "America's *perennially* troubled public diplomacy efforts." This pattern strongly indicates the presence of an inappropriate, rather than non-existent, strategy.

America does indeed appear to have an overarching strategy or mindset guiding American public diplomacy. However, that strategy perhaps is so ubiquitous it has been forgotten. Since September 11, 2001, American public diplomacy strategy has been to fight and win an information battle. "The battle for the hearts and minds" has become so much a part of American popular and media parlance that it is regularly substituted for the official term "public diplomacy."

The information battle strategy has been clearly articulated from day one and as recently as yesterday. In the days immediately following the attacks, President Bush stated, "We have to do a better job at making our case." When America launched the war on terrorism, the *National Security Strategy* issued by the White House put public diplomacy second after the military war: "We will also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism," adding, "This is a struggle of ideas and ... America must excel." The 9/11 Commission reaffirmed the information battle strategy: "Just as we did in the Cold War, we need to defend our ideas abroad vigorously."

The two-prong goal of the information battle strategy has also been repeatedly and consistently articulated over the past three years. The first goal in the war of ideas is to promote America's ideas and values. The second goal, pursued simultaneously, is to discredit the enemy's ideas and values.

The tactics, or "how to" specifics of implementing the strategy are similarly evident in all of America's public diplomacy initiatives: (a) identify and study the target audience; (b) design persuasive messages; and (c) disseminate the messages using the most expedient and expansive channels possible. These "best practices" tactics honed by the private sector permeate the public diplomacy debate. Similarly, the 9/11 Commission begins its recommendations with defining the message.

When America first began the battle for hearts and minds, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke asked a question that resonated with many in Washington. The 9/11 Commission repeated Ambassador Holbrooke's question: "How can a man in a cave out-communicate the world's leading communications society?"

On the surface, there is nothing wrong with America. Foreign publics do not "hate America," but some are wondering if America cares about them. There is nothing wrong with America's message. Foreign publics aspire to democracy, freedom of press, good governance, prosperity and stability. There is nothing wrong with America's voice. America's superpower status ensures that America's words and actions will be heard above all others.

However, stepping back to look at the bigger picture, two observations stand out. First, America's post 9/11 public diplomacy appears to be strongly and consistently following an information battle – “war of ideas” strategy. Second, the strategy does not seem to be working. Instead of winning, American public diplomacy has been “perennially troubled.” America, as many have noted, is losing the battle.

II: Why the Strategy Worked during the Cold War

Forty years ago, during the height of the Cold War, the information battle strategy ideally matched the geo-political landscape and communication technology of the time. The international arena was defined by the bi-polar rivalry between the Americans and the Soviets – two identifiable government powers with comparable capabilities and constraints. Fighting an information battle readily complemented the political, military and economic struggle between the two superpowers.

The communication technology fit the information battle strategy. Broadcasts were limited, and could be monitored and controlled. Information dissemination was vital; the one with the most information could dominate and frame the political debate. Controlling the airwaves through saturation or jamming, created a “spiral of silence” that effectively isolated and discredited the opponent. Because a government's persuasive power rested on *quantity* rather than *quality* of information, volume was more important than credibility.

Foreign and domestic audiences were separated geographically as well as by news source. Technological and political restrictions limited the flow of information between the two audiences, making it possible to speak to one without confusing or alienating the other. The prevalence of government-controlled media made the “free flow of information” a cherished commodity.

The neatly defined bi-polar context, which provided an over-arching, ready-made framework for sorting and interpreting information, was perfectly suited for fighting a rival information battle. No matter how much information the two sides pumped into the information environment, there was no blurring of meaning or inherent ambiguity. “Us versus them” had persuasive power.

Public diplomacy during the Cold War was about bi-polar interests, information volume, control and separate audiences. American public diplomacy rightly defined its strategic goals as promoting American interests, increasing volume, segmenting audiences, and controlling information. Public diplomacy was a product: creating the best and distributing the most information to foreign audiences.

Many credit the fall of the Berlin Wall with America's success in the war of ideas against communism. America sought to emulate that success when it launched the war on terrorism. Officials increased funding, employed the latest technology and worked overtime – yet, America kept the Cold War strategy of fighting an information battle. As

the GAO pointed out, officials are still measuring public diplomacy “success” in terms of information quantity – number of viewers, listeners, programs and brochures. Yet, with each public diplomacy “success” anti-Americanism has grown. The strategy that worked so well during the Cold War is not working in the war on terrorism.

III: Why the Strategy Is Not Working in the War on Terrorism

Duplicating the public diplomacy success of the Cold War during the war on terrorism has not been possible because the dramatic international developments in the political landscape, combined with advances in communication technology, have spawned a radically new terrain.

The bi-polar context that once neatly defined and sorted all information has given way to a multi-polar context of diversified global concerns, glaring regional conflicts, and heightened cultural awareness. Each dimension adds another layer of filters capable of distorting even the most skillfully crafted message that America can devise.

The first dimension of this new multi-polar context is multiplicity of global concerns such as disease, poverty, environmental degradation – and terrorism – that transcend the physical borders of individual nations. To address these “shared” problems, nations have turning to a more cooperative approach. Not surprisingly, international treaties, initiatives and forums have taken on increased significance. In a context that favors a cooperative group approach, American efforts to singularly pursue its national interests magnify foreign perceptions of American “exceptionalism,” “unilateralism,” and “isolationism.”

Second, decades-old conflicts once overshadowed by the superpower rivalry have resurfaced with a vengeance. American actions relative to regional conflicts and politics now carry greater weight than they did in the past. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict, for example, has become a “prism” for viewing American policy as well as litmus test for the U.S.’s credibility in the region. American “foreign” policy is “local” for the publics absorbed by these conflicts. The glaring intensity of these conflicts has made American policy the message of American public diplomacy.

Third, culture has replaced nationalism as the prevailing dynamic of the international arena. Although culture knows no national boundaries, it creates its own cognitive boundaries. For those within its confines, culture informs communication. For all others, culture distorts. Culture has wreaked havoc on American public diplomacy; distorting its message as well as image. America’s style of communication that resonates so positively with many Americans has alienated many non-Americans. In some cases, American efforts to explain or communicate a policy were perceived as negatively as the policy itself. In other instance, opponents capitalized on the cultural differences to use America’s messages against itself.

America's ability to fight an information battle has also been undermined by advanced communication technology. The information age has morphed into what is arguably a new global communication era. The Information Age was about information production and dissemination. Yesterday, the most significant feature of the Internet was the *amount* of information. The "problem of plentitude," as Professor Joseph Nye called it. Today, it is the *exchange* of information. The immense popularity of E-mails, blogs, chat rooms and online discussions reflect the new communication dynamic. Instant messaging, mobile phones, and satellite television are about being connected.

News and information are no longer the sole prerogative of government-run media channels. Government officials who once relied on the international language of diplomacy to speak to each other in private have been compelled to join a frenetic global discourse often dominated by non-state actors. Misinformation, official and otherwise, ricochets in what David Hoffman called "a global echo chamber." Advanced communication technology is a double-edged sword; it can ensure maximum exposure, but that exposure may not necessarily be positive.

In this new global communication era, some of the tactics necessary to wage an information battle are no longer feasible. Others are counterproductive. Before, information control was technologically possible and strategically desirable if it helped "influence" skeptical audiences. Today, government attempts to control or manipulate information are fodder for the international media operating on a 24-hour news cycle. Before, America could rally the home front by demonizing a foreign enemy, without alienating foreign listeners. Today, what one hears, everyone hears. Before, public diplomacy was an information product, made in America and disseminated overseas. Today's communication interactivity has made public diplomacy a communication process. "Dialogue" keeps surfacing in public diplomacy discussions because people expect a more interactive and participatory role.

America is not "winning" because the idea of fighting an information battle is a relic of the Cold War. If achieving information dominance – or "out-communicating" others – were the key to winning hearts and minds, America, as an information and technological giant, would have won long ago. The strategy is not working because it is out of sync with today's socio-political landscape and global communication era. It is time to change the strategic focus of American public diplomacy. Time to switch strategies.

IV: Switching Strategies: From Battles to Bridges

To "win" hearts and minds in today's charged political landscape and global communication era, American public diplomacy needs to be able to navigate the new terrain without being exploited by it. American public diplomacy needs to "bridge" the perceptual gap between America and foreign publics. Fighting information battles over the airwaves cannot do that; building communication bridges with the people on the ground can.

The idea of building bridges is not new. The Fulbright program is illustrative of the strategy's long history and success in American diplomacy. What is new is the prominence and significance building bridges has assumed today. If the Cold War was about information command and control and the Information Age about bits and bytes, the global communication era is about networks. Disseminating information is "spam." Networking – building bridges – is strategic.

For those who doubt the strategic power of building bridges and networking in today's global communication era, witness the growing influence of non-state actors in the international arena. Aggressively pursued, building bridges can traverse cultural and political hurdles and capitalize on the interactivity and connectivity that define the global communication era. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have used on the new communication technology to network and build a formidable soft power capable of moving entrenched government powers. The Campaign to Ban Landmines, recipient of the Nobel peace award in 1997, is an example of the strategic power of a network. Unfortunately, as the 9/11 Commission so extensively detailed, Al-Qaeda is a network

Switching the strategic focus of American public diplomacy means redefining its strategic communication goals. Previously, American public diplomacy was equated with "overseas information programs," and the mission was "to engage, inform, and influence" foreign publics. In a global communication era, effective public diplomacy is about building bridges with foreign publics; a mission defined by networking and working to create positive relations and goodwill between American and foreign publics.

Switching strategic focus also means adopting new tactics. The tactics to insure information dominance in an information battle focus on maximizing the amount or quantity of information. The one with the most information wins. Today, the one with the most extensive network and strongest relations wins.

There are numerous ways or tactics for how to build networks. One tactic is identifying and exploring potential links. American public diplomacy has been focused at the micro-level stage of finding "the message." Audience research, particularly opinion polling, has been subservient to creating the message. A more effective avenue of research is conducting an audit of American and foreign institutions that share similar activities, interests, or concerns and that may serve as links in a networking strategy.

Another tactic is reinforcing existing links such as providing assistance in organizing or facilitating conferences, training symposium, or goodwill venture. American public diplomacy does not have to do all the heavy lifting financially. Securing private funding may be one of the many logistical hurdles American and foreign institutions can work together to overcome. Shared ownership can spawn shared rewards that strengthen relationships.

A third tactic is to actually create links where none existed before. To achieve this, American public diplomacy may have to become more agile, flexible and innovative, as some reports urged. Creating new links may mean reaching out to local NGOs and assessing their needs before matching them with American institutions. Foreign institutions may need capacity building to participate in networking programs. They may need assistance with securing visas, a major hurdle for many foreign nationals in the wake of America's new security procedures. American institutions, on the other hand, may need assistance in overcoming the challenges of working with foreign institutions or settings. American officials may need cross-cultural media training to increase their effectiveness in dealing with foreign media outlets.

Adopting these networking tactics that create links and build relationships can provide more reliable measures of public diplomacy effectiveness. Traditionally, information quantity has been the primary measure of success. Yet as the GAO pointed out, the quantity of information does not necessarily translate into more favorable public sentiment toward America.

A new generation of research is developing the tools to measure the quality of relationships. As business firms are discovering, those able to establish strong relationships with their core consumer groups tend to have a higher profit margin than those who rely on information publicity. Using these cutting-edge research tools may be particularly important for American public diplomacy. As noted, the quality of political relationships profoundly impact America's credibility, image and stature.

Since 9/11, America has incorporated several bridge-building initiatives, such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative and American Corners. The cultural and educational exchange programs, such as the Fulbright Program and American visitors program, are weathering the information battle because they are inherently about strengthening relationships. In the global communication era, these initiatives are likely to be more effective than information-based "arm's length" public diplomacy.

Making the strategic switch from battles to bridges may not be easy given that America is still militarily engaged in the very same arena that it is trying to build goodwill. Iraq, like the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, reflects the increased focus on regional conflicts by foreign publics and underscores the need to firmly insert policy into the public diplomacy equation.

As America pursues the war on terrorism, public diplomacy is unlikely to diminish in terms of its significance to American security. The perceptions of foreign publics do matter and changing those perceptions is possible. However, it requires what the 9/11 Commission called, "institutionalizing imagination." To be effective in today's radically changed political landscape and global communication era, American public diplomacy needs to imaginatively explore a new strategic focus for American public diplomacy. To win hearts and minds of others, America itself needs a new imaginative and strategic mindset: forget battles, think bridges.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Al-Mirazi.

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I want to thank you for this opportunity to talk to you today about the 9/11 Commission, the report's recommendations on public diplomacy.

I'm glad that the Arab media is being included in the discussion of what should be done, instead of being excluded and blamed for bearing bad news. This hearing reflects a sincere attempt to diagnose the nature of the problem instead of finding a scapegoat for the challenges the United States faces today in the Middle East. And as they say, diagnosis is half the treatment.

Sometimes it's easier to talk about what is not the problem. There is a general misconception that the Arab media—and Al Jazeera in particular, that I am presenting here—is a major cause of the rising anti-American sentiment in the Arab and Muslim world. By the way, there is an interesting parallel in that many Arabs and Muslims blame the U.S. media for reinforcing anti-Islamic sentiment and negative perceptions of Arabs and Muslims, but I believe neither is the case.

A recent Zogby International poll of 3,300 adult Arabs in six Arab countries shows that Arabs who have been to the United States, who know Americans, or who have learned about the United States from watching U.S. television, are as angry with the U.S. foreign policy and have nearly as unfavorable attitudes toward the United States as those who have no such direct experience. Media, or medium, I don't think is the main reason.

The work of Professor Shibley Telhami of the University of Maryland has also clearly shown that Arab media, exactly—if we would like to criticize—like the American media, is more market-driven than commonly understood, and that it does not shape opinion as much as it reflects it and responds to it. So as most experts in the Arab world agree, the main problem is not the media; it is U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East that is the main source and cause of anti-American sentiment in the region—in my view, as well.

Unfortunately, post-September 11 U.S. policies did not elevate the existing problem, but instead exacerbated it. Before the invasion of Iraq, the United States was criticized for its perceived role in supporting Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories. Now the United States is widely perceived in the Arab world as itself the occupying power of yet another Arab-Muslim population, the Iraqis. We're dealing here with perceptions.

The United States has also been criticized in the Arab world for its business-as-usual policy with certain authoritarian Arab dictators while promoting regime change in certain others.

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq did nothing to change this view because the United States is now seen as replacing defiant dictators with compliant, puppet regimes. All the efforts to improve U.S. standing in the Muslim world, short of making policy changes, are unlikely to succeed. In fact, as the 9/11 Commission Report states, favorable ratings of the United States have dramatically decreased in some Muslim countries.

For example, as was mentioned here today, the report says that favorable ratings for the United States in Indonesia have gone from 61 percent after September 11 to 15 percent just the last summer.

And by the way, Indonesia is not an Arab-speaking country, so we cannot blame it on the Arabic-language program, Al Jazeera.

Today's hearing is titled "Defending Ideals and Defining the Message." Assuming that one of America's most cherished ideas is that of a nongovernment-controlled and independent press, how can you promote this ideal amongst Arabs using a government-sponsored, funded and controlled medium such as Al-Hurra TV? You don't need to reinvent the wheel by creating a new medium that is inherently compromised by its self-serving goals, at least in the eyes of the Arabs.

To give you a good example, 2 years ago the Israeli Government launched an Arabic language television channel satellite, Channel 33, in an attempt to convey its message to the Arab world. It was a complete failure, and they ended up going back to speaking through the Arab media outlets that already exist and that already had the trust of their viewers. It's worth noting here that Al Jazeera still routinely interviews Israeli officials and commentators.

As for defining the message, in this age of globalization, media proliferation and the Internet, you can no longer distinguish between traditional and public diplomacy, nor can you distinguish between domestic and international discourse. Any remarks made in a press conference or in a congressional hearing, just like ours here, instantly reach the very audience you think you have time to tailor a specific message for. Rhetoric is instantly available and disseminated the second it's uttered, whether by a mullah speaking from a mosque in Tehran or by a decorated U.S. General speaking from a church in small-town America; and we should remind ourselves that the airwaves are just as full of anti-Muslim sentiment as anti-American sentiment.

I would also like to interject here that General Boyken's anti-Islamic remarks were first broadcast by NBC and that the first photos of Abu Ghraib prison were broadcast by CBS, both U.S. networks, not Arabs, not Al Jazeera.

In summary, given these inherent problems with the whole concept of a public diplomacy, it's understandable that it's difficult to keep the position of an Under Secretary of State For Public Diplomacy filled. Not even the best advertising executives can help you market a product that serves you and not the consumer. If U.S. policymakers are confident that their policies in the Middle East are the right ones and do not need to be changed, then they should not be surprised at negative reaction to these policies.

Just as U.S. officials and policymakers make the rounds of U.S. networks every Sunday in order to explain their policies to the American audience, they should do the same with the Arab networks, as I believe should Members of Congress that I invite on a daily basis to be on Al Jazeera and to speak to our audience. This kind of routine interaction with an already established and trusted media would allow these officials to both explain the policies and instantly gauge the reactions to them. This kind of engagement over the long term might lead to the positive changes so desperately needed on both sides.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Al-Mirazi follows:]

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A testimony by **Hafez Al-Mirazi**

Washington Bureau Chief

Al Jazeera Satellite Channel

**The 9/11 Commission Recommendations on Public Diplomacy:
Defending Ideals and Defining the Message**

United States House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats and International Relations

August 23, 2004

Chairman Shays and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I want to thank you for this opportunity to talk to you today about the 9/11 Commission report's recommendations on public diplomacy.

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Sometimes it's easier to talk about what is not the problem. There is a general misconception that the Arab media--and Al Jazeera in particular--is a major cause of the rising anti-American sentiment in the Arab and Muslim world. [By the way, there is an interesting parallel in that many Arabs and Muslims blame the US media for reinforcing anti-Islamic sentiment and negative perceptions of Arabs and Muslims.] But neither is the case. A recent Zogby International poll of 3,300 adult Arabs in six Arab countries shows that Arabs who have been to the US, who know Americans, or who have learned about the US from watching US television, are as angry with US foreign policy and have nearly as unfavorable attitudes towards the US as those who have no such direct experience. ("Don't Blame the Media," *Washington Watch*, August 16, 2004)

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as most experts in the Arab world agree, the main problem is not the media; it is US foreign policy in the Middle East that is the main source and cause of anti-American sentiment in the region.

Unfortunately, post-9/11 US policies did not alleviate the existing problem, but instead exacerbated it. Before the invasion of Iraq, the US was criticized for its perceived role in supporting Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories. Now the US is widely perceived as itself the occupying power of yet another Arab-Muslim population, the Iraqis. The US has also been criticized in the Arab world for its business-as-usual policy with certain authoritarian Arab dictators, while promoting regime change in others.

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq did nothing to change this view because the US is now seen as replacing defiant dictators with compliant, puppet regimes. All the efforts to improve US standing in the Muslim world, short of making policy changes, are unlikely to succeed. In fact, as the 9/11 commission report states, favorable ratings of the US have dramatically decreased in some Muslim countries. For example, the report says that favorable ratings for the US in Indonesia have gone from 61% to 15% since last summer. And by the way, Indonesia is not an Arabic-speaking country, so we can't blame it on Al Jazeera.

Today's hearing is titled "Defending Ideals and Defining the Message." Assuming that one of America's most cherished ideals is that of a non-government-controlled and independent press, how can you promote this ideal amongst Arabs using a government-sponsored, -funded, and -controlled medium such as Al-Hurra TV? You don't need to reinvent

the wheel by creating a new medium that is inherently compromised by its self-serving goals. To give you a good example, two years ago the Israeli government launched an Arabic-language television channel (Channel 33) in an attempt to convey its message to the Arab world. It was a complete failure, and they ended up going back to speaking through the Arab media outlets that already existed and that already had the trust of their viewers. It is worth noting here that Al Jazeera still routinely interviews Israeli officials and commentators.

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In summary, given these inherent problems with the whole concept of a public diplomacy, it is understandable that it is difficult to keep the position of Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy filled. Not even the best advertising executive can help you market a product that serves you and not the consumer. If US policymakers are

confident that their policies in the Middle East are the right ones and don't need to be changed, then they should not be surprised at negative reaction to these policies. Just as US officials and policymakers make the rounds of US networks every Sunday in order to explain their policies to the American audience, they should do the same with the Arab networks. This kind of routine interaction with the already established and trusted Arab media will allow these officials to both explain the policies and instantly gauge reactions to them. This kind of engagement over the long term might lead to the positive changes so desperately needed on both sides.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. We'll go to 10-minute rounds of questions, and we'll start with our chairman, Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. I'd like to thank our last speaker for being here. I think this is the second time he's testified before this subcommittee.

I'm not all that aware of what members Al Jazeera has—do you tend to kind of focus on the Senate and get a distorted view, or do you invite Members of Congress to also participate?

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. No. We invite all, and your office, we have made many requests, unsuccessfully. We could not get you on Al Jazeera, and we are renewing that request of all of you.

Mr. SHAYS. I was going to ask that question with that in mind, because I honestly don't know when we've been asked, and I would like to make sure that you call me personally, because I would like to have the opportunity to be on Al Jazeera—

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. I appreciate that.

Mr. SHAYS [continuing]. For a variety of reasons.

One of the things that's very clear to me is that, in a sense, we're doing the reverse of what we sometimes don't like about the Europeans. We've set up a government business to compete with the private sector.

Is Al Jazeera owned privately, or is it owned by a government as well?

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. Al Jazeera is similar to the BBC, in which it's a public corporation. It receives grants and funds from the state of Qatar, but it's had its own independent board of directors that set the policies regardless.

Mr. SHAYS. Does it have advertising as well?

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. Yes. We do have advertisement, and we were hoping when Al Jazeera was launched that only for 5 years would we receive public grants, and after that we would be like CNN is, relying on our own. But unfortunately, Al Jazeera found out that most of the people who fought against Al Jazeera in the Middle East—Arab regimes who didn't like Al Jazeera bringing dissidents to speak over there, or human rights activists to talk about human rights views, in addition to the pressure they tried to apply on the Government of Qatar, unsuccessfully—they found it easier to apply the pressure on their own advertisers. So most of our advertisers would be very intimidated and reluctant to advertise on Al Jazeera because of their government being angry at Al Jazeera.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Knell, please feel free to participate. You didn't have an opening statement, but we welcome your statement as well.

Is there anything that was said by another panelist that you would disagree with, and would want to just make a contrasting point?

Mr. REINHARD. I think Secretary Beers and I may have a disagreement on the point about credibility of the messenger, and I would—

Mr. SHAYS. So maybe you could elaborate what you mean.

Mr. REINHARD. Yes.

The testimony that was given by the report of the Subcommittee on Public-Private Partnerships and Public Diplomacy last June, and the statement in that testimony says that in many cases in sit-

uations, nongovernmental actors may be better placed to achieve a given impact than the government. It goes on for a paragraph, but it says, "Government policies and resource allocations for public diplomacy should explicitly address programs that provide incentives to private-sector organizations to perform tasks in which the direct and obvious engagement of the government would be counter-productive."

Someone mentioned a—

Mr. SHAYS. That seems like a reasonable statement. Do you disagree with that?

Ms. BEERS. By—

Mr. SHAYS. No. That was Ms. Beers' statement, Secretary Beers' statement, correct?

Mr. REINHARD. No. This was a statement of the Ian Davis committee saying that the government is not at this moment a credible messenger. Fawaz Gerges, who is a Middle East expert, Muslim professor, at Sarah Lawrence said, "Arabs and Muslims are deeply attracted to and fascinated with the American idea," but he goes on to say, "in the last few years so much focus has been on foreign relations and on the opposing relations between the United States and the Arab world."

Mr. SHAYS. I'm just trying to understand that. Where is the disagreement that—

Mr. REINHARD. She is saying that the government is a credible messenger at this time, and I was—

Ms. BEERS. No, I'm not saying that. I'm saying—

Mr. SHAYS. One second. Secretary Beers, I want to just understand it, and then you'll have plenty of time; and I realize this is a comment among friends for the most part and people with respect for each other.

What I'm trying to understand is—I'm trying to figure this all out, and it would help me to know whether it might be subtle differences.

And you can explain what you were saying.

Mr. REINHARD. OK. Someone—

Mr. SHAYS. So what's your position?

Mr. REINHARD. My position is that the government at this point in time is not a credible messenger to the Middle East and would be better advised to provide incentives to other actors, as the previous testimony said.

Mr. SHAYS. What would your position be, Secretary Beers?

Ms. BEERS. Well, we went through this experience with shared values, which is a series of mini-documentaries, and the only place we tested it in the form that Keith and I would both agree is substantially well researched, the process went like this: People were able to see these stories about Muslims in America five or six times, and in the first wave of exposure they said, "I don't believe you." And it's a one-sided discussion, very skeptical.

But the second viewing, they were in love with the baker who is one of the candidates and a young woman who is a TV star in America. After a bit, they found out that the baker was actually coming to their country to speak, and it shifted the gears a lot for them, even though they didn't go to the meeting. And in the final

debate, the attitude about the United States and its anti-Muslim theory was completely diverted.

Now, not by every single person who saw it—

Mr. SHAYS. And this is a government presentation?

Ms. BEERS. And it was clearly—although we said it's from the U.S. Government and the people of the United States.

Because we're from the State Department, we have to explain everything. That was a very artificial situation; and what I think is important is to understand that underpinning—two things: Underpinning all of the rhetoric about the United States is a very real curiosity if you can approach it properly.

And the second thing that's always in my mind is that you can be in Washington so long, you forget this. If you ask the people in the Muslim countries what are the No. 1, two and three things in their lives, they never mention foreign policy. What they talk about is my faith, my family, education for my children and ninth on that list is foreign affairs.

So I always hold out the hope, since these people are our audiences, that we have a right to engage with them. What I don't disagree with ever is that we'll get there faster if we have partners like Keith's business circle, which is inspiring, because they've taken the initiative and they can go places we cannot go.

On the other hand, we have to go together sometimes.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me go to Dr. Zaharna.

Dr. ZAHARNA. I want to say I agree with both, a more arching framework. Yes, Mr. Reinhard said the United States, it is the messenger and it's not credible, and that we're going to have the—I mean, theoretically, there's a big problem with that.

But then also public diplomacy is the U.S. Government; that's its responsibility. Other people have other parts, but public diplomacy is inherently the government. I see it as the government's charge. But how to work together on that? That's the thing.

I think the government can do more partnerships and also with local NGO's, working with international NGO's. Their most valuable possession is their credibility. If the United States links up with them, they're going to be afraid it's going to affect their credibility. But the United States can get extra mileage if it enhances the local—works with the local NGO's on the ground, does capacity-building or anything along that line.

And working with American businesses, linking those two NGO's, an American NGO and a foreign NGO, and getting them to find private funding, such as an American corporation; they share the problems, they share the rewards, they build the links, and the United States gets the credibility.

Mr. KNELL. Mr. Chairman, Sesame Workshop is one of those NGO's that is trying to do, I guess, a version of public diplomacy called Muppet diplomacy, where we have been working around the world now in over 120 countries trying to promote issues around literacy and numeracy and respect and understanding and health and hygiene, and we've been very active in the Arab world.

We have gotten good support from U.S. Government agencies like AID, but we've also gotten support from other governments, from Canada, from Holland, from the European Union, to help promote respect and understanding in the West Bank and in Gaza.

And we are one of those NGO's, I think, as my colleague said, who can make a difference.

And I have to tell you that it is about listening. It is about facilitating. Americans, like our group, 300 of us based in New York, who are working around the world trying to make a difference, it's about creative engagement as educators to intervene and promote universal values. And we have not really in any country in the world run into a huge obstacle that did not allow us to complete our mission.

So we are engaged currently. We are in Afghanistan having dubbed programs—

Mr. SHAYS. My time is up, and Mr. Tierney is here, so I want to make sure we go on.

I'd like to have a second pass, Mr. Chairman, if I could, but all I hear you gentlemen saying is that we can't just depend on public diplomacy, that the private side can do a tremendous amount to present a case. But it strikes me that Secretary Beers isn't suggesting it only be public.

And so, Dr. Zaharna, you are the great conciliator here who has brought us all together. Thank you for your comments.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TURNER. One of the questions that I have concerning Al Jazeera relates to the issues of the shared values that have been discussed, the issue of—so many people who have testified before us today talk about the concept of shared values and how America needs to portray more the common bonds and explain its policies. And I know that we may never agree on the issues of American policy.

You might, of course, recall that discussion from our second panel, I read from—you had a September 26, 2003, interview where you were talking about the causes of September 11th, and you reflected and said that—you cited the first Iraq war. We call that the "liberation of Kuwait," and you referred to it as the "first Iraq war." Many of those conflicts of policy we may not agree upon, but translating those conflicts or policies to global terrorism and the glorification of death and the suicide bombers and killing of others is something that I think that we can look to you as having a responsibility for.

There have been allegations that you're cooperating with terrorists and terrorist organizations. At a minimum, there's been, certainly, the allegation that Al Jazeera glorifies the culture of death.

You said you merely reflect the culture which you're representing, or your market; but I wanted to ask you about, you know, what is Al Jazeera's view of its role in global terrorism, where some view you as a facilitator? What do you view as your responsibility toward real stability in the world?

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. Thank you for your question. First of all, I would like to distinguish between two things, my own personal views, such as the one that you read in an interview that I made in September 2003 trying to explain to an interviewer, or an audience, what I would personally consider reasons or causes that may express the right to find for September 11.

Going back to the Gulf war of 1991, or the liberation of the Kuwait war, or the first Iraq war, there are so many names of it, so

if I choose one, it does not mean in any way eliminating the other or, again, as to another title for that war.

And between that, my personal views that I can indulge in, if you would like me to speak about it, Al Jazeera itself, that is a station that is committed to presenting both sides of the story in any event, in covering the Arab-Israeli conflict. As I mentioned, we have Israeli officials, Israeli commentators speak, and we have Palestinians, regardless of their affiliation, also speak on the war against terrorism or the al Qaeda issue.

We also allowed videotapes or statements made from people related to al Qaeda, as well as we are covering live and extensively—almost, I would say, more than 400 to 500 hours of President Bush's speeches, live, carried on Al Jazeera since September 11.

If you maybe count all of Al Jazeera broadcasts since September 11 of the bin Laden tapes, it might not be more than 5 hours in all its entirety, but people, of course, I would understand that they would say Al Jazeera, bin Laden, because they only heard the tape on Al Jazeera, but for them President Bush is available everywhere, so why should they mention Al Jazeera on it? The same way that people would say that the bomber manifesto was in the New York Times, that does not in any way mean that New York Times was collaborating with the bomber or trying to promote ideas of terrorists or the publisher of Timothy McVeigh's book about why did he do the terrible things in Oklahoma.

And by the way, Timothy McVeigh was a soldier in Iraq in the first Iraq war, or the 1991 war, and I believe at some point in his book mentioned that he learned how it's easy to kill people during that war.

The Washington sniper was a veteran or someone who was in the 1991 war, and when I mentioned the 1991 war, I mentioned that also the violence and the war creates violence and destabilization, and that could be one of the reasons.

If you would like me to focus on one thing, I would like to say that just the message and the mission of Al Jazeera is represented very clearly in our motto, "the opinion and the other opinion," or the opposite opinion, and we have been faithful to that. And also we have been criticized harshly, first in the region and now in the United States—or after September 11, the United States—for that reason, bringing both sides of the story and asking people, please do not shoot the messenger if you don't like the message.

Mr. TURNER. Secretary Beers, the shared-values programming that you had put together is an attempt to communicate, if you will, a relationship and include, of course, an antiterror message or antiterror goal.

Our committee has information that Al Jazeera refused to carry those. Is that correct or is that inaccurate?

Ms. BEERS. Well, I think what happened is—I'm sorry to repeat this, but the word came back to me that Al Jazeera had moved their rate up to double the normal rate because it was "hazardous material"—I'm not sure it was put quite like that—and we were refused in a number of governments. But in this case, I think it was, we fought the very disproportionate rate and we had it covered with some other networks. So I think we didn't go on it.

I'm not so sure that they said "no" to us, and I'm working from a memory there. Perhaps you know.

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. May I comment on that?

Mr. TURNER. Please.

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. Because it came to our attention that complaint from a colleague at the State Department working in public diplomacy, and at that time there was a visit by the general manager of Al Jazeera in Washington, and when he heard that, he was outraged and made some phone calls.

We found out that the person that was contacted, the advertising agent in the region, who was the one who told the people who carried the advertisement that "I could buy for you more time on Al Jazeera for that money" and convinced them not to go to Al Jazeera, but they could get more time for their money than going to Al Jazeera, but not Al Jazeera declined it.

Al Jazeera actually until now put in advertisement that I would say even glorified or put very positive spin on the Iraqi interim constitution, or interim law, many other things; and we are welcome even if someone would like to bring these ads back. We'll welcome them, but I think they might need to be updated, because some of the people featured in these ads, I believe, have been harassed by FBI agents or had some bad experience after September 11. So maybe they need to update it.

Thank you.

Mr. TURNER. Secretary Beers, you look like you're wanting to comment.

Ms. BEERS. No. I'm just sorry. I didn't know what he said about the FBI agent.

Mr. TURNER. Do you want to expound on that?

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. I'm saying that the more also we promote the stories of Arab Americans, and we do promote these stories—last Thanksgiving, for example, I host a talk show from Washington, and in that talk show, I brought a story of in Wayne, Michigan, which I said, let's do news on Thanksgiving in America, let's explain that this guy won a mayoral election while he had only two Arab American families in Wayne, Michigan, and that was in November 2001, immediately after September 11, yet people in Wayne choose this guy. So we are not short of putting positive things in America.

But the problem also that you follow, what happened to Arab Americans. Since the last 2 months, the FBI has been rounding and meeting and interviewing Arab Americans, just to interview them, ask about their views, their religious beliefs; and the excuse for that has been in order—just to remind people that we are there or collect information as preventive measures.

These things also does affect American image, as well as the Census Bureau when they were asked by the Homeland Security to give us information about all the Arabs living in a ZIP code, more than 1,000 Arabs in any one ZIP code that have more than 1,000 Arabs, give us the names, and that was a reminder for people to what happened in World War II. And thanks to Homeland Security people, the civil rights officer was in Al Jazeera in my show and explained things. And I believe they promised to correct the matter.

So sometimes the experience of Arab Americans has to be reflected in order to give credibility to the message, but if it's on an advertisement, we don't have to ask you to do whatever. We will broadcast it as advertisement.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses for their testimony.

There are some who say that no matter how good we get at public diplomacy, or think we are getting at it, that we won't be really good at it in this area of the world unless we learn to listen better, enhance listening skills.

Would each of you tell me whether or not you think that the United States is, in fact, listening to people in this region of the world? If not, how would we enhance those skills and proceed from there? We'll start with Mr. Al-Mirazi.

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. As I mentioned, the interaction is very important. It's very important to engage U.S. policymakers in Arab media interviews and in talking to the Arab people, because it gives them a chance in order to answer questions, to take questions.

And that is pretty important just not to make it a monologue, because we carry a lot of press conferences as monologue. But in order to answer questions and to be sincere, maybe to take it back and digest it and in a weekly meeting say we heard that and we couldn't have an answer, a good answer. And just give the example of the Homeland Security or the Census Bureau. We had someone from Homeland Security. The second day, immediately, we had a meeting with Arab Americans and they almost like regret what happened, and said that has to be corrected in a very sensitive manner in the future.

I think as you mentioned, sir, listening is very important. And as we are talking about review of U.S. intelligence, review of many other things, I think review of U.S. foreign policy in the region is important. And we should not deal with foreign policy as if it is something on the side. Foreign policy means a domestic policy for people who are at the receiving end in the Middle East, whether they are Iraqis or Palestinians or Egyptians.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Doctor.

Dr. ZAHARNA. Are we listening? No. Because if we were—there is one thing in all of this. The Palestinian Israeli keeps coming up, and now the situation in Iraq, and Najaf now, what is going on in the religious site. Before, there was the superpower rivalry and there was the nuclear threat and everybody looked at that. Now that is gone, these foreign policy issues have become like the glaring spotlight. And if we were listening, we would have heard and done things maybe differently.

And if we have a security problem here in the United States, America's allies in the region are sitting on a more dangerous security problem by not addressing the foreign policy issues.

Mr. TIERNEY. What do you think we would have heard?

Dr. ZAHARNA. What we would have learned?

Mr. TIERNEY. What we would have heard if we were listening.

Dr. ZAHARNA. Oh, my goodness, the military in the region. The American military, these are the young—this was America's best

face. Young American people being in the region. And some of the actions that were conducted out of cultural ignorance and cultural sensitivity have tarnished and bruised more than anything. And that is the biggest thing. They are the face of the American public diplomacy.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Reinhard.

Mr. REINHARD. We talked to people on the streets in 130 countries. And this was a question—leading the witness obviously, because we asked them for advice on what they would give to Americans traveling abroad. But the two most frequently recurring words were “listen” and “respect.” And some of the quotes: Learn to listen instead of talking all the time. And then they went on to say, and if you must talk all the time, would you please lower the volume. Stop comparing everything we do to the way you do it. If you can’t stop talking, turn down the volume, I mentioned. You might try learning a few words in our language. The Superbowl does not mean much to us. If we had an athletic competition called the World Series, it would occur to us to invite other nations, and on and on.

And then, some verbatims about the negative perceptions. The ones I had on the screen about the insensitivity to cultural differences and the supreme arrogance which kept coming through was that our assumption is that they want to be exactly like us. I think one of our—I am in the advertising business and one of our big multinational clients spends \$30 million on research. That is no human resources, no capital, just \$30 million on research around the world to win friends for their brand.

I believe the Federal Government spends something like \$5 million.

Mr. KNELL. We can listen better and unleash creativity more. I think we can connect around children. This is not just a news ping-pong match, even though it sometimes turns out that way. Education and culture as was mentioned before is really important. In Egypt, when we did *Alam Simsim* the Egyptian “Sesame Street,” this is a local show. They chose to promote girls’ education and health and hygiene. That was not us dictating to them. And in the West Bank, our Palestinian partners tell us that the biggest problem for the average person is boredom. They are unemployed. They cannot leave their houses. They’re blockaded from traveling to visit relatives.

So what are they doing? They are watching television. What are they watching? We have heard about some of that today. So being able to give them some of the resources and the technology to promote positive values about their own cultures and self-esteem and to create empathy is something that we are doing and other people are trying to do. And I would encourage the committee to think about how our government can help promote some of those things in the private sector moving forward.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Secretary Beers.

Ms. BEERS. In the goals that I started with, which I think is modest compared to how we would like to approach our relationship with the Middle East, I talk about mutual understanding. And you really can’t get there unless you have a reasonable comprehen-

sion and empathy with whom you are attempting to speak. And this is kind of a golden rule for all communication.

But in addition to understanding that, you have to be prepared for some kinds of action, some kinds of programs or exchanges that activate. That is why I like so much the picture of the teenager in Cairo being able to talk to whomever he chooses in Idaho. Because what happens there has its own chemistry. And it is not so artificial. I know that any program we put together, whether it is in the private sector or something the government manages to put on the table that is people to people, there is a kind of kinetic energy and chemistry that takes place there.

So it is listening and also being prepared to take part in a responsible exchange and action.

Mr. TIERNEY. I take somewhat from this there is general agreement on the panel that the Commission's report recommending that we rebuild scholarship exchange and library programs reaching out to young people is right on the money. General agreement on that? Not?

Ms. BEERS. No, I'm sorry, I do agree with those things. They are vital, and that is why we are always quoting to you how many people in the world affairs came and studied here and now they are leaders. We're doing a very good job with the elite and leaders. But you can't stop there. I am concerned that you will think we mean just expand those programs.

In my mind, if you can't take those ideas of education, school, using the local television just like Sesame has done, you are not going to get enough reach nor will you make enough impact. So it is a modification.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK. I accept that. Anybody else?

Mr. REINHARD. I would second that. And I would also add that in your invitation you quoted from the 9/11 report that bin Laden has nothing to offer but death and violence, and we have to offer hope of a brighter future. I would respectfully suggest that bin Laden has quite a bit to offer to these people, which is the word we kept hearing in our listening: respect and dignity. Which he can grant. And if we can take our vision of hope and a brighter future and make it real, as Secretary Beers and Mr. Knell said, by building bridges through this shared value of learning and education, that would be a very, very good place to start.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, you had an interjection you wanted to make? I yield.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you for yielding, but it has changed. Is that all right? What you said to me is stunning in a way, but, regrettably, very true. And I would love to get Al-Jazeera's take on this as well. When I was in Iraq, I had more Iraqis say, "Thank you for getting rid of Saddam Hussein," and "When are you leaving?" in the same sentence. There is this wonderful poll that said two-thirds wanted us to stay and two-thirds wanted us to leave.

But what struck me was—and it seemed reasonable, when you think about it, is reasonable. We did not want it to be a French revolution. In our Revolutionary War, we wanted it to be the American Revolution. So I found that they were very proud people.

The little things that we did that we think were inconsequential were huge to them. And then all these wonderful things we did just

seemed meaningless. I think that you have done something—you've got the first criticism of this report that I basically can accept. Because your comment was "the only thing he has to offer is," and I accepted that and I believe it on one level. But on another level, he promises them something that they don't seem to feel from us, and that is dignity and respect. People were willing to lose their lives for that, which is obscene to me.

What is your take on this as you hear this, Mr. Al-Mirazi?

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. Mr. Chairman, if we would look to criticizing the whole report, I would also mention that there is a failure when it comes to United States help and details of United States help to al Qaeda or the founders of al Qaeda in Afghanistan. The people who originated it, who used to be called in the Arab world the Arab Afghans, the people who fought the Afghani war against the Russians. And the report just mentioned very passing sentences about the United States, Pakistan, and Saudis.

Mr. SHAYS. You would like to be very clear. In other words, we supported the very elements that—OK.

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. Exactly. Exactly, sir. And that is the need for a review of U.S. foreign policy, not just to say that we need more scholarships. That is nice. That is important. We can't say that scholarships are not going to be helpful. Of course it will. But the damage is still there. And during the cold war and Voice of America that I did work for before, and other in the United States, the Saudi Arabia role has been mentioned that they were only involved in building mosques in the former Yugoslavia. Yes, they were building mosques with the help of the United States. They were distributing copies of the holy Koran with the support of the United States because they were trying to beat communism and they were helping and supporting fundamentalism in the Arab world.

Someone quoted Mr. Casey, Bill Casey of the CIA, the CIA Director, as saying the more fundamentalists they give me in Afghanistan the better, because they kill more communists.

So we supported that brand. The United States supported that brand. The United States used the Islamic religion in order to conquer the Soviet Union, and now we are talking about madrassa. Madrassa, by the way, just means a school in Arabic. It is a religious schools. And when people in the Arab and the Muslim world hear U.S. officials attacking madrassa just by the word madrassa, it means for them as if someone is attacking in the Arab world Christian schools or charter schools.

So we also have to find out exactly what do we mean and what exactly are we talking about. And let's compare. The Palestinians have raised that issue before, when we told them we need to look into hatred in your textbooks. And many people said we would like to look into hatred not only in Palestinian textbooks and Israeli textbooks, but look into hatred or antiIslamic statements in the U.S. media as well as in the Arab media, or the other way around.

This comprehensive view, the clear condemnation of both killing any innocent, whether that innocent is a Palestinian or that innocent is an Israeli, is very helpful. Be consistent. And as to the values of the United States, I don't think that the Arabs or the Muslims have different values than the Americans. These are human

values. People have taken every generation and adding to it and enhancing to it.

So if we stand for liberty and justice for all, the Palestinians will tell you, how about liberty for us? Why it was not difficult for you to keep Iraq occupation for 8 months under Saddam and it is fine for to you keep Israeli occupation for more than 56 years. And you have to find answers for them.

And this is what we are talking about. Engaging in dialog and really sitting down and reevaluating U.S. foreign policy toward the Arab and Muslim world. Not because of September 11, but just because we need it.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Did you want to make a comment?

Dr. ZAHARNA. What Mr. Reinhard brought up about the appeal of bin Laden.

Mr. SHAYS. It is my intention to end this hearing in 5 minutes.

Dr. ZAHARNA. Oh, I am done.

Mr. SHAYS. No, no, it is just that I want people to know so they can judge their time and so on. But I want you to say whatever you want, and I want other people to as well.

Dr. ZAHARNA. Islam, when he put what does he have to appeal and he said human dignity and respect, it hit me today, I thought this thing from the Council of Muslim is very important. Bin Laden is getting a lot of mileage by the United States calling it Islamism. Because Islam is my religion also and I have read a ton of reports. I can't distinguish between Islamism, fundamentalism, and extremism. It is the same. And no matter how you slice it or dice it, they will hear it that way.

Mr. SHAYS. What do you call it? You can't call it—

Dr. ZAHARNA. I think the Commission did a great thing by narrowing from terrorism to al Qaeda and then get it away from religion. And I have read a lot of reports, too, in the Arab world and the Muslim world they are not distinguishing it either. It's an important thing.

Mr. SHAYS. The reality is, it is not Japanese.

Dr. ZAHARNA. Japan is a country.

Mr. SHAYS. It is not Hindus that are basically attacking the United States right now. It is a particular group that is very narrow among a particular religious belief. And you know, that is the reality. That is what it is. You are saying in facing reality, it is offensive.

Dr. ZAHARNA. He is getting mileage from it. And as the 9/11 Commission said several, several times it is a very, very small group. The Commission did a great job by taking terrorism and narrowing it. The more we can narrow it, the stronger that is going to be. And they debate it but it just hit me today, this does get him a lot of mileage.

Mr. SHAYS. Fair enough. And it is important for us to know that. Go ahead. If you have something to contribute, the last thing I want to do is stop you. What else did you want to say?

Dr. ZAHARNA. That is it.

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. Just to second what she said, I know it is easier for an audience to identify with something. But it is also risky and we have to consider that. I heard a lot of feedback, negative one

when the word Islamic and Islamic terrorist were put in the Commission. We cut live to the Commission when they finished reporting it and using words like "al Qaeda" or "bin Laden followers" or something like that, it is clear. The same way we are talking about the IRA, not the Catholic Irish, regardless of how many Catholic Irish would identify with the IRA. But we say it is the IRA and I think it is very important to do that. Because you have also Jewish terrorists who are on the list of terrorist organizations of the State Department, but we do not use that.

Mr. SHAYS. And I agree with what you are saying, yet I wrestle with this. They use as their basis their Islamic faith.

Dr. ZAHARNA. And the United States is giving them extra mileage.

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. And Muslims in Nigeria, for example, saying Muslims. So people in Nigeria understand it, and people in the Arab world understand and they can distinguish Islamists, because those people carry the Islamic banner. But when you take it to a Western audience and send it back to the Arab world or the Muslim world, it would sound for them as if you were talking about the whole Islam. But if it is indigenous, people say Islamists, Islamist does not mean Muslim, but it would be lost in translation.

Mr. SHAYS. It is absolutely essential we know what it means. And if we are going to talk about winning hearts and minds, and that's what it means, however helpful it may mean to us, it is often going to have a huge negative. Would you have any comment on this, Secretary Beers?

Ms. BEERS. I think that we tried to be very careful about that word and we have used sometimes the word "radical" as a way of defining the extreme end that happens in any religious endeavor. There is always a small group at the very end of it that are more radical and create a different response to the whole religious practice. I do not have a solution, and I don't know what anyone would offer us in a way of a proper word.

Dr. ZAHARNA. A political name?

Ms. BEERS. Just a name we can use in communication.

Mr. SHAYS. The bottom line is you have told us what we can't do; I am not sure what we can do, and that is basically your point. One of the values of the Commission was that we need to know who we consider the terrorists and what do we call them, and I am guilty of saying a war on terror, and as one commissioner said, that is like taking Pearl Harbor and saying a war against the Zero airplane, which was the vehicle through which Pearl Harbor was implemented, the use of that aircraft. But I do not say a war on Zeroes.

So it is something, I guess, that we are all going to have to sort out: What is the name that means something that is helpful to us in knowing who ultimately we have to deal with, but doing it in a way that does not come across to an entire world population as a huge negative. Anyway.

Do you have any last questions? Is there anything you would like to put on the record? Any of you? Yes?

Ms. BEERS. Outside the debate we had about when to activate the government as messenger, I would like to say for the record that Keith Reinhard, whom I have known him for 35 years.

Mr. REINHARD. And I have known you for 35 years.

Mr. SHAYS. Maybe there is something you want to keep private here.

Mr. KNELL. Sesame Street is in the middle.

Ms. BEERS. This is not easy to be interrupted. I am trying to say something good about him. I have never succeeded yet. For the record, Mr. Reinhard has provided the most remarkable leadership I have ever seen in that organization that came to life under his jurisdiction about a year and a half ago. These people did not exist. He brought together the most elite team imaginable. There are people who do not have time to do anything, and they show up and they work with him and they are going to do something remarkable on behalf of our country. And I just hope they get the recognition about that.

Mr. SHAYS. Secretary Beers, let me just say to you that your service to our country, and your contribution to this committee, is very appreciated. You have been a wonderful servant to America, and we appreciate it more than you can imagine.

Ms. BEERS. Thank you. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I would like to ask if anyone else has any comment?

Mr. REINHARD. One thing. I actually had three pages about how highly I regard Secretary Beers, but in the interest of time I will just publish that for you.

Mr. SHAYS. You sound a little bit not sincere.

Mr. REINHARD. Oh, no. Oh, no.

Ms. BEERS. We met in church. He would have to be.

Mr. REINHARD. We are very close friends. We were talking about listening and we have also been talking about messages. And the best advice I ever received on the subject is, you don't learn anything by talking. And I really think we have to keep that in mind.

And what Professor Zurgis, how he envisages this. He talked about the floating bloc of young people in Iran. And according to him, they haven't made up their mind yet whether to buy the mullah's brand or the Western brand. It is essential that we make our ideas, which stem from their needs, their shared values, sensible to them, however we do that.

And the last thing I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, is a quote from one of our young staffers in Cairo. And I believe that he gives us really good advice for a mind-set that we should bring to this discussion. He says, in investment America must be presented as the facilitator, not the patron. In the realm of charity, as the partner, not the philanthropist. And in business endeavors, as the courier of progress, and not the preachers of Westernization.

If we can all become couriers of progress, I think we will make great progress for our country.

Mr. SHAYS. That is a nice way to end up. I would be happy to have both of you make a comment if you would like.

Dr. ZAHARNA. Thank you.

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. The first thing I would hope and renew my request for interviews for Al-Jazeera with the three of you, and we would be grateful and glad. That would help promote United States and articulate U.S. policies and U.S. views to the Arab world with no expense to taxpayers, unlike Alhurra Television.

And just to correct for the record, in the previous panel we were criticized by one of the speakers and the panelists as comparing Al-Jazeera to the National Enquirer. The harshest critics of Al-Jazeera compared it to Fox News, but here I got emotional being compared to National Enquirer.

Mr. SHAYS. This is the first time I have seen you smile today.

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. Thank you. Let me just for the record—and I would like anyone to have the commission, independent commission to compare Al-Jazeera Washington Bureau coverage of U.S. foreign policy and U.S. policies in general compared to the U.S. Alhurra Television. We have started since the primaries in January, a weekly 1-hour election show to explain to our audience every Tuesday and rerun twice again what the U.S. political system means.

Mr. SHAYS. You are actually able to explain that? I should watch.

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. And Alhurra just started like 2 weeks to go do something like us to follow.

Mr. SHAYS. Competition is good. You took the lead and they are following. The one thing I have been encouraging our government to have Alhurra, but I think it will help you be better and them be better. They only have credibility if they tell the truth. And what I had is one or two individuals call me up from the media, criticizing something that they were doing that seemed antiAmerican. And I said if that is what happened, that needs to be said for their credibility. They had people on the program that others wondered whether they should have on the program. I realize there are a lot of questions.

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. And I agree with you, sir. The more the merrier, and it is not a zero-sum game. Funding Alhurra doesn't mean you're cutting Al-Jazeera or the other media.

Mr. SHAYS. We are looking forward to a continued dialog, and you all helped us understand all of this better. And ultimately this, if not more, certainly equal to all the other efforts that we have in our government. We are not going to succeed unless we do better with public diplomacy and also improve our public policy.

Thank you all very much. This hearing is adjourned without a gavel.

[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

House Government Reform Committee

National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations Subcommittee

The Honorable Christopher Shays, Chairman

**"The 9/11 Commission Recommendations on Public Diplomacy: Defending Ideals and
Defining the Message"
(August 23, 2004)**

Statement for the Record

**Timothy E. Shamble, President
American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1812
&**

**Gary A. Marco, President
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Local 1418**

Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for this opportunity to submit a statement for the record in conjunction with the hearing "The 9/11 Commission Recommendations on Public Diplomacy: Defending Ideals and Defining the Message" (August 23, 2004).

The 9/11 Commission makes brief mention of the role of international broadcasting in the Middle East and cites what it calls "promising initiatives" on the part of the International Broadcasting Bureau's Broadcasting Board of Governors (IBB/BBG). The commission also calls for more funding for international broadcasting.

Shortly following the publication of the 9/11 Commission's report, the BBG (the "Board") issued a press release in which it referred to its "successes" in the Middle East, an inexact juxtaposition of the actual language of the report. This is more than a question of semantics. There is a world of difference between "promising initiatives" and "successes." Taking liberties with the meaning of words points to what is an underlying flaw in the Board's Middle East broadcasting.

In questioning the members of Panel Two at the hearing which included BBG Chairman Kenneth Tomlinson and the acting Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy, Patricia deStacy Harrison, Subcommittee Chairman Christopher Shays tried to address the question of "success" asking panel members to define "success" and how one measures success.

We submit that the answers to this question given by the panel members at the hearing in regard to the success of U.S. international broadcasting initiatives were insufficient. And

judging by the plummeting percentages of pro-American attitudes in the critical target area of the Middle East reported by such groups as the Pew Research Center and Zogby International, the public diplomacy function of the United States is teetering on the brink of catastrophe.

The BBG is enamored of catchy phrases. One of the most popular is "marrying the mission to the market." It follows that the question to be asked is: "What is the product?" Or, as Chairman Christopher Shays asked: "What is the message?"

The Board has taken a private sector marketing approach to international broadcasting and public diplomacy. We believe that this is fundamentally wrong.

In addition, the Board treats international broadcasting and more importantly, public diplomacy, like a disposable American commodity -- such as a bar of soap or can of soda -- much like the discredited views of former Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy, Charlotte Beers, a member of Panel III, who during her short tenure at the State Department tried to advance this concept.

The Board would like the Congress and the Administration to believe that by following marketing techniques that have proven to be successful in commercial American media, the same kind of success can be achieved in public diplomacy and international broadcasting. However, research commissioned by Congress in the Djerejian task force report, the Heritage Foundation, the Pew Research Group and Zogby International, all come to an entirely different conclusion; namely, that this approach is not working in the Middle East. Not only is it not working, the intended audiences of the Board's broadcasting initiatives are becoming even more hostile toward the United States and its policies toward Arab and Muslim populations and regions.

Successful public diplomacy is not about selling a product. It is not a disposable commodity. Rather, as Undersecretary Patricia Harrison emphasized, it is about building relationships. It is an instrument of national policy, a reflection of the national and public interest. Successful public diplomacy, again paraphrasing Ms. Harrison's testimony, builds trust, establishes credibility, defines mutual interests and concerns. All this leads to the goal in the long run of enhancing security and reducing conflict. Unfortunately, there is none of this in the current broadcast initiatives of the Broadcasting Board of Governors in the Middle East where the primary reliance is upon pop music and superficial headline-style news. Arab and Muslim people are at the epicenter of events that are violent and destabilizing. These events radiate outward globalizing conflict that becomes international in scope.

The unions representing the international broadcasters believe that the BBG is on the wrong track. For that reason, more than 50% of the employees, including supervisors and rank-and-file workers signed a petition to the Congress calling for an investigation of the Board and its initiatives. We have attached a copy of this petition for the members of the Subcommittee.

Although the authorization bill for our Agency includes a hefty increase in funding for international broadcasting, millions above the funding request, we believe that it behooves the Congress to avoid the view that just throwing money at international broadcasting is going to fix a problem or achieve a result in lieu of a rational approach, particularly in the face of objective

analysis that says the current effort is failing abysmally. It is unfortunate that, to all appearances, the Broadcasting Board of Governors has succeeded in persuading the Congress to do just that. As a result, the Board dismantled the Voice of America Arabic Service, rather than expanding and improving upon its already established presence in the Arab and Muslim world. Remember, it was the weak signal that was at fault and not the content. The Board has also gotten the Congress to commit to al-Hurra television which, not to the surprise of the professional career staff, is failing abysmally.

U.S. international broadcasting is not something to be trivialized. It is not a "toy," as a prominent member of the Board referred to it. This type of public comment from a member of the governing Board derides and seriously undermines the credibility of this critical facet of public diplomacy. It is our contention that serious damage has been done in placing faith in pop culture marketing to the Arab and Muslim world.

In short, international broadcasting is not about "marrying the mission to the market." Rather, it is about facilitating national and public interest through the effective communication of ideas.

To successfully realize this goal, a serious course correction is in order for the Broadcasting Board of Governors. There should be serious, maximum oversight and review of existing Board projects like Radio Sawa and al-Hurra television. In our view these projects are wasteful, ineffective and do not facilitate the national or public interest. One suggestion would be to reestablish an Arabic Service of the Voice of America which would balance entertainment programming with substantive, thorough and responsible discussion of critical geopolitical issues in the Arab and Muslim world. In addition, the Congress should mandate that the Voice of America be required to broadcast in English, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week worldwide including to the Arab and Muslim world. Furthermore, U.S. international broadcasting should be integrated into a unified and focused public diplomacy effort such as was once the case under the United States Information Agency. The Congress should also consider the shortcomings of funding redundant broadcasting efforts outside the Voice of America that waste money and resources. And, the Congress should reexamine the current television broadcasting to the Middle East in light of what appears to be an almost universal revulsion in the Arab and Muslim world for al-Hurra television.

These actions will set U.S. international broadcasting on a clearer and more effective course than the one presently being offered by the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Current Board initiatives have done more harm than good. It will take time to repair the damage that has been done. However, the sooner that remedial action is taken the greater the likelihood that such action will be effective.

Submitted in the National and Public Interest.

Who's Killing America's Voice?

WHO'S KILLING AMERICA'S VOICE?

At a time when the ability of the United States to speak to the world in a clear, effective, credible voice is more crucial than ever, *the United States is broadcasting less news, information and analysis to fewer countries for fewer hours in fewer languages.* The presidentially appointed Broadcasting Board of Governors is dismantling the nation's radio beacon - the Voice of America - piece by piece.

The BBG is creating radio and television entities that circumvent a Congressional Charter (Public Law 94-350) - designed to shield VOA from political interference and to ensure accurate, objective and comprehensive broadcasts. No such editorial protections apply to the new broadcast entities.

The Board says listeners perceive VOA as a tool of the U.S. government. But like VOA, the newly established ventures are government funded, and hiding that fact undermines journalistic credibility. VOA has a solid journalistic reputation and a widespread audience. It should be revitalized, not weakened.

BBG's most aggressive efforts have focused on new radio and television services to the Middle East - services whose slick, entertainment-driven program formats have generated sharp criticism in both Western and Arab news media.

Further, the BBG is now in the process of crippling VOA English - the world's only international broadcaster charged with comprehensive and balanced coverage of the United States.

We, the undersigned VOA managers, staff writers, editors, producers, engineers and technicians, are deeply concerned by these developments. As broadcast professionals, supporters of VOA's global mission and U-S taxpayers, we call on the U-S Congress to conduct an immediate inquiry into the actions of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Some of the Board's most serious attacks on the Voice of America are listed on a following page.

Signatures, next page:

Who's Killing America's Voice?

HOW THE BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS IS KILLING VOA:

Following the lead of its most influential governor -- Norman Pattiz, the founder and CEO of the giant Westwood One radio network -- the Broadcasting Board of Governors has:

1. **Closed VOA's Arabic Service and replaced it with Radio Sawa, a slick, pop-music-driven radio service that has no editorial accountability.**
 - Refused VOA Arabic Service requests for more staff, upgraded transmitters, local AM and FM frequencies and marketing support, then determined the Service didn't have an audience and closed it. However, the BBG then gave those resources to the newly created Radio Sawa, replacing the \$4 million/year VOA Service (news analysis, context and information) with Radio Sawa's \$36 million/year pop music and news-brief format.
 - Claimed to Congress that Radio Sawa has up to 90% listenership. In fact, Radio Sawa is heard on FM in only 16 cities in 10 of the 22 Arab League countries. It is broadcast widely on AM, though listeners rarely tune to AM for music.
 - Approved a format that does not report breaking news, including the capture of Saddam Hussein. At best, Radio Sawa's news coverage is cursory, providing little to no context or analysis.
 - Shielded Radio Sawa from program reviews, a requirement of any credible media service.
2. **Committed nearly 100 million U.S. taxpayer dollars to launch a satellite-fed Arabic television Service, al-Hurra ('the Free One'), which has no editorial accountability.**
 - Refused to bolster well-established though understaffed and underfunded VOA television services
 - Dismisses widespread criticism of the content, presentation and premise of al-Hurra in Arab and Western news media
 - Approved a format that does not report breaking news, including the assassination of Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin (it continued airing a French cooking show), a major bomb attack in Baghdad (it stayed with a Jim Carrey

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documentary) and U-S attacks on insurgents in Fallujah, (again, it stayed with pre-recorded programming).

3. **Reduced VOA broadcasts to Iran and launched a new autonomous broadcast entity, which has no editorial accountability.**
 - Replaced VOA Persian and English broadcasts on the most critical transmitter to Iran with a new, sometimes redundant Radio Farda.
4. **Slashed broadcasts in VOA English, the United States' mother tongue, which is the only international broadcaster bringing broad and balanced news and information about the United States to 15 million people worldwide (1/5 of VOA's total audience).**
 - Determined English to be strategically unimportant, despite the fact that 1.3 billion non-Americans speak English and it is the internationally recognized language of diplomacy, commerce, culture and science
 - Reduced broadcasts in English from 24 hours a day to 19, and will reduce it to 14 hours per day by the end of this year.
 - Closed and proposed closing several critical domestic and overseas news bureaus
 - Forced sharp reductions in writing, editorial and technical staff for English programs.
 - Halted English broadcasts to Central and South America and the Caribbean.
 - Sharply reduced key frequencies and weekend broadcasts of English programs to Africa.
5. **Halted broadcasts to 10 East European countries, still struggling with political and economic instability.**
 - Eliminated Latvian, Estonian, Polish, Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, Romanian, Lithuanian, Slovak and Slovene language services.

IN CONCLUSION...

Who's Killing America's Voice?

The Voice of America is a vital component of U.S. public diplomacy and national security. We urge the Board to work with Congress and dedicated VOA professionals to reach out to today's worldwide audiences with a *responsible* mix of news and features, more and stronger broadcast signals, and vigorous marketing of VOA programming. We seek only this: to restore the Voice of America to its historical role as an authoritative, reliable and respected source of news and information about the United States and the world.
