

AMERICAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND ISLAM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

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AMERICAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND ISLAM

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2003

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 9:35 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Brownback, Coleman, Biden, Feingold, and Nelson.

The CHAIRMAN. This meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order.

Today the committee meets to review the challenges facing United States public diplomacy, an increasingly important component of American foreign policy. We will give special attention today to American efforts to communicate with the Islamic world, but American public diplomacy is a resource that must be applied in all parts of the world.

We are fortunate in our quest to be joined by Charlotte Beers, Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, and Kenneth Tomlinson, Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. We look forward with anticipation to your testimony. They will be followed by a second panel of distinguished experts from academia and government who have thought deeply about public foreign strategies.

Recently I outlined in a Washington Post article five campaigns for winning the war against terrorism. Two of those campaigns are at issue in today's hearing: strengthening American diplomatic capabilities and building democratic institutions in the world. American public diplomacy should be a powerful tool in advancing these campaigns.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, we have examined more deeply and more frequently the standing of our Nation. Americans are troubled by examples of virulent anti-American hatred in the Islamic world, and they are frustrated by public opinion in allied countries that seems increasingly ready to question American motives or blame American actions for a host of problems. In an era when allied cooperation is essential in the war against terrorism, we cannot afford to shrug off negative public opinion overseas as uninformed or irrelevant. The governments of most nations respond to public opinion, when it is demonstrated in the voting booth or in the streets.

America's economic success has been aided by the magic of marketing, advertising, and public relations. It is logical to conclude these same skills could be employed to burnish and to defend the American image around the world. As my colleague, Chairman Henry Hyde of the House International Relations Committee, has said—and I quote—“How is it that the country that invented Hollywood and Madison Avenue has allowed such a destructive and parodied image of itself to become the intellectual coin of the realm overseas?” End of quote of Chairman Hyde.

This is a good question and a starting point for much debate. But as we discuss public diplomacy today, we must resist the temptation to believe that public relations wizardry alone can fix the American image overseas. Successful public diplomacy is not about manipulating people into liking us against their interests. Rather, it is about clearly and honestly explaining the views of the United States, displaying the humanity and generosity of our people, underscoring issues of commonality, and expanding opportunities for interaction between Americans and foreign peoples.

Even the most enlightened public diplomacy will not succeed overnight, and success will require resources and hard work over a period of decades that focuses on supporting democratic institutions and a free press in the Islamic world and elsewhere. It will also require the United States to engage the world at every opportunity. The missing ingredient in American public diplomacy between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the September 11 attacks was not advertising cleverness. It was a firm commitment by the American people and the American leadership to do all the painstaking work required to build lasting relationships overseas and advance our vision of fairness and opportunity. The experience of September 11 jarred most of us out of complacency, but the committee is anxious to ensure that the best public diplomacy strategy is being developed now.

In particular, I am concerned that our broader efforts at international development and democratization are not sufficiently coordinated with our public diplomacy. Public opinion overseas is driven by everything the United States does and says, and yet policies related to foreign assistance, military cooperation, alliance building, trade negotiations, and many other initiatives are formulated often with little reference to public diplomacy.

We must also examine whether resources devoted to public diplomacy are sufficient. On February 6, this committee discussed the State Department budget with Secretary of State Powell. We noted at the hearing that for every \$1 spent by the U.S. Government on the military, only 7 cents is spent on diplomacy, and out of that 7 cents, only about a quarter of a penny is devoted to public diplomacy.

The public diplomacy budget includes funding for a wide array of activities, including State Department information programs, international academic and cultural exchange programs, and the U.S. Government's broadcasting initiatives. Yet the aggregate amount that we devote to communicating the American vision to the rest of the world, about \$1.2 billion, is less than half of what some individual American companies, such as the Ford Motor Company or the Pepsi Corporation, spend on advertising each year.

The Foreign Relations Committee will be interested in learning the recommendations of our panels on funding levels and effective strategies for our public diplomacy overseas. Your views are timely, as this committee is engaged in the process of writing the State Department authorization bill now. We want to support your efforts. We value insights that you wish to provide.

It is my privilege at this point to yield to my distinguished colleague, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing. We began this process last year to examine the issue of public diplomacy and what was lacking and what was needed.

I welcome back the Under Secretary and the new Chairman of the BBG. He was not Chairman last time we were here—or two times ago, I should say.

And I must say at the outset my statement is going to be more critical than I have been for some time, reflecting my frustration.

I recall years ago, during another Presidential administration, when I was asked by a President to go visit then-Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and it was during the period, as you will remember, Mr. Chairman, when we were talking about and debating and discussing with our European friends the so-called neutron bomb. And there was a great split between Germany and the United States at that time, and there was a question whether a Democratic President handled it very well that time. I think he did not. But at any rate, I was sent over.

I will never forget sitting in Chancellor Schmidt's office. He was a chain-smoker, frustrated, angry with us, would not speak to the President at the time. And he pounded his hand on his small conference table and he said, "but you do not understand, Joe. Every time America sneezes, Europe catches a cold." And the point I think should be well taken.

We have a public diplomacy problem with our European friends right now, let alone the Arab community worldwide, the Muslim community. We know we have a problem. We have as much of a problem now in Europe, in Asia, as we do in the Muslim world, or almost as much.

Just as American foreign policy cannot be sustained at home without the informed consent of the American people, I would argue it cannot succeed abroad unless it can be explained, not only to Presidents and Prime Ministers, but also to foreign publics. We must deal with a very simple fact. Many foreign governments are constrained by their ability to support American foreign policy if their own people oppose U.S. foreign policy. We have to engage with foreign audiences in a dialog about the objectives of American foreign policy.

In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, support and sympathy for the United States was nearly universal. The French, with whom we have a very strained relationship at the moment—the French newspaper, *Le Monde*, proclaimed a giant headline, "We Are All Americans." Hundreds of thousands of people filled public squares across Europe and Asia in support of the United States of America. It was spontaneous. NATO, without our prompting, invoked article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty.

Less than 18 months later, this enormous goodwill and energy has largely been squandered.

Earlier this month, hundreds of thousands of people rallied in the streets of Europe and elsewhere to condemn American policy.

A study conducted by the Pew Research Center indicates that the number of people in many foreign nations who have a positive view of the United States fell significantly between the years 2000 and 2002. In key countries with significant Muslim populations, the United States is viewed unfavorably by large majorities. In Pakistan and Egypt, 69 percent of the population had an unfavorable view of the United States. Just 6 percent of the population in Egypt had a favorable view. In Turkey, a NATO ally, 55 percent of the population had an unfavorable view.

A remarkable percentage of people in Europe believe U.S. policy in Iraq is driven by a desire for oil, which it is not. As many as three-quarters of the public in France and Russia believe this nonsense. And I am recalling from memory now, but about 10 to 12 months ago there was a poll in France conducted asking, can you think of anything good to say about Americans? Do not hold me to the number, but it was close to 70 percent who said, “no,” they could not think of anything good to say about America.

Why this dramatic reversal? Well, I think there are several factors, not all of which can be dealt with by public diplomacy.

First is our projected attitude. I would respectfully suggest that the administration has not followed the advice of its Presidential candidate and President in the year 2000 during a Presidential debate. When asked about how the United States should be viewed or would be viewed abroad, then-Governor Bush said—I am quoting—“It really depends upon how our Nation conducts itself in foreign policy. If we’re an arrogant Nation, they’ll resent us. If we’re a humble Nation but strong, they’ll welcome us . . . our Nation stands alone right now in the world in terms of power, and that’s why we have to be humble.” I have not heard anybody characterize the utterances of the administration in the last 8 months as humble. Humility is a term not familiar to many senior levels of the administration, I would argue, with the single exception of the Secretary of State. The administration has often been disdainful of the opinions of foreign governments on ranges of issues, from the abrupt abandonment of the Kyoto Protocol, which I did not support, to the provocative assertions of the doctrine of preemption just as diplomatic campaign was commencing on Iraq.

There is another problem, it seems to me, and that is the way in which we seem to be willing to maybe inadvertently embarrass foreign leaders occasionally, from the first meeting with President Kim visiting Washington, to refusing assistance by our NATO partners in Afghanistan, to Secretary Rumsfeld’s dismissal of our oldest partner in Europe as “Old Europe,” and to the administration’s often taken-for-granted attitude about allied support. We kind of act as if we are never going to need any help again. We kind of act like we are not going to need any alliances in the future. This is not how, in my view, you win friends and influence people, which means your job is going to be a lot harder, both of you.

I would suggest, third, that our outreach to the world since September 11 has been hampered by the slowness of our response and

our failure to properly invest in public diplomacy. Soon after September 11, at the request of the President, with Henry Hyde in the Oval Office with me, the President asked for ideas and asked would we prepare for him a proposal for public diplomacy and how we should modernize it, upgrade it, change it. And so, I—and I imagine others did too—gave the President a detailed proposal. I am sure—I hope—Secretary Beers has seen it. I do not have any particular pride of authorship. As a matter of fact, many of your Board, Ken, helped to draft this. But I do not mind that it was not adopted. I mind that it was not discussed. I mind that it went nowhere. Not my proposal, any serious, substantive alteration.

Soon after September 11, the State Department began planning for an advertising campaign to Muslim countries about the United States. It took them until October 2002 to reach the airways, and even then some of our allies in the Middle East refused permission for the advertisements to air.

The administration does deserve credit for attempting to coordinate its message overseas through the White House Office of Global Communications, but organizational change is not policy, nor does it produce budgetary resources.

The Broadcasting Board of Governors also deserves a great deal of credit for the innovative radio broadcasts to the Middle East and for proposing a Middle East television network in its budget for fiscal year 2004. But the administration's budget for fiscal year 2004 otherwise short-changes several major public diplomacy programs.

For example, the request for international exchange programs, which are essential in exposing thousands of people to the United States and U.S. citizens, are reduced in the President's budget for fiscal year 2004. For example, the Fulbright program falls from \$150 million to \$141 million, instead of going up. Professional and cultural exchanges, \$86 million to \$73 million. This will result in reductions of nearly 2,500 fewer participants in exchanges next year.

Similarly, the budget request for the Broadcasting Board of Governors for fiscal year 2004 requires the elimination and reduction of broadcast by Voice of America or Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty to several Central and Eastern European countries. We just hosted the Bulgarians in the Foreign Relations Committee. The one thing they mentioned was why are you not continuing to broadcast in our country. Now, we spent 50 years fighting to get broadcasts into their country, and now, because of budgetary constraints, you are going to have to move resources to the Middle East—I assume that is where they are being moved—and no longer broadcast in Bulgaria. And the Bulgarian Government is asking us not to stop. Well, I cannot understand why we would go off the air or reduce broadcasts in places where there is a significant listenership, such as the Baltics and/or the Balkans.

As our diplomatic efforts on Iraq have made plain, we cannot take allies, old or new, for granted. We must consistently engage them. We should expand our international broadcasting and international exchanges, not contract them. They are valuable tools to tell America's story to the world.

And I would conclude, Mr. Chairman, by making one point in a little different way than you made it. Here after the first gulf war,

we allowed over that period of time, from then to now, for the Arab world and many in the European world to become convinced that the reason why there were starving children, malnutrition, lack of medical supplies in Iraq was because of a U.S.-imposed embargo. Public opinion around the world assumed, instead of that madman Saddam taking the money, diverting it to weapons of mass destruction, building palaces and castles, and otherwise using the food money and the money he had through legal and illegal means to provide for the needs of his citizens, we were blamed. We were blamed. And that had nothing to do in my view with the failure to be humble or the failure to have the proper policy.

The only reason I mentioned those two points at the outset is it makes your job harder. If our policy in and of itself, if known accurately, is disliked, all the public diplomacy in the world is not going to change anybody's mind. But it seems to me that we are never given a square deal, a fair shake, and in large part because we have not modernized our diplomacy and we have not modernized our public diplomacy via the use of the airways. So I hope this hearing will shed some light on that.

And I hope, Mr. Chairman, that this committee will be able to convince the administration that prudent investment of more resources in public diplomacy is very, very, very much in our interest.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Mr. Chairman, I commend you for convening this hearing on America's public diplomacy efforts. Just as American foreign policy cannot be sustained at home without the informed consent of the American people, it cannot succeed abroad unless it can be explained, not only to Presidents and Prime Ministers, but also to foreign publics.

We must deal with this simple fact: many foreign governments are constrained in their ability to support American policy if their own people oppose the U.S. position. We therefore must engage with foreign audiences in a dialog about the objectives of American policy.

In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks, support and sympathy for the United States was nearly universal. The French newspaper *Le Monde* proclaimed that "We Are All Americans." Hundreds of thousands of people filled public squares across Europe and Asia in support of the United States.

Less than eighteen months later, this enormous goodwill has been largely squandered. Earlier this month, hundreds of thousands of people rallied in the streets of Europe and elsewhere to condemn American policy on Iraq.

A study conducted by the Pew Research Center indicates that the number of people in many foreign nations who have a positive view of the United States fell significantly between 2000 and the end of 2002.

In key countries with significant Muslim populations, the United States is viewed unfavorably by large majorities. In Pakistan and Egypt, 69 percent of the population had an unfavorable view of the United States; just 6 percent of the population in Egypt had a favorable view. In Turkey, a NATO ally, 55 percent of the population had an unfavorable view. A remarkable percentage of people in Europe believe that U.S. policy on Iraq is driven by a desire to control Iraqi oil—as many as three-quarters of the public in France and Russia believe this nonsense.

Why this dramatic reversal? I would cite several factors.

First, the administration has failed to heed the President's own advice, given in the second Presidential debate in 2000. When asked how the world should view the United States, then-Governor Bush said this:

It really depends upon how our nation conducts itself in foreign policy. If we're an arrogant nation, they'll resent us. If we're a humble nation, but strong, they'll welcome us . . . our nation stands alone right now in the world in terms of power, and that's why we have to be humble.

Humility is not a term familiar to many in senior levels of this administration, which has often been disdainful of the opinions of foreign governments on a range of issues—from the abrupt abandonment of the Kyoto Protocol to the provocative assertion of the doctrine of preemption just as the diplomatic campaign on Iraq was commencing.

Second, there is another problem the way in which we perhaps inadvertently embarrass foreign leaders. From embarrassing South Korean President Kim on his first visit to Washington to refusing offers of assistance by NATO partners in Afghanistan to Secretary Rumsfeld's dismissal of two of our oldest partners in Europe as "old Europe," this administration has often taken allied support for granted.

This is not how you win friends and influence people.

Third, our outreach to the world since September 11 has been hampered by the slowness of our response and the failure to properly invest in public diplomacy programs.

Soon after September 11, I suggested to the President a major expansion of U.S. international broadcasting to Muslim countries. I didn't mind that it wasn't adopted. I mind that it wasn't discussed.

Soon after September 11, the State Department began planning for an advertising campaign to Muslim countries about the United States. It took until October 2002 to reach the airwaves, and even then some of our allies in the Middle East refused permission for the advertisements to air.

The administration deserves credit for attempting to coordinate its message overseas through the White House Office of Global Communications. But organizational change is not a policy, nor does it produce budgetary resources.

The Broadcasting Board of Governors also deserves great credit for the innovative radio broadcasts to the Middle East, and for proposing a Middle East Television Network in its budget for fiscal year 2004.

But the administration's budget for fiscal 2004 otherwise shortchanges several important public diplomacy programs.

For example, the request for international exchange programs—which are essential to exposing thousands of people to the United States and U.S. citizens, are reduced in the President's budget for fiscal year 2004. For example, the Fulbright program falls from \$150 million to \$141 million, and professional and cultural exchanges falls from \$86 million to \$73 million. This will result in real reductions—nearly 2,500 fewer participants in exchanges next year.

Similarly, the budget request for the Broadcasting Board of Governors for fiscal 2004 requires the elimination or reduction of broadcasts by the Voice of America or Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to several Central and Eastern European countries.

But I cannot understand why we would go off the air or reduce broadcasts in places where there is a significant listenership, such as in the Baltics and the Balkans.

As our diplomatic efforts on Iraq have made plain, we cannot take any allies—old or new—for granted. We must constantly engage them. We should expand our international broadcasting and international exchanges, not contract them. They are valuable tools to tell America's story to the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Witnesses, with those scene-setters, you can see the challenge. We know you will rise to it. We are delighted you are here, and I would like to call upon, first of all, Under Secretary Beers and then Mr. Tomlinson.

Under Secretary Beers.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLOTTE L. BEERS, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. BEERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee. I think you are going to find my remarks a bit like an echo, but I can dimensionalize them from some very recent experiences that help put context in this same discussion that we have been having also.

Before you is a report on CD-ROM and if you are not CD-ROM friendly, there is a paper-published report as well of our recent ac-

tivities in the last year. You also have examples of booklets, and you have a copy of the new communication plan for the VISA program.

I am going to depart a bit from my longer remarks with an overview that I think is relevant.

The CHAIRMAN. Your full statement will be published in the record, and likewise Mr. Tomlinson's.

Ms. BEERS. Thank you very much.

September 11 did give us a highly accelerated learning curve. I must tell you without the supplemental and the way we could redirect 2002 funds, we could never have initiated these programs I am going to discuss with you into Muslim audiences with whom we had had almost no discourse.

Our job is to both inform and engage, but I must tell you inform is really the first job. I would say 60 or 70 percent of the efforts of our 800 people who are in the State Department in the United States work 24 hours a day to present, explain, and advocate our policies. Around the world then we link into our embassies' staff, some 16,000 who are the whole team, 600 public diplomacy officers, and we touch them through Web, through e-mail, through cable, and our own embassy television channel. They can take our products and activate them locally in ways that we cannot. With roundtable interviews, they turn them into something very important in the local market.

We also in the last year entered, through totally new channels of radio and television, in the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. Our officials were on those channels in record numbers as we discussed the kind of foreign policy issues we had and the context for those. We also had a number of op-ed pieces, personal interviews, and a great number of roundtables. Our Web site languages and products now include Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, and Pashtu. We have extremely able partners in this business of getting the word out in terms of BBG.

But we have learned the power of a digital video conference with Ken Pollack, the writer who has produced "The Threatening Storm," a very reasoned and interesting discussion of the pros and cons of Iraq. We asked him to interrupt his book tour and put him into nine countries in Europe where we needed that message, as Senator Biden points out. And it had a powerful effect. He is going back again in many other countries.

I think this year we have gained great skills in public affairs. We no longer wait for people to produce our stories. We went into Afghanistan and we did an 18-minute documentary on the reconstruction of Afghanistan. And my proudest moment was when that ran on Pakistan TV on the 6 o'clock news.

So one of the important lessons of this year is that the television channels, which are more crowded every year, and the radio channels will be very thirsty for programming, and there is an art form to getting them to use programming that we can produce and make available.

The products we produce these days are very different from a few years ago. It requires good detective work. We have to go find the story that is not the story being written in that country in the headlines, which sometimes you wonder if you have been in a time

warp because they do not cover any of the things that our people know so well, which explains the mystery sometimes about the gap between us and the rest of the world.

In addition to good detective work, we have to have artful writers and photographers, and that is why those samples in front of you are an important comment. International information programs can now produce a four-color booklet translated in many languages. For example, "Iraq: From Fear to Freedom." It talks about the horror of Hussein's regime, but also our deep desire for a democratic and unified Iraq. Believe me, in some places where we will send this in the world, this has never been heard, so it is important to assume that you are dealing with a great deal of lack of information.

Our most recent program, "Iraqi Voices for Freedom," is a great prototype of how the Policy Coordinating Committee, which was approved by the NSC and co-chaired by myself and the NSC, works. The international programs people did interviews of the exiles. Department of Defense did some other kinds of interviews. The Near East Bureau vetted these people and we launched this program offering the press not only the booklet but also the interviews in video which they can pick and use as B-roll on their television channels, and the individuals themselves have agreed to do DVC's or interviews. So it is that kind of total communication that I would say back in my advertising day is the way to get the word out in context.

We have just established an Arabic speaking team who are headed to London next week. This is the gateway for much of the Arab and Muslim television newspaper people, and we need a constant amount of training, teaching, interviewing, and engagement.

Now, that is my second point, which really sounds like your point. You determined long ago in our charter that it must also include engagement, the building of mutual understanding and trust between whom? America and the world. That is a pretty big job, and these days it seems a bit daunting, but it is a very elegant job. And we are passionately committing to doing this, but we need—we really must have—long-term, sustainable investment. And above all, we need an agreement in all the parts of the government that this is a crucial job. It is not a job to be done on the way to something else.

We do have long-tested proofs that we can engage successfully. When we bring people in on our educational and cultural exchanges, they are literally transformed from being hostile and suspicious to friends of the United States, and we can verify this in any number of ways. But are these enough? And 35,000 exchanges a year does not answer the deep need we have to engage with people.

We just had 49 Arab women here to witness our elections and democracy in action. And 13 women teachers came over from Afghanistan and now we will send our teachers back to help them. You know what they ask us? Please do not desert us.

Five northern Iraq Kurdish television people just came into the United States to learn modern broadcasting.

We know how to engage, but we have lost many of the natural points of contact. In Central Asia and Russia, there are the Amer-

ican Corners. In the Western Hemisphere, there are a few binational centers. These should be all over the world. They answer the problem of security. They are co-produced with the local government, and they create a natural dialog.

We have the ultimate secret weapon, by the way. It is English teaching. English teaching can be allowed in any country in the world regardless of how they feel about us because it opens the doors to science and technology.

In the world of Islam, we have discovered that we have a powerful common cause, and that is we really both want our children to thrive. Much of our few extra dollars in ECA has gone to setting up models of teaching in Muslim countries and youth exchanges, partnered again with local governments because we have to get them in the game. That is what the Middle East Partnership Initiative is about, that consulting and agreement to shape things and make something happen.

All of this is promising, but it is only a beginning unless we have a commitment and long-term funding.

Engagement also dramatizes for me a key question which we have attempted to answer this very year. Who are we trying to engage? And given the declines in our budget and resources, the answer had to be in the last 10 years the governments and the elites, those leaders in the country, but in fact, we must be about engaging the peoples of the world. It is not only our charter, it is an urgent need.

Now, we tested the way to do this. We produced messages directed to the people directly in Muslim countries, and what we learned is there is often a disconnect. The government and the elites will tell you they know all this, and you find from other research that the people in the country have simply no knowledge of the most basic tenets of the values of the United States, for instance, religious tolerance.

So we produced a series of mini-documentaries which were really stories of Muslim Americans talking about the way they live here. We had to actually pull them back from being too exaggerated for fear people would not believe them because they have such a passion for their life here. It was about their ability to practice their faith and integration.

In order to make sure these stories were heard, we bought our own television, radio, and newspaper. That was something of a first, and that is why you hear it called an advertising campaign, but in fact, it was storytelling made possible because we developed our own channel of distribution.

We also had all of the people on the television stories traveling to the countries to speak, to add to the authenticity. And the booklet in front of you, "Muslim Life in America," was a part of the way the embassy kept the dialog going.

I wish you would think about this for a minute. During that time, 288 million people—288 million people—saw these messages two to three times during the holy month of Ramadan. That is the kind of reach we need to do everywhere in the world, and it was the first time we had a program of that kind of penetration.

Focusing on Indonesia, we then went in and tested what these messages were accomplishing. We did it exactly like you would a

major campaign for some of our brands that travel around the world. The recall is one number and the message retention is another. The recall of these messages was higher than a soft drink can achieve in 6 more months of advertising. It broke the bank in terms of recall. In terms of message retention, every single person who recognized it came back and said they are talking about the way they live in the United States. I had no idea. A woman said, "I did not know you could wear scarves safely in that country." Another said, "do you mean they are free to pray openly?" If you could see these visuals, which most of them we taped, you would understand that the need to get the word, to exchange the word, to share ideas is actually very important.

What this means, in terms of results measured against modern marketing, is that the messages are interesting and the people are very thirsty and they are living with a large amount of distortions.

The other thing that happened is a continuing dialog is stimulated because of this massive reach. Indonesian TV came to us, agreed to do an hour television show, 50 Americans, 50 Indonesian. It just aired, 1 hour, 135 million people. That is the way we begin to make inroads against the preconceptions and the negatives.

The "Muslim Life in America" booklet, which you have there, is in use in an amazing number of places now, not only schools, libraries, and seminars, but my favorite story is Air Asia from Malaysia called and asked for 10,000 copies. So now we have forced reading on the airplanes, and it is not a bad other new channel of distribution.

The point is we must engage. We have tested this year very many programs to open doors to ordinary people. We need your support to create a sustained engagement with the world.

You know who needs this too? Our businesses, our universities, and our hospitals. They need us to help them engage. We have, as you know, amazing products, science, technology, engineering, medicine. We have the whole potent world of our best literature, music, sports, and movies, but it is not out there. Our American people are willing to go. In your States are people who constantly approach the State Department and say, "what can I do to help," and we need to organize these kinds of people, these businesses, these sophisticated musicians and artists, so that they move as emissaries through the world in our behalf.

We have in front of you amazing good programs, but they are in test. They are not funded to go roll out. "Sesame for Teens," the Arabic youth magazine, Arabic television, English teaching, cosponsored with the local governments. We have an army willing to be signed up in the world of the United States. You know that the educational and cultural exchanges are backed up by 90,000 volunteers, people in your States, who are saying, I already know a way to help. How can we magnify that manifold?

These people we need to talk to do not even know the basics about us. They are taught to distrust our every motive. Such distortions, married to a lack of knowledge, is a deadly cocktail. Engaging, teaching, common values are preventative medicine.

I would hope that, as you stated so eloquently in your opening remarks, that you can use your considerable influence to produce a strategic document that makes it clear that this kind and depth

of engagement is one of the very important components of the long-term defense of the American people. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Beers follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLOTTE L. BEERS, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you here today.

One way to look at September 11 is that it provided all of us with a painful, highly accelerated learning curve.

We were gratified to have funds in the emergency supplemental to initiate new programs intended to open doors with audiences with which we had precious little discourse. A brief description of these programs and any results to date has been sent to you and members of your staffs. I look forward to any comments you care to offer.

Among the lessons of 9/11 is that our educational and cultural exchanges—be they of young leaders, academics, students, or others—are almost always positive, literally transforming, experiences.

This is a hugely significant conclusion. It is impossible to calculate the return on this investment. It would be too high to be believable. Fifty percent of the leaders of the global coalition in the war against terrorism had been International Visitors. More than 200 current and former Heads of State, 1,500 cabinet-level ministers, and many other distinguished leaders in government and the private sector from around the world have participated in the International Visitor Program.

There's also a problem. The number of exchanges—35,000 a year worldwide—is nowhere near enough and should be expanded in the future, since they are so productive. The transformation of perceptions and the recognition of commonality that we realized after 9/11 are so important must take place for millions, not just thousands. We have to go beyond the significant dialogue we have with government officials and country leaders and reach out to mass audiences.

Let's just take a few key countries in the Middle East. For example, the population of Egypt is 71 million. Saudi Arabia is 23.5 million. Pakistan is 148 million, and Indonesia has a population of 231 million.

We are talking about millions of ordinary people, a huge number of whom have gravely distorted, but carefully cultivated images of us—images so negative, so weird, so hostile that I can assure you a young generation of terrorists is being created.

The gap between who we are and how we wish to be seen, and how we are in fact seen, is frighteningly wide.

Well, does it matter? Our businesses, whose brands travel the world, know it matters because they are boycotted. Our great universities and faculties know it matters because schools in England, Germany, Australia and elsewhere are doing a very good job of offering alternatives.

The gap matters most of all because our country has a profound belief in the power of sharing a way of life that enhances the individual, protects rights and faith, and optimizes potential.

And there is no way to even engage others in the world in such honorable pursuits if every action is viewed with distrust and cynicism or hate.

It is depressing to hear major non-governmental organizations, well funded by our tax dollars, claim that acknowledging our role in their work would diminish or destroy their ability to get the job done.

Let's agree that the gap in perceptions matters. What can we do about it?

We can attack the misperceptions, unmask the lies, and live up to our own high expectations by taking our messages to the millions, activating every emissary we have, tapping into new channels of communication, and delivering programs that benefit both us and the recipients—all to create and sustain a dialogue of enhanced growth and potential for these millions.

It's not as overwhelming as it sounds, but it does have to be agreed as a long-term goal, consistently funded, and adequately measured.

We need too to find ways to enlist our private sector in this effort. We need to engage our best and brightest business, academic, and cultural leaders—not to consult, but to participate in programs and mentoring, drawing on their unique and helpful perspectives on the American way of life and on their capacity to teach. The willingness to be engaged and this depth of talent is not a resource we can let be latent.

We need to take the best of America to other countries, to offer who we are honestly and sincerely, to share with them our exceptional gifts in English teaching, literature, science, and technology.

We've lost most of the natural touch points for doing this. What we do still have are the American Corners in Russia and Central Asia and the Binational Centers of many of our Western Hemisphere neighbors.

These can teach us how to redirect our capacity to open up access points to America—to one another.

We still have a few English teaching programs. These can be revamped and made more serious, more ambitious, more focused on universal values. We have fabulous new material in literature, in poetry, in film—but it's not out there.

We need to organize, fund, and support the many creative talents—the musicians, actors, writers—who will go willingly to teach, inspire, and tell the story of America by their own lives.

We can do a better job of sharing what's already known and written through television and the Internet.

We must create better access to our most priceless endeavors, for instance, medicine. Here, we need to talk about the work of the National Institutes of Health, whose mission is to uncover new knowledge that will lead to better health for everyone. We have stunning stories of life saving medicines developed and delivered by USAID—but no one hears these stories.

There are brave and bold plans in front of you now. Prominent among them are a Sesame Street for teens, an Arabic-language television channel, an Arabic-language magazine, the Middle East Partnership Initiative and its important exchange component, and a global Partnerships for Learning initiative aimed initially at the Muslim world.

In the end, what the task before us needs most of all is leadership. And that's where we all come in.

All of this is for the long term, but I hope I've conveyed our sense of urgency about lifting public diplomacy—our way of engaging the world—to a significantly higher and more sustained level.

Now the shorter term, *this real time* is also greatly urgent as we deal with such issues as the War on Terrorism, the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and the past, present, and future of Iraq.

That's why the primary task of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs is to inform. Our Washington bureaus and our Embassy Country Teams around the world work intensively everyday to present, explain, and advocate our policies in many languages.

Over the past month for example, State Department officials have done 72 foreign events and 217 domestic outreach events.

As we deal with the issues surrounding Iraq, we have prepared a variety of materials in support of our position:

The booklet *Iraq: From Fear to Freedom* examines in a comprehensive way the horror of Saddam Hussein's regime but also addresses the U.S. desire to see a future Iraq that is democratic, unified, and at peace with its neighbors.

In our booklet *Iraq: A Population Silenced*, we focus on human rights violations by Saddam Hussein, and his associates. We include first-person and eye-witness accounts of the atrocities committed. A quote: "Iraq under Saddam's regime has become a land of hopelessness, sadness, and fear, a country where people are ethnically cleansed. Prisoners are tortured in more than 300 prisons in Iraq. Iraq under Saddam has become a hell and a museum of crimes."

Tomorrow, we will introduce a brochure and filmed interviews under the heading of *Iraqi Voices for Freedom*. These voices represent but a few of the millions of Iraqis whose hopes for the future have been silenced by tyranny.

We have also focused on certain exchanges that will allow the visitors to become unofficial emissaries when they return home.

49 Arab women came here in November to witness our election process and democracy in action. They couldn't believe the fervor of the debate and then . . . the coming to a common resolve . . . the day after election.

We also invited thirteen women teachers from Afghanistan to enhance their skills and prepare them to train other teachers in their country. They asked us not to forget them . . . and we are working now to send American teachers to Afghanistan.

We also hosted women from Afghan government ministries for a four-week program in which they met with national and local leaders and received edu-

cation and computer skills and leadership management. While in Washington, the women also met with Cabinet officers and members of Congress. President Bush himself gave them assurances that the United States will not forget Afghanistan and urged them to tell him, in specific terms, how the U.S. can best help rebuild their country.

Just recently we asked five northern Iraqi/Kurdish television producers, managers and directors to learn about broadcast operations in the United States. Having viewed the mini-documentaries about "Muslim Life in America," these journalists were impressed with this story of freedom in America . . . the pluralistic side too. . . . They are going to substantial risk to take the videos home with them.

All year, we have been testing many new programs to create models . . . prototypes for reaching those millions to whom I referred earlier.

One such initiative took the form of a series of mini-documentaries of Muslim Americans describing their freedom here, their ability to practice their faith, and their integration into the life of America. These stories were told through paid media programs on television and radio and in newspapers, and augmented by speaker programs and a booklet on "Muslim Life in America."

And 288 million people were exposed to these messages through pan-Arab satellite television and newspapers, as well as through the national media of Indonesia, Pakistan, and Kuwait during the holy month of Ramadan.

We took Indonesia as a case study, tested the levels of recall and message retention, and found them to be significantly higher than, for instance, those of a typical soft drink campaign run at higher spending levels for more months.

This kind of exceptional result means that the messages not only were relevant, but they were also very interesting. In random taped interviews, people on the street made it clear that these messages literally opened minds and challenged the carefully taught fiction that the Muslims of America are harshly treated, illustrating instead religious tolerance is fundamental in the U.S.

The follow-up—the continuing dialogue—is even more important. Indonesia's largest television channel taped a one-hour Town Hall meeting between Americans and Indonesians—people to people. Filmed on February 7, it will air shortly, reaching 135 million people.

The "Muslim Life in America" booklet previously mentioned is one of the most successful pieces we've ever produced. It's now in use in overseas schools, libraries, and seminars and even on Malaysia's national airline, Air Asia.

One interesting lesson of this initiative is our discovery that a disconnect can exist between leadership elites and ordinary people. The elites are often not aware of the depth of misperception and myth traveling in their countries.

Another more obvious lesson is the importance of television as the dominant medium in today's information environment. Building on this lesson in Egypt, we invited an Egyptian TV group to film the story of several USAID projects, highlighting the families that benefited from the clean water, the improved education, and the micro-loans that resulted. The television coverage, readily available to a mass audience, confirmed the commitment of the American people to improving the quality of life around the globe. But we need to get these stories in a far wider reach—and more artfully.

Building upon the Shared Values initiative, and aimed initially at the Islamic Near East, we are initiating a new program called "Shared Futures," which will bring sustained attention to economic and political and educational reform in the Muslim world through media campaigns, television and media co-ops, and other creative programming and in partnership with the local institutions.

Our lessons have come fast and hard this year. We learned the importance of good collaboration as a magnifier. The geographic bureaus and overseas missions of the Department house our most talented resource—people. Our Public Diplomacy Officers need and want training in modern marketing and outreach to large audiences. We've formed a strong partnership with USAID so the real story of the generosity of the American people can be told.

Perhaps most importantly, we have learned that, for some time into the future, we will be dealing with the natural tension between our need for security and our desire to be open and inviting. This is nicely summarized by our new communication plan on visas, "Secure Borders—Open Doors."

These words are a good summary of where we are with the world. Our policies must be heard. They deserve powerful advocates, but it is also crucial that they be delivered in a proper context.

Our Open Doors and all that stands for is a message too muffled by circumstances today.

We must have both conversations. We need new programs and sustained funding to do this.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Under Secretary Beers.
Mr. Tomlinson.

**STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH Y. TOMLINSON, CHAIRMAN,
BOARD OF BROADCASTING GOVERNORS, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. TOMLINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I note the presence in the audience of Director Charles Z. Wick who did so much during the Reagan administration to increase resources for public diplomacy, and it is great to see him here.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is Director Wick? Great to see you, Charlie. Thank you for coming.

Mr. TOMLINSON. I will submit my testimony for the record.

Before I give my brief remarks, I want to pay tribute to the leadership that this committee has given international broadcasting and public diplomacy over the years. Mr. Chairman, I vividly remember the times that Steve Forbes and I came to you at the height of the cold war for help and you were always there for us.

Senator Biden, you were the political father of the Board I chair. Your vision has been remarkable, and I thank you so much for your leadership and we look forward to working with you all.

Mr. Chairman, Secretary of State Powell's presentation to the United Nations 2 weeks ago, laying out the case that Iraq had failed to halt its banned weapons programs, was beyond any doubt among the most important statements in the war on terrorism and one that everyone in the world needed to hear.

Had Secretary Powell delivered that speech only 2 years ago, most people in the Middle East would have heard it only through the distorted filter of radio and television stations controlled by those hostile to the United States. Only a tiny fraction would have had the patience to tune into Voice of America's Arabic Service that was broadcasting exclusively on scratchy short wave.

Today the situation is very different. Thanks to the creation of Radio Sawa and its journalistic leadership, millions of people in the Arab world, and most notably the people of Iraq, heard simultaneous translations of the Secretary's case broadcast live, with later programs that reexamined the evidence supporting America's case against Saddam Hussein. In an age when Arab boycotts of American products are widespread, a U.S. Government-run radio station almost overnight has become the most popular voice of its kind in major portions of the Middle East, including Baghdad.

Now, how did this come to be? Months before the horrors of September 11, my predecessors on the Broadcasting Board of Governors, in no small part energized by my colleague, Norman Pattiz, recognized the need for a far greater U.S. broadcast presence in the Middle East. These activists, also recognizing that in the Middle East short wave is a vehicle of the past, set about negotiating agreements that would give us powerful AM transmitters broadcasting through the region from Cyprus and Djibouti. We added FM stations in Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Djibouti. We also broadcast on digital audio satellite and the Internet.

Now, in the beginning some dismissed Sawa because its format featured the best of Western and Arabic pop music, not understanding this music would attract a huge under-30 audience for accurate news and current affairs. Today daily features like "Ask the World" where statements of top U.S. policymakers are used to answer questions from listeners and "The Free Zone," a weekly discussion of democracy and human rights in the Middle East, enhanced Sawa's basic news coverage. Whenever important events warrant, Radio Sawa interrupts its regular format to present complete and full coverage of events like Secretary Powell's presentation or President Bush's network address to the Nation a few weeks ago or last evening's AEI's speech projecting the President's vision for a post-Saddam Iraq. That speech, by the way, was also carried live on VOA's "Worldwide English."

It is little wonder that Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times called Sawa "the triumph of the Bush administration's focus on public diplomacy abroad."

Now, Sawa may be the star of our efforts in the war on terrorism, but it is only one of our recent initiatives and it represents only one approach to international broadcasting. We have added Radio Farda 24/7 service to the youth of Iran while maintaining VOA Persian broadcasting by television and radio and the Internet for older audiences. And Mr. Chairman, I will also submit for the record a recent New York Times article, "U.S. Uses a Powerful Weapon in Iran: TV."

The CHAIRMAN. It will be included in the record.

Mr. TOMLINSON. Thank you, sir.

[The New York Times article referred to follow:]

[From The New York Times, Arts & Ideas, December 7, 2002]

U.S. USES A POWERFUL WEAPON IN IRAN: TV

(By Lynette Clementson with Nazila Fathi)

WASHINGTON, Dec. 6—The letter, written in Farsi, was as tantalizingly mysterious as the videotape it was wrapped around. "Excuse the unprofessional quality of the video," wrote the sender, a young Iranian, "We didn't want to attract authorities by using a production crew."

On the tape was a jolting series of interviews with frustrated Iranians complaining about their country's stalled political reforms and the repressiveness of its ruling mullahs.

The unsolicited video was sent not to the C.I.A. but to the young Iranian cast of "Next Chapter," a hip, new MTV-inspired television show broadcast from the Voice of America headquarters here and beamed to Iran via satellite. The sender, who had smuggled the tape out of Iran and mailed it from London, could not broadcast the hotly political material on government-controlled Iranian television, so he appealed to his Iranian peers in the United States.

The subject was more controversial than the show's typical fare, which intersperses bites of politics and hard news with fast-cut segments on sports, movies, fashion and cars. But the show's hosts broadcast it anyway, between a piece on the winners of the third annual North American Wife Carrying Contest in Newry, Maine, and an interview with Jay Leno.

"We know that so many young people in Iran are fed up, and they just want to be heard," said Roozbeh Mazhari, 29, one of the hosts of "Next Chapter," referring to the sandwiching of the tape. "But they also want some fun."

While the United States is bracing for a possible military offensive in Iraq, behind the scenes a soft war is well under way. It is aimed at winning the hearts and minds of young people in the Middle East a time when radical Islamists are encouraging anti-American sentiment.

In Iran, dissatisfaction with the Islamic regime has been building for years. In recent weeks, it has led to pro-democracy protests in the streets of Tehran over the death sentence given to a reformist scholar. This sea change has created new opportunities for influencing opinion.

"Next Chapter," which had its debut on Sept. 10, is one of several recent projects that are putting a new spin on old-fashioned American propaganda.

Some programs are directed by the State Department, which last year hired Charlotte Beers, a former Madison Avenue advertising executive, to devise a multi-million-dollar public diplomacy campaign, complete with academic exchange programs and slick public service advertisements, to soften anti-American feelings.

In a separate venture, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the government agency that oversees Voice of America, received \$35 million this year to start a youth-oriented Middle Eastern radio network. (Voice of America's programs are run by journalists, and their content is not subject to State Department approval.) The network, called Radio Sawa ("sawa" means "together" in Arabic), sprinkles news tidbits written from an American perspective into a heavy rotation of American and Middle Eastern pop music.

Later this month the board will begin broadcasting a similarly formatted \$8 million venture in Iran called Radio Farda ("farda" means "tomorrow" in Farsi).

"Next Chapter," produced by the Voice of America's Farsi service, has a comparatively small startup budget of less than \$1 million.

The new programs' youthful direction is dictated by demographics. Like many Middle Eastern countries, Iran has many people under 30, roughly 70 percent of its 66 million citizens. "These are not traditional users of U.S. government-sponsored news," said Norman J. Pattiz, chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors' Middle East committee. "We can reap terrific dividends by talking to these young people directly in a way they understand."

Some believe that soft tactics are far wiser than military might. "America is so much more than its military and economic prowess," said Reza Ladjevardian, 36, an Iranian writer based in Houston. "The people of Iran have seen that fundamentalism doesn't work. Appealing to them with cooperation and reasoning, rather than 'axis of evil' talk, is a virtually risk-free proposition for the U.S."

The cast of "Next Chapter" agrees. This weekly program tackles topics ranging from political talk over a possible war with Iraq to street talk over "8 Mile," the rapper Eminem's hit movie, now making its way through the Middle East on pirated DVD's. The show carefully avoids direct criticism of Iran's Islamic regime; its style is subtly subversive.

A recent entertainment segment, for instance, profiled the Cuban jazz trumpeter Arturo Sandoval, who did not have a word to say about Iran or Iranians but talked movingly about fleeing a repressive regime for political and artistic freedom. The interview with Jay Leno focused on using comedy to criticize politics.

Another segment showed Iranian students at the University of Maryland enjoying Mehregan, a traditional Persian fall festival, without mentioning directly what viewers in Iran already know: that this secular holiday's celebration is discouraged by the country's religious leaders.

A regular feature called "A Day in the Life" uses a reality television approach to showcase ordinary Iranian 20-somethings living in the United States. As the jumpy camera followed Anahita Sami, a 20-year-old student, and her friends around the campus of George Washington University, she chatted about dorm life, exams, being away from home for the first time, nothing particularly exciting. But the point is made: Yeah, she can wear those clothes, say those things and do that stuff.

"We need to get this generation ready for something new," said Ahmad Baharloo, who directs Voice of America's Farsi service and is executive producer of "Next Chapter." "We don't want to tell them what to do, but make them look and think and respond to logic."

The show, which is simulcast on the radio and over the Internet, is too new, Voice of America officials said, to have data on the number of viewers. Early feedback suggests it is reaching only a tiny slice of its potential audience. Iranians have complained to Voice of America that they can't find the show on their satellite channels, and when they do, the signal is too weak for good reception.

Still, there is evidence of a sprouting fan base. Amateur videos, like the one from London, have arrived from Iranians in Japan and Seattle. Web hits to Voice of America's Farsi service, at voanews.com/farsi/, spiked by the hundreds in the weeks after the show's premiere.

There are also e-mail messages from eager viewers like Hadi, a Tehran teenager who wrote that he and other teenagers in his apartment building were gathering to listen to the show on the radio because they could not get it on television. "I wish we could ask President Bush to send us a digital satellite so we can see your show,"

Hadt wrote, adding that his friends held a candlelight vigil in observance of the first anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks.

There has, however, been considerable criticism of the new youth-driven government efforts. Some say the new shows are so soft that they are condescending. And in Iran, where conservative factions of the government have recently closed down dozens of independent news publications, political strategists argue that there is greater need than ever for serious news.

"Yes, youth may want to listen to music and watch fun TV," said Nasser Radian, a professor of political science at Tehran University who is currently a visiting professor at Columbia. "But there is still an audience hungry for real analysis, and the United States is wasting an opportunity if they ignore that."

Mabtab Farid, who worked until recently as a political reporter on "Next Chapter" and is now part of the news team for Radio Farda, agrees that hard news is essential. But she said young people in Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East were also eager for new ways to reach across cultures.

As a child in Iran in 1979, Ms. Farid, 29, watched American news clips of the hostage crisis at the United States Embassy in Tehran. "I remember yelling at the TV," she said. "I would say: 'Those stupid journalists! They keep saying Iran has taken America hostage. Don't they know it's just a small group of bad people? Don't they know we don't all hate America?'"

She says the experience helps her understand what it must be like for Iranian youth who now feel marked by the "axis of evil" label.

"We know what's missing on each side because we have been on both sides," Ms. Farid said. "These shows give us a special tool to reach from one side to the other."

The cast of "Next Chapter" is still struggling for the right balance in content. The program has referred to the recent student protests in Iran in its brief news segment, but so far it has avoided commenting on them.

"You cannot spend every minute of the day on politics," Mr. Baharloo said. "Part of our job with the show is to give the young people a rest."

Still, some messages are getting through. On a recent Tuesday night in Tehran, four men and two women sat around a 29-inch television in the home of Pooya, a 30-year-old rug merchant, waiting to watch the show.

The friends giggled over the cast members' Farsi, which they said sounded a bit too American and informal. And they weighed in on the movie and car reports, which they agreed were cool.

The show opened with a segment on the American Humane Society and the importance of protecting animals: a seemingly mundane topic but timely in Iran. One of the country's hard-line Muslim clerics had recently declared dogs unclean and called on security forces to stop people from walking them in public. As the group listened intently, Pooya's younger brother, Ali, patted the family dog and nodded his approval.

Mr. TOMLINSON. VOA has added a new Arabic language Web site aimed at opinion leaders throughout the region. Combined signals of VOA and RFE/RL's Radio Free Afghanistan delivers news and information for an astonishingly high audience there. VOA and Radio Free Asia have doubled broadcast hours to North Korea, and we hope to do more. We need to do more.

Meanwhile, RFE continues to build on its record of scholarship and journalistic integrity to a largely information-deprived part of the world. Nineteen of RFE/RL's 34 language services broadcast to nations with a Muslim majority. But in my view the most important public diplomacy initiative of our time can be found in President Bush's 2004 budget request that would help make a U.S. Arabic language television network a reality in the Middle East, echoing what you proposed, Senator Biden, 2 years ago.

In the days following the administration's announcement, Congress also made available seed money for Arabic television in the 2003 budget, and that is going to be very important to us. With the spirit that built Sawa, we are hard at work hoping to make Arabic television a reality as soon as possible. Everyone now recognizes that direct to home satellite television is not only the biggest media phenomenon to hit the Arab world since the advent of television.

It is also the biggest political phenomenon. Al-Jazeera should not go unanswered in the Middle East. We need to present to the Arab world the kind of pluralism of opinions and openings to a broader world that Thomas Friedman says will act like nutcrackers to open societies and empower Arab democrats with new tools.

Finally, on this day as I sit before you with my esteemed colleague, Under Secretary Beers, I think we need to understand the importance of maintaining the strength of public diplomacy and the traditions of international broadcasting. I am convinced that we will not be successful in our overall mission of delivering our message to the world if we fail to grasp that these are two different spheres and they operate according to two different sets of rules. It is very important that government spokesmen take America's message to the world passionately and relentlessly, just as you have done. We should not be ashamed of public advocacy on behalf of freedom and democracy in the United States of America.

International broadcasting, on the other hand, is called upon to reflect the high standards of independent journalism as the best means of convincing international audiences that truth is on the side of democratic values. These arms of public diplomacy should be parallel pursuits because the effectiveness of either is adversely affected when one attempts to impose its approach on the other.

I remember 30 years ago when RFE/RL and VOA began broadcasting the Watergate hearings. These broadcasts caused heartburn for many in Washington, but looking back, we see it constituted a veritable civics lesson on the importance of separation of powers and the rule of law. Over the years I have heard so many citizens of post-Communist countries tell how those broadcasts helped them understand the real meaning of democracy.

We in America are fortunate: telling the truth works to our long-term advantage. That is why international broadcasting is so important in this country. That is why our radio and TV voices to the world need to be stronger, and that is why we need Arabic television.

We look forward to your questions and we thank you very much for your interest.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tomlinson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH Y. TOMLINSON, CHAIRMAN,
BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS

Secretary of State Colin Powell's speech to the United Nations two weeks ago laying out the case against Iraq was beyond any doubt among the most important statements in the war on terrorism, one that everyone in the world needed to hear.

Had Secretary Powell delivered that speech only two years ago, however, most people in the Arab Middle East would have heard it only through the distorting filter of radio and television stations controlled by those hostile to the United States. Only a tiny fraction—perhaps no more than one or two percent of the entire population—would have had the patience to tune in to the Voice of America's Arabic Service that was broadcast exclusively on scratchy short wave.

But last week, the situation was very different. Thanks to the creation of Radio Sawa, a new program of U.S. international broadcasting, millions of people in the Arab world heard his speech as it was delivered—without the kind of distortions the media in the region all too often insert. Informal survey data show that Radio Sawa—the name means “together” in Arabic—is already the most popular station in many Arab capitals and has gained a significant audience even in Saddam Hussein's Baghdad!

Indeed, Radio Sawa has been so successful that one American commentator, Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times, has called the station “the triumph of the Bush Administration’s focus on public diplomacy abroad.”

VICTORIES ON THE MEDIA FRONT

Success for America’s international broadcasting combines two essential ingredients: trust earned by accurate reporting—which is critical to a democratic people’s ability to make informed decisions. And a free open channel to the other ideas that are at the center of this nation’s being. We are a nation built on ideas. Our international broadcasting must always reflect, examine, question and illuminate these ideas. Truth about the events we report is as critical to our mission as explaining to our audience why we value the truth.

Allow me to tell you something more about the Sawa success story—and also about some of the other successes in U.S. international broadcasting—not only because they are so impressive on their own and important in our war against terrorism but also because they point the way to the future.

Months before even the horrors of September 11, my predecessors on the Broadcasting Board of Governors—in no small part energized by my colleague Norman Pattiz—recognized the need for a far greater U.S. broadcast presence in the Middle East. And they set about negotiating agreements that would give us powerful AM transmitters broadcasting throughout the region.

With your support, the U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors launched Radio Sawa eleven months ago. A 24/7 service with 48 newscasts a day interspersed among a mix of Western and Arabic popular music, the station’s signals go out on a combination of AM and FM transmitters across the Middle East as well as via digital audio satellite, short wave, and the Internet. Because Radio Sawa represented such a radical departure from longstanding international broadcasting approaches, many were skeptical. But our surveys and reports from independent observers across the region highlight the new reality: in the Arab Middle East, Sawa has won the U.S. an audience including not only the young—who make up the vast majority of the population there—but also older people who turn to it for news and information.

When we launched Radio Sawa on March 23, 2002, we blanketed the Middle East, using a carefully conceived combination of medium wave and FM transmitters, digital audio satellite, short wave and the Internet. We installed a high-powered AM transmitter in Cyprus, and we’re poised to begin service from another long-range AM transmitter in Djibouti. Our listeners in Iraq are getting their signals from an AM transmitter in Kuwait. Many of our allies in the Middle East—Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Djibouti have given us our own FM stations. In addition, Radio Sawa currently has four customized 24/7 programming streams for Iraq, Jordan, the Gulf, and Egypt/Levant.

Radio Sawa news is twice an hour (a full newscast is up to 10 minutes) provides Arabic listeners the kind of comprehensive, balanced and up-to-the-minute news this audience needs to make informed decisions. In addition, Radio Sawa broadcasts many other substantive programs including: “Ask the World Now,” where statements of top U.S. policymakers are used to answer questions from listeners; “The View from Washington,” where a daily summary of major-U.S. policy statements on Iraq; and “The Free Zone,” which addresses broader topics such as democracy building, and human rights with special emphasis on women’s rights. All of these programs are intended to fulfill Sawa’s motto: “You listen to us; we listen to you.”

At the same time, the Voice of America has set up a special VOA Arabic Web site to help spread America’s message in Arabic to journalists, opinion leaders, and officials throughout the region. Many members of this elite audience have already signed up to the site’s daily news delivery by e-mail, and many journalists are drawing on these materials to prepare their own articles. Some of them are even publishing VOA materials on American policy in their own newspapers or re-broadcasting them to audiences who might not have any other access to American opinion.

U.S. international broadcasting has not neglected other key parts of the Middle East and the Muslim world more generally. VOA with its recently revamped Cantonese Service and recently expanded Indonesian Service, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and particularly its Central Asian and Caucasus services, and Radio Free Asia also carried Secretary Powell’s speech as well as additional extensive coverage of the rationale for the war on terrorism. Nineteen of RFE/RL’s current 34 broadcast languages are for countries or regions whose populations are primarily Muslim.

Most recently, we at the BBG have combined the signals of VOA and RFE/RL’s Radio Free Afghanistan to produce a 24/7 news and information radio stream for

Afghanistan. We have begun to broadcast on FM in country and are working to launch an AM capability by May of this year. Afghans have a long tradition of listening to our broadcasts and our new combined effort is attracting even more. To ensure that we reach an even greater percentage of the audience there, we have installed FM transmitters in the Afghan capital Kabul so that people there can hear our programs more easily. We've provided an FM transmitter to the Afghan government itself. We plan to install FM transmission in several other major cities as soon as the security situation permits. And we plan to turn on our new medium wave AM transmitter in May 2003, a station that will allow everyone in Afghanistan to listen to our broadcasts on this more accessible channel.

We have also launched a major effort to reach the young people of Iran. In December, the Broadcasting Board of Governors established Radio Farcia—"Radio Tomorrow" in Persian—to provide a 24/7 stream of programming for the people of Iran. President George W. Bush said during its first broadcast that "the Iranian people tell us that more broadcasting is needed because the un-elected few who control the Iranian government continue to place severe restrictions on access to uncensored information."

A joint effort of VOA and RFE/RL, Radio Farda which broadcasts more than five hours of original news and substantive content in addition to music every day—has been an overnight success. For obvious reasons, we can't do survey research in Iran. But in the first few weeks alone, thousands of Iranians have sent us e-mails to thank the U.S. for reaching out to the Iranian people over the heads of the Iranian government. A typical e-mail received only last week including an expression of thanks to all the Americans behind this effort and expressing the hope that there will soon be "justice and liberty" in Iran and that soon the Iranian and American flags will be flying next to each other.

This is progress in the war against terrorism. Ideas are the major battleground in this war. We are getting America's ideas of individual freedom, equality, toleration, and limited government across. And we are succeeding where it matters: by reaching directly into the hearts and minds of a tremendous audience whose other sources of information repeatedly, deliberately, and grotesquely misrepresent who we are, and what we stand for.

THE CHANGING MEDIA ENVIRONMENT

But as important as these breakthroughs on radio and the Internet are, today they are not enough. The battleground has shifted, and that is why I appear before you today.

Television and especially direct-to-home satellite television is transforming the media environment across the region. All of you know about the impact of the 24-hour news satellite channel Al-Jazeera. Its reports have become a staple of our own nightly news. And its impact, along with that of other international satellite channels on the region, is now far greater than any other media. That new reality prompted Thomas Friedman of the New York Times to observe that satellite television is "not only the biggest media phenomenon to hit the Arab world since the advent of television; it also is the biggest political phenomenon" across that region.

The Administration is proposing that we create just such a channel to counter the lack of depth and balance that help to create distortions and misrepresentations when these stations report on the United States, its policies and its people. As Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, I am proud to have this opportunity to make the case for the creation of a U.S. Arabic language satellite television channel. Our case rests on three fundamental facts of political life in the Middle East:

First, as I've already noted, television has already become the most important medium in the region for news and information. The transition from the world of the nomad to modernity, from a newspaper-centric to radio-centric to a television-centric media environment has taken place at breathtaking speed across the area. Surveys consistently show that more than four out of five people in the Middle East get all or almost all of their news from television and that they trust television more than any of the other media channels.

Second, satellite television offers the chance to break the grip that governments in the region now exercise over most radio and television news outlets. As such, it promotes the kind of pluralism of opinions and opening to the broader world that is, again in Friedman's words, "acting like nutcrackers to open societies and empower Arab democrats with new tools." The United States has an interest in promoting democratic change in these countries, and promoting competition and openness in the electronic media is an essential element in our campaign to do just that.

Third, the kind of reporting that U.S. international broadcasting has always done—providing accurate, balanced and reliable information—over time will win us more long-term and reliable friends than anything else we might try to do. As a former director of the Voice of America and editor-in-chief of the *Readers' Digest*, I can tell you that there is a real hunger for such information and that by providing it we will find that we have more friends in the world than many now suspect.

But in my view, the most important public diplomacy initiative of our time can be found in President Bush's 2004 budget request that would help make a U.S. Arabic-language television network a reality to the Middle East. In the days following the Administration's announcement, Congress also identified seed money for this Arabic television effort in the 2003 budget.

September 11, 2001, changed the way we must approach international broadcasting. We thus propose ending most VOA and RFE/RL broadcasting to the democracies of Eastern Europe where free speech is practiced and where the process of joining the NATO alliance is under way. The closing of these services, whose employees have so gallantly served the cause of freedom, will bring a moment of sadness to many of us who saw victory in the Cold War as a direct result of these radios. But we should remember at the same time that the goals these services struggled and sacrificed for has been achieved, and they should take great pride in the role they played in this historic mission.

Our task now is to draw upon our previous success in the Cold War, to go forward with the new war of ideas as we offer democracy, tolerance, and self-government as the positive alternative to tyranny, fanaticism, and tenor. And if we are given the funds the President has requested for Middle East television, I am confident we can build an Arabic-language satellite television station we'll all be proud of. Moreover, its launch will make a major contribution toward helping the peoples of the region move away from extremism and violence and toward democracy and freedom in what we all hope will soon be a post-Saddam Middle East.

TOWARD A BROADER INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING STRATEGY

When the United States launched its international broadcasting effort more than a half century ago during World War II, there was only one channel available: short wave radio. We could broadcast into countries from the outside only in this way, and we did so across the world. In the 1940s, '50s, '60s, and '70s, people around the world listened to the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty exclusively on short wave. Our message got through, and many of those who made the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were regular listeners. When asked about the importance of international broadcasting for his country, Polish leader Lech Walesa responded "Can you imagine the earth without the sun?"

But with the collapse of the Soviet empire and with the simultaneous advance of technology, the range of choices available to us to deliver our message has increased dramatically. In addition to short wave, we now can broadcast on medium wave both AM and FM through affiliate stations, deliver text, sound and pictures via the Internet, and broadcast television both a through affiliates and via satellite. And we need to choose carefully the combination of these various technologies to ensure that we effectively reach every one of our target audiences.

In making that choice, we need to remember that one size does not fit all. In some markets, we will need one kind of programming and in others a very different kind. Moreover, in some places, we will be best able to reach our audience via television, in others via the Internet, and in still others via radio either short or medium wave.

We need to keep in mind that no media market is monolithic. We have to make choices about which parts of that market we most want to reach. In some cases, we may need to use more than one channel to do so. In the Middle East, I am confident that a combination of Radio Sawa, RFE/RL's Radio Free Iraq, Arabic language Internet, and a U.S. Arabic language satellite television is the best answer. But I would not advocate the same combination or the same type of programming for other markets.

And we need to keep in mind that the media scenes in many countries are changing so quickly that unless we constantly evaluate what we are doing, we may be left behind. We must carefully monitor the situation in all countries around the world and evaluate what we need to do relative to American policy concerns and financial limitations. And at the same time, we also must move to create a U.S. international broadcasting system that is sufficiently flexible to allow us to shift resources in a timely manner. I along with all the other members of the Broadcasting Board of Governors consider this to be our most important challenge. I have already

spoken about some of the steps we have taken in this direction. And all of us look forward to discussing the implications of this with you both now and in the future.

Let me conclude my statement with some reflections on the relationship between traditional public diplomacy and international broadcasting. I am convinced that we will not be successful in our overall mission of delivering our message to the world if we fail to grasp that these are two different spheres and that they operate according to two different sets of rules. Indeed, we must always remember that each is most successful when it does so and least effective when it attempts to impose its approach on the other. This Committee well recognized these differences when it considered the International Broadcasting Act of 1994.

Traditional public diplomacy involves government spokespersons here in Washington and around the world taking America's message to the world passionately and relentlessly to foreign officials and foreign audiences. International broadcasting, in contrast, is most effective when it operates first and foremost according to the highest standards of independent journalism. It is based on establishing a direct line of trust between those delivering news and information and those consuming it, and consequently, reliable, accurate news and explicit identification of policy programs is a requirement for success.

This is something officials in Washington and Americans in general are not always comfortable with. I well remember 30 years ago when RFE/RL and VOA broadcast the Watergate hearings as part of their responsibility to report the news accurately and fully. Some here in town and even more outside in the country at large thought this was a mistake. Why were we paying taxes to finance broadcasts about our problems? But I can tell you that I have met so many citizens of the post-communist countries who have told me that it was precisely these broadcasts so long ago that helped them understand why democracy and freedom are so important. After all, they've told me, under communism, who could imagine that their rubber-stamp parliaments would ever investigate a sitting president, let alone take steps to bring him down?

We in America are fortunate: telling the truth works to our advantage, and it works to the advantage of those we tell it to. More than a decade ago, we celebrated the demise of communism in Europe and the special role that U.S. international broadcasting played in first breaching and then bringing down the Iron Curtain. Now, we confront another barrier, what Thomas Friedman has called "an iron curtain of misunderstanding separating America and the Arab-Muslim world."

Many view this barrier as being even more insurmountable than the old one that divided Europe. But with your help and support for a U.S. Arabic-language satellite television system, I am confident that we will have equal success and successfully overcome what now divides us from the Middle East.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Tomlinson.

On our first round, we will adopt a 7-minute limit, and let me commence the questions by saying to both of you, as you could tell from the opening statements, or really, if you have witnessed any of our most recent hearings, the committee is usually more enthusiastic about the project than the witnesses. Now, this is not always the case. You are under some constraints, and we realize that. The purpose is not to embarrass you.

But at the same time, we have exhorted the administration to plan much more comprehensively for Iraq, and we are pleased that that is occurring. One could argue that was already occurring prior to our having hearings about this. I acknowledge all sorts of things occur unknown to this committee. But nevertheless, this does seem to be accelerating and we appreciate the feedback coming from the administration. I cite that as an example at least of the sort of feeling I have with regard to today's hearing. I think it is shared by my colleagues.

In essence, I am disturbed. Senator Biden mentioned specifically our excellent interview with the Bulgarian Foreign Minister and Defense Minister in a coffee we had just this week. And as he pointed out accurately, the burden of their major plea was Radio Free Europe.

Now, we all went back to the drawing board to see what happened to Radio Free Europe, and what appears to have occurred, as well as what happened to the exchange programs that my colleague cited—he mentioned the Fulbright program. I would mention the Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange Program which has been critically important I believe, particularly in the east of the country over the course of the years. All these exchange programs apparently are \$150 million less, 2,450 less exchange participants. The Radio Free Europe business is just a part of a general pulling back from former Eastern European and Baltic States, almost on the principle, as in foreign aid. We used to have sort of a graduation out of foreign aid on something else, self-sufficiency. I believe this is shortsighted and I am uncertain—at least as we get into the reauthorization situation in a bipartisan way, we want to try to correct it.

Now, at that point, we will probably run into a collision of one sort or another, that is, with the limits that were imposed upon you as you reduced all these programs going downhill or OMB or the Presidential budget or what have you. So I am not certain as we head out into those territories who we find.

But on the other hand, I think we have a feeling these things are very important and, as a matter of fact, a vindication really of those who have been involved in both broadcasting and journalism for a long time. Not only are they appreciated, but these governments that are fledgling democracies, new members of NATO and trying to be a part of Europe are saying essentially they need this for the integrity of public information in their countries even as they develop these resources. They are a benchmark and at least a signal of what the United States thinks and does. And that is important in these countries. It ought to be important to us that they believe it is important as subscribers to this.

Now, leaving that point, let me just say that later on we will hear some data from the Pew Foundation, and I will not try to preempt that testimony in the second panel. But it makes an interesting point on one of the charts that in the sort of general question of whether you like us or you do not, the United States is doing extraordinarily well in Uzbekistan, and this is a country that for many Americans was off the radar screen until 9/11. It is on the radar screen now. As a matter of fact, more active diplomacy has occurred, visits even by the President of the country over here with some of us.

On the other hand, Jordan, in terms of public opinion with regard to whether we pay attention to their government—that was one of the questions asked—or what they think about the war against terrorism—is really a disaster as far as very much sympathy or rapport with the United States of America.

Now, some analysts who are outside this hearing and are talking about the Middle East in general would say this reflects the fact that diplomacy with regard to Israel and the Palestinians has not gone very swiftly. As a matter of fact, that is the issue for countries that are in proximity to the Israeli-Palestinian question. Uzbekistan more off in the Afghanistan area where we have been active in other ways maybe is a different story, and I understand these demarcations.

But at the same time I would just say simply this is a confusing picture, albeit the date of it was December and life goes out and you are pointing out dynamic efforts that sort of take hold bit by bit.

Can you make any comment about these two issues? First of all, the budgetary issues. What sort of support do you need from us? In your own mind's eye, what would you do if you had the latitude to do it? And second, explain this extraordinary change in data, say, between Uzbekistan and Jordan as one of the sharpest of the contrasts? Ms. Beers?

Ms. BEERS. The budgetary issue is familiar to all of us, in that the President's budget gets an amazing amount of restraint based on all of the many things to be done. And that is why our budget is basically straight-lined, although it has variations on the theme.

I think the way I take that challenge is to use the money we have to put in place test models that you would be comfortable, if rolled out, would be very successful in engagement. And we have not failed to do that. We have a number of programs. And now I think we are before you saying that we need a fairly sweeping change in terms of how we make up our long-term strategic direction in terms of engagement, and with that will come the consequences of not only funding but people and maybe a very important other element that I would like to add to that mix and that is the machinery to tap into the talent pool of the United States. It is troublesome to me to have CEOs and advertising executives around the world say I am ready to help and we do not have the system and the process to activate them. That is the budget issue.

The dichotomy between a country like Jordan and Uzbekistan is partly the degree of hope and momentum that the country itself has and its closeness to the United States in terms of an emerging democracy. I do not know if it applies as much to Uzbekistan or not but the Freedom Support Act influenced very interestingly the ability to do what used to be done, libraries, American Corners, access points, much more generosity in exchanges and teaching. It was like that money was held intact. And I think you will find that a really positive effect, and if you look at those numbers, it might be fair to draw a course conclusion that that was additive, that that was a way of being that we would like to return to.

Maybe Ken would like to add.

Mr. TOMLINSON. Mr. Chairman, we were so budget-starved, we were so money-starved in international broadcasting that 2 years plus ago in the weeks before 9/11, we came close to eliminating the Uzbek service. Now, that is astonishing. In the 10 years following the end of the cold war, support for international broadcasting declined 40 percent in real terms.

Now, this past year—and God knows, being before this committee—I grew up on the Blue Ridge Mountains, and as a boy I used to go to revival meetings and the revival meetings would cause you to focus to get more enthusiastic about what you are supposed to be doing.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what we do here, these revival meetings.

Mr. TOMLINSON. It is an experience just like that.

I am very proud of the fact that we got a 10 percent increase in our budget out of OMB this last time, which was rather remarkable considering the budgetary constraints of our time.

But without question, I still think that Arabic television to the Middle East is our most important initiative, and I know you do, Senator Biden, or at least you gave us the vision for it. And when we look at the changes post-9/11, we have to come to the reality that these television programs are vitally important to us.

But I appreciate your views on the other issues. I have spent time in Bulgaria and the Baltic States, and know the importance of broadcasting.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. My time is expired.

It would appear to me and other members of the committee that depending upon circumstances as they may flow in Iraq, that the administration is likely to approach the Congress for substantial supplemental appropriations, that we are going to have a sizable debate outside of the normal budgetary picture. At least in this Senator's opinion, that is what we are talking about in terms of public diplomacy and the course of that is tremendously important.

I would ask that if you have models that you have rolled out, as you described this, Ms. Beers, that you make these available to the staff of the committee, both Republicans and Democrats, so that we have some idea of what the thoughts are that you have already researched so we do not reinvent the wheel. I think in a rapid way, in our authorization process, which is the old-fashioned way—and we are trying to push through that this year—we may likewise have a more emergency situation with a supplemental appropriations debate. And that may offer further opportunities to fulfill the revival spirits of our meetings.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Praise the Lord.

I really do not think there is anything that we are going to undertake in this committee that is more important. There are some things as important, but not more important.

I just want to do a little review so you all know, as they say, where I am coming from on this. What is being heralded accurately as just an incredible success is Sawa. For those listening, what that is is a radio broadcast in the Middle East that hits Oman, Kuwait, the UAE, even into Iraq. I just want to review the bidding here.

We had a big fight with the last Board several years ago about an idea that one person gets credit for, Norm Pattiz. I went to Norm Pattiz and recommended him to the last President to put him on the Board because this is a guy who made a billion bucks getting people to figure out how to listen to radio. If we were going to decide how we are going to get into Arab horse racing, Ken, you would be the first guy I would go to. I am not being facetious.

And so what did we do? It was something totally unconventional. Pattiz is the guy, if you fly across the country and you put on that headset and you listen to rock music or any music where it is interspersed with interviews with the musician, it is interspersed with talk about how the song is written—it is that whole deal—who put that package together. I kid him. I say he is the only guy involved in public diplomacy, when he tries to get something done, he flies

his own G-5 to the area. Well, he did that learning how to get people to listen to the radio.

You may remember the big argument was that what is our target audience. Let me remind everybody here. And I will not go through it all, but let us just take Turkey, 19 million people between the ages of 15 and 30. In Iran, 23 million people between the ages of 15 and 30. In India, 114 million people to target. In Indonesia, 58 million.

How do you get these people to listen? It sure is not by an all-news program. Does anybody in this country between the ages of 15 and 30 tune in in any numbers to public broadcasting? It is an incredibly important means of communication.

What do they do? They listen to rock stations. Do you know the single best-known people are in Egypt? The same people who are the single best-known people here. A lot of people know our chairman, but they know Britney Spears a hell of a lot better.

And if you are going to communicate to this age category, it is one thing to have former Chairman Joe Biden on a broadcast into Oman talking about U.S. policy. It is another thing to have the rock star, and the best-known people in Jordan are rock stars. The best-known people in Egypt are rock stars. I do not think we know that. We know so little about the Muslim world, we assume that it must be clerics, that their version of Jerry Falwell or Pat Robertson is what is best known. Fine men. I do not mean that as a knock.


And conservative journalists and a lot of other people say this is no way to communicate an idea and a notion. And Pattiz's idea, embraced by you, Mr. Chairman, and others on the Board, starting by the way in early 2001 this was put together before this administration really got organized—and thank God they embraced it and it is a great success. What do you have now?

If you take a look at the listening, 51 percent of those young adults listened within the past 7 days to Sawa in Oman, 25 percent in Kuwait, 30 percent in the UAE. Listening to radio station, all adults, 36 percent compared to all other radio stations—all other radio stations. I would ask this be included in the record.


The CHAIRMAN. It will be included.

[The charts referred to follow:]


Radio Sawa and VOA in Amman: Spring vs. Fall 2002



Listening to Radio Sawa: Core Target Audience




Listening to Radio Sawa: Young Adults




Listening to Radio Sawa: All Adults


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
Radio Sawa and the Local Media Scene in Amman: Core Target Audience



Radio Sawa and the Local Media Scene in Amman: Young Adults




Does Sawa Draw Audience from Other Stations?




Base: All adults ages 15-29. April n=600; October n=659.


The Radio Sawa Audience: Age




The Radio Sawa Audience: Gender



Trust in Radio Sawa



Radio Sawa and Attitudes to the U.S.



Senator BIDEN. Radio Sawa and local media seen in Oman, core target audience. Radio Sawa 92 percent; MBC, Middle East Broadcasting, 79; Radio Jordan, 78; Radio Jordan AM, 25; BBC, 18; Voice of Palestine, 6 percent. That did not exist at all before. This is a big deal.

And the reason why I have been pushing so hard—and I know you have been incredibly supportive, Mr. Chairman—for the television version of this, as you said in your statement, just ride through the Middle East. Everything from a tent, figuratively speaking, to the most modest accommodation has a satellite dish, one of those little RCA deals or whatever make they are. So there is an opportunity here that is immense.

But my question is this. Based on the analysis that was done, we projected that you need for all the Muslim world, not just the Middle East, about \$250 million of infrastructure, including personnel, to be able to replicate the kind of saturation—not the same programming—you have accomplished with Sawa. Why has that request not been made for that infrastructure, including hardware, satellites and the like? And how many of the 1,000 personnel that it was estimated by a fairly thorough study here would be needed to get up and running and a Muslim-wide public diplomacy, not just in the Arab States? How many personnel do you have that exist in the United States and in-country, as well as how much hardware requirements do you have? My term, hardware. That is not the term you guys use.

Mr. TOMLINSON. I was just getting ready to submit for the record some of the same statistics that you had on the success of Sawa. It is absolutely amazing.

We think we can get on the air with Arabic television with \$62 million. We hope to have that money soon. There is no question I am going to take every word you said this morning, Senator Biden, back to my colleagues.

Senator BIDEN. But there is only \$30 million allocated, is there not?

Mr. TOMLINSON. Yes; \$30 million in 2004.

Senator BIDEN. In the request. There has only been requested \$30 million, but it is going to cost you \$30 million in startup costs, and it is going to cost you another \$30 million to broadcast for a year. Right?

Mr. TOMLINSON. Maybe a little more.

Senator BIDEN. My understanding is at least \$61 million.

Mr. TOMLINSON. At least.

Senator BIDEN. And right now the only request that is coming before us, if we pass the President's request, will be \$31 million, which means you will not be up and on the air—I am overstating it—with the television version of Sawa, for the lack of a better way of saying it in the interest of time.

Mr. TOMLINSON. And with proper pressure with people of vision like you on this committee, maybe we can do something to change that in the coming weeks.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I know my time is up, Mr. Chairman. I just want to remind all the committee members what they know, and I know they know it well, but anyone listening. Al-Jazeera has had a catalytic impact on attitudes about us, and let us assume that

it was not even intended. Let us give the benefit of the doubt, which I do not, but let us give the benefit of the doubt. There is no counterpart for that.

And one thing I would argue is there is not a discrimination imposed by citizens under the age of 30 living in all these countries. They will not boycott this. The old thing, you got to put programming on they want to see, just like you have got to have material on they want to hear. If you build a better mousetrap, you attract those audiences, they will listen.

I sincerely hope, Mr. Chairman, we are able, just on that one small piece, to give this operation enough of an opportunity so it is not stillborn to get it up and moving. But I think it is a very small piece, but it is a critical piece.

Mr. TOMLINSON. I will be very brief. I was for many years editor in chief of Readers Digest. The founder of Readers Digest, Dewitt Wallace, spent more time on those jokes and fillers in Readers Digest than he did on a lot of the geopolitical articles because he realized it was vitally important to get people to open that magazine and that is what we are talking about here.

Senator BIDEN. I would like to make one other point my staff raised to me. I know you know it and my colleagues know it, but I am not sure everybody else does. Sawa broadcasts uncensored news. The key to this is that there is total journalistic integrity here, and I think that is an important piece for all of us to keep in mind, not to suggest that our other broadcast capabilities are not useful. They are.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

I recognize now another entrepreneur in both public and private life, Senator Hagel.

Senator BIDEN. When you say another, I clearly do not fit that description. Mr. Pattiz does.

Senator HAGEL. Joe, you can fit any description you like.

Mr. Chairman, thank you. I welcome our witnesses as well. Secretary Beers, thank you. Chairman Tomlinson, thank you for your leadership, what you are doing at a very critical time not just in our history but I believe the history of the world. We are framing the future of mankind in many ways, and what is in your portfolio is much about that, not propaganda, not what Joe just talked about, but the development of trust is what the coin of the realm is in all businesses and in all of life. And we appreciate that.

Before I ask a question, I want to go back to the recognition, Mr. Chairman, you gave of Charles Wick who is sitting out in the audience. I had the good fortune a number of years of working with Mr. Wick on a number of projects. I would say that I do not know of anyone who was more innovative, more creative, who understood long, long ago what you all are doing now better than Charles Wick. He understood it 25 years ago what we were not doing and what we should have been doing. And he did amazing things over at USIA and it was much because of his foresight and tenacity, leadership, perseverance. Occasionally he had to get a little tough I recall, but he left things a lot better than he found them. And it is upon that rock we build much of what you were doing, and I appreciated your recognition of Charles Wick, Mr. Tomlinson. Thank you.

Secretary Beers, in your testimony I believe you accurately point out the primary task of public diplomacy and public affairs is to inform, you go on to say, every day to present, explain, advocate policies in many languages. Part of that is education, and I think part of that as well is to always reverse the optics here, understand what the other people of the world are thinking about us and why, not just overload the circuits with flushing about Americana, but what is on their minds. Why is it that they have these misrepresentations, misunderstandings of this country? So that effort in my opinion is very important that it be seen both ways.

The objective here, as you all know, is the future. We have short-term obligations, responsibilities, threats, and we are dealing with those, but we are really playing for the long-term. We are playing for the next generation of Muslims and Arabs and friends. We want those young people that Joe Biden talked about to be our friends not because we are buying them or we are giving them credits or F-16s or forgiving debt or giving them grants, but we want them to understand us and like us and trust us and be part of who we are.

You have an amazing opportunity, which you are taking not only responsibility for but I think taking full benefit of that opportunity. As I was going through some of the information that you have presented in, again, another part of your testimony, Secretary Beers, referencing on page 6, the 13 women teachers from Afghanistan and what that project was about. I want to make a point on that not just because it was the University of Nebraska at Omaha who helped organize that and put that together. And they are very proud of that, by the way.

But the University of Nebraska at Omaha put together a compilation of newspaper articles, which I am sure you have seen. It is an October 27 through December 2002 compilation of stories run in the Omaha World Herald, stories all over the Midwest, about the personalization of what you did with this project. It is really amazing because it gives the people of the Midwest a whole new appreciation for what is going on and why. Obviously, at the other end of that, the Afghani teachers were I think enhanced as well.

My point is—and then I will get to a question—we do not want to lose sight of those personal programs either. The broadcast piece is critically important, and there is no question. But we can use all these programs together, and I know you do integrate those programs to enhance our overall strategy, objective, and using them as part of that effort.

Now, with that said, Joe Biden said something earlier in his opening comments about world opinion regarding America immediately post September 11, 2001 and where we are today, which we will hear more about in the Pew poll. And we are all familiar with those general numbers.

The first question that could be asked, should be asked. What happened? Joe used the term “squandering.” I do not know what happened either. We all know there were a number of developments and factors that played into that. But what happened to all that good will for America? How did it happen? Why did it happen? I know you are all dealing with that, but as you develop your programs as you have laid out here and the budgets and what you

have got ahead, the integration of those programs, you obviously have to have some measure of segmented marketing, targeted marketing, but overall marketing.

So here is a question. How do you differentiate, or do you, in the programming to Islamic societies, for example, in the Middle East versus Southeast Asia versus Africa? Are they the same? Do you take it into account the differences? How do you come at that as you define that down? Secretary Beers, thank you.

Ms. BEERS. I think that is a really good question. You said a great phrase, "reverse the optics." In our place we talk about "it is not what you say, it is what they hear." Obviously, we have to be in a dialog that is a great deal more than informing people of our policy, and even when Ken gets them listening avidly to American music, we still have to get these people to learn English and to open the opportunities in their lives to science and technology. In spite of how many closed doors we have in the Muslim Arab world, they will allow and encourage English teaching, and I just think we need to jump on that now and get that done in a degree and depth we have never done before. Can you think of anything that would yield more immediate results? I really cannot.

So when you think about those countries, I am looking at the countries that do not have as much literacy, that in fact do not have television channels outside of their cities, that do not have any access to the Internet, and I am prepared to work in teaching English on television and in one-on-one channels and through "Sesame Street" and any other machine we can.

There are other things that are sort of the life cycle of countries that influence us on how we work with them. For instance, in Indonesia we have a little bit of a more favorable environment. We can start a little further along. We can assume mutual interests. We bring their clerics here. They are encouraged to be more moderate, and we activate them when they go back and see if we can help support their causes.

In other countries, to speak out like that would be automatically unpopular, and we have to just start on a simple program like let me tell you what it is like for your fellow Muslims in this country, and so that is what we do.

In Egypt, where we could not, for instance, get any dialog going in putting something on television, we have asked the local television channels in Egypt to help us co-produce stories of USAID projects in that country. They are completely unaware of the money we have all spent in that country. And now we have running on the air of the channel the water project, the rebuilding of the mosque, and there is a minor recognition that the United States took part in that.

So in some countries we are crawling like that one. In others, we are actually bold enough and life cycle enough afar to be able to talk about moderate Muslims taking up their own voices.

We have been very successful in reaching for women and helping the country see that the empowerment of women is a very potent force. It is very inspiring to see a small group of women who come to the United States, as you have just articulated, go home and become emissaries. Now, our job is not to lose track of them. Our job is to fund their efforts to buy teaching tools to train other teachers

and to multiply. Today we do not necessarily have the means to do that, but I think that is a segmentation of the first order.

Senator HAGEL. Madam Secretary, thank you.

Mr. TOMLINSON. Mr. Chairman, could I just have 30 seconds? Senator Hagel, I want to pay tribute to you because you are one member who is willing to take time out of your schedule to appear on Voice of America. You were on the "Focus" program just 3 weeks ago. We thank you.

In the spirit of, Mr. Chairman, what you and Senator Biden had to say about the situation with broadcasting to the Baltics and the Balkans, let me make a plea that we also remember the importance of preserving and enhancing broadcasting to mature audiences. I am talking about the traditional McNeil-Lehrer, BBC-type broadcasting that is so important in this world. Lord knows, I embraced the work of Norm Pattiz and Sawa early on. I took a pounding for it in fact. I am proud of the support I have given these broadcasts. I also want to make sure that we preserve our traditional programming for the world because that is important too. That is where we get into these budgetary pulls and crunches, and that is why I so welcome what you all said today.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.

Radio Free Europe is a mature audience-type thing.

Ms. BEERS. You mean like us.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right for most of us.

I want to introduce now for his questioning another exchange program beneficiary, Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you for holding this hearing. This is a time in our history when a lot of Americans want to be assured that we are asking the right questions post 9/11, that we are looking at the right issues, and I do not think they always feel assured. The fact that you are willing to devote such attention to this issue I think is a very positive sign to all Americans that we are starting to really get at the real questions that face us in the future.

In that regard, Ms. Beers, I want to ask you a bit about the considerable press attention to some of the administration's post-9/11 public diplomacy activities like the videos created to inform people abroad about Muslim communities in America. Do any of our public diplomacy materials actually address the policy issues that seem, at least according to the research I have seen, to be at the heart of some of this resentment toward America? And do they seek to explain the U.S. policy choices? If you could talk a little bit about that.

Ms. BEERS. I am so relieved to have the question on the table. I was giving a speech and a gentleman at the back of the room said, "what about the gray elephant sitting on the table, your disastrous foreign policy discussion?" So let me answer that now. I have had a chance to think about it a long time. It needs a very specific answer.

As I said in my opening remarks, 60 to 70 percent of every single thing we do is about getting the policy out, articulating it, and putting it in context, and we have explored this year many other ways to do it, including third parties and all these many materials that

go out, including the reconstruction of Afghanistan, what we hope for for Iraq, stories that are very relevant and timely today.

We also work very hard in rapid response with the Office of Global Communications, and we are working on long-term strategic directions as well.

But let me explain to you why I think it is so important to do both. We have an interesting chart validated by thousands of people in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. What is most important to you in your life? And number 9—1, 2, 3, 4, 9—is foreign affairs because what they care most about—no surprise here—would be what you would answer, maybe if you were not in the office. My family, my children's right to thrive, the opportunity to practice my faith. I am absolutely convince that when you ask us to develop communication about mutual understanding, you have in mind the great understanding, that is, the things that unite us, that also have to be brought up to bear.

So admittedly, we have limited funds, and I have said to you today that most of our funds, resources, and energy go to the No. 1 job, which is the articulation and successful discussion of foreign affairs. Even when we find dissatisfaction with those, we pursue that area. That is what our embassies do. They do it every day and they do it amazingly well.

But we have this other aspect which I think is neglected, underfunded, and vital, which I would summarize as engagement.

Senator FEINGOLD. Do I understand you to say that you do not go directly then at the policy issues in these materials? Is that what you were suggesting?

Ms. BEERS. Well, for instance, within the bounds of the 2-minute documentaries on "Muslim Life in America," what we are really talking about—we have proved that we have communicated this—is that they take away that the United States stands for religious tolerance. In my way of thinking, religious tolerance is the value that underpins and informs all of our policies. So if you will accept that definition, I think it is right on policy.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, it is an interesting question. I was sort of getting at some of the larger foreign policy issues that I think are causing us to be criticized, but I will take that answer for what it is and ask a different type of question.

What mechanisms in our public diplomacy arsenal actually allow for us to listen to other viewpoints rather than trying to sell our own? Is listening not a fundamental show of respect for others in and of itself?

Ms. BEERS. Well, anybody who has tried to sell products around the world and taken brands around borders, as the United States has done more successfully than most people in the world, would say, if you do not start with listening, you are nowhere. So we are training all of our people in a really different way I think these days to talk about not what you want to see, but to study people and understand them so well you know where they are coming from. How can you do that without listening?

So we have incorporated into all of our research plans for the year the kind of research that talks to listening not just what they said in polling, but how do they feel and what do they think. Out of those diagnostics will come a better understanding of how we

should speak with one another. While some of those like the town hall between the Americans and the Indonesians—there is no substitute for those moments of discovery. We need very good data and listening forces. Then we need the rather informal ways of doing digital video conferences [DVCs] where you are just listening. You are not necessarily coming up with a solution.

But we have learned that one on one and person to person, especially in the Arab world, has an enormous weight. That is why every one of our officials and I think so many in the government have been willing to do DVCs because you are there, you are repeating what the President has said. You are really there to listen and make an impact.

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me reinforce that. Since 9/11 both here and in a number of African countries with significant Islamic populations, I have had a chance to meet with government leaders, with Islamic leaders, and yes, whatever I say, hopefully, has some merit, but what really counts is that there is an American elected official sitting there listening to them. And that needs to happen not just on a micro scale, but it has to be visible to individuals around the world on a macro basis as well.

Let me followup with something else you mentioned. You talked about rapid response. Just 2 weekends ago, the world witnessed massive demonstrations protesting the war in Iraq and in many cases expressing anger at the United States. I realized, as I was traveling to Africa, that might have been the most anti-American weekend in my lifetime, which is really quite incredible.

How has our public diplomacy machinery responded to these messages? You talked about rapid response. Is it nimble enough to respond to events like these demonstrations? Are we somehow making it clear that even though we do not agree with the protesters, that we are listening? I am concerned that if we look like we do not react at all, that that just reinforces the worst, most unfair images of America and Americans.

Ms. BEERS. I am with you on this one. I think it is very dangerous to have silence as a response. And throughout the world, we have seen things worsen if we do not have a machinery for answering back.

I think in a situation like this, part of what we do are the materials that are in front of you that help to put in context why we are where we are with Iraq, what that regime is about, what our dreams and hopes are for that people.

But the most important vehicle we have for those kind of answers is the President's speech last night where he was able to talk about how important peace is, why we have come to this position, and why right has to be backed up by force. Now, that speech, because of the machinery we have in the world today, was put out on the air the same evening it went out in some 30 languages around the world through the system at State, and I am sure it went out in many other forms on Voice of America and so on. And that is carrying the main message on those sorts of things.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I appreciate that remark, but I would suggest at this time, given the feelings toward our foreign policy, that to rely mostly on the President speaking would be an insufficient strategy. We need a lot of American voices. Certainly his is

the preeminent. But at this point there are a number of people who do not want to listen to our President whom we still have to reach, and we need to have those ears open to other Americans who are pointing out our values, and even though we may have some disagreements about the specifics, we are united as Americans in trying to solve these problems. We need many voices, as you are obviously devoted to making happen. That is sort of what I came back with after a week in Africa hearing some of these concerns.

Ms. BEERS. One thing I like so much is that you went there and you were able to learn and you did some of the discussion and interviews. One of the things our embassies say to us is that when people like you come to the country, please be available for discussion, for interview, for listening because you have a way disproportionate influence. And we have been trying to make that point because it is a great help to us.

But one of the things we have been trying very hard to do is what we call third party, which means that we speak through many other voices. This is a really important characteristic. When I mentioned Ken Pollack, I do not know if you have ever heard this gentleman talk on television, but we now have him in many places in the world. His very reasoned approach on the pros and cons of Iraq—his book is called “The Threatening Storm”—has completely opened the minds of our audiences, and frankly it would be in a way that even Secretary Powell could not. So you have made the point, that it is necessary to do both.

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank you.

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

I want to thank the chairman and ranking member for holding this important hearing, and to thank all of the witnesses for being here today.

I believe that the issue we are discussing is among the most important to be taken up by this committee. The reason is simple. America's first priority today is the fight against global terrorism. We cannot hope to win that fight without the commitment of others working in a broad coalition to deny terrorists safe havens and access to financing. The fact is that today, even as American military and economic might stand unchallenged around the globe, we need the rest of the world more than ever before. We need real partners, not reluctant client states, to join with us—not only to defeat terrorists, the forces of destruction, but also to join together to construct a better future, a more just and prosperous and peaceful world.

But I fear that despite the importance of cultivating partners, some of our rhetoric and some of our policy is doing just the opposite, and we are alienating people around the world. Just two weekends ago the world witnessed massive demonstrations protesting a war in Iraq, and those demonstrations often quickly became vehement manifestations of anti-Americanism. I recently spoke with the Foreign Minister of a country that has been directly affected by terrorism, and the Minister confided that it will be difficult to be so forthcoming in support for U.S. and support for the fight against terrorism, because public opinion in his country is turning against America, and is equating cooperation with us with endorsement of a host of problematic ideas, including disdain for international institutions, a policy of unilateral, preemptive military action. I heard the same kinds of sentiments expressed at recently when I met with extremely accomplished Muslim leaders in South Africa.

Sometimes these comments are painful to hear. Certainly I find it painful to listen to the widely-held and often unfair perceptions of U.S. policy in the Middle East. But listening and engaging and reaching out is exactly what we have to do.

In the last Congress, in the wake of September 11th, I started convening a series of off-the-record roundtable discussions with members of the African diplomatic corps here in Washington, and Senator Frist, who was then the ranking member, and I took care to ensure that representatives of countries with significant Muslim

populations were at the top of the invitation list. I did this because I was concerned about perceptions abroad that the U.S. is hostile to Islam, and I did this because many of our African partners were concerned that they were being treated more like foot soldiers. The roundtables proved a very useful forum for an exchange of views, and I hope that they can continue in this Congress. But rather than giving me a sense of having finished the job, they have only convinced me of how much more needs to be done to meaningfully engage with the rest of the world.

Perhaps the most important form of American power projected over the last century has been the power of our ideas and values. If we lose our capacity to lead in that sense, then all of us sitting here, all of us in government, will have presided over the greatest loss of power in American history, regardless of how much we spend on our mighty and admirable military forces. And we will have put ourselves at a great disadvantage—likely a decisive and crippling disadvantage—in the fight against terrorism.

We all have a role to play taking up this challenge. Because of all the challenges and limitations inherent in the official foreign policy of a democracy, engagement beyond governmental policies and programs is especially important. And this means the American people—American businesses, Peace Corps volunteers, students studying abroad, professionals pooling technical expertise with colleagues around the globe—all these nonpoliticized forms of engagement remain stable throughout election cycles, and provide a backbone of common sense and basic understanding on which governments from any party can build when developing foreign policy. When Americans make connections across borders, they build links that are a steadying influence abroad and at home. They gain knowledge that they can use to guide their government. They present to the world a vision of America that is not about empire or arrogance. They suggest to others that we need not chose between the global status quo and a future of destruction and violence—America is interested in a third choice, an alternative in which we join together to build a better future.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
Senator Brownback.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much and thanks for holding the hearing. I think it is an important one and an important topic. Thank you both for being here to brief us and to testify and answer questions.

I would like to direct your focus right now onto Iran. I have had some discussions on that. And pardon me for not being able to be here for all the questioning thus far, but I really want to ask you a little bit about Iran and the public diplomacy efforts in Iran. I think they are critical, crucial for what is taking place. As I look and observe and have held a number of hearings in the subcommittee in previous Congresses on Iran, you have got a real foreshadowing that is taking place there as one of the countries of the “axis of evil.”

The United States is certainly not going to invade or use a military option, but it seems like the most positive, the best option in dealing with Iran is the public diplomacy option where you have a very ready population there that wants to hear what is taking place. You have an enormous diaspora in the United States that has lots of personal contacts back and forth with Iran because there is a communication that can take place back and forth. The mixture is there for public diplomacy to be an enormous tool to really change a society that needs changing and a government that needs changing.

I am sorry I do not have this blown up, but it is a map of funding of terrorism and spread of fundamentalism by the Iranian Government around the world, a lot of it in Central Asia that is taking place and a number of other different places. But this is the Government in Iran that is really attempting to spread a message and a difficulty for us in a lot of places.

The public diplomacy efforts in Iran some have been critical of as not being robust enough, not being targeted and supportive of the student protest movements that are taking place there, of the overall protest movements.

I want to applaud some of your efforts. I want to ask you, do you think you are hitting the target for the need? You are clearly the very point in dealing with Iran and the change of that society that we most need to exercise in a robust, wise, targeted fashion. What is your estimate of your actions in Iran?

Ms. BEERS. Well, we are doing careful and I would say modest efforts. Part of that is because of the implication that we do not want to go in as the U.S. Government being pro a group of people who are trying to work out their own history. So I would say that we need to be subtle about our support and try to make available the pieces of information and the processes that they need to learn from. We do now have just coming up a Persian Web site. We also know that there are a number of difficulties in getting into Iran with the Internet and so on.

When we did this "Muslim Life in America" story, we tracked the fact that some of the pan-Arab television and some of the others had overlap into Iran, but we were not able to go in and research it or do any formal assessment of it.

Senator BROWNBAC. Ms. Beers, could I ask you, because my time is going to be very limited here, how well are you networked into the Iranian-American community here and communications into Iran on public diplomacy?

Ms. BEERS. Well, I would say at least those of us here in public diplomacy have occasional meetings with them. Throughout the government, I think they have quite a ready dialog going.

But it brings the suggestion up that maybe we need to activate them in the same way that we did the Muslim American group that helped us do "Muslim Life in America" where we pulled together a whole team and they took up the advocacy. Maybe that is a parallel.

Senator BROWNBAC. Well, and I think it is a good parallel, and you have got a ready population. They want to do this. They have, in some cases, owned television stations up and going or radio, and you can do Web-casting now as some opportunities or possibilities. They really want to work and work closely with us. You have got to pick, obviously, the right groups that would be credible and ones that would work well with you, but it may be the absolute best option because this is Iranians speaking to Iranians.

Ms. BEERS. The counsel we get is that these people who have good dialogs are the way to work at this point and pick the right ones, but thank you for that point because the Council on American Muslim Understanding has proven to be a very powerful relationship. I think we could see doing the same.

Senator BROWNBAC. They have got several radio stations in California that would be good possibilities of broadcasting, just taking programming even on into Iran.

Ms. BEERS. And what they will say to us is we do not need any U.S. Government rubber stamps, but we could use help and support and that is what we could offer.

Senator BROWNBAC. That is correct.

I have met with a number of the groups over time, and I have been impressed with their abilities, their desires, their passion in a country that is extremely important. And the way we will be dealing with Iran I think over the future is primarily through public diplomacy.

Ms. BEERS. And you have communication efforts.

Mr. TOMLINSON. I will give you for the record what we have done in this area, but I very much agree with your challenge that, within the bounds of journalistic integrity, we focus more on the Government of Iran and we focus more on the record of the clerics. And that is what we have been doing in recent weeks. We have had extensive contact, sometimes through Members of Congress, with leaders of the Persian community in the United States.

When we went 24/7 with Farda, we literally got tens of thousands of e-mails from Iran with people enthusiastically embracing what we were trying to do. We have been increasing the seriousness of our programming in Farda. This weekend we will have the first "Democracy and Human Rights Roundtable." We began last week the weekly "Iran This Week."

It is also important to recognize—and I will bring over to your office later today a copy of this New York Times piece on "U.S. Uses a Powerful Weapon in Iran: TV."¹ VOA television has been absolutely outstanding in Persian, the work they have done, and they can do more. They have two programs each week. We could do more.

Both VOA and Farda have active Web sites. You just would not believe—in fact, we will send you copies—the e-mails that come in from the young people of Iran urging us to continue what we are doing. I think you will be proud of that.

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, the people of Iran clearly want to come our way, and I think we really just need to provide information. I appreciate your great work.

One total side bar, but I just got back from there. I was there at the swearing in of the new President of South Korea and met with a number of North Korean dissidents or people that had left North Korea. That is going to be another challenge for you in public diplomacy that has some interesting opportunities now that we have not had I think for some period of time, and I would like to engage you on that. It is a total separate topic, but I would like to engage you on that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Brownback.

Senator Nelson would have been next up, but he had to leave to make a quorum in another committee. But he asked me to raise questions about Iran. So your intervention, Senator Brownback, was timely as you have a bipartisan focus and it was an important set of questions and answers.

Mr. TOMLINSON. I will send you all a copy of a paper on what we are doing.

[The paper Mr. Tomlinson referred to follows:]

¹The article is reproduced on page 16 of this hearing.

BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS—BROADCASTING TO IRAN

SUMMARY

While the nation and the world's attention are focused on Iraq, students and young people in neighboring Iran are growing restless under the clerics' despotic rule, and increasingly giving voice to their desire for liberty. America's international broadcasting is responding to this clear signal of positive change. With the reallocation of base resources and strategic use of supplemental funds, we are increasing radio, television, and Internet services to Iran. Immediately below is a brief summary of what we have done in recent months to strengthen, expand, and invigorate our broadcasting to Iran. A more detailed explanation of these actions begins on the third page.

BBG RADIO BROADCASTING

- *Radio Farda broadcasts 24 hours per day seven days a week:* Formatted to attract the 70 percent of Iranian population that is under the age of 30, Radio Farda broadcasts began in December, 2002. A reformatted service of RFE/RL with content provided by Voice of America, Farda is a unique Persian-language radio service that provides two newscasts every hour and two 30-minute newsmagazine shows daily. Since its debut, Radio Farda has quickly established itself as a major figure on the Iranian media scene. Three 30-minute weekly programs, specially geared to furthering U.S. policies and reporting on events in Iran, were added in February 2003.

- *VOA Persian broadcasts 4 hours a day seven days a week:* To maintain and build our traditional audiences, VOA's Persian service provides news, analysis of current events, interviews, and music. VOA continues to retain a significant audience in Iran.

BBG TELEVISION BROADCASTING

- *Roundtable With You (weekly 90 minutes program):* *Roundtable With You* is a news and information program broadcast weekly. A focus group of Iranians traveling abroad indicated that the Iranian audience regards VOA Persian's flagship television show *Roundtable With You* as the showpiece of VOA's Persian Service.

- *Next Chapter (weekly one hour program):* In September 2002, VOA's Persian Service launched this innovative weekly youth magazine show. The Service has received thousands of phone calls and e-mails since it went on the air.

BBG INTERNET SERVICES

- *Radio Farda's Internet site* provides live audio streams of its radio broadcasts around the clock. The site has prompted tens of thousands of e-mails on Farda Programming and has become the number one visited site of all BBG radio Internet sites. In February 2003, the Web site received 1,390,495 page views.

- *VOA's Persian Internet site* attracts 80,000 visitors per week and includes original features prepared for the target audience in Iran including top news photos of the week and features on life in America, human rights, and the plight of women in Iran. It is updated at least twice daily and provides a vehicle for feedback on TV and radio programming. This site ranks among the top three at VOA. More than any other VOA language group, Iranians have embraced the Internet as a vehicle for the delivery of sound and images.

BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS—BROADCASTING TO IRAN

Using radio, television, and the Internet, America's broadcasts to the Iranian people aim at young and mature audiences with a combination of news, analysis, ideas, music both popular and classical Iranian, and pictures of life in America. Our level of effort has increased, but audience response reminds us daily that the Iranian people still thirst for information about political liberty in the West, what a free Iran could look like, and how adaptable democracy is to differing circumstances. Below is a detailed list of U.S. international broadcasting's current effort in Iran.

RADIO FARDA

- December 2002 marked the launching of Radio Farda (*farda* is the Persian word for "tomorrow") a 24-hour Persian language station featuring programming by Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty based in Prague. Radio Farda is a unique, Persian-language radio service that uses a popular music format to reach the 70 percent of the Iranian population under the age of 30 with accurate

news and information. The new service is broadcast round-the-clock on AM, digital audio satellite, and 21 hours a day on shortwave. It is the first and only round-the-clock foreign broadcast to enjoy the advantage of beaming its signal into Iran on AM, a much more widely heard frequency than shortwave.

- Radio Farda's signal delivers a combination of popular Persian and Western music designed to appeal to a young audience. It also broadcasts over five hours of daily original news and substantive content. Radio Farda produces fresh news and information at least twice an hour, with longer news programming in the morning and the evening.

- Farda has quickly established itself as a major player on the Iranian media scene. Farda's newscasts focus on Iran-related news. They include interviews with Iranian dissidents and pro-democracy advocates. The fact that Iranian authorities—from the Supreme Leader Khamenei to lower ranking Iranian officials—have included Farda in their anti-American diatribes is positive testimony to the new U.S. broadcaster's effectiveness. To add to its programming mix, during the week of February 17, Farda launched three 30-minute public affairs shows that examine current affairs in Iran, youth, and culture, and human rights and democracy. Each show airs twice a week and also appears on the Farda Web site.

FARDA INTERNET

Radio Farda's Internet site (www.radiofarda.com) also has proven to be a major success in a very short time. Farda already has become the number one visited site of all of BBG's radio Internet sites. In February 2003, the site received 1,390,495 page views. In addition, Farda programming has prompted tens of thousands of e-mails. For non-Persian speakers, the Farda site offers an English summary of its news. Farda recently added Windows Media Player, which enables thousands of Iranian students whose university computers are not equipped with Real Audio Player to listen to live audio streams of Farda broadcasts.

VOA PERSIAN LANGUAGE SERVICES

VOA reaches Iran in three media: radio, television, and Internet. We are in the process of constructing a multimedia service that builds upon the strengths of each service and allows for greater efficiency.

VOA Persian Radio

- VOA's Persian Service radio is currently broadcast for four hours daily via shortwave, from 6:30-7:30 a.m. and from 8:30-11:30 p.m. Iran time, a significant increase from before September 11, 2001.

- Most of VOA's Persian Service radio broadcasts are devoted to news, analysis of current events, and interviews with U.S. policymakers and regional experts. Policy features that specifically address and articulate U.S. policy towards Iran are now being increased to five per week. Music, both Iranian and western, is also a regular part of the broadcast day.

- Other substantive broadcasting includes interactive exchanges (by phone and e-mail) with listeners in Iran, special programs that focus on women's rights, education, and how a vigorous civil society benefits the nations that encourage it.

- VOA Persian covered the student demonstrations in late 2002 against the Iranian regime and included interviews with students, other dissidents and Western analysts about the likely impact of the events. The Service received hundreds of e-mail messages, telephone calls, and faxes about the events. Many said they relied on VOA radio reports to keep them up-to-date on developments in their country.

VOA Persian Television

- VOA television is on the air with original shows for two-and-a-half hours per week. The popular *Roundtable With You* is a 90-minute weekly TV-radio simulcast call-in show aimed at opinion shapers and the educated public. To reach this critical group, which includes the growing number of Iranians who turn to television as their primary source of news, VOA expanded the show from 60-minutes to 90-minutes in March 2002. VOA's *Roundtable With You* airs every Friday at 9:30 p.m. local time, providing the latest news and current affairs information on subjects directly affecting the lives of Iranians.

- VOA's flagship *Roundtable With You* reaches the people with whom we need to communicate, and in very significant numbers. Research conducted by a professional pollster in Iran during the last 18 months showed that more than a third of respondents in the capital—Tehran—regularly watch the show. Iranian rulers know

this, and their public criticism is additional proof of the popularity of VOA television programming. A focus group of Iranians traveling abroad indicated that the Iranian audience regards *Roundtable With You* as the showpiece of VOA's Persian Service. Viewers keep VOA's six phone lines lit up with callers during the show. The show also receives e-mails during the broadcast from viewers who want to participate, and accommodates other callers who phone in when the show is not on the air.

- Further strengthening its impact in the region, VOA's Persian Service in September 2002 launched an innovative weekly magazine show, *Next Chapter*. The show is a fast-paced, one hour TV program aimed at Iranian youth. Television is the major source of news for Iran's youth, whose knowledge about the world beyond their repressive regime plays a major role in their increasing dissatisfaction with the mullahs' rule. *Next Chapter* airs on Tuesdays at 10:30 p.m. local time. It reaches its audience via satellite broadcast on Asiasat 2, Hotbird 3, and New Sky.

The response to this new youth-oriented *Next Chapter* show has been overwhelming. VOA has received thousands of phone calls and e-mails since it went on the air. The morning after the show's launch, tapes of the show were already appearing in Tehran's black market. (Attached to this document is The New York Times' article about the show from December 7, 2002.² The article called VOA's television programs to Iran a "powerful weapon" of the U.S.)

- VOA's successful current programming of two-and-one-half hours of weekly Persian TV broadcasts not only counters the influence of anti-American broadcasters such as Iran's state-owned TV. More important, it also gives Iranians greater appreciation for, and a deeper understanding of, the liberty and self-governance that they want for themselves.

VOA Persian Internet

- Measured by the number of visitors to its Web page—80,000 per week—VOA Persian Service's site (www.voanews.com/Persian) ranks among the top three at VOA. Iranians have eagerly embraced the Internet as a vehicle for the delivery of sound and images. One demonstration is Iranian responses to the broadcast of a recent VOA Persian Service *Next Chapter* episode via RealAudio and RealVideo. The episode looked at the lives of two Iranian American radio announcers in the U.S. Within 18 hours of the Internet broadcast, nearly 1,000 Iranians sent e-mails that contained highly favorable comments.

- VOA Persian's Web site news is updated at least twice a day. All VOA Persian radio and television programs are streamed live or on-demand, in both video and audio. In addition, the Persian Web site includes original features specially prepared for Iranian Internet users such as American movie reviews, top news photos of the week, life in America, human rights, and the plight of women in Iran.

FROM THE PAST TO THE FUTURE

The foundation of our broadcasts to Iran was laid during World War II. VOA's Persian Service operated from 1942-1945, and from 1949-1962. It was revived most recently as the Iranian revolution loomed in 1979. Unlike the hiatus between 1962 and 1979 when the U.S. suspended Broadcasts to Iran, the BBC's multi-media effort to reach out to Iran today is having a significant impact on Iranians both young and old, their attitudes about the United States, and their increasingly open rejection of clerical rule. Both logic and necessity point us to redouble our efforts to reach Iran's people. This is exactly what we are doing.

We are now in the process of upgrading reception of our Internet video streaming to Iran. By the end of April 2003, we will have at our disposal a high power AM antenna in the United Arab Emirates for use by Radio Farda to Iran. Our broadcast time and transmission capacity gives America's voice and image greater visibility and influence in a nation whose future is being decided before our eyes. We are fully engaged in this high-stakes drama. The United States' international broadcasting effort to Iran is an effective example of the power of combined radio, television, and Internet services working harmoniously to communicate directly with a critical foreign audience in a strategic part of the world. The news, information, and ideas it beams are now reaching an audience that is weary of tyranny and thirsty for liberty.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coleman.

²See page 16.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the challenges of being the last is that your question is often asked. In fact, I was going to raise the same question about Iran, kind of mirroring what my colleague from Kansas has said.

What you have got, one, you have the critical importance of Iran and the role that the present regime is playing in international terrorism that we understand. And two, the opportunities we have here, significant opportunities, there is a strong diasporan community that can—if you look at the challenges we have, that America has, as we deal with folks in another part of the world, it is making the connection with truth of what we have here and the quality of life here and the values we represent here.

I mean, one of my great frustrations in the short time that I have been here—the chairman put together a hearing on world hunger, and you hear about the leadership role that the United States plays in dealing with world hunger. Yet, around the world people do not understand that.

The discussion about what is going on in Iraq and the protests that my distinguished colleague from Wisconsin talked about with folks carrying signs, “No War for Oil,” and as the distinguished ranking member talked about, he was in France and he said, “yes, this war is about oil, but it is about French oil. It is not about American oil.” And the United States does not have a history or a policy of appropriating other people’s resources, and that is not our goal.

So I was going to also reflect upon the incredible challenge that you have. It is my background as a former mayor. You have got to look for successes, small victories, build on your assets. We have in this country a very strong Persian community. There are both the radio stations and I believe TV stations in the Los Angeles area, and we need to deal with the Iranian situation.

So I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that you would also drop by in my office those materials on what we are doing, and that we reflect on the great opportunity not to present this as an American governmental voice, but rather to use the connections with the Iranian community here, the Persian community here to reach out to their fellow countrymen who are hungry I believe. I believe that every sense I get from what I read is that the young people of Iran are ready for change. It can only come about through the public diplomacy that we are talking about here. So I second the perspective of the Senator from Kansas.

Let me ask you a question. We talked a little bit about getting a Middle East and Arabic satellite television station up and running. What is the timing on that? Where are we on that?

Mr. TOMLINSON. If we had money, I think we could be on the air with that television station in a matter of 6 months plus.

Senator COLEMAN. I am a little slow. How much money? What does it take to get the money, and how quickly can you get it?

Mr. TOMLINSON. The President has \$30 million in the 2004 budget. It is the first time Arabic television has been formally proposed by any administration. The appropriations committees added \$2 million to \$4 million in the 2003 budget, which gives us the latitude to actually begin planning television, which we are doing as we speak. We have Norm Pattiz on the case. We are hopeful that

in coming weeks there will be an infusion of funds to help us reach the \$62 million that we need to fully launch this television satellite network. There are many details to be worked out, but we got Sawa on the air in record time. We got Farda on the air in record time. I use the word "we." Other people did the work. I sat back.

Senator COLEMAN. Well, Chairman Tomlinson, I think it is a very important initiative, and we certainly should be moving with all deliberate speed to see if we cannot get this done.

Mr. TOMLINSON. If we have the money, we will get it on the air.

Senator COLEMAN. Can you talk just a little bit about new technologies? I am a baby boomer, but technology—I have just kind of passed it to my 16-year-old who is kind of enveloped in it. Use of the Internet, how extensive is that, how effective is it? What sort of resources are you putting into that?

Mr. TOMLINSON. Virtually every language service in all of our services has a very important Internet Web site where people can log on and find out what we are saying in all of these languages. We have a problem with Internet jamming in China, for example. We are working hard to overcome it. It is a very important future consideration. A number of Senators have played a real leadership role in focusing the world on the horrors of this Internet jamming. But the Internet has a very, very important role in what we do in every section of our Agency.

Senator COLEMAN. In my past life as a mayor, I took a lot of advantage of public-private partnerships. There were tremendous resources on the private side, the tech side. Are we doing the same thing? We have got a lot going on in Silicon Valley and just the vision there. Do we work hand in hand with folks on the private side to deal with these issues?

Ms. BEERS. We have several interesting, I would call them, prototypes with, say, Microsoft where they have set up a system of computers. My expectation is if we move and are able to get "Sesame Street for Teens" on the air, that it has to be backed up by computer facilities' adjacencies of some kind. And we are talking with private sector people about doing this because in a way nothing is more useful for them in their businesses in those countries than an educated public.

The Internet capacity is a very dynamic situation. In some cities you see a very sophisticated coverage. In others, you still have everybody clustered around a cafe.

One of the mixed bags about Internet is that anything that comes on the Internet is construed to be the truth. So our enemies use it more effectively than we do, and we are trying to really move that into a communication model in all of our embassies.

But as far as the Internet goes, the whole motor of the State Department's ability to communicate with its 16,000 employees around the world is the Web. Without it, I tremble to think what we would do.

What the difference is now is we really have so much more language coverage, and we have a very interactive situation. For instance, in this "Shared Values," there was a page in the book and a Web site. The Web site was not run by us. It was run by the Council on American Muslims. That is why I liked the provocative questions on Iran because we are meeting with Iranians from Cali-

ifornia and Ohio and Michigan, and we just want to. It has not really occurred to me, but I think maybe we need to see if they want to build a sum larger than the parts and begin to support them in that way.

And the Internet is going to be an important part of all of these communities, but first we have to teach these children English. Then we have to teach them how to use the computer to study science and technology.

Without the private sector, we do not have the money and the means. That is why I am so frustrated and plead with you to help get us a system where the private sector's relationship with us is faster, easier, and more productive. If you are handed a card by a CEO whom you might know and he said, "I would love to help you," you have still got to go another 6 months to organize that, to put a team on it, and to put it in proper perspective. And you know how that works.

Mr. TOMLINSON. Senator Coleman, one of the first things Seth Cropsey did after he was confirmed as head of the International Broadcasting Bureau was to put together a team on future technologies. Seth and I started out in this business 20-some years ago where everything was short wave. There has been an amazing revolution, and we have to make sure that we are in touch. Like the direct-to-home broadcast satellite situation is something that cries out for television today. Today. But we also have to anticipate what the technology is going to be tomorrow so that we do not have to wait until we are too late.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Coleman.

We have three additional distinguished witnesses, but I do want to recognize Senator Feingold who has an additional question for this panel.

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Chairman, thank you for letting me do another round. It is partly your own fault. You are holding so many good hearings, that you are stimulating me to want to do second rounds. But I again thank you for this important topic.

Ms. Beers, do you see it as part of your role as Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy to encourage and facilitate the engagement of ordinary Americans in international issues? For example, can you give the committee some examples of opportunities available to Americans who want to reach out beyond our borders? What more can be done in this regard?

Ms. BEERS. Well, I think there is an example that is actually not very well known in this country that simply astounded me when I got my first briefings from the educational and cultural exchanges. While we do 35,000 of these a year and you fund them with a certain amount of money every year, without the 90,000 volunteers in the United States who house these people, who liaison, who make agendas, who put their programs together, who travel them around, we would never be able to literally afford even that much. So I think that is one overt way. And I have wanted very much to mount a campaign that says thank you because I wonder sometimes if we just do not presume that good will.

What I think we need to do is we are constantly visited and we see people who have an interest in doing many other things in the

world, and we try to organize in such a way that our embassies and posts can add to that. For instance, Assistant Secretary Pat Harrison is working on something now called Cultural Connect, and when this is developed fully, I think it will be a fascinating model because we have met with writers, musicians, and artists, and they will be going with our support to countries to not just give a performance, but to stay there as a mentor. It is a beautiful idea. They initiated to some extent with us. Now, the machinery of doing that is very complex. You have to make sure everybody is in place. You have to be able to fund that on a larger basis. But this pilot program is very encouraging I think. And Yo-Yo Ma is one of the first contenders. He is such a gifted teacher, but he is one of many.

Senator FEINGOLD. I am excited to hear about that. I would like to followup with you.

I just want to ask about one other thing. I agree, Secretary, with your goal of promoting a positive image of America to the Islamic world, but frankly I fear that some developments here at home may be undermining your work abroad. On the one hand, President Bush says that the fight against terrorism is not a fight against Islam, and he is right to emphasize that.

But at the same time, the administration has taken steps that I believe in some cases unfairly target Muslims for harsher treatment by law enforcement officials than other Americans or immigrants. It began with the Justice Department's roundup of hundreds of Arab and Muslim individuals after September 11.

Next came the Justice Department's interview program targeting 8,000 male visitors from Arab or Muslim nations for questioning.

Then late last year, the Justice Department initiated a special call-in registration program that selectively targets male students, businessmen, and tourists from two dozen Muslim or Arab nations plus North Korea.

More recently we read news reports that the FBI Director has asked field offices to count the number of Muslims in mosques in their respective regions for purposes of formulating performance goals and, among other areas, wire taps and surveillance.

So, when you hear that list, it seems to me that selective law enforcement activities carried out by the Federal Government could serve to fan the flames of anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world and undermine what you are trying to do.

Have our posts been hearing about these issues and what are we doing to respond to these concerns on the public diplomacy front? And is there any mechanism whereby the impact of these policies on our public diplomacy efforts is shared with the parts of the administration that actually pursue these policies, such as the Justice Department?

Ms. BEERS. Well, in front of you is an interesting answer to that question, I think. It is the VISA program, and we put it together for several reasons. Is to harness our own resources so that we speak with one voice. And as Justice turns INS into the Homeland Security representation, in our Policy Coordinating Committee, which I run with the NSC, Homeland Security is part of that meeting that discusses all these issues. So, first of all, we are all around the table.

Second, the language that we have used in the VISA plan I think is a symbol of the tension that we will have to live with, and the line happens to say "Secure Borders-Open Doors," and that is the problem that we are going to live with for a long time. We have to put security first. We can make no apologies for it. We have got to improve the way we do it, but we have also got to have open doors in the way that that United States invites people to this country. Not only is it true to our character, it is vital to business, administration, academic, trade. I mean, we are cutting off too much here if we do not have open doors.

I will give you an example of how it is working now, and these are not perfect stories. In Malaysia, I just met with the Ambassador, and she had such a huge backlog that it was a controversy in her country. They worked around the clock to clean up those backlogs. They have now this new way of communicating what it will be like when you come to the United States. Because people are staying away for fear of it and they might read a story like you just named. We tell them here is what you have got to go through. Here is what it is like to be fingerprinted. Here are the special groups. At least being informed about the process is part of the way of dealing with it.

And then we also tell stories locally, when the embassies take them up, of someone who just went through the process so that you are able to identify that it is possible. So, for instance, one of our stories is a young student. He said, "the first time I went to the United States, it took me 3 weeks. This time I had to take 5 months, but it was worth it." So we hope that we are able to open those doors.

Now, listen to this what the Ambassador just mentioned in passing, and this is what gives me hope. She said, "that in fact we approve 92 percent of our applications." So against all of these stories, we need to get that word out, that we are open and we make no apologies for being secure in making that effort. That is a way of handling it.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I appreciate that answer. It just goes to the obvious point that it is not just our foreign policy but our domestic policy in response to terrorism that will have a great deal to do with how effective we are in achieving the worthy goals that you are pursuing. And I thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the additional round.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Feingold.

We thank both of you very much for your enthusiasm and your leadership, and we look forward to working with you to make sure that all of our efforts are successful. Thank you for coming.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent that I be able to submit several questions in writing to each of the panelists.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will occur.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you both.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The Chair would like now to call upon Andrew Kohut, director of the Pew Research Center For The People & The Press in Washington, DC; the Honorable Kenton Keith, senior vice president, Meridian International Center, Washington, DC; and Dr. R.S.

Zaharna, School of Communication, American University, Washington, DC.

It is a privilege to have each of you before the Foreign Relations Committee this morning. I will ask you to testify in the order that you were introduced, Mr. Kohut, Mr. Keith, and Dr. Zaharna. All of your statements will be made a part of the record in full, and we will ask that you summarize or make comments about those statements as you choose. First of all, Mr. Kohut.

STATEMENT OF ANDREW KOHUT, DIRECTOR, THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. KOHUT. Well, I am happy to be here to help the committee achieve a better understanding of the U.S. image in the Islamic world. I am not here to make recommendations. I am here to try to give you as much as I can about the nature of the problem.

I am going to draw upon the results of our "Pew Global Attitudes" survey in 44 countries around the world in which we interviewed 38,000 people, obviously not only Muslim countries, but we did interview in 6 Muslim countries in the region of conflict, that is, in the Middle East and Central Asia. In the total of the 44 countries, 11 countries had predominantly Muslim populations or large Muslim populations.

Now, the big headline to come out of this survey was America's slipping image, which I am sure you have all heard a lot about because it was not only in Muslim countries, it was among NATO nations. It was in the developing world, and it was in Eastern Europe, but certainly also in the Muslim nations. We found in 27 countries where we had a benchmark, the American image was lower in 19 of those countries.

But we also found a reserve of good will for the United States and for American citizens. Majorities of people in 35 of the 42 countries in which we asked the question said they still had a good opinion of the United States, they still had a good opinion of the American people. And I suspect that even with all of the contention out there about our Iraq policies, that there is still a lot of good will that exists toward the United States and the American people in most countries.

But I think our problem of the real dislike of America continues to be concentrated in the Muslim nations of the Mideast and conflict area. Unfavorable ratings in those six countries were at the 60 and 70 percent level for five of the countries and, Senator Lugar, as you pointed out, only in Uzbekistan did most people say that they liked America and they liked the American people.

The most disturbing decline in my view was the way in which the publics of our NATO ally Turkey had changed. Our unfavorable rating rose from 20-something in the year 2000, obviously before the attacks, to 55 percent in the late summer of 2002 when we did this survey. And not only was the absolute number of people who had unfavorable opinions of us great, the Turks held strongly unfavorable opinions. Forty-two percent said they had a very unfavorable opinion of America. And in Pakistan, our new ally in the war on terrorism, only 10 percent of Pakistanis said they had a good opinion of the United States.

And I think dislike of the United States is principally driven by our Mideast policies. That is what opinion leaders told us, the Pew survey of opinion leaders that we did at the end of 2001 with the International Herald Tribune. They said it is the No. 1 reason why America is disliked.

But there is also clearly backlash in the Muslim world against the war on terrorism. Our 44 nation survey found broad support all around the world but not in the Muslim nations. In 10 of the 11 predominantly Muslim countries, the Muslim publics said they do not like this war on terrorism. We do not favor it. This was even the case in Muslim countries where the United States still has a good image on balance, for example, in Indonesia, in Senegal, and Mali. They like us but they do not like our war on terrorism.

I think the Muslim publics in the survey also clearly agreed with the rest of the world in its general criticisms of us. They say the United States ignores their own countries when we decide our international policies. We are unilateralists. That was the view of 74 percent of the Turks, 77 percent of the Lebanese.

The number 2 global criticism is that our policies contribute to the rich-poor gap, and that was overwhelmingly the view in the Muslim world.

And third, the United States does not do enough to deal with global problems. Also an unquestioned perception in the region of conflict.

The Gallup Poll, which conducted nationwide surveys in 9 Muslim nations at the beginning of 2002, summed it up this way, and I am going to read a quote from their report. They said that “the perception that Western nations are not fair in their stances toward Palestine fits in with a more generalized view that the West is unfair to Arab and Islamic worlds. It is one of the several examples of Western bias in the minds of these people.” That might extend to Afghanistan, to Iraq oil, and now, of course, to Iraq and other situations.

But I have to say that it is not all bad news. Opinions about the United States are complicated and often contradictory even in the Muslim world. Large majorities all around the world admire the United States for its technological achievement. That continues to be the case in Jordan, for example. Where only 25 percent have a favorable view of us, 59 percent admire our technological achievements. Even in Pakistan where 11 percent have a good opinion of the United States, 42 percent admire what we have done technologically.

And opinions of the United States’ popular cultural exports—our movies, our television, our songs—are a lot better in the Muslim world than you might expect. Sixty-five percent of the Lebanese say they like these things. In Muslim countries of Africa such as Senegal and Nigeria, cultural exports are still well received.

Now, in the region of conflict, the Muslim publics mostly shun our pop culture. I think Senator Biden was right when he said that young people in Jordan and places like that look to rock stars, but not to our rock stars. They look to their own because our cultural exports in much of the region of conflict are shunned, this is certainly the case in Pakistan.

But even when America's products are well received, there is a view in the Muslim world and there is a view all around the world that there is too much America in the lives and cultures of Europe and the entire globe. There is a reaction against globalization and the impact of America.

Finally, I would like to say that the unpopularity of the potential war with Iraq can only further fuel hostilities in this region toward us among the Islamic world. We did a survey in Turkey in November and we found that, unlike Europeans, the Turks were divided as to whether the regime in Baghdad is a threat to peace and a threat to the stability of that region and were even uncertain as to whether Saddam Hussein's going would be a good thing or a bad thing for the Turkish country.

I think of particular interest to this committee is that the Turkish respondents told us that the United States wants to take out Saddam Hussein not because he is a threat, rather because the United States is unfriendly to Muslim countries and wants to get rid of unfriendly Muslim countries. And I suspect that this is a common perception all around the region with regard to Iraq.

In summary, antipathy toward the United States is shaped by how its international policies are interpreted. I will again go back to my old firm Gallup. Their findings reflected that when they wrote that large majorities said that the West does not respect Muslim values nor show concern for the Islamic and Muslim worlds.

I think improving America's image is a tough charge unless we can prove that our critics in the Muslim world are wrong about the intentions and consequences of our policies. Until that happens, U.S. communication efforts in that region can only be defensive, doing the best possible with a bad situation by correcting misinformation, by softening hostility, by playing to the aspects of America that are still well regarded. And this is not to disparage the efforts of public diplomacy but, in the end, we will only be affecting opinions on the margins.

However, I think that there are some bigger opportunities down the road. As I look at the second wave of the survey that we are analyzing, we show a very substantial level of democratic aspirations among the Muslim people. People in these countries place a very high value on freedom of expression, multi-party systems, freedom of the press, and equal treatment under the law—in fact, higher than in some of the nations of Eastern Europe where we conducted our polling. Our upcoming release this spring will detail these aspirations and show how they can exist side-by-side with a desire for a stronger presence of Islam in governance, which to some of us at least seems contradictory.

American policies that are seen as encouraging democratization might help establish or bolster constituencies for the United States in Muslim countries, especially outside the Mideast—in Africa—where American Palestinian policies have not so inflamed opinion. In the Mideast, the establishment of democratic institutions in Iraq after Saddam Hussein, if it comes to that, could prove to be an important first step in that most problematic part of the world for us.

And I will close my remarks there.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kohut follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANDREW KOHUT, DIRECTOR, THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER
FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS

I am delighted to help this committee achieve a better understanding of how the United States is perceived in the Islamic world. I am not here to make recommendations about how to solve America's image problems, but rather to give you as much as I can on the nature of the problem.

While this committee is primarily interested in the image of United States in the Islamic world, I will put my remarks in context by also discussing attitudes toward the United States around the world more generally. The Pew Global Attitudes Project surveyed 38,000 people in 44 countries. We released our results, "What the World Thinks in 2002," in December and you all should have copies of our report.

Despite an initial outpouring of public sympathy for America following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, discontent with the United States has grown around the world over the past two years. Images of the U.S. have been tarnished in all types of nations: among longtime NATO allies, in developing countries, in eastern Europe and, most dramatically, in Muslim societies.

Since 2000, favorability ratings for the U.S. have fallen in 19 of the 27 countries worldwide where trend benchmarks are available. While criticism of America is on the rise, however, a reserve of goodwill toward the United States still remains. The *Pew Global Attitudes* survey finds that the U.S. and its citizens continue to be rated positively by majorities in 35 of the 42 countries in which the question was asked.¹ True dislike, if not hatred, of America is concentrated in the Muslim nations of the Middle East and in Central Asia, today's areas of greatest conflict.

The most serious problem facing the U.S. abroad is its very poor public image in the Muslim world, especially in the Middle East/Conflict Area.² Favorable ratings are down sharply in two of America's most important allies in this region, Turkey and Pakistan. The number of people giving the United States a positive rating has dropped by 22 points in Turkey and 13 points in Pakistan in the last three years. And in Egypt, a country for which no comparative data is available, just 6% of the public holds a favorable view of the U.S.

Fully three-quarters of respondents in Jordan, the fourth largest recipient of U.S. assistance, have a poor image of the United States. In Pakistan and Egypt, an even-larger aid recipient, nearly as many (69%) have an unfavorable view and no more than one-in-ten in either country have positive feelings toward the U.S. In Jordan, Pakistan and Egypt, the intensity of this dislike is strong—more than 50% in each country have a very unfavorable view.

Public perceptions of the United States in Turkey have declined sharply in the last few years. In 1999, a slim majority of Turks felt favorably toward the U.S., but now just three-in-ten do. As is the case in Pakistan, Jordan and Egypt, the intensity of negative opinion is strong: 42% of Turks have a very unfavorable view of the U.S. The same pattern is evident in Lebanon, where 59% have a poor opinion of the U.S.

Uzbekistan, a new U.S. ally in the fight against terror, is a notable exception to this negative trend. By nearly eight-to-one (85%-11%) Uzbeks have a positive opinion of the United States and more than a third (35%) hold a very favorable view of the U.S.

Dislike of America undoubtedly reflects dislike of U.S. policies in the Middle East. In a survey of opinion leaders released by the Pew Research Center in December 2001 ("America Admired, Yet its New Vulnerability Seen as Good Thing, Say Opinion Leaders"), a majority in Islamic countries told us that U.S. support of Israel is the top reason that people in their countries dislike America.

But backlash against the U.S.-led war on terror is also a big part of the problem. Unlike in much of the rest of the world, the war on terrorism is opposed by majorities in 10 of the 11 countries predominantly Muslim country surveyed by Pew. This includes countries outside the Middle East/Conflict Area, such as Indonesia and Senegal where majorities still held favorable opinion of the U.S. While they still like us, they don't like our war on terrorism. The principal exception is the overwhelming support for America's anti-terrorist campaign found in Uzbekistan, where the United States currently has troops stationed.

Jordanians, in particular, are overwhelmingly opposed to the war on terror (85%-13%). Majorities in Egypt, Lebanon and Turkey and a plurality in Pakistan, a key U.S. ally in the region, also oppose the U.S.-led war on terror. In Pakistan, Lebanon and Egypt, Muslims are more likely to oppose these efforts to fight terrorism than non-Muslims.

¹ These survey questions were not permitted in China, and were not asked in the U.S.

² Countries included in the Middle East/Conflict Area are Egypt (Cairo), Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan.

The prevailing opinion among people in this region is that the United States ignores the interests of their countries in deciding its international policies. This view is as dominant in Turkey (74%), a NATO ally, as it is in Lebanon (77%). More specifically, the Pew survey finds a strong sense among most of the countries surveyed that U.S. policies serve to increase the formidable gap between rich and poor countries. Moreover, sizable minorities feel the United States does too little to help solve the world's problems.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE WAR ON TERROR: CONFLICT AREA

	U.S. Foreign policy considers others		U.S.-led war on terrorism	
	Yes	No	Favor	Oppose
Conflict Area	%	%	%	%
Uzbekistan	56	38	91	6
Jordan	28	71	13	85
Pakistan	23	36	20	45
Lebanon	20	77	38	56
Egypt	17	66	5	79
Turkey	16	74	30	58

The Gallup Poll, which conducted nationwide surveys in nine predominately Muslim countries in January 2002, summed it up well. They concluded that “the perception that Western nations are not fair in their stances toward Palestine fits in with a more generalized that the West is unfair to the Arab and Islamic worlds . . . it is one of several examples of Western bias that might extend to Afghanistan, Iraq Gulf oil and other situations.”

“AMERICANIZATION” REJECTED

But it is all not one way—even in Muslim countries, opinions about the U.S. are complicated and contradictory. As among other people around the world, U.S. global influence is simultaneously embraced and rejected by Muslim publics. America is nearly universally admired for its technological achievements and people in most countries say they enjoy U.S. movies, music and television programs.

Very large majorities of the publics in most of the world admire U.S. technology. This is the case even among people with a low regard for the United States generally. In Jordan, where just a quarter have a favorable opinion of the U.S., 59% say they admire U.S. technological achievements. Even in Pakistan, where one-in-10 have a positive image of the U.S., a 42% plurality says they admire U.S. scientific advances.

Opinion of American popular culture is mixed, but more positive than one might expect. In Lebanon, where most have an unfavorable view of the U.S., 65% say they like American music, movies and television, in African countries with significant Muslim populations such as Senegal and Nigeria, majorities say they like American popular culture. But majorities in Jordan and Cairo dislike U.S. culture, as does a plurality in Turkey. Pakistan stands alone in the extent of its dislike of American popular culture. Eight-in-ten Pakistanis dislike American music, movies and television.

Although people in some Islamic countries like American popular culture while others reject it, there is more of a consensus that people do not like the spread of “Americanism.” In general, the spread of U.S. ideas and customs is disliked by majorities in almost every country included in this worldwide survey. In the Middle East/Conflict Area, overwhelming majorities in every country except Uzbekistan have a negative impression of the spread of American ideas and customs. Just 2% of Pakistanis and 6% of Egyptians see this trend as a good thing. Even in generally pro-American Uzbekistan, 56% object to the spread of American ideas and customs.

WAR IN IRAQ

The unpopularity of a potential war with Iraq can only further fuel hostilities—almost no matter how well such a war goes. At the Pew Research Center, we got some sense of this when we conducted another survey in addition to our 44-nation poll. In November, we also surveyed the people of five countries Britain, France, Germany, Turkey and Russia, about their attitudes toward a potential U.S.-led war in Iraq.

Unlike western Europeans and Russians, Turkish respondents were divided on whether the regime in Baghdad is a threat to the stability of the region, and were divided over whether ending Saddam Hussein's rule would be good or bad for Turkey. Further, and of particular interest to this committee, a 53% majority of Turkish respondents believe the U.S. wants to get rid of Saddam Hussein as part of a war against unfriendly Muslim countries, rather than because the Iraqi leader is a threat to peace.

SUMMARY: OPINION OF U.S. LINKED TO VIEWS OF POLICIES

In summary, antipathy toward the U.S. is shaped by how its international policies are interpreted. Gallup's findings reflected that clearly in showing that large majorities in their nine-nation survey said the West doesn't respect Muslim values, nor show concern for the Islamic and Muslim worlds.

Improving America's image is a tough charge unless we can prove that our critics in the Muslim world are wrong about our intentions and the consequences of our policies. Until that happens, U.S. communication efforts in the region can only be defensive, doing the best possible in a bad situation—correcting misinformation, softening hostility by playing to aspects of America that are still well regarded. But in the end, we will only be affecting opinions on the margins.

However, I think there are some bigger opportunities down the road as I look at the second wave of the Pew "Global Attitudes" polling. We will show a very substantial level of democratic aspirations among Muslim people. Valuing freedom of expression, multi-party systems, equal treatment under the law runs very high in Muslim countries—in fact, higher than in some nations of eastern Europe. Our upcoming release this spring will detail these aspirations, and show how they exist side-by-side with a desire for a strong role for Islam in governance.

American policies that are seen as encouraging democratization might help establish, or bolster, constituencies for the U.S. in Muslim countries, especially outside of the Middle East—in Africa, particularly, where America's Palestinian policies have not so inflamed opinion. In the Middle East, the establishment of democratic institutions in Iraq after Saddam Hussein could prove to be an important first positive step in that most problematic part of the Muslim world.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much Mr. Kohut.
Mr. Keith.

STATEMENT OF HON. KENTON W. KEITH, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, MERIDIAN INTERNATIONAL CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador KEITH. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very much for the invitation to appear. I am Kenton Keith, senior vice president of Meridian International Center. I am chair of the board of directors of the Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchange, and I am a member of the Public Diplomacy Council.

I would like to take a moment to acknowledge how happy I am to see Charles Wick in the audience. I worked with him for some years and had one memorable trip to the Middle East accompanying him.

I would also like to acknowledge the presence of a number of my old colleagues in USIA, some of the Nation's finest public servants.

Prior to taking up my current position, I was a Foreign Service officer with the United States Information Agency. Much of my career was spent in the Middle East, including my appointment by President Bush in 1992 to be U.S. Ambassador to Qatar. Following that assignment, I headed USIA's area office that supervised all the Agency's operations in the Near East and South Asia. More recently I took on a temporary assignment for the State Department during which I established and directed the Coalition Information Center in Islamabad.

Mr. Chairman, both in my present capacities and based on my past experiences, I welcome the opportunity to provide this statement for the record about the importance of public diplomacy, especially in the aftermath of the horrific events on September 11 and in support of our national campaign to rid the world of terrorism.

To win the war on terrorism, the United States will need more than the might and will of our Armed Forces. To ultimately defeat terrorism, we must also engage the Muslim world in the realm of ideas, values, and beliefs. No previous foreign affairs crisis has been so deeply rooted in cultural misunderstanding and we must address this gulf of misunderstanding if we are to succeed.

It would be naive indeed if we failed to acknowledge that American policy in the Middle East, as perceived by the Islamic world, is a persistent and pervasive source of tension and hostility toward the United States. Nevertheless, policy disagreements alone cannot account for the fact that in many Islamic countries the United States, which we all know to be a great force for good in human history, is regarded as the source of evil. In some places the President of the United States is regarded as a bigger threat to peace than is Saddam Hussein. As a Nation, we have not done an adequate job of explaining ourselves to the world or of building the personal and institutional connections with these countries that support healthy bilateral relationships.

Mr. Chairman, my written statement addresses four areas where our public diplomacy needs to be strengthened. Given the constraints of time this morning, I will touch only briefly on four of these needs: increased exchange programs with the Muslim world, a visa policy that is effective and predictable, increased media outreach to Islamic audiences overseas, and a State Department bureaucratic structure that enhances rather than inhibits public diplomacy.

On exchanges, a meaningful and effective Islamic exchange initiative will require \$100 million above the current appropriation for State exchanges. We recognize that this is a significant amount of money. We believe, however, that this funding level is necessary and appropriate given the expanse of the Muslim world and the urgency and importance of the tasks at hand. This amount of money spent on promoting our ideas and our values and on our creative culture is very small when compared to the sums we will expend on military hardware, but it is no less crucial to our success.

We commend you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Kennedy for your leadership in introducing last year the Cultural Bridges Act, co-sponsored by 12 other Senators, including Senators Brownback, Dodd, Feingold, Hagel, and Chafee. Your bill articulated the necessary vision and authorized adequate resources for this critical task. That vision and those resources are still necessary despite the very welcomed supplemental appropriation of \$20 million for programs in the last session.

On visas, we need a policy that balances our needs for heightened physical security and for continued openness to those who visit the United States for legitimate purposes. We need to recognize that the presence of foreign visitors through exchange programs and for business, education, scientific research, and tourism contributes to our national security.

From my own experience as an advisory board member for International Programs at the University of Kansas, I can report that there is growing concern in the Heartland that the best foreign students, scholars, and researchers are beginning to look elsewhere for higher education. These future elites now regard the United States as inhospitable to them. If this situation continues, Mr. Chairman, our Nation will be squandering one of its most valuable foreign policy assets, the opportunity to educate the next generation of world leaders.

Concerning media outreach, Radio Sawa has made encouraging progress. I am aware of and mindful of the criticisms that Radio Sawa has had to endure that it does not carry enough substantive programming, but I would argue that Radio Sawa has established something that has not existed before and that is a direct link with these young people in the Arab world. It is an extremely valuable thing and needs to be built on.

But now we need to move into television broadcasting. Nine out of 10 Middle East adults get their news from either their national television networks or satellite stations such as Al-Jazeera. Most of those outlets, including Al-Jazeera, are open to us, and we should use them. And definitely the United States should move ahead with your support to initiate direct satellite TV broadcasting in the Middle East and throughout the Islamic world. The funds being requested for the BBG in fiscal year 2004 are not enough.

Finally, a word on bureaucratic structure. The structure of the State Department inhibits public diplomacy. It does not enhance it. Senior public diplomacy officials in Washington have no supervisory connection to field operations where much of the real public diplomacy work takes place. And those public diplomacy officials in Washington who do have a direct relationship with the field are office directors in regional bureaus and are too low-ranking to have meaningful impact on budget, policy, and personnel decisions. The results are diminished focus, uncoordinated activities, and reduced field resources.

Of many recommendations one could make to remedy this situation, I wish to focus on one, the creation of Deputy Assistant Secretary positions in the regional bureaus devoted solely to public diplomacy. Establishing a Deputy Assistant Secretary [DAS] position in each regional bureau would ensure that public diplomacy is actively represented in senior level meetings, and thus an integral component in our approach to every foreign policy issue. A senior officer with these responsibilities could effectively coordinate public diplomacy activities across the region, make the case for additional resources when needed, and play an active role in personnel decisions.

Mr. Chairman, I was happy to represent the United States Information Agency in the negotiations that took place for the reorganization of the foreign affairs agencies. We recognized at that time that this was a problem that was going to have to be dealt with at some point. I think that point is now. Creating and maintaining new DAS positions for public diplomacy would be a critical first step in changing the Department's culture and would send an unmistakable message to those who work at State that public diplomacy matters and matters enough to require senior leadership.

As a long-term solution to the profound problems of cultural misunderstanding, there will be no substitute for public diplomacy. It must be a key component of our long-term effort to eradicate terrorism. We applaud your leadership, Mr. Chairman, and that of the other distinguished members of your committee in focusing attention on what must be a critical element in a successful anti-terrorism strategy.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Keith follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR KENTON W. KEITH, CHAIR, ALLIANCE FOR INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, MERIDIAN INTERNATIONAL CENTER AND MEMBER, PUBLIC DIPLOMACY COUNCIL

Good morning. I'm Kenton Keith, senior vice president of the Meridian International Center, chair of the board of directors of the Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchange and member of the Public Diplomacy Council. The Alliance is an association of 67 U.S.-based exchange organizations, and as you know, Mr. Chairman, we have worked closely with this committee over the years on a variety of issues. MIC is a nonprofit organization that promotes international understanding through exchanges of people, ideas, and the arts. The Public Diplomacy Council is a private, non-profit membership organization that works to further the awareness and academic study of America's communication with foreign publics, and is associated with the Public Diplomacy Institute at The George Washington University.

Prior to taking up my current positions, I was a Foreign Service Officer with the United States Information Agency. Much of my career was spent in the Middle East, including my appointment by President Bush in 1992 to be U.S. Ambassador to Qatar. Following that assignment, I headed USIA's area office that supervised all the agency's operations in the Near East and South Asia. More recently, I took on a temporary assignment for the State Department during which I established and directed the Coalition Information Center in Islamabad.

Mr. Chairman, both in my present capacities and based on my past experiences, I welcome the opportunity to provide this statement for the record about the importance of public diplomacy, especially in the aftermath of the horrific events of September 11 and in support of our national campaign to rid the world of terrorism.

To win the war on terrorism, the United States will need more than the might and skill of our armed forces. To ultimately defeat terrorism, we must also engage the Muslim world in the realm of ideas, values, and beliefs. No previous foreign affairs crisis has been so deeply rooted in cultural misunderstanding, and we must address this gulf of misunderstanding if we are to succeed.

It would be naive indeed if we failed to acknowledge that American policy in the Middle East as perceived by the Islamic world is a persistent and pervasive source of tension and hostility toward the United States. Nevertheless, policy disagreements alone cannot account for the fact that many in Islamic countries regard the United States, the greatest force for good in human history, as a source of evil. As a nation, we have not done an adequate job of explaining ourselves to the world, or of building the personal and institutional connections with these countries that support healthy bilateral relationships. The gap between us and those people and institutions seems to grow ever wider and deeper. The signs of profound anti-American resentment multiply in today's world, spreading well beyond the Middle East alone. All of us have watched with dismay the overt anger and misunderstanding spilling into the streets of the world in recent days. A survey of nearly 40,000 people across the globe late last year by the Pew Center confirmed the soaring level of world mistrust of the U.S. and its motives.

As a long-term solution to the profound problems of cultural misunderstanding, there will be no substitute for public diplomacy. It must be a key component of our long-term effort to eradicate terrorism. We applaud your leadership, Mr. Chairman, and that of your committee in focusing attention on what must be a critical element in our successful anti-terrorism strategy.

In my testimony today, I want to focus on four aspects of public diplomacy: the critical contribution of international exchange programs; the need for a rational, effective visa policy; the need for improved media outreach to the Islamic world; and the need to correct anomalies in the State Department's bureaucratic structure that I believe diminish the effectiveness of our public diplomacy. Let me turn first to exchange programs.

THE IMPORTANCE OF EXCHANGE PROGRAMS: BUILDING CULTURAL BRIDGES

People-to-people ties are an essential part of our public diplomacy. As Ambassador Arthur Burns once said, "The achievement . . . of true understanding between any two governments depends fundamentally on the kind of relationship that exists between the peoples, rather than on the foreign ministers and ambassadors."

In the Islamic world, we clearly have not done an adequate job of fostering relationships between our peoples. A Gallup poll conducted in February 2002 reported that 61 percent of Muslims believe that Arabs did not carry out the attack on the United States. Mr. Chairman, that statistic alone speaks somber volumes about our failure to project our values and ideals effectively in Islamic nations.

We must recognize that we begin this effort in a very unfavorable position. Changing minds—or merely opening them—is a long, painstaking process. There are no quick fixes. And if we are truly to win the war on terrorism, there will be no avoiding the need to build bridges between the American people and the people of the Muslim world. Mr. Chairman, we must begin this process now.

This effort will require us to be creative, disciplined, and patient as we try to reach audiences whose attitudes towards us range from profoundly skeptical to openly hostile. We will not succeed in opening every mind, but we do not need to do so. What we must succeed in doing is challenging and changing a climate of opinion that unjustly paints the United States as a source of evil. Improving the relationships that exist between our peoples is the best way to do that.

America's unique status in today's world as the sole superpower puts new and difficult challenges before us. These new relationships with the people of other nations don't come easy. They can be, and often are, colored by resentment, jealousy, and suspicion. In this world there is an absolute requirement that we demonstrate a true respect for the opinions of mankind, that we listen as well as speak, and that we hear and understand those opinions and take account of them as we set our policies. Our public diplomats are trained to do exactly that, as well as to articulate clearly and persuasively the true nature of U.S. values and goals. The exchange components of our public diplomacy must serve to deepen that understanding that we must achieve.

And if we succeed, terrorists will find it much more difficult to gain support or sympathy, either from their governments or from their societies.

Increasing the State Department's exchanges with the Islamic world will give us the means to build a range of productive, positive relationships based on shared interests. This initiative will engage the American public—in our communities, schools, and universities—in an effort to project American values. We will find no better or more convincing representatives of our way of life.

And the engagement of the American public will leverage significant additional resources to support this effort.

Initial efforts were made during the 107th Congress to both authorize and fund programs on a broad range of exchange activities to build relationships with the Islamic world and enhance U.S. national security.

Mr. Chairman, we commend your work with Senator Kennedy in writing and introducing the Cultural Bridges Act of 2002, calling for an additional \$95 million annually for exchanges with the Muslim world. The Alliance actively supported your bill, which garnered bipartisan support from 12 Senate cosponsors, including several members of this Committee: Senators Brownback, Chafee, Feingold, Dodd, and Hagel.

In tandem with the Freedom Promotion Act introduced by House International Relations Committee Chairman Henry Hyde and passed by the House of Representatives, this bipartisan effort led to initial funding for these programs in the supplemental appropriations legislation for fiscal year 2002. The supplemental included \$10 million for a high school exchange program aimed at Muslim youth and an additional \$10 million for the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Exchange at the State Department to fund more Fulbright exchanges, programs to promote religious tolerance and values, English language programs, American studies programs, media training and other key initiatives for the Islamic world.

The funds are a welcome beginning in building new ties to the Islamic world, yet they are only the initial seeds of a plan that will require a major effort, necessitating our engagement in a very broad range of countries, in an arc reaching from Africa to the Middle East, stretching further eastward from Central Asia to the Indian subcontinent to Southeast Asia. Addressing so many countries and cultures will demand thoughtfully differentiated approaches to public diplomacy. In some countries, significant increases in our traditional exchanges, such as the Fulbright and International Visitor programs, will be appropriate, welcome, and effective. In other countries, such an approach may be seen as threatening. Particularly in those

cases, we must be creative in finding ways of reaching more skeptical publics, such as journalists and religious communities. And everywhere, we must seek ways of reaching younger participants.

Significant new resources will be required to develop these programs. The scope of the task is too great, and its importance to our national security too critical to be able to accomplish our goals by simply shifting money from other regions of the world. The importance of maintaining a broad, worldwide coalition to combat terrorism suggests strongly that shortchanging one area of the world in order to temporarily emphasize another will be an ineffective strategy. To do this job right will require new funding.

Reductions in public diplomacy over time have limited our reach: we have closed posts and cultural centers, reduced numbers of public diplomacy positions in our embassies, and steeply reduced the number of exchange participants. As populations in significant Muslim countries have increased by approximately 15 percent over the past 10 years, the numbers of exchange participants from key countries such as Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey have declined by approximately 25 percent.

In the face of those reductions, Mr. Chairman, it is important for us to recognize the dedication, hard work, and effectiveness of the State Department's corps of public diplomacy officers. Faced with diminishing resources and a major reorganization that abolished USIA and moved their function and careers into State, these professionals have performed in their typical fashion: professionally and effectively.

Mr. Chairman, a meaningful and effective Islamic exchange initiative will require \$100 million above the current appropriation for State exchanges. We recognize that this is a significant amount of money. We believe, however, that this funding level is necessary and appropriate given the expanse of the Muslim world and the urgency and importance of the task at hand.

Moreover, this amount of money spent on promoting our ideas and values is very small when compared to the sums we will expend on military hardware, but it is no less crucial to our success.

The level of support we have witnessed from senior members of both parties and both chambers underscores the timeliness and importance of this initiative. This is a moment when our national interests require Congressional leadership to build these cultural bridges. The U.S. exchange community stands ready to assist you in this effort, and is grateful for your support.

NEEDED: A VISA POLICY THAT SERVES ALL ASPECTS OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY

Since the horrific September 11 attacks on the U.S., the way the United States administers its visa policy has received much scrutiny, and appropriately so. Members of the exchange community, like all Americans, want a visa policy that protects us from those who would do us harm. We understand that greater scrutiny is required, and we support this. The Alliance, along with NAFSA: Association of International Educators, also actively supported last summer provisions in the Homeland Security legislation that maintained the visa function within the Department of State. We are gratified that Congress shares our view that State is the appropriate locus of consular services.

State's effort to tighten visa adjudication, in consultation with the Department of Homeland Security, is necessarily a work in progress, and has led to unpredictability and confusion. The impact of this somewhat messy process is being felt in virtually all walks of American life: business, medicine, education, scientific research, travel and tourism. The simple fact is that in 2003, there is very little activity in American life that does not have an important international dimension. And by disrupting these activities through slow or inconsistent visa procedures, we pay a high price as a nation.

As spring and summer and their high volume of visa applicants approach, we urgently need to implement a balanced approach to visas, one that addresses our national security concerns and also encourages the many legitimate visitors whose presence benefits the United States. Participants in long-standing summer exchange programs, such as camp counselors and summer work-travel students, are enormously valuable to American businesses and gain first-hand exposure to American life. Often these are individuals who could not afford to come to our country without a job to cover their expenses. Because these programs are of short duration and keyed specifically to the summer season, long delays in visa processing this spring could prove very disruptive both to exchange participants and to the many American businesses that depend on them.

Uncertainty over visas also is having a significant impact on American campuses. I serve on the advisory board for international programs at the University of Kansas, my alma mater. KU reports that a Chinese economics professor who returned

home to conduct research last summer has not yet been able to return to the U.S. pending background checks. This has caused significant disruption for the university, which had to scramble to find others to teach her classes for the fall and spring semesters.

Further, KU tells me that undergraduate applications for the fall are down 20 percent, and that it finds good students around the world increasingly looking to Great Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand for higher education. Growing difficulty in attracting foreign faculty and researchers leads my colleagues in the heartland to the conclusion that many in the international scholarly community, both faculty and students, view the U.S. as inhospitable to them.

This perception and the behavior it impels are enormously damaging to our long-term interests, which are well-served by attracting the best and brightest to an American education.

Mr. Chairman, we encourage the Committee to work with the Departments of State and Homeland Security to ensure that our visa policy supports our national security in all its aspects, and to ensure that adequate resources are available for the consular function.

Our security requires that we screen more carefully and effectively identify and screen out those who would harm us. Our security also demands that we welcome those with a legitimate purpose for being here, and whose presence manifestly benefits our nation.

Mr. Chairman, we urgently need to find a balance between these two imperatives, and we encourage you and your colleagues to be active in that effort.

THE MEDIA CHALLENGE: CARRYING OUR MESSAGE MORE EFFECTIVELY

Mr. Chairman, it is vitally important that our government-sponsored media and our relationships with foreign media must be improved if we are to succeed in the competition for attention in Islamic nations. As Coalition Spokesman during the campaign to unseat the Taliban government and destroy Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, I faced two challenges. One, facing down the disinformation from the Taliban ambassador in Islamabad, was relatively easy to achieve. The second, convincing a skeptical Islamic world press that the Coalition was at war with terrorism and not with Islam, was far more difficult. In truth, we made little headway in that essential struggle. But a useful lesson was learned: the U.S. must take foreign media more seriously. Our government understandably focuses its attention on the domestic press. It should now be clear that renewed efforts to get our message into foreign media are required. Nine out of ten Middle East adults get their news from either their national television networks or satellite stations such as Al-Jazeera. Most of those outlets, including Al-Jazeera, are open to us, and we should use them. Mr. Chairman, I believe this will not require major new funding, but a change in emphasis.

I applaud the innovative FM radio programming undertaken by the Voice of America. Radio Sawa seems to be steadily gaining listenership among Arab youth. However, television is the key. It has been the sense of Congress that the U.S. should initiate TV broadcasting into the Middle East. An increase of \$135 million to the BBG for FY 2004 will make this possible. There is an urgent need for this to go forward as soon as possible.

STATE DEPARTMENT STRUCTURE: INHIBITING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Mr. Chairman, I share the view of many in the public diplomacy community that the merger of USIA into State has inhibited rather than enhanced our efforts. Under the current structure, which I believe to be flawed, the primary purveyors of public diplomacy programs and resources—the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, and the Office of International Information Programs—have no direct connection with the public diplomacy sections in our embassies, and no formal connection with the regional bureaus that supervise those posts.

This anomalous structure runs the risk of marginalizing public diplomacy within State, and already has diminished its effectiveness. Those senior officials with responsibility for public diplomacy do not control field resources; those with a direct connection to the field resources are mid-ranking office directors in the regional bureaus, and do not have the clout to take bold action. Instead of sitting in policy-making councils, these public diplomacy office directors spend their very long days responding to task assignments. The structural flaw already is manifesting itself in diminished focus, uncoordinated activities, and reduced field resources.

Mr. Chairman, I would respectfully draw the committee's attention to documentation previously presented by the Public Diplomacy Council that gave recommenda-

tions for the enhancement of public diplomacy in its new home within the Department of State. These recommendations represent the distilled wisdom of some of the most distinguished public diplomacy professionals we have had.

I would like to stress just one of those recommendations, which I believe to be the key to effectively addressing the structural flaw—and to strengthening the State Department's management of public diplomacy. Congress should authorize and the Department should create in each regional bureau a Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) position responsible solely for public diplomacy.

Establishing a DAS in each regional bureau would ensure that public diplomacy is actively represented in senior-level meetings and thus an integral component in our approach to every foreign policy issue. A senior officer with these responsibilities could effectively coordinate public diplomacy activities across the region, make the case for additional resources when needed, and play an active role in personnel decisions. The DAS would coordinate closely with the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, creating a policy-level link between these two functions that is not constricted by the competing demands of a DAS who deals with public diplomacy as one of several responsibilities.

Creating and maintaining new DAS positions for public diplomacy would be a critical first step in changing the Department's culture, and would send an unmistakable message to those who work at State: that public diplomacy matters, and matters enough to require senior leadership.

Mr. Chairman, this proposal has informally surfaced before, and the Department has not appeared to welcome it. There are two primary arguments against adding public diplomacy DAS positions: that State already has all the DAS positions necessary to do its job, and that there are not enough senior public diplomacy officers qualified for these positions. Neither of these objections holds water.

As to the limitation on the number of DAS positions, what we are talking about today is how to increase the effectiveness of public diplomacy, a vital element of our national security strategy. Are we to ignore an opportunity to strengthen our public diplomacy in order to preserve an arbitrary ceiling on DAS positions? I believe the American public is more interested in effective action than it is in the number of senior officers required to accomplish it.

As to the availability of qualified senior officers, my own knowledge of the public diplomacy corps suggests to me that there are any number of experienced officers well suited to this type of leadership role. But State need not exclude senior officers from other career specialties when assessing candidates for these new positions. For example, one can easily imagine many political officers being particularly effective in making the connection between public diplomacy and policy.

Mr. Chairman, the bureaucratic structure imposed on public diplomacy by the merger is not working. The most direct path to a more effective structure is to establish these DAS positions. I would be happy to discuss this matter further with you, Members of the Committee, and your staffs, and encourage you to take the necessary steps to effect this change.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Keith. I will call now on Dr. Zaharna.

**STATEMENT OF DR. R.S. ZAHARNA, SCHOOL OF
COMMUNICATION, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC**

Dr. ZAHARNA. Thank you, Senator Lugar and distinguished members of the committee. It is a pleasure to be here today.

Mr. Chairman, your skillful leadership and foresight is reflected in your appreciation of the seriousness of American public diplomacy in the Muslim world, especially given the possibility that the U.S. military may be going into action in the region.

Mr. Chairman, I have submitted my testimony for the record.

In addressing the topic today, I wish to focus my observations not in terms of religion but rather in terms of culture. Culture shapes how religion is viewed and practiced, and it is culture that shapes communication as well. I would like to highlight some of the issues of concern of American public diplomacy and then also talk to how we can be proactive going into the region.

First, I am concerned that American public diplomacy appears to be backfiring and doing more of the same may hurt us more than help us. Since September 11, 2001, America has turned up the volume of American public diplomacy with high profile, aggressive initiatives in the Arab and Muslim world. Under Secretary of State Charlotte Beers outlined some of these initiatives earlier. With such an intensive and concerted effort, one would expect positive results. Instead, support for America has declined and anti-Americanism has grown. The question is why. I have addressed some of the reasons in my statements. However, the point that I wish to make is that until what we know what we are doing wrong, doing more of the same may hurt us more than help us. I am not advocating American silence, but I am suggesting turning down the volume until we figure out how to achieve more positive results.

Second, American public diplomacy appears to be focusing too much on the message and image building instead of relationship building. Most Americans tend to think of communication in terms of sending a message. American public diplomacy likewise has focused on getting America's message out without considering how it is being perceived. This is the fundamental problem with one-way monologues.

America can strengthen its communication with the Muslim world by thinking how it can build relationships instead of relay messages. In the Muslim world, communication is primarily about building relationships, cultivating, solidifying, defining relationships. American executives often complain that they must spend endless hours and sometimes days having coffee or tea before they get down to business. It is not because we like coffee or tea so much, but it is because relationships are the cornerstone of activities in this part of the world. So, instead of speaking at the people in the Muslim world, we need to speak with them and start looking more at ways of creating a dialog.

Third, American public diplomacy appears to be focusing too much on what we say abroad and not on what we do at home. When people talk about American public diplomacy, they are usually focusing on the State Department, the White House, or the Pentagon. They tend to forget in today's CNN world of instantaneous global communication that what we—and I mean all Americans—do and say right here in America is heard around the globe. This is both good and bad.

For example, the derogatory statements made by prominent American religious leaders quickly spread like wildfire through Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. President Bush condemned some of the comments. A few of the leaders apologized. Nevertheless, the damage was already done. America's own religious tolerance became suspect.

On the positive side, Congress has a tremendous role to play. As the face of the American people, all eyes are on you. You do not have to go to the Middle East to have a positive impact on American public diplomacy there. Just by visiting a mosque in your district or holding a town meeting on Iraq or hosting an interfaith dinner or attending a Muslim community event, you will be sending a powerful message that speaks volumes about American toler-

ance, diversity, and democracy. And it will reach the people back home.

Finally, my final concern is how the American military action and a continued military presence in Iraq may impact American public diplomacy. The American military will likely become the new face of American public diplomacy, overshadowing all other efforts. The interaction between our soldiers and the local people will become the medium as well as the message.

The American military enters with a distinct disadvantage. Already the media has spoken extensively about American "military occupation" and setting up "a civil administration." American associations with these terms relate back to Japan and Germany and how American military occupation helped transform these countries into economic super powers. In the Arab and Muslim world, both of these terms are associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and they are very highly negative and I think we need to be aware of this.

The American military can overcome some of this disadvantage through heightened cultural awareness and symbolic cultural gestures that show our respect for the culture and the religion of the local people. The more our soldiers know about these cultural differences, the more they can navigate the cultural land mines and the safer they and the local people will be and the better they will be able to put a better face on America's new foreign public diplomacy.

Thank you, sir, and I look forward to answering questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Zaharna follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. R.S. ZAHARNA, SCHOOL OF COMMUNICATION,
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

I. KEY POINTS

- The terrorist attacks in September 11, 2001, focused attention on America's public diplomacy.
- The U.S. Congress, State Department and White House have all intensified their efforts to get America's message out and improve America's image.
- Instead of yielding a more positive American image, America's public diplomacy appears to have generated more anti-American sentiment.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in America on 9/11, Americans were asking, "Why do they hate us?" The attacks underscored the importance of public diplomacy. As Congressman Henry Hyde noted at last year's congressional hearings, "the perceptions of foreign publics have domestic consequences." President George Bush echoed the sense of urgency when he said: "we have to do a better job of telling our story."

In short order there was a flurry of activity to get America's true message out to the world. Within a month after the attacks, a former advertising executive with more than forty years of experience, Charlotte Beers became Under Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy. The Senate and House held hearings, passing the new "Freedom Promotion Act of 2002," which injected \$497 million annually into the budget of public diplomacy. First the Pentagon, then the White House established special offices to help with America's public diplomacy initiative.

The Arab and Muslim world became a central focus of many of the State Department's new initiatives because this was where the American message was being perceived as horribly distorted or missing altogether. Top American officials began granting interviews to the Al-Jazeera news network, taking America's case directly to the Arab public. The State Department compiled a booklet on the link between Al-Qaeda and September 11, "The Network of Terrorism," that quickly became its most widely disseminated brochure ever. The State Department also produced a Web site and series of mini-documentaries on the positive contributions of Muslim Americans. The United States also launched its own Arabic-language radio station

Radio Sawa, featuring American and Arab pop music with short news broadcasts. Radio Sawa has successfully garnered such a large listening audience that there are plans to launch an Arabic-language television station styled on the CNN news format.

With such a concerted effort at the highest levels of the American government to get America's message out, to "win the hearts and minds" of the Arabs and Muslims, one would expect an increase in understanding and support of American policy. Instead, it appears the opposite has occurred. America's intensified public diplomacy initiative has met with more misunderstandings, and support for American policies has declined globally—not just in the Arab and Muslim world.

Studies conducted by the Pew Research Center, the German Marshall Fund and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, and the University of Michigan all cite a precipitous drop in support for the United States around the globe, even among traditional American allies as well as new adversaries. The *Economist* (January 2, 2003) noted similar findings last month in a report on American values. However, in the regions where the most intensive public diplomacy efforts have been made, the negative image of America is particularly pronounced. In Pakistan, a critical ally in the United States military operation against the Taliban in Afghanistan, support has dropped 22 percent. Some believe that the surprising victory of the Islamic party in Pakistan earlier this year stemmed from increased anti-American sentiments. In Egypt, a longtime American ally, only six percent of those polled have a favorable view of American policy.

The immediate explanation for the declining support is the Bush administration's war on terrorism and the impending military operation in Iraq. However, the whole purpose of public diplomacy is to generate support from foreign publics for political policies. To be effective, public diplomacy must work not only in times of peace, but also in times of conflict. In fact, when conflicts are pending, it is essential that public diplomacy be effective if hostilities are to be avoided and potentially destabilizing public sentiment contained.

The critical question is: How have America's efforts to improve its public diplomacy caused a decrease in foreign public support, particularly in the Arab and Muslim world? If the United States does launch a military operation against Iraq, a move sure to fuel anti-American sentiments, will American public diplomacy be able to meet the challenge?

II. WHEN CAMPAIGNS FAIL OR BACKFIRE

- American public diplomacy may not be achieving positive results for logistical and strategic reasons.
- American public diplomacy appears to be backfiring because the cultural style, content, and tactics used resonate positively with the American public, but negatively with non-American publics.
- American public diplomacy appears to be backfiring because the targeted foreign publics are getting conflicting messages from the United States.

Logistically, time is a major factor determining the effectiveness of a campaign. The campaign goals outlined by American public diplomacy officials require formulating, testing, and disseminating information to change attitudes and ultimately behaviors. Such campaigns normally require five to seven years to be effective. Thus, it is too early to refer to the current attitudes and behaviors in the targeted areas as "results." Officials can do little to speed up the process of changing attitudes that have developed over a substantial span of years.

Strategically, another factor that affects a campaign's effectiveness is the degree of cooperation between senior policy makers and those responsible for communicating those policies. The greater the coordination, the more effective the overall campaign. Domestically, few successful political campaigns are run today without the active involvement of a communication strategist and pollster to ensure that policy statements are well received by the public. These professionals are at the decision-making table. The close link between policy formulation and image cultivation is well established on the domestic front. On the international front, such coordination, which is even more critical because the stakes are so much higher and the cultural terrain less familiar, appears to be lacking.

While time requirements and strategic coordination may account for the perceived lack of results, American public diplomacy appears also to be generating negative results. In short, it's backfiring.

Cultural differences in style and substance often cause campaigns to backfire, particularly in an international, cross-cultural setting. Public diplomacy appears to entail more than simply translating official messages into a new language and dis-

seminating them to a targeted population. It is equally important that the underlying cultural style and content of a nation's public diplomacy messages resonate positively with the foreign public. If there is asymmetry in cultural styles, a nation's effort to improve its public diplomacy may inadvertently magnify cultural differences and amplify misunderstandings. One can alienate the very same audiences one is trying to persuade. That's a public diplomacy backfire.

Many of the new American public diplomacy initiatives reflect a uniquely American cultural style. For example, President Bush's penchant for "speaking straight" may resonate positively with an American public that values directness. But the Arab public prefers more indirect messages, especially in public. Thus, irrespective of the message's content, differences in delivery style can cause a message to resonate negatively.

Similarly, Americans view facts and arguments as particularly persuasive. Much of America's public diplomacy efforts have focused on gathering as many facts as possible as a bulwark to a persuasive argument. In other cultures, metaphors and analogies that suggest important relationships are much more persuasive than impersonal "facts." Arguments in these cultures are seen as relationship busters, not builders. American officials may be perplexed by how callously foreign audiences dismiss the facts, yet foreign publics are chagrined by how American officials are so myopic in their focus.

American officials are also perplexed by the rampant spread and credibility of rumors. The rumors usually are not true, but not only are the rumors believed, they also appear to spread faster and farther than anything disseminated over the mass media. Rumors speak to the power that interpersonal communication has over the most extensive media network American officials can devise. Television may be good in getting the message out, but personal discussions usually determine what the message is.

The perception of conflicting messages can also cause a campaign to backfire. In this regard, American officials are working on two fronts, one external and one internal. Externally, America is working to combat competing messages from the Arab media and Islamic religious leaders. To combat competing messages from the Arab media such as Al-Jazeera, the Arab news network, the United States is considering launching its own Arabic-language television station. To combat competing messages from Islamic sources, part of the State Department's efforts are focusing on ways to reform school curriculum. Both these initiatives appear valid. However, both initiatives reinforce a competitive stance vis a vis the United States and the Arab and Islamic world, rather than a cooperative, relationship-building stance.

Another source of conflicting messages to the Arab and Muslim world appears to be coming from the United States itself. Addressing these internal sources of conflicting messages can help to deflate the power of conflict messages from external sources. The United States may need to become more vigilant in addressing the dual messages it is sending to the Arab and Muslim world because each perceived contradiction erodes America's overall credibility.

For example, American officials say the war on terrorism is not against Islam, yet, many in the Arab and Muslim world perceive that predominantly Muslim countries are being targeted. They cite the different stance the United States is taking in advocating the use of force in Iraq, a Muslim country, and diplomacy in North Korea, a non-Muslim country.

Similarly, American officials question Islam's tolerance and decry anti-American statements from Muslim religious leaders. Yet, many throughout the Muslim world question America's own tolerance when prominent American religious leaders deride Islam. The President has disavowed and condemned these statements and some of the religious leaders have apologized, but the damage had been done. America's own religious intolerance became the story.

The current American public diplomacy initiative also vigorously promotes a positive image of Muslim Americans through special Websites and advertisements. Yet, many Muslims in America now live in fear of ethnic or religious profiling. Some are afraid to fly on airplanes, some are afraid to give to charities, and others are afraid to wear a headscarf. Hate crimes and ethnic profiling of Muslims has grown at an alarming rate in the United States. Their fears are expressed to friends and relatives abroad.

American officials extol the virtues of American democracy and justice. Yet, many in the Arab and Muslim world who have family in the United States are petrified by the perception of a new system of justice in post-September 11 America. The idea that someone can be picked up, held in secret, for an indefinite period of time, and without access to a lawyer is truly frightening if one sees religion or ethnicity as the only common denominator.

Finally, American officials speak ardently of their support for Israel in the conflict with the Palestinians. Given the long-standing alliance between Israel and the United States, as well as the close family ties between many in both countries, the identification that many Americans have with Israel is understandable. For many of the same reasons that Americans identify with Israel, many in the Arab and Muslim world identify with the Palestinians. Just as Americans appear to respond immediately and emotionally to the deaths of Israelis—and appear insensitive to the deaths of Palestinians—many throughout the Arab and Muslim world respond immediately and emotionally to the deaths of Palestinians—and appear insensitive to the deaths of Israelis. The use of American-made weapons by Israel visually associates the American image with the death and destruction among the Palestinian people, a predominantly Arab and Muslim people with whom others throughout the Arab and Muslim world closely identify.

There is an important footnote to be made about American policy. American policy in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is not an abstract entity that is contained solely within the realm of American values. American policy concretely translates into the use of highpowered American-made weapons being used in heavily populated civilian areas. The inevitable result is the large number of civilian casualties and the vivid images of human suffering. These images speak louder than the volumes of words about American values. One Jordanian teenage girl spoke of her perception of American values, suggesting that while American values are noble, there is a double standard in their application: “All the Americans ever talk about is their freedom, and their liberty and their independence, and they can’t see that they are actually taking that away from people [the Palestinians] who have lived in that land for generations and generations.” Thus to focus on promoting American values, without addressing the underlying contradictions and perceptions, may be counter productive.

III. RECONSIDERING AMERICAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

- Relationship-building strategies may be more effective than message and image-building strategies.
- Until American officials address the reasons why American public diplomacy is backfiring, intensifying its campaign may only fuel anti-American sentiment.
- If the United States takes action in Iraq, the American military will become the face of American public diplomacy and precipitate special considerations.

One can look at public diplomacy from two perspectives: relationship-building strategies versus messages and image-building strategies. Currently, American public diplomacy appears very much focused on its message and its image. Relationship-building strategies focus on developing mutually beneficial and reciprocal connections between people and nations. Adopting relationship-building strategies represents a new mindset and approach. However relationship building is not alien to American ideals and values (it reflects the best of America’s civic spirit), and most important, it may prove to be much more effective for American public diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim world than the current approach.

Currently, the United States does not appear to be adopting a relationship-building approach. When American officials began to address public diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim world much was made of how to “win the hearts and minds” of people. The very focus on “winning” in itself suggests a competition, a dividing line between “us” and “them.” One wins, the other loses. The negative perception of an “us-versus-them” mindset can undermine the win/win, cooperative perspective that is needed to build positive, mutually beneficial relations.

Relationship building means paying close attention to language. In times of conflict, securing the support of one’s own public is the most important task. One way American leaders have been demonstrating their support and rallying the American public is through the use of strong rhetoric. However, their words are heard not only at home, but around the world. Using strong rhetoric to gain American public support may be counter-productive if it results in loss of support abroad. America may be an individualist culture and shrug off personal insults. In collectivist cultures, to insult one is to insult the entire group. Culturally insensitive remarks are easy to make, hard to retract, and backfire horribly. American public diplomacy officials may need to work more closely with American politicians to assist them in becoming more culturally aware of how others may perceive American political rhetoric.

Ultimately, relationship-building strategies may also be more effective because they are more culturally attuned to that of the publics with whom America is trying to communicate. The focus on getting its message out is a one-way communication approach that requires very little participation from the audience beyond the Arab

and Muslim publics accepting the American message. Nothing in the Arab or Islamic world suggests that this public subscribes to a one-way, transmission model of communication. The culture and society are built around relationships. Relationships-building strategies tend to be more long-term, but they are more in tune with the culture of the people in the Arab and Muslim world.

Second, American officials may need to address the reasons why public diplomacy is generating more anti-American sentiment before it takes further steps to intensify public diplomacy efforts. In this regard, American public diplomacy may opt for less visible and aggressive communication strategies. Currently, American public diplomacy officials appear to be focused on the technical problem of disseminating information without accounting for how that information is being interpreted by foreign publics. In the course of disseminating information, it appears that problems of conflicting messages, different communication styles, and cultural insensitivity are causing American efforts to backfire. The United States is trying to hammer home its message to the Arab and Muslim world; “they” aren’t getting it, but America’s image is taking a beating. Until the counter-productive factors are addressed, disseminating more of the same information in the same manner is likely to compound America’s image problem, not lessen it.

Strategically, whenever an image is highly negative, the goal is to deflect the audience’s attention away and downplay the negatives. Communication professionals skilled in crisis communication management, more commonly found in the corporate or private sector, have often been quite effective in deflecting public criticism and minimizing the negative effect of unpopular actions.

Given the possibility of the United States launching a pre-emptive strike into a large Arab country that is predominantly Muslim, crisis public diplomacy may be the most strategic communication option and most prudent course of action at this time.

Finally, the possibility of American military action and a continued military presence in Iraq raises special concerns for American public diplomacy. The American military will likely become the face of American public diplomacy, overshadowing all forms of verbal or mass media efforts. The direct interaction between American military personnel and the local population will be the message as well as the medium.

The American military enters with a distinct disadvantage. Already the media has spoken extensively about an American “military occupation” and setting up “a civil administration.” The American association with military occupation is fundamentally positive; the American occupation of Germany and Japan helped transform both into world economic powers. In the Arab and Muslim world, military occupation conjures up images of Israeli military occupation; images that are in no way benign or positive. These negative images are fertile ground for rumors, stereotypes and fears that will shape the public perception of an American military occupation of Iraq. Similarly, the use of the term civil administration is associated with Israeli attempts to take control of the Palestinian people. Again, the association is quite negative and ripe for being perceived as negative no matter how positive American intentions may be.

Lastly, cultural awareness and sensitivity will be key for helping the American military to put its best face forward, avoid tensions and ensure the safety of both American military personnel and the people they encounter. If American troops have not been trained in important cultural differences in behavior, such as eye contact, they need training so that they do not misinterpret a harmless stare as an aggressive challenge. If there are not sufficient female soldiers to interact with the local female population, there will likely be no interaction and thus an opportunity for relationship building may be lost. If religious practices such as covering one’s hair is looked down upon or reverence to holy sites or religious rituals are not upheld, American military will lose important opportunities for demonstrating tolerance and respect for the religious beliefs of the local people. All of these seemingly small, concrete gestures by the American military will do much to shape the face of American public diplomacy during this critical time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Zaharna. Each of you have raised so many interesting and complex questions that it is difficult to concentrate, at least in direct questions to you, all of this material.

Let me just indicate at the outset that certainly, Mr. Kohut, in your polling you have found—and at least you are finding I guess in the second round—freedom of expression is highly valued, and

we would hope that that would be so and the building of democratic institutions. The dilemma I suppose some of us have is that in many countries in which you have done your polling, there does not appear to be much freedom of expression. That is, the governments do not at this point appear to be honoring that type of idea. It may be that the "people," in quotes, who are not a part of the elite, the administration, the governing power, would like to have more expression, and most of us as human beings would. We as a Nation try to appeal to that.

But we are in a cross current here. The Israeli-Palestinian issue keeps coming up in one form or another, sometimes euphemistically called Mideast policy. The intersection that Dr. Zaharna mentioned in many of these relationships, including our own foreign policy, our military or so forth, not only is reflected in potential conflict with Iraq, but the failure to make headway with the Palestine and Israeli issue. If these two things are almost insuperable, probably you are right, Dr. Kohut. You are simply polling to show that things are not going well, but what we heard in the first panel with regard to public diplomacy only, at least in your judgment, will marginally affect this.

Or as you were saying, Mr. Keith, or maybe Dr. Zaharna, turn the volume down—one or the other of you said this—because essentially you are getting very hyped up and very enthusiastic about all this, but you may in fact be exacerbating the problem.

That is the reason we asked the three of you to come, not to be counter-distinct to the first panel, but there are many views in this country from veterans of the trail like yourselves who have been in this business a long time.

I am still left, after listening to all this, with the thought that probably, all things being considered, we should increase our public diplomatic efforts. That is, that the first panel probably in many ways is on the right track even though each of our hearings, one the chairman had last year and this one this year, are more informative each time as to what we are doing or who is doing it.

The exchange problem we have sort of highlighted, but you have put a new dimension on that, Dr. Keith, suggesting that \$100 million should be spent really, as I understand, on exchanges with regard to the target audiences we are talking about today, that is, the Mideast, Near East, and that may be right. The construction of these exchange programs, which you know from your own experience as Ambassador, is not an easy task. There are some ongoing propositions that have worked well and we are inclined, I think, in this committee to support at least the level we have been doing as opposed to cutting back on that. And really we will look forward to experts like yourselves as to how, if the money were authorized and appropriated, it could be wisely spent, who selects the people, where do they go.

As you have suggested, Mr. Keith, in our universities presently in one of your four points, the visa issues are very difficult for students. Purdue University in my own home State I cite simply because there are 5,000 international students there. This is a huge problem not just for the students but the administration of the university in working with the authorities in Indiana or Chicago or wherever these people intersect.

And yet, I have encouraged them there, as well as at other universities, that the administration take a lot of time really to work with the students, to accompany them often to the immigration offices or wherever. I think that kind of relationship and the sensitivity of that may encourage them to stay in the United States, to stay on the course because they came here to begin with, as many university students did, from around the world because we have a lot to offer. And we want them and we want their leadership. These, once again, are relationships which are tremendously important if we are to have this public diplomacy and have some sustaining value.

So I take each of the points you have made without having a firm conviction, as each of you do, as sort of 1, 2, 3, 4, how we proceed in this. This is an area of sensitization of this committee, but finally we have to make some decisions, as will our administration, as will our colleagues and the rest of the Congress.

So let me just ask for sake of argument. I come down on the thought that we probably should increase our exchange efforts, that clearly we ought to try to work out with immigration ways in which the antagonisms that come from exchange are mitigated, or even if they are not exchange students, just people paying toll or freight coming here to the United States, that we are helpful to this, that we continue to boost international students coming here.

With regard to the issue of how we get across freedom, this probably is a basic thing that we could have a hearing about all by itself. In other words, today I think in a way we have been talking about tactics, but the overall strategy probably is a world that shares some common values of freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of religion. And with many of the countries we are talking about, we are not witnessing a whole lot of this. Why? And what should be our foreign policy with regard to these countries that appear to inhibit their citizens?

And if in fact we have an opportunity in Iraq, if the aftermath of Iraq is United States involvement plus, hopefully, many, many other countries, most people who have testified before this committee say that will be a daunting task. The numbers of institutions in Iraq specifically that are there to build upon for democracy are pretty thin, and it is a longtime quest even in a situation that has some resources that could ultimately be fairly prosperous on behalf of the people. The old idea we had earlier on with Chairman Biden's hearings of people dancing in the streets and going off in freedom was clearly very naive. There may be a short amount of dancing, but then not very much democracy. And how you get the structure there so that people build this is still not clear to many of us although we may be involved in that very soon.

This is why we have been trying to stress to our own administration planning as thorough as the military planning because it probably will have to come in an immediate transition from our military. General Franks, we have heard, will not be ruling Iraq in the event we come to that situation, nor anybody else of his stature. But there will be thousands of Iraqi bureaucrats or public servants or however you wish to characterize them who will have to be enlisted to feed, to police, to do these things. And will they be democratic? Will they be able to get across the boundaries of Sunnis and

Shiite Muslims and Kurds, quite apart from Iranian tribes and others that are in the country? You know, all of us are going to school very rapidly and trying to really help each other.

But let me just ask generally if you have any comment about what should be the strategy of our committee or our government at least in the foreseeable future, the next 90 days, in which very fateful decisions may be made. Does anyone want to have a try at that?

Mr. KOHUT. I just want to emphasize one thing. I am not trying to be pessimistic or discourage public diplomacy. It is certainly the right thing to do. It is the only thing we can do. But our committee's policies are the 800-pound gorilla in terms of these people's attitudes, and one point I have not made is as bad as it has been in the Mideast area in the region of conflict, it is not that bad in Africa, but it is getting bad in Africa because the African Muslims are beginning to look at the Mideast issue and the Palestinian issue and say America really does not care about people like us.

So barring dealing with that 800-pound gorilla, one of the things that we have to offer as the oldest democracy is some way of addressing the aspirations of these people. You are right. They do not have democracy, but they want it. And I was surprised and I cannot wait until I can report to you how clearly they want it and how much they understand what it has to offer them. If we do Iraq and in the aftermath of Iraq we can make the case to them, well, it will not obviate the problems with the 800-pound gorilla, but it is something we can do that is really concrete and important.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Well, that data on the aspirations for freedom will be very important. There is some skepticism, but if that is true, that really offers something to build on even as we try to contrive how you do the building.

Ambassador KEITH. Mr. Chairman, if I could speak for a moment to the 800-pound gorilla. If you have been around as long as I have in the Middle East working on this issue—and that is the issue that I have been dealing with since my first post in Baghdad in 1966. I was in the Middle East for the 1967 war, for the 1973 war, for the 1991 peace conference in Madrid. I can tell you that opposition to American policy and particularly opposition to the unquestioned support of the United States and its people for Israel and Israel's interests is not new. It has been a consistent thing. Nevertheless, our unfavorable rating at the present moment is much lower than it has been at many points during this period.

I think Mr. Kohut's baseline study is extremely important, but for those of us who have gone through this process, we understand that when the United States has been perceived as taking an active role in trying to pursue its stated policies in the Middle East, a just solution to the Palestinian issue and security for both sides, security for the State of Israel, there has never been any confusion about where we stand on that. But when it appears that we are actively pursuing those goals, our stock goes up. It is easier for us to work. It is easier for us to deal with our interlocutors. It is easier for us to pursue other public diplomacy goals and other foreign policy issues. When it is perceived, as it is today, that the Middle East problem has taken a back seat, is being put off to the side while the United States pursues the anti-terrorism issue, then our

popularity, approval ratings go straight to the bottom, and it makes it very difficult for us to achieve anything.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Zaharna.

Dr. ZAHARNA. Thank you.

I would say, yes, the policy addressing that has definitely been a factor.

I also want to go to the training. There has been a lack of cultural sensitivity in the area, and the more culturally sensitive we are, I think the better we will be on that. And so training.

And when I talk about turning down the volume, I am not talking about no public diplomacy, but there are many things that we can do in the meantime, the training, the exchanges, the working with the American public on that, also the USIS. The loss of that was a tremendous loss. It lost the agility. It lost the field-driven initiatives.

My only concern with the television is what is the buy-in for the audience. For radio American music is wildly popular. To have a television program on the CNN format that focuses on our policies that are not wildly popular is almost like shining the spotlight on the 800-pound gorilla, and that is my concern there.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, perhaps the television, to pick up one of your points earlier on, can indicate Senator Biden going to a mosque in his district or likewise our doing that or maybe even hearings like this. People I suspect in some of the areas that we are discussing today would like to know that sensitive Americans are trying to talk about this intelligently and trying to bring forward from experts like yourselves some ideas that could affect public policy. That remains for others to decide.

I just thank each one of you, and I want to recognize my colleague, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much and thank you all for being here. It is an important contribution you are making.

In the previous hearing we had on this subject, we had witnesses from the public sector like all of you who gave a similar perspective. I have been, as the chairman and others I am sure have been doing, gathering in my office for the past 9 to 10 months experts on the Middle East, actually quite frankly more broadly experts, academics from around the Nation and from around the world on Islam. As a matter of fact, 3 years ago, realizing how little I knew about Islam, I hired a Ph.D. anthropologist from Harvard whose expertise is Islam to begin to try to educate me.

And I have come up with a few tentative conclusions of my own which I would like to just put out there, not for pride of authorship but for your constructive criticism to maybe help me further fashion what role I think we should be playing in trying to affect policy as it relates to public diplomacy. But quite frankly, I think you all have made a similar point.

The Middle East, the "Palestinian issue," is of gigantic consequence, and I would agree with you, Mr. Ambassador, that there is a direct correlation between our benign neglect and that translates into opposition. I have been, not a lone voice, but an unheeded voice for this administration from day one that this would be the result of their failure. It is better to act and make

a mistake in my view than to have the posture which this administration took when they came in, which was literally, and almost formally announced, we are not getting involved in that. We are not getting involved in the Middle East. Period. If you remember the first 8 months, that is what the policy was, including things like messages being sent that we were going to draw down forces in the Sinai. We were talking about a relatively few forces.

But that reverberated. I remember I was meeting with Mubarak in his office in Egypt and him looking at me like what in the hell are you doing, my phrase, not his. The message sent around the world was we are getting out of this deal. We will let the parties take care of this which translates everywhere else in the world—as much as we are disliked by many, including the Palestinians, doctor, as you know, having worked for the Authority, there is this notion that they know the ultimate answer rests with us as well as them. I do not know a single Palestinian leader who thinks there can be any prospect of a solution in the Middle East without the United States being a player.

So I start off where I think most of you start. There is an 800-pound gorilla sitting in the middle of the room.

I would argue further it is aggravated by the fact that if we claim our shift in priorities relates to terrorism, everyone in the Middle East knows Saddam is not the worst actor. The bulk of the terrorism affecting the Middle East coming out of Iraq compared to Iran or Syria is minuscule. I do not know anybody in the Middle East who thinks that the hot bed of support for liberators from the Palestinian perspective, terrorists from the Israelis' perspective—the locus is Baghdad. Nobody believes that. I do not know anybody who believes that. Let me ask you a question. Do you think anyone in the Middle East believes the locus of terror is Baghdad? I am not being facetious now. I am being serious.

The reason I raise this, it seems to me it matters. It matters about policy. So one of the problems I have on the one hand is that all the experts with whom I have spoken over the last year basically say, Joe, you could get all the public diplomacy in the world right. If you do not get the policy adjusted—and it is not just Israeli-Palestinian issues, but policy relative to oligarchic regimes. Everybody forgets. How did bin Laden get his start? Was his focus on the United States? No. Does he give a damn about a single Palestinian you have tried to help, doctor? No. Did he ever evidence any interest in the Palestinian people? No, never. It was all about a regime he thought had gone bad.

But here is my dilemma. My dilemma is that I am not going to get to change the policy of this administration, which I think is wrong-headed in terms of its priorities. I agree with a number of specific things it is doing, but prioritizing how to approach it I disagree with.

But here is what bothers me and the reason why I think public diplomacy done well may very well mitigate. A group of Arab specialists, several of whom are Arabs, academics who have spent time with me, say we are not going to win the hearts and minds of the Arab world unless there is a fundamental shift in policy, which I am not proposing a fundamental shift because I do not agree with—at any rate, that is another issue.

But what we have to do is give the moderates in the Arab world something that they can fall back on, some place to push off of. That is what public diplomacy might be able to do.

Now, let me get right to a specific point. I recently was in Davos at the World Economic Forum, and I got so tired of being lectured by the world about the United States. I found it interesting when I had an opportunity to be on a panel with one of my French colleagues. And this goes to your point, doctor. When religious leaders who are wrong-headed and ignorant, like those who spoke out about Islam being a religion of terror, paraphrasing what was said—that was not a quote—that gets immediate coverage throughout the world, particularly in the Muslim world.

I for one have visited our mosques. I go. I engage the Islamic community in my State and many others do. I would argue that the record, in the face of the terrorist acts that occurred here which were the product of those who happened to be Muslim and the deafening silence of religious leaders in the Muslim world—deafening silence in the Muslim world. I would argue that say the United States has acted better than any other country in the world in terms of how it treats the minority of Muslim American citizens. Remarkable.

And I would point out, look how the Muslim community is treated in France. It is outrageous. If we treated the Muslim minority, which in that country is significant, like the French do, we would be justifiably vilified in the whole world. So why is it that France gets no criticism in the Muslim world? It is outrageous. Their visa policy, their policy toward allowing participation in their democracy within their country by Arab citizens of France is despicable. I do not hear any of you at all talking about that. I do not hear anybody talking about that in the Middle East.

Which takes me to the point that I think what you had to say, doctor, is meaningless. This notion of cultural sensitivity, which is real, obviously does not get us much. Because name me a European country, doctor, that is remotely as sensitive to Muslim culture as America is in its insensitivity. Name me one. That is a question. Can you name one? One European country where the treatment of Arab Muslims, citizens or those on visas in those countries, are treated as well by the laws that are on the books, by the actions of their citizens, and by the general media in that country, as well as Muslims in the United States are treated. Can you name me one country in Europe?

Dr. ZAHARNA. Senator Biden, I did not mean to——

Senator BIDEN. That is a question. But can you name me one? Because it is a larger point I am trying to make.

Dr. ZAHARNA. I was just trying to bring a different perspective.

Senator BIDEN. No, I understand that. But I am looking for perspective. Can you name me one country?

Dr. ZAHARNA. I did not mean to row and ruffle.

Senator BIDEN. No. I am not ruffled. Look, this is an important academic point, doctor, because if your point is right, that if we are more sensitive——

Dr. ZAHARNA. Yes.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. We would not be facing this dilemma in the Middle East among Arab Muslims, which I do not

discount, if that is correct, then you would be able to say, if this were a debate, which it is not, let me give you evidence. If countries in Europe are less sensitive to Muslim interests in their country and yet are viewed better than we are, then obviously cultural sensitivity is not a defining element of how we are viewed. It goes back to policy. I stand to be corrected by any of you.

Dr. ZAHARNA. I am not saying that it is the only thing or that one discounts the other, but greater cultural sensitivity—

Senator BIDEN. Is always good.

Dr. ZAHARNA. And that was my point.

Senator BIDEN. Well, but it is marginal. What frustrates me is I find it to be so marginally different. I find myself caught between two poles here, an administration whose general insensitivity is boundless in my view by the way it treats our friends and allies, and on the other hand, the generic criticism of American society in a way that I find not sustainable in fact.

So I would like to know for the record is there any European country that any of you are aware of that are more sensitive culturally, politically, judicially, or in any fashion to Arab Muslim interests than we are? That is just a question.

Mr. KOHUT. I would like to both give you some fodder for your argument and perhaps give you an explanation. I have some comparisons I am going to send along to you about the way the American public reacted to the Japanese in 1941 after the Pearl Harbor attack.

Senator BIDEN. Exactly. It is remarkable how they acted.

Mr. KOHUT. Not behavior. Polls. The differences between reaction to the Japanese then and attitudes toward the Muslims now are extraordinary, just extraordinary. The American public has become more civil, more tolerant, and both Gallup and our surveys showed after 9/11 favorability ratings of Muslim Americans actually rising. This is not well known.

But now I want to go to your second point. How can the French get away with what they do and our rather civil reaction to Muslim Americans and the larger Muslim world exists? And the difference is we are not France. We are the most powerful Nation in the world, clearly the most powerful Nation in the world.

Senator BIDEN. Good point.

Mr. KOHUT. And that power breeds two things. It breeds suspicion and it breeds resentment.

I was struck. When we did a survey with the International Herald Tribune after the 9/11 attacks, there was a great outpouring of sympathy, but the No. 1 thing—not the No. 1 thing but a very prevalent view in every part of the world, even Europe, was it is good that the Americans know what it is like to be vulnerable.

Senator BIDEN. Precisely.

Mr. KOHUT. And that reflects the resentment of our power.

This business in our survey about thinking that we want to do this for oil, even when the Europeans share—they do not share our strategies and tactics, but they share our concerns with Saddam Hussein, is a measure of suspiciousness about our power.

So, how do you deal with that? You deal with that, when you are the most powerful Nation in the world, by acting humbly, more humbly than you might act in a rational way.

Senator BIDEN. The example I give to people in my home State, to reinforce that point, is your very good friend and next door neighbor working for the DuPont Company just came home to his wife and said, by the way, I just lost my job to downsizing. And you just purchased a brand new Lexus for your wife, and you drive up the driveway and your wife comes out and says, by the way, Charlie just lost his job. If you are a good neighbor, you would park the Lexus in the garage. You do not go next door and knock on the door and say, Charlie, guess what I just got Jill. A new Lexus. Average people understand that. We do not do that very well at all.

But the reason I pursue this—and I realize I am keeping you, Mr. Chairman—is we tend to have an instinct for the capillary instead of the jugular around here. It is not a criticism of any witness. I sincerely mean this. My word. Because I think your testimony is vitally important. But for us to figure out what really is at stake here.

I would argue the point you just made, and that is it seems self-evident to me as a plain old politician that our ascendancy, beyond all proportion to any other nation in the last several centuries in terms of cultural superiority—by superiority I mean not really superiority. If you are a Frenchman and you want to get on the Internet, you better speak in English. It is highly resented. We did not say you have got to use English. There is no trade agreement saying it has to be in English. And what I say to America is imagine if in order to log on the Internet, you would have to be able to speak French. You would be angry as hell about the French. Period.

So what I am trying to get at here is what are the things we can actually do because the root of this, even if we could sit down and agree on what the absolute best policy in the world is, the most just, the clearest, if we had Plato's philosopher king sitting here making these judgments, I would respectfully submit we would still have a problem.

Now, that does not mean we ignore things we can do, but it does mean we should have a sense of proportion about what we are likely to be able to do.

And what we need to do I think in America is not only make the case for more sensitivity, but acknowledge what the American public has done, what they have done. They have been incredibly tolerant. Look what happened. I am so sick of the Europeans. I have had it up to here. Look what happened when in fact there were population shifts. What caused La Pen's rise to power? A virtual Nazi in France. Anti-Arab sentiment. Where do we see that in this country?

We have some idiot preacher mischaracterizing the Islamic religion and it is treated in the Middle East as if he were a Presidential candidate, and La Pen in his xenophobia got virtually no attention in the Middle East among Palestinians or anyone else. As you can tell, it frustrates me.

And so as much as my criticism of this administration—and it is real. It is deep. I disagree in fundamental ways with the way they are going about their policies and diplomacy. I find this difficult to draft, in effect, or come up with even in my own head what it is that our policy should be relative to the public diplomacy. It

should be more exchanges. It should be, it seems to me, to focus on the tolerance in this country.

But by the way, I can picture this television station working extremely well. All I would like to do is they could put on a morning show just going to one of the several thousand mosques in the United States. These folks are not dumb, if they do it like the radio station. The people putting this together are pretty smart. They could focus on pointing out that there are more Muslims in America than there are Episcopalians. There are more Muslims in America than most of the mainstream Protestant religions. The point is that it is very, very difficult to get that message through in any way, shape, or form.

So I just hold out, not for the panel, the rhetorical challenge, find me a single country in the world, a single, solitary country in the world, that is as open, as tolerant and that you would argue would have reacted—possibly one of the Scandinavian countries, I would argue. Find me any beyond that that would have acted as nobly as I think the American people have acted in the face of what has happened to them.

I apologize for my frustration, but I hope you understand it is borne out of a failure in my own mind to figure out where the jugular is. All I know is we have been fooling around with the capillaries an awful lot here. It is not to suggest we need not be more sensitive. We should. It is not to suggest we should not be educating in our schools children on Islam and the background and in the universities. It is not to suggest any of that. But it is to suggest that that is not going to solve the problem.

The problem is a lot deeper than that, and it goes to the fact that we are the big guy on the block and we do not handle it very well. I think history is going to go back and show that it is not surprising that after the walls come down, it has taken us a decade or more to try to figure out our place in the world.

I will conclude with this. You know, most people, when I go abroad, think Americans love us being a super power. I do not know about what is happening out in your State, Mr. Chairman, but my folks think if there has got to be one super power, it might as well be us, but they would rather not be the super power because guess what. We did not get one single word of credit for the tens of thousands of Muslim women we kept out of rape camps in Bosnia. We did not get one single, solitary piece of credit in the Middle East for risking the lives of young women and men for one reason, to save Muslims, Bosniaks, Kosovars, Muslims. And it frustrates me.

So if Middle Eastern countries want to be treated like mature nations, they have to start acting like mature nations. And you cannot have the front page of the Saudi-run newspaper talking about how for Purim the blood of Arab children is needed in order to make the pastries. You cannot have the Ambassador from Saudi Arabia in London writing poetry that is hailing suicide bombers as martyrs for Islam and keep his job and pretend to be you are a responsible country.

Enough of my editorializing. I thank you for your testimony. I apologize for the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Dr. Zaharna, you have a thought.

Dr. ZAHARNA. Yes. I want to say, yes, that I am Palestinian, a Palestinian Texan and Muslim, and this exchange has been enlightening for me. It is the first time for me, and I do sense your frustration very strongly and clearly. It has been an educational point that I will take with me with the later writing. It has been educational, just as I have been involved with the Jewish American dialog. And one of my colleagues is here with me today. So I will take that back and absorb it.

Senator BIDEN. There is nothing to be sorry about. It does not have anything to do with you, doctor. I am just trying to figure out what it is we have got to do. What do we have to focus on to change this.

The CHAIRMAN. We will all struggle with that.

I appreciate very much your comments, Dr. Zaharna, likewise Mr. Keith and Mr. Kohut. I appreciate the publications that you all have given us, but I want to commend the Global Project Attitudes publication. There are so many interesting tables here that are grist for the mill maybe for further hearings of our committee, as we come to understanding—for example, the charts that you have—why some countries believe HIV/AIDS is the primary problem in the world. Some believe misunderstanding among races and cultures. Some think nuclear weapons. The United States believes that is the major problem. These are very diverse major problems and the orientation of these countries, and sometimes unpredictably, is astonishing but certainly worthy of all of our sensitivity and our thorough study. We thank you very much for contributing so much to our hearing.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you. It was very helpful.

The CHAIRMAN. And the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF HON. CHARLOTTE L. BEERS, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Question. Since September 11, 2001 how have you changed resource allocations—people and programs—in order to put greater priority on countries with significant Muslim populations? Please provide detail.

Answer. Public diplomacy resources have been shifted since 9/11, with a significant emphasis on foreign Arab and Muslim populations. Funds were increased 34% in FY 2002 and 13% in FY 2003 for the South Asian geographic bureau; and 15% in FY 2002 and 19% in FY 2003 for the Near Eastern geographic bureau.

These increases reflect the priority attention given to the Afghanistan war and the continuing war on terrorism in these regions. They also demonstrate the large adjustments that we made immediately following 9/11 and are continuing in FY 2003 to reflect public diplomacy priorities in those regions.

While no program increase for public diplomacy is requested for FY 2004, funding will increase 3% for the Near Eastern bureau and 5% for the South Asian bureau in FY 2004 to maintain current services.

An additional \$35 million in FY 02 supplemental funding for public diplomacy initiatives has also been directed to foreign Arab and Muslim populations. These activities included television broadcasts, speakers, and foreign journalist tours on values and religious tolerance; English language programs, English teaching, and educational reform projects; American studies programs in universities; and programs on Iran and Iraq. They also included exchanges involving youth, women, the Ful-

bright program, media training, English language instruction, and American studies.

In addition, a number of programs and activities were initiated at Headquarters and provided to field posts to reach Arab and Muslim populations. We have begun publication of a magazine for young Arabic speakers. The pilot phase of this project, with four initial print editions, is under way with the first scheduled in April. We have expanded translations of our print and electronic publications into Arabic and other languages, including "Network of Terrorism" and "Muslim Life in America." We are launching a Persian-language Web site and have increased foreign journalist tours and briefings and television cooperative productions with broadcasters from countries with significant Muslim populations.

In FY 2002 the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs redirected 5% of its base exchange resources (\$12 million) to engagement with the Muslim world and the war on terrorism. The FY 2003 exchanges plan maintains this emphasis, increasing the Middle East's share of worldwide exchange resources to 15%, compared to 11% in FY 2002 and 10% in FY 2001. The bureau's Partnerships for Learning exchanges funded by the supplemental funds target youth in specific world regions, focusing 50% on the Middle East, 20% on South Asia, and approximately 10% each on East Asia, Africa, and Eurasia.

Question. In 1998, Congress approved legislation to merge the U.S. Information Agency into the Department of State. It was understood at the time that it would take time for the two cultures to be fully integrated. A recent Inspector General report reviewing the work of the Bureau of African Affairs contains this quotation: "Public diplomacy officers believe that they are often not included in policy deliberations, even those with a clear public diplomacy content, because policy officers are not interested in public diplomacy." That's not heartening, but I don't know if it is representative of the entire Department.

Please provide your assessment of how the culture of the State Department is changing to better incorporate public diplomacy perspectives. What more needs to be done to encourage this transformation?

Answer. Since integration, public diplomacy is more tightly connected than previously with the policy formulation process. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary understand and support public diplomacy's role in policy formulation. The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs participates in the Secretary's daily meeting with other policymakers. Deputy Assistant Secretaries with responsibility for public diplomacy in regional and other bureaus bring public diplomacy concerns to discussions throughout the policy process, and PD directors in the bureaus provide the operational link between programs and policy.

Public diplomacy is integrally connected with the policy process on our top priority issues of anti-terrorism and Iraq. The Strategic Communications Policy Communication Committee (PCC), which is chaired by the Under Secretary, includes a very active sub-group on public diplomacy, which is directly connected with the policy-making PCC on Iraq.

Enhanced research provides important data on foreign attitudes to be considered as policy is formulated. Resources are being provided to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to further strengthen our research capability.

We are taking steps to increase coordination between the Office of the Under Secretary and the regional bureaus. For example, the Under Secretary and her staff have increased interaction with bureau public diplomacy offices. New responsibilities for the Under Secretary's staff now include individual points of contact for each regional bureau, scheduling bi-weekly meetings with the public diplomacy office directors from the regional bureaus and responsible Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and working with Bureaus to integrate public diplomacy strategies into bureau and mission program plans. In addition to the above measures, we continue to seek full integration at all levels.

Question. Are all public diplomacy officers physically co-located with their colleagues in the regional bureaus? Do any public diplomacy officers assigned to regional bureaus remain at SA-44?

Answer. No public diplomacy officers assigned to the regional bureaus remain at SA-44. All regional bureau public diplomacy offices at Main State are located in close proximity to the respective regional bureau's management suite and other offices.

Question. Public diplomacy is not just about programs or budgets, it's about people—it's about Ambassadors and diplomats in the field getting out and engaging foreign publics. It's about making speeches, not only to elites but to mainstream audiences. It's about doing interviews on local media, rather than only talking to the

foreign ministry. Every ambassador should be asked: what are you doing? What have you achieved? What more can you do? What do you need from us in Washington?

- What is your view on what's happening out in the field? How do you monitor these activities? How are posts held accountable by Washington?

Answer. Secretary Powell has made it clear that all our diplomats overseas must be actively engaged in forwarding our public diplomacy mission. In March, the Secretary sent a personal message to ambassadors urging them to make special efforts in public outreach on Iraq. With strong support of the regional assistant secretaries, I constantly urge our Public Affairs Offices to take full advantage of all Mission assets to take our messages to the general public, not just government leaders and opinion makers. Mission outreach programs drawing on political, economic, commercial and other sections as well as public affairs and the ambassadors, are increasingly active in missions from Beijing to London and Mexico City.

To reach broader audiences, I have made development of our television capabilities, a priority. In addition to the very far-reaching mini-documentaries and related materials of the Shared Values initiative, which reached 288 million people in the Middle East, South Asia, East Asia and elsewhere, we are developing electronic town hall meetings between Americans and foreign audiences. A very successful town hall meeting between students in Washington and counterparts in Jakarta will serve as a model for similar programs in the future. TV co-ops, with the Department providing expertise to foreign broadcasters to develop programs highlighting America's contribution to development in other countries, is another very promising model.

I receive weekly reports from all regional bureaus accounting for their primary public diplomacy activities in the field. I also meet regularly with the regional bureaus to review priorities and progress towards meeting them. Because, as Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, I have authority over public diplomacy funding, including funding for programs implemented by the regional bureaus, I am able to set strategic goals according to which funding requests can be measured. If necessary, I am able to reprioritize funding disposition, as I did to support the war on terrorism after September 11, 2001. I believe relations between my office and the regional bureaus are good and growing stronger and continue to build on the strengths of integration.

Question. In your testimony, you give strong support for international exchanges. You say that they "are almost always positive, literally transforming, experiences." You say that the number of exchanges is "nowhere near enough and should be expanded in the future." Yet the President's budget for Fiscal Year 2004 reduces international exchanges. This will result in real reductions: the Committee staff was informed that it will result in 2,450 fewer exchange participants in 2004.

- What is the rationale for these reductions? Why are we cutting these programs at this time? Is this based on a view that these programs are not worthwhile?

Answer. We need ways to reach the youth of the world, to build appreciation for American values as an example of applying universal aspirations of human dignity and freedom; to quell hostility towards us, and to engage in constructive dialogue that increases mutual respect, and changes anti-American attitudes. Exchanges are central to that longterm effort.

The reduction to exchanges is budget-driven, not policy-driven. It is the result of overall federal budget constraints.

The President's FY 2004 request for Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs is \$345 million, consisting of:

- \$245 million for base exchanges, which is straight-lined from the FY 03 level. The Department will pursue prioritization of effort and achievement of efficiencies to maximize the utilization of these funds.
- The request also includes \$100 million, for the merger of FSA/SEED exchanges from the Foreign Assistance appropriation into the Educational & Cultural Exchanges (ECE) appropriation. In the past, the Department has used. Foreign Assistance transfers from USAID to support these key education, visitor, and citizen exchange activities in the NIS and southeastern Europe.

Question. In January, President Bush issued an Executive Order created a White House Office of Global Communications.

- a. How does the State Department interact with the White House Office?
- b. What is your role in ensuring interagency coordination on public diplomacy issues?
- c. The Pentagon has a lot of resources for "information." How are those efforts coordinated, if at all, with your office?

Answer. State Department Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs remains at the frontlines of international communications but the Office of Global Communications (OGC) effectively coordinates the efforts of many agencies involved in reaching overseas audiences, including the Pentagon. This coordination helps to make public diplomacy programs and activities more effective.

We work closely with the OGC, and through the OGC we have the White House fully engaged in our efforts. We have White House leadership, authority, and support on critical matters. It makes coordination among agencies easier, faster, and gives greater priority to the need for influencing international public opinion.

In addition to our tactical work with the OGC, I co-chair a Policy Coordinating Committee on Strategic Communications (SC/PCC) along with the NSC Senior Director for Democracy, Human Rights and International Operations. Members represent the OGC, NSC, DOD, BBG, AID and elements in the State Department, all with responsibility to communicate with international publics.

This committee was created late last summer in order to ensure that agencies work together and with the White House to develop and disseminate the President's messages across the globe. The SC/PCC is responsible for coordinating interagency support for public diplomacy, international broadcasting and international information programs; and promoting the strategic communication capabilities throughout the government. It is imperative that there be transparent, systematic coordination.

The PCC member organizations include the White House Office of Global Communications (OGC), which coordinates broad Presidential priorities, special initiatives and planning for principals.

To date, the SC/PCC has four subcommittees, all dedicated to devising unified strategy: Iraq, Afghanistan Reconstruction, Education, and Future Directions. The last is developing a national communication strategy.

Question. Your predecessor commissioned a survey of U.S. ambassadors about public diplomacy programs. One in ten ambassadors put in a plea for an increase of "American cultural exhibits, artists, and performer programs." The budget for these programs is minuscule—running at a few million dollars a year, at most.

Section 224 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, establishes a new Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy.

a. What has been done in the last year to try to increase support for, and funding of, cultural diplomacy programs?

b. It's been nearly five months since the Foreign Relations Authorization Act was enacted. When do you expect to establish the Advisory Committee?

Answer. In response to the direct need for more cultural engagement with countries with significant Muslim populations, ECA increased its funding for cultural and arts programming by almost 60% in FY 2002, from \$1.6 million in FY 2001 to \$2.5 million. While this is still not adequate to meet the demand from our embassies abroad, this increased funding did enable the bureau to enhance the Department's cultural outreach.

In FY 2002, the Bureau held a grant competition that resulted in three grants of \$200,000 each to fund exchange programs run by UCLA's Asian Pacific Performance Exchange, Carnegie Hall and the Sundance Film Festival. These programs are specifically designed to engage Muslim audiences in Indonesia, the Middle East and Central Asia. The Bureau also launched in February 2002 the "After September 11: Images from Ground Zero" exhibit of photographs by American photographer Joel Meyerowitz. Shown without editorial comment, this exhibit of 27 powerful, large-format images of the destruction and recovery at "ground zero" in New York documents the true face of terrorism and the determined response to it of the American people. Thirty sets of these photographs were put in circulation overseas, and in the first year were shown in over 150 galleries and museums in 143 cities in 71 countries. ECA estimates that over 600,000 people have seen the exhibit in the past year, and media coverage has been very heavy and positive. The exhibit will continue its international showings until early 2005.

In FY 2003, ECA is launching its "Culture Connect" program, designed to send the finest in American performing and creative artists overseas to engage with youth audiences. This program will focus on promoting in-depth, people-to-people connections between prominent American artists of all genres and future leaders overseas.

The Department is working to establish the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy. We welcome this opportunity to reach out to the American private sector and obtain advice on increasing the presentation abroad of the finest of the creative, visual, and performing arts of the United States and developing strategies for increasing public-private partnerships to sponsor cultural exchange programs.

We have researched the issues involved in establishing and launching this committee. Now, with the passage of the Department's FY 03 appropriations, funding for implementing this new initiative is available. As a result, we are taking the necessary steps to officially establish the committee, fulfilling the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).

I have designated a point of contact in my office to serve as liaison with designated ECA staff, and I have tasked ECA to work with me in developing a strategy to identify potential Committee members, define the Committee's operational procedures, guidelines and rules of order. At this writing, the Committee's charter and organizational structures are being drafted in compliance with existing regulations.

Question. The Congressional Budget Presentation for public diplomacy the Department of State shows \$103.3 million for American salaries in FY 2004 (compared to \$100.9 million in FY 2003) and \$159.9 million in Bureau managed funds in FY 2004 (compared to \$154.2 million in FY 2003). Of the increases requested for FY 2004 for each component (i.e., American salaries and Bureau managed funds), how much represents program increases and how much is current services?

Answer. The FY 2004 public diplomacy budget request includes no program increases. All funds requested cover current services only.

Question. In 2002, the Department launched the "Shared Values" campaign—the multi-media campaign of advertisements to Islamic countries focusing on Muslim life in America.

a. What was your rationale for this undertaking? What did you hope to accomplish? Do you believe you accomplished your objectives?

b. Do you intend to continue this effort? Is continuing it a question of the effectiveness or a question of resources?

c. Which countries refused to broadcast the advertisements on state-run television? What was the basis for such refusal? How hard did we press diplomatically to obtain a positive response?

Answer. Independent research conducted in several predominantly Muslim countries after September 11, 2001 revealed widespread misperceptions about America throughout the Muslim world. This research obtained from many different sources showed there is an urgent need for Americans to better communicate with the Muslim world. Misperceptions about the United States are widespread and are perpetuated daily by governmental and non-governmental sources, biased media reports, extremist groups, and false rumors. Additionally, this research and other studies clearly demonstrate that Americans and Muslims share similar core values: family, faith, charity and learning. The Shared Values Initiative is an opportunity for people from all walks of life to communicate with each other about shared values and concerns. So, in an effort to highlight those similarities and reach out to the Muslim world, the State Department formed a unique partnership with the Council of American Muslims for Understanding (CAMU), which served as the basis for the Shared Values Initiative.

The Shared Values Initiative was designed to be inclusive of many voices—not just diplomats and policymakers—but also professional people, entrepreneurs, educators, students, and religious leaders—from both the United States and the Muslim world to build a foundation for free, candid, and respectful engagement and exchange between Americans and people from the Muslim world.

The Shared Values Initiative in 2002 succeeded in meeting its initial goal of stimulating dialogue between Americans and people from predominantly Muslim countries.

The Shared Values Initiative will continue through many different applications. This Initiative was never meant to stand alone, but to be an integral part of our overall outreach efforts. The Department will continue to reach out to the Muslim world to demonstrate the values we share.

The television spots that, along with radio spots, and print treatments, as well as a booklet on "Muslim Life in America" and speakers' tours, formed the core of the Shared Values Initiative, were offered to several pan-Arab satellite television channels and to television networks in Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Kuwait, Egypt, Lebanon, and Morocco. While the pan-Arab channels and the television networks in Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Kuwait accepted the spots, thus ensuring a wide audience throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds, the authorities in Egypt and Lebanon refused to allow our spots to run on their networks, while the authorities in Morocco asked that we delay. In Egypt, the spots were judged to be too "political;" in Lebanon, they were considered "tangential to the real concerns of our people;" and in Morocco, they were seen as "untimely." Our Ambassadors in

each country supported our requests at the political level, but the refusals in Egypt and Lebanon and the request to delay in Morocco could not be reversed.

Question. In your testimony, you refer to polling conducted in Indonesia following the use of advertisements from the “Shared Values” campaign. Please provide any relevant polling data.

Answer. Research indicates that the paid media, events and publicity provided new information to Indonesians and encouraged them to rethink some of their pre-conceptions about America. Messages that the campaign delivered were:

- The U.S. guarantee of equal opportunities and protection of people’s rights.
- Muslims are accepted in the U.S.
- There is respect and tolerance among people from different backgrounds.

The Mini-documentaries were viewed as good intention to foster understanding between the U.S. and Indonesia. The following is a summary of the research data:

In only three weeks of the mini-documentaries’ five week flight, roughly 91 million Indonesians were made aware of the individual executions of the campaign.

Prompted Recall	
Journalist Devianti	67% 91 million people.
Teacher Rawia Ismail	56% 76 million people.
Baker Abdul-Raouf Hammuda	48% 66 million people.

Source: NFO Worldwide.
 **Based on 231MM total population, 88% Muslim, 75% Media Penetration, 90% Reach, the universe totals 137MM people.

Levels are at or above those of major U.S. consumer campaigns after four to six months of significantly higher spending.

Prompted Recall	
Journalist Devianti	67%.
Teacher Rawia Ismail	56%.
Baker Abdul-Raouf Hammuda	48%.

**During last two weeks of a five week campaign.
 Source: NFO Worldwide.

Prompted Recall	
Leading Soft Drink Campaign	36%.
Leading Credit Card Campaign	54%.
Leading Computer Hardware Campaign	47%.

**After 4 to 6 months of heavy spending.

Prompted Recall	
United Way 2001 Ad Awareness	62%.
Ad Council Colon Cancer Prevention	40%.

**After 1 Year.
 Source: United Way & Ad Council

When asked what new information they received from the mini-documentaries, research indicates that approximately 63 million people “learned” that Islam is not discriminated against in America.

Message Recall	
Islam is not discriminated/equal treatment	46%—63 million people.
Freedom in doing religious duties	44%—60 million people.
Inter religion tolerance/respect each other	35%—48 million people.

Islam is well accepted in America 23%—32 million people.

Source: NFO Worldwide.

**Based on 231MM total population, 88% Muslim, 75% Media Penetration, 90% Reach, the universe totals 137MM people.

Message Playback levels after 3 weeks is comparable to those of major consumer brands after four to six month campaigns.

Islam is not discriminated/equal treatment	46%.
Freedom in doing religious duties	44%.
Inter religion tolerance/respect each other	35%.
Islam is well accepted in America	23%.

**During last 2 weeks of 5 week campaign.

Source: NFO Worldwide

Software helps you stay ahead of competition	51%.
Is a leading provider of wireless software	40%.
Has powerful products to meet highest demand	24%.

**After 4 to 6 months of heavy spending.

Source: Audits and Surveys.

Question. The contract for this campaign was awarded by means other than full and open competition. What was the justification for doing so?

Answer. The Department relied upon the “unusual and compelling urgency” exception to other than full and open competition (Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 6.302-2 (48 C.F.R. 6.302-2)) in awarding the contract for this campaign. While the law and the FAR require that a contracting officer specify government needs and solicit offers in a manner designed to achieve competition, both also include language that indicates it may not be “practicable” to do so in all circumstances.

In this particular time-sensitive effort to address terrorism, the Department determined that it was not possible to prepare a sufficiently definitive statement of work in time to serve as a basis of competition. Furthermore, it would have been necessary to develop evaluation factors, which undoubtedly would have included market breadth and depth, as well as price—all of which, it was felt, would likely lead us to McCann-Erickson.

In light of these considerations, as well as our belief that the likely outcome of any competition would have been the same, the Department determined that the urgent and compelling nature of the activity to be undertaken warranted this alternative, non-competitive approach. It was felt that competition could not be accomplished effectively and efficiently without harming the ability to commence program performance.

Question. Have there been other contracts awarded in connection with public diplomacy campaigns in FY 2002 or 2003 which were awarded by means other than full and open competition?. If so, please provide detail about the number of such contracts, the value of such contracts, and the purpose of such contracts.

Answer. There were no contracts that were awarded for public diplomacy campaigns in FY 2002 or FY 2003 without full and open competition, other than simplified acquisition, such as small purchases under \$100,000, which require three bids, as the requirement for full and open competition does not apply.

Question. The contract with McCann-Erickson for the “Shared Values” campaign provides for a “placement fee” for the agency for the placement of the advertisements. The fee is a fixed amount. The country placement costs in the Task Order (#2) are not. What was the final cost for country placement? Was the fee within the prescribed range of 6 to 12%? Is such a fee comparable to industry standards?

Answer. The following includes the proposed breakout per country for the placement of advertisements and the contractor fee per country under Task Order #2:

Projected Placement Costs:		
Indonesia	\$2,000,000	
Egypt	\$2,800,000	
Kuwait	\$350,000	
Lebanon	\$350,000	
Jordan	\$350,000	
Turkey	\$2,000,000	
Morocco	\$750,000	
Total	\$8,600,000	
Fixed Placement Fees (rounded to the nearest whole percentage):		
Indonesia	\$230,000	12% of total placement costs.
Egypt	\$230,000	8% of total placement costs.
Kuwait	\$20,000	6% of total placement costs.
Lebanon	\$20,000	6% of total placement costs.
Jordan	\$20,000	6% of total placement costs.
Turkey	\$230,000	12% of total placement costs.
Morocco	\$50,000	7% of total placement costs.
Total	\$800,000	overall 9%.

The following includes the media costs to date per country for the placement of advancements and the contractor's invoiced fee under Task Order #2:

Indonesia	\$1,753,000
Kuwait	\$219,000
Lebanon	\$0
Morocco	\$0
Malaysia	\$925,000
Pakistan	\$659,000
Pan Arab	\$1,309,000
Middle East & South Asia	\$0
Total	\$4,865,000
Placement Fee	\$795,000

It should be noted from the above, that all placements have not yet been completed. Placements continue and all costs have not yet been incurred. When all costs are incurred and billed, the final fee is anticipated to be approximately 9 percent as originally estimated. Such a fee is within or below industry standards.

Question. The contract with McCann-Erickson expired on September 30, 2002. Was it extended? How? To what date? Please provide a copy of any extension(s).

Answer. The ordering period for the contract with McCann-Erickson expired on September 30, 2002. The contract did not require completion of all tasks by that date, but rather, that further orders could not be placed after that date. The three task orders under Delivery Order # S-LMAQM-02-F-4393 were awarded on August 23, 2002. Work on those task orders continues. No additional delivery orders have been awarded under this contract. The contract's period of performance has not been extended.

Question. With regard to the contract for the "Shared Values" campaign, was any official from the White House or any government department involved in any respect in the decision to—

- a. Use other than full and open competition?
- b. Select McCann-Erickson as the contractor?

Answer. No official from the White House or any government department was involved in the decision to use other than full and open competition or to select McCann-Erickson as the contractor.