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INTERNATIONAL STUDIES



A “NEW” MIDDLE EAST? IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAEL’S SECURITY

„NOWY” BLISKI WSCHÓD? IMPLIKACJE
DLA BEZPIECZEŃSTWA IZRAELA

*Agnieszka Bryc** 

— ABSTRACT —

The turbulent changes in the Middle East which were seen at the very beginning as good news for Israel, at the end of the day became more ambiguous. The Arab Spring and then the war in Syria that had erupted along with massive social protests ended up with regime changes, but what was crucial, the primary success of the Arab awakening was captured by Islamist movements. The changes in the Middle East were even deeper due to at least two factors – Russia „coming into” and the United States „going out” of the region. These new regional circumstances combined with the geopolitical shift in the Middle East and a crumbling American supervision made Israel conclude that its security has become more complex and the U.S has no more been the only significant great power player in the region. Hence the difficult political and military situation around Israel has created a need to adapt to security challenges and simultaneously, to take political opportunities.

The goal of this paper is to highlight basic ramifications for Israeli security and diplomacy

— ABSTRAKT —

Dynamiczne zmiany, jakie zaszły na Bliskim Wschodzie, początkowo postrzegane były jako korzystne dla Izraela, ostatecznie jednak okazały się bardziej dwuznaczne. Arabska wiosna i następnie wojna w Syrii, które wybuchły na fali wielkich protestów społecznych, doprowadziły do zmiany władzy, lecz kluczowym rezultatem było to, że zostały one przejęte przez ruchy fundamentalistyczne. Zmiany na Bliskim Wschodzie były poważniejsze i głębsze przynajmniej z dwóch powodów – Rosji „powracającej” na Bliski Wschód oraz Stanów Zjednoczonych „opuszczających” region. Obie te okoliczności wraz ze zmianami geopolitycznymi w regionie oraz słabnącą dominacją USA na Bliskim Wschodzie zmusiły Izrael do przewartościowania swojej polityki bezpieczeństwa. Stąd Izrael stanął przed szeregiem wyzwań dotyczących bezpieczeństwa, ale także wobec nowych okoliczności stanowiących szansę na poprawę jego stanu.

Celem artykułu jest wyjaśnienie głównych implikacji tych zmian dla bezpieczeństwa oraz polityki zagranicznej Izraela. Kluczowe pytania

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of the American and Russian factors in the current Middle East politics. The key questions are: How to secure Israeli interests in these new circumstances? How to assess, on the one hand, the risk of the ongoing decline of American interests in the region and, on the other hand, the complexity of the Russian strategy in the Middle East? Finally, whether Israel might be able to gain recognition by the Arab world, not to mention to keep its strategic domination in the region which is already being challenged by the Islamic Republic of Iran and its nuclear ambitions.

Keywords: Israel; Syria; Russia; the U.S.; the Middle East; war; conflict; security

dotyczą: możliwości zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa Izraela w nowych uwarunkowaniach regionalnych; określenia, jakie ryzyko dla bezpieczeństwa Izraela wiąże się z osłabieniem aktywności USA na Bliskim Wschodzie przy jednoczesnym rosnącym zaangażowaniu Rosji. I wreszcie – czy w takiej sytuacji Izrael zdoła doprowadzić do zwiększenia uznania jego państwowości w świecie arabskim, a także czy będzie w stanie utrzymać swoją dominację strategiczną w regionie podważaną przez ambicje jądrowe Iranu.

Słowa kluczowe: Izrael; Syria; Rosja; USA; Bliski Wschód; wojna; konflikt; bezpieczeństwo

INTRODUCTION

Israel belongs to the countries which domestic policy and international behavior are determined by security matters (Kącka, 2011), likewise the Middle East belongs to the regions which geopolitical map only at first glance seems to be stable, predictable and clear. What differentiates the Middle East and increases its significance in world politics is the combination of intense multidimensional – sectarian and political – hostility, violent conflicts and ability to widespread instability well beyond its traditional boundaries (Bojarczyk & Bryc, 2013). For the last forty years Israel has had some impact on creating balance of power in its neighborhood and only the recent Arab Spring has generated an earthquake in the Middle East *status quo*, reshaping it from grass-roots. Accordingly, the newly emergent unstable environment has created challenges and assets for Israel, but currently, the key factors are twofold – Russia “coming-in” and Americans to some extent “going-out” from the region. Since Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015, the region has been perceived as one of the battlegrounds in relations with the West. Their rivalry has complicated all geopolitical calculations of all powers operating in the Middle East as well as regional players and particularly Israel. So, the key cards to be played in the Middle East by Washington and Moscow are definitely three – the future of Syria, the Iran nuclear program and its regional expansion, and at last – the regional strategic balance remaining in the state of flux.

RUSSIA IN SYRIA: A FRIEND OR A FOE?

Apart from the challenges created by the war, Syria has been the focus of Israeli attention for a few reasons – firstly, geographic proximity; secondly, long-standing hostility between the two countries; thirdly – in contrast to Egypt and Jordan – the lack of a peace treaty; and finally, Syria's demands to recover the Golan Heights, taken by Israel in 1967. At present, the importance of Syria is definitely a function of its client relations with Iran and Russia, as well as the likelihood of the spillover effect across the Golan Heights.

The war in Syria was therefore for Israel both an opportunity and a challenge. At the very beginning, Israelis were hoping the Alawite regime of Bashar Assad would be replaced by a new and moderate one, but with time the challenges have dominated the assessment mostly due to mounting destabilization along Israeli border and the risk of Syria becoming a satellite of Iran. Trying to avoid this worst scenario, Russia's role in Syria was perceived by Israelis twofold: as a necessary complication as well as a chance to hold Iranians at bay (Bryc, 2013, pp. 101–102).

Today Syria is the main battleground among the leading regional players – the Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia – for their position in the Middle East. Simultaneously, global powers like the United States and the minor one but desperate to improve its international status – the Russian Federation – have made the war in Syria a significant part of a global agenda. Furthermore, most of them maintain a military presence on the ground or operate via proxies. There are thereby Iranian and Iranian-proxy forces in support of the Assad regime; Turkish ground and air forces, allegedly formed in the past as a part of the anti-ISIS coalition but currently used rather to deter Kurds, as well as American, French, British, Jordanian, Russian, and Israeli air forces.

In practice, Syria is already split internally and divided into areas of foreign influence. Hence, the question for Israelis is, who would be able to shape Syria's future and thereby the Middle East stability – Americans, Russians, or someone else? Definitely the importance of the U.S. in the region is doubtless for them, however the future of American impact on the region remains vague. In contrast to the full-scale engagement in the past in Iraq and Afghanistan, American absence in the war in Syria is being so striking. Not surprisingly, in Israeli assessments, it is Russia and its military success in Syria that has shaped significantly new ramifications for Israel's security policy (Dekel & Magen, 2015).

Russia's decision to use force in Syria in September 2015 stemmed from several considerations. First of all, military support for Assad has challenged the United States, whose position and impact on the regional balance of power is believed to be reduced. Challenging the American interests in the Middle East may help Russia to exploit its influence in Damascus and bargain more successfully with Washington after their relations became frozen as a result of the Russian annexation of Crimean Peninsula in 2014. Being aware of the long history of Russian-Syrian cooperation and the Kremlin's strategic interests there, Israel realizes that Russia's actions in Syria are aimed at, firstly, keeping the bastion of its influence in the region; secondly, recovering previously lost influence in the Arab world; thirdly, expanding with military facilities outside post-Soviet area; lastly, keeping a market for arms sales and finally filling each vacuum created by a limited activity of Americans in the region.

In spite of the complex situation due to Syrian war, Israel and Russia have been trying to keep pragmatic bilateral relations, mostly in terms of security. Nevertheless, the deployment of Russian S-400 ground-to-air missiles in northern Syria has challenged Israel by virtue of limiting the Israeli Air Force's freedom of action and secrecy because S-400 system covers extensive areas in Syria, Lebanon, and northern Israel. From the new position at Lakatia on the Syrian coast, the range encompasses half of Israel's airspace, including Ben Gurion International Airport (Gross, 2015).

So Russian military and political presence in Syria combined with Israel's interest to deter any terrorist group (Hezbollah) or Shia militias from entering the Golan Heights motivated both countries to find a channel of communication and operational coordination to avoid any confrontation. Such a "deconfliction mechanism" has been operating at multiple levels. Nevertheless, it is always a matter of time until something happens. The first such deep crisis broke out in September 2018 as Syrians downed, instead of Israeli jet, the Russian airplane. The Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed immediately his sorrows but reaction of the Kremlin was acute. Although Putin did not decide to downgrade bilateral relations, he ordered to transfer to Syria advanced S-300 ground-to-air missiles systems that might challenge any air operation of Israeli air forces. Such systems (S-400) were being operated in Syria, though they were only being used by the Russians and not being employed against Israel, so far. Now, however Israelis declare that in their opinion both countries still have a fundamental interest in continuing good relations and maintaining their understandings in

Syria, the risk of Russia repaying Israel with the same is more serious. And the last Netanyahu wants now is a confrontation with Russia.

Paradoxically, the key challenge for Israelis is not a military but a political one. Undoubtedly, the Israeli government is deeply disturbed by the Russian assistance extended to the Iranian-led Shiite axis in Syria and by cooperation with Iran as well. Israelis suspect that Russians are training Hezbollah how a world-class army gathers intelligence, makes plans, and executes operations. Israelis are also warning that, by working side-by-side with Russian officers, Hezbollah is likely to refine a modern military strategy that would make Israeli military specialists reassess the capacity of Nasrallah's group. Consequently, a newly offensive-minded Hezbollah capable of more complex operations could deal heavier blows to the Israeli army in a clash along the southern Lebanese border. It may even attempt to enter Israeli territory, as Hamas did in the 2014 conflict, albeit in a more capable manner (Allouche, 2016).

Although it is not difficult to see Russia's motivations for supplying Hezbollah with weapons, many specialists doubt this. According to Eyal Zisser, a professor at the University of Tel Aviv, "The Russians are careful not to engage directly with Hezbollah. Russia's message to the Israelis is quite clear – as long as you do not sabotage our efforts in Syria you are free to do with Hezbollah whatever you want" (Cohen, 2016). On the other hand, not all Israeli analysts dismiss the story. Yiftah Shapir, the head of the Middle East Military Balance project at Israel's Institute of National Security Studies, does not believe that Russia would openly sell P-800 Yakhont cruise missiles and Buk surface-to-air missiles (SA-17) to Hezbollah – the main threats as far as Israel is concerned. However, he believes that Hezbollah is resupplied with Soviet-origin weaponry – artillery shells for guns, artillery rockets for MRLs and anti-tank missiles (Cohen, 2016).

An ostensible support of Hezbollah and open backing of Iran and Syrian President al-Assad are presenting Russia as a reliable ally in the Middle East, which does not change much in the region now, but in the long term may allow Russia to rebuild its wider presence in the Arab Peninsula and successfully weaken Americans in the region. Thanks to Russia's loyalty and decisive operations in Syria, it sends a clear message to Arabs that, unlike the United States, Russia indeed supports its allies and does not betray them (Trenin, 2018, pp. 86–112). This has also ramifications for Israel, because the question is not only whether Russia is coming back to the region, but more importantly, who will be the Kremlin's ally – Iran, Turkey, moderate Arabs, or Israel?

Looking back to Russian allies in the Middle East so far, the Jewish state has been challenged by the Russian-Iranian cooperation, particularly by Russia's role in developing Iran's nuclear program. Israelis are worried about Tehran's ongoing efforts to arm itself with nuclear weapon, develop its missile program and generate a military presence on Israel's borders with Syria and Lebanon. The final success would mean for Israelis the end of its strategic superiority in the region and neutralization of its defense and deterrence capabilities. Seen from Moscow, the alliance with Iran is one of the most useful cards to play in the game in the Middle East, but undoubtedly their bilateral relations are overshadowed by a long tradition of mutual fear and suspicion. Therefore, their cooperation is definitely broad, but much more of tactical importance. Kremlin's choice is based on the recognition of Iran's growing importance as a regional power, which, along with hostile Iranian-American and Iranian-Israeli relations, is giving Russia many tactical possibilities in front of the U.S., Israel and the Arab countries (Moore, 2014, pp. 47–65). What is more, it would help Russia to erase the label of a junior partner in relations with the United States. In fact, Russian leaders have no illusions about the nature of the Iranian policy and they realize the danger of proliferation in the world's still most combustible region, but all these concerns are part of the more comprehensive concept of Russian international strategy. Russia's backing of Iran is neither unconditional nor unambiguous, so consequently to keep the balance, Russia has supported a few UN Security Council resolutions on Iran, three of which imposed light sanctions on that country, and was part of the P5+1 (alongside with the other four permanent members of the Security Council and Germany) group that had negotiated the nuclear deal with the Iran (Trenin, 2010, p. 14). Certainly, Russia, like the rest of the world, does not want Iran to develop nuclear weapons, but it is not interested in waging a preemptive war against Iran, like the U.S. did in Iraq. For these reasons it condemned Trump's threats to withdraw from the 2015 landmark deal with Iran that aims to curb Tehran's nuclear program in exchange for lifting sanctions. As the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov argued, such reckless policy of the American administration could end up with international destabilization or even more unpredictable consequences (Lavrov, 2017).

What Israel can do in this case is to count on the competing interests of Moscow and Tehran in the Middle East and the broader international scene and try to attract Russia in security matters (Bryc, 2017, pp. 85–95). Such thinking does make sense, because even in Syria there is much room for Russian-

Iranian rivalry. Their views on the future of Syria are the first but not last bone of contention. While from Iran's perspective Assad's survival is of substantial importance – since any regime that could take its place would be much less convenient for Iran – from Russia's perspective the Assad regime is important but not critical. This means that the Kremlin is in fact ready to negotiate with the U.S. some compensations in Syria in return for the lifting of economic sanctions that followed its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and a recognition of Russia as a significant global player (Piechowiak-Lamparska, 2019). The next area of potential dispute between Russia and Iran is the future dependence of Syria. While Russians have dominated the diplomatic and political backing of Syria in international politics, they had to share the military campaign with Tehran, which has helped Iran to expand its influence into Syria with the perspective of creating a broader political, military and logistics land-bridge between Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. So the question of who will dominate the Syrian regime – Russians or Iranians – would be a room for rivalry between these both powers. Another reason for potential dispute between Russia and Iran is the future of Syrian Kurds. Iran is closely watching Russian and American military relations with the Syrian Kurdish nationalist Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). While Iran has worked with the PYD and Russia to back Assad's forces, given its own increasingly volatile problems with Kurdish separatist groups, Tehran has rejected federalism in northern Syria (Geranmayeh & Liik, 2016, p. 6).

The Kurdish card is played by Russia not only in front of Iran, but mainly in relations with Turkey. Nevertheless, today Russian-Turkish relations seem to have reconciled after the freeze caused by the downing of a Russian jet by the Turkish air force on November 24, 2015. The fact is, there is by all means more rivalry than cooperation between Russia and Turkey. Firstly, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin represent aggressive and ambitious leaders driven by the desire to transform their respective countries into the powers they once were. It is no accident that their nicknames are "sultan" for Erdogan, and "tsar" for Putin. Even if current Russian-Turkish relations are pragmatically warm, there is not enough space in the Middle East and in the post-Soviet sphere for such ambitious leaders, and one day their interests are likely to clash once again. Secondly, regarding the Syrian crisis, they occupy the opposite positions in terms of Assad's removal from power and the role of Kurds in the Syrian conflict. Furthermore, while both countries formally had opposed the Islamic State and declared to weaken it, they were actually making use of it to garner legitimacy for their activities in Syria.

However, a variety of future scenarios in the Turkish-Russian confrontation are still possible, and the fact is that the stability in Syria is rather not possible without the mutual cooperation of Ankara and Moscow.

So, what are Israel's options for Russia in Syria? Choosing among bad and worse options – Bashar Assad's survival with Russian patronage in Syria or Iranian presence vide their proxies operating in close neighborhood with Israel – the calculation is quite clear in favor of adopting for Russians behind the borders. This is why the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has officially called on President Putin to follow a few demands or otherwise Israel will successfully hit any peace attempts by military involvement in Syria. Firstly, Israeli interests have to be taken into consideration during peace talks sponsored by Russia and Israel must be, even covertly, involved in these negotiations. Secondly, Russia – not Iran – should take responsibility for security in Syria. Thirdly, Israel will not accept any Iranian infrastructures for manufacturing, assembling, and storing advanced weapons anywhere in Syria. Lastly, Israel will not allow for Russian or Iranian arms transfers to Hezbollah or Shia militia in Syria (Dekel & Magen, 2017).

It is no wonder that when an Iranian drone was intercepted in Israeli airspace in February 2018, Israelis decided to respond militarily and strike targets in Syria. Despite the precise military operation, for the first time since the first Lebanese war in the 1980 the Israeli jet was brought down by anti-aircraft. This incident was definitely a mutual Israeli-Iranian exchange of messages that, on the one hand, Israel is ready to intervene and risk a full-scale conflict in Syria with Iranian forces and their allies, including Hezbollah if they would dig in on Syrian territory and approach the boundary with the Israeli-held portion of the Golan Heights. On the other hand, bringing down F-16 was a clear signal to Israel that the next such operation should be assessed as of a high risk and the capabilities of Iran in Syria must be taken as operative.

All in all, Israel took a few lessons from this accident. First of all, Iran has demonstrated its military capacity, what suggests that in the case of any Israeli intervention in its sphere of responsibility, Iran will respond. The scenario of a conflict with Hezbollah, which thanks to its involvement in Syrian war is now more experienced, better equipped and well trained, seems to be more likely. Hence, Israel should take into consideration a broader clash in the northern front of Golan Heights with the Iranian proxies in Syria and in southern Lebanon with Hezbollah. To make it more complex, the alternative of the conflict in the northern front is burdened by the risk of drawing Russia into the regional

confrontation. Therefore, the next conclusion is that Israel could not restrain Iran alone and any military scenario must consider not only the Russian factor and the assessment of how long Moscow could remain neutral but first of all whether the American administration would grant their permission being aware of the likelihood of a confrontation with Russia (Shapiro, 2018).

TRUMP FACTOR

The U.S. support is fundamental for Israel for the variety of reasons. The key factors are however the military and financial aid allowing Israel to keep the "qualitative military edge" (QME) over neighboring militaries, international backing which successfully neutralizes anti-Israeli resolutions in the United Nations, not to mention deeper mutual understanding and shared values (Sharp, 2018). Nevertheless, the U.S.-Israel special relationship used to be far from perfect. And the case was not only Barack Obama's presidency when some of the underlying foundations of this special alliance were challenged by more critical attitude towards Israel regarding to settlements' policy in the West Bank or the peace process in deadlock. Also, what was crucial for the Prime Minister Netanyahu – the diplomatic opening with Iran, an initiative that would end three decades of Iranian-American hostility in return for depriving Israel its strategic superiority in the Middle East (Katzman, 2016, pp. 65–94).

Not surprisingly, Netanyahu's government had been seriously concerned about the Israeli-American alliance under Barak Obama. It was in particular the rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran that was recognized as directly touching Israel's security and strengthening the risk of the U.S. abandoning its strategic ally (Jervis, 2017, pp. 31–57). Hence, it was ironic that it was Barak Obama, whose contact with the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was notoriously cold, to sign the largest in the U.S. history a 10-year agreement of \$38 billion deal for military aid to Israel (Booth & Eglash, 2016). Politically, such a huge package was partly a response to the nuclear deal that the United States and other P5+1 powers had finalized in July 2015, and it was harshly criticized by Netanyahu, who called it a "historic mistake" that would ease sanctions on Iran while leaving it with the ability to get the bomb one day, and the new money was an attempt to pacify Israeli concerns about continuing threats from Iran (Green, 2016).

Fortunately for Benjamin Netanyahu, Donald Trump has been sharing his antipathy for the Vienna deal, even as it sets them apart from the overwhelming majority of other world leaders. In line with the Israeli Prime Minister's stance, the American President firstly signaled his intention to withdraw certification of the Iran deal and then finally took the step. Although that does not lead directly to the end of the agreement, but it allowed to restore sanctions on Iran. In fact, Israel has little if any chances to stop Iranian nuclear deal, so Benjamin Netanyahu has to understand and appreciate his limitations and the tiny likelihood of stopping Iranian nuclear system by using primarily military solutions instead of diplomatic and political ones (Landau & Stein, 2015).

The Trump's staff responsible for the Middle East dominated by hawks and critics of the Iran deal as well as supporters for sanctions and preemptive attacks suggests that the American policy in the Middle East is likely more pro-Israeli and anti-Iranian than in the past. It is not surprising as President's Trump electorate is Christian and for biblical reasons pro-Israeli. They believe that creation of the Israel as a Jewish State was the fulfillment of biblical prophecy. This way the Israeli-American alliance is not only the result of political calculations and shared interests, but comes from more spiritual political philosophy. Consequently, there are numerous pro-Israeli politicians in the White House like Jared Kushner, the President's son-in-law leading the diplomatic effort in working on a proposal of a new Middle Eastern peace agreement, Jason Greenblatt, a special envoy to the Palestinian-Israeli peace process (till September 2019), and Nikki Haley, the U.S. envoy to the UN (till the end of 2018). In the very beginning, President Trump nominated David M. Friedman, a lawyer aligned with the Israeli far right, as an ambassador to Israel. Pro-Israeli were also John Bolton, a security advisor, and Mike Pompeo, the former director of CIA who replaced Rex Tillerson as the Secretary of State.

Coming to evangelical Christians' expectations, President Trump took the decision on moving the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem already in 2018 to make it coincide with the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the State of Israel planned for the 14th of May. The decision came despite overwhelming global opposition, not only the Palestinian one and the most of Muslim world, but it was in contrast to previous political consensus of all presidents so far. Putting aside the fact that the movement of the embassy to Jerusalem will not change anything on the ground, as for Israelis Jerusalem is their capital city, as well as Palestinians will not give up their claims for the East Jerusalem as their capital city.

All in all, this would bring to at least two consequences. Firstly, it is widely feared that moving it to the Holy City for Jews, Christians and Muslims will fuel anti-Jewish radicalism in the Muslim world if not spark anti-Israeli violence in the region. Secondly, it will push back already waning efforts to achieve peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Despite these worries the majority of the Israeli analysts has welcomed this decision. Some of them even doubt whether Palestinians and other Arab nations would carry out massive upheavals. For instance, Elliott Abrams, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in Washington, DC and Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor in the administration of President George W. Bush, claims that violence depends only on Arab leaders and if Palestinians want peace, they will negotiate for peace – wherever the U.S. embassy sits (Tzogopoulos, 2017).

There are justified worries, however. American politics in the Middle East being so favorable to Israel might force the Jewish State to face more security challenges than opportunities. First of all, recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital by moving the American embassy there from Tel Aviv disgraces the Palestinian authorities and primarily President Mahmoud Abbas, who turns out to lose his face in front of the Palestinian people and remain helpless in this situation. The problem for Israel is indeed not a weakening position of Abbas, but the risk of long-lasting, non-violent resistance of Palestinians both in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to which Israeli security forces are definitely not prepared. The logic is quite clear, as long as violence is on the Palestinian side, the Israelis will legally respond with force, but a non-violence may challenge Israel because it will likely help Palestinians to gain more international support and weaken their deeply ingrained image of terrorists and extremists. As a result, the more successful the non-violence is, the less successful is the Israeli campaign against a worldwide international criticism (Hussein, 2015, pp. 143–160).

Another potential threat for Israel is a risk of a new hybrid war. The U.S. politics in the Middle East bias towards Israel will likely fuel all grass-roots anti-Jewish sentiments in the region. Contrary to the conventional threat, the challenge would be the asymmetrical conflict against those with both guerilla and regular capabilities like Hezbollah and Hamas. These organizations could not be perceived any more as typical irregular militias based on spontaneous supporters due to the long-lasting experience of Hezbollah in Syria or Hamas in three mini-wars with Israel, more professionalism thanks to an advanced military training delivered by high professionals (Russians and Iranians for Hezbollah),

financing from abroad, better equipment and improvement of logistic skills (Davis, 2016, pp. 68–72). While none of them is interested in a direct clash with Israeli, it is predicted however that a potential conflict cannot be excluded in south of Lebanon, the Gaza Strip and most of Israel's parts, according to the range and location of Hezbollah or Hamas rockets and missiles regardless of the capabilities of the Israeli anti-rocket system intercepting missiles in the air (Eilam, 2016, pp. 247, 254).

Hamas has been governing Gaza since 2007 and for more than ten years it has been in charge of managing the public security, health system and administration. Within a decade Gaza's two million residents have suffered from poor humanitarian conditions, high unemployment (44 percent), poverty (40 percent), not to mention the lack of reconstruction after wars with Israel (*Palestine's Economic Outlook*, 2017). Struggling with the fallout from an Israeli-Egyptian border blockade since 2007, Hamas has found it increasingly difficult to govern or provide basic services to Gaza's residents. So, the very last reconciliation agreement that Hamas and Fatah signed in Cairo in October 2017 has been giving Hamas some political benefits. However, its implementation is still questionable and quite likely may end up like the previous attempts. Nevertheless, the handover of Gaza administrative control to the Palestinian unity government will allow Hamas to saddle all costs and responsibility of governing Gaza with Mahmoud Abbas' administration especially as he started pushing Hamas to return the territory to the PA's control by refusing to pay for Gaza electricity, administration salaries and public health. This is why Hamas – eager to rid itself of the burdens of governing, though unwilling to disarm its military wing – showed flexibility at the talks. The calculation is clear, public and administration will become the responsibility of Fatah whereas security and resistance of Hamas. Moreover, the process of reconciliation might help Hamas to weaken the position of President Abbas, who is now suffering from a general criticism in the West Bank for lack of success in attempts to negotiate the terms of Palestinian statehood with Israel, no legacy and chronic corruption. Simultaneously, it helps him to strengthen Abbas' rival Mohammad Dahlan, the ousted Gaza leader of the Palestinian Fatah movement, who lives in exile in the United Arab Emirates. Hamas is hoping that an alliance with Dahlan would persuade some Arab countries to provide financial aid to the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Finally, Hamas does not want to be the party responsible for the reconciliation's failure lest this undermines its relationship with Egypt as its position has been weakened by recent developments in the region, includ-

ing Saudi-led moves against Qatar, once a major financial contributor to Gaza (Haaretz & Reuters, 2018).

Despite its weakness and reconciliation process with Fatah, Hamas realizes that at a time when the entire Arab world is fighting the U.S. President Donald Trump's decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital, it cannot remain on the sidelines. Thus, it is trying to show that it is actively opposing Trump's announcement by, *inter alia*, organizing "The March of Return" in Gaza, a return not to the peace process, which Hamas rejects out of hand, or to the pre-1967 boundaries, which it refuses to recognize, but to 1948, the year of setting up Israel (Chafets, 2018). The "March of Return" has unveiled a new tactic, mass swarming, designed to force Israeli troops at the border, provoke to use force and, at the end of the day, the international condemnation. It seems, however, not to work so successfully. Meanwhile, the lesson for Israel is that it should improve its capabilities in case of such not-so-violent "marches" and "days of rage" but very provocative and aiming rather at gaining the mass-media attention and international societies' hearts and minds.

The U.S. pro-Israeli decisions are creating, among many challenges, also opportunities for the Israeli government. More precisely, although the decision of moving the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem would reverse decades of the U.S. policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and undermine Washington's role as a broker in the peace process, the undoubted advantage is that Israel's relation with some Arab countries, mostly the Persian Gulf monarchies and mainly Saudi Arabia, has become no more so-covert-alliance as well as no more a taboo. Such a shift may bring a broader, however, still limited pragmatization of contacts with the Arab countries based on mutual interests, like, first of all, confrontation with Iran by exchanging intelligence with the Saudis. What is important for Israel, Saudis and Qataris play a significant role in the Palestinian conflict, which is for now fairly low on the agenda of the Middle East in turmoil, but in case of restarting the peace process it would be crucial to limit the Arab monarchies involvement onto the talks or at least their critical reaction to the "ultimate deal" which President Trump promised to make between Israelis and Palestinians.

The image of the U.S. as solely pro-Israeli ally is one thing, practical strategy is quite another. Although many of Trump's words may be welcome in Israel and Saudi Arabia, both governments know that the U.S. policy seems adrift in the region. The declining role of Americans in the Middle East since Obama's presidency has created a more complex situation of Israel and encouraged the local players retained greater ability to determine regional politics on their own.

As a result, historical grievances, geopolitical rivalries and ideological clashes, which never disappeared from the agenda, are able to manifest themselves more freely than before, and here it is enough to point a virulent competition for regional hegemony between Saudi Arabia and Iran which is able to destabilize entirely the region (Istomin, 2016, p. 4).

The lesson for Israel is – in spite of the ongoing alliance with the U.S. – to be more self-reliant in terms of security in the Middle East. President Trump's decisions may harm Israel in the long run, like by stating in Ohio in March 29, 2018 that the American forces will be pulled out of Syria "very soon". The problem is not the sole declaration but the following words "Let the other people take care of it now" (Merica, Liptak, & Diamond, 2018), which suggests that Syria will likely become either Russia's "protectorate" or Iran's. Such declarations are concerning Israel and other regional nations like at least Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon as being the most impacted by the war in Syria. From their perspective, the U.S. military presence in Syria has been seen as a buffer against Iranian activity, and especially against Tehran's desire to establish a contiguous land route from Iran to the Mediterranean coast in Lebanon.

IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION

The Arab Spring and the following war in Syria have transformed the regional politics as well as shifted the balance of power. First of all, it has highlighted declining interest of the United States in the region and simultaneously elevated regional states like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey and the newcomers like Russia. Consequently, the political vacuum created by a limited activity of the Americans has been filled to some extent by Russians taking any opportunity to find and use the leverage to bargain with the U.S. in other regions.

The Arab Spring, seen from Israel, was a chance to topple the regime of Bashar Assad and install in Damascus more moderate government. These hopes became soon pointless due to capturing the success of the Arab Spring by Islamic fundamentalists and particularly Iran. So, once again it turned out that in the Middle East things are not always what they seem to be.

Moreover, Moscow, at first glance seen as an acceptable partner in the Middle East, is in fact much more a risky one. Its interests are more global than Israeli ones and the Middle East is not a priority for Russia, as it is rather an instrument of leverage in front of the United States. So, President Putin, who is recognized

rightly as pro-Israeli, might easily maneuver between Israel, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel to achieve Russia's interests. If in Kremlin's strategy would be a rapprochement with Tehran, Moscow will not hesitate to act in favor of Iran. Nevertheless, the paradox and at the same time the room for Israel is that Russia's position in the Middle East is neither so stable, nor so crucial. In fact, Americans who are seen as abandoning the region cannot disengage from the Middle East completely and are able – if needed – to limit Russian inroads to the region.

Finally, however the regional political circumstances have been changed dramatically, the task for Israeli security has not been changed so much and remains focused on not-so-new two assumptions – to rely first of all on itself in terms of defense and to keep the U.S. involved and focused into the Middle East.

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TOO MUCH OR TOO LITTLE INTEGRATION? EU AND ASEAN RESPONSES TO THE 2015 MIGRATION CRISIS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

ZA DUŻO CZY ZA MAŁO INTEGRACJI? REAKCJE UNII
EUROPEJSKIEJ I ASEAN NA KRYZYS MIGRACYJNY Z 2015
ROKU – ANALIZA PORÓWNAWCZA

*Katarzyna Marzęda-Młynarska** 

— ABSTRACT —

The study analyzes the responses of the European Union (EU) and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to the 2015 migration crisis and answers two questions: first, why did those two regional organizations prove ineffective in dealing with 2015 migration crisis? Second, why despite different legal, institutional and functional frameworks for cooperation in the migration field, the process by which both organizations made their decisions was very similar? The analysis of the EU and ASEAN migration governance frameworks shows neither too much integration (EU) nor too little (ASEAN) favor regional migration crisis solving.

Keywords: EU; ASEAN; 2015 migration crisis

— ABSTRAKT —

Celem artykułu jest analiza reakcji Unii Europejskiej (UE) i Stowarzyszenia Narodów Azji Południowo-Wschodniej (ASEAN) na kryzys migracyjny 2015 roku oraz uzyskanie odpowiedzi na dwa pytania badawcze: po pierwsze, dlaczego oba ugrupowania integracyjne okazały się nieskuteczne w rozwiązywaniu kryzysu migracyjnego z 2015 roku? Po drugie, dlaczego pomimo różnych normatywnych, instytucjonalnych i funkcjonalnych ram współpracy w obszarze migracji proces podejmowania decyzji w związku z kryzysem migracyjnym wyglądał podobnie w obu ugrupowaniach? Analiza modelu zarządzania problemem migracji w UE i ASEAN wykazała, że zarówno za dużo, jak i za mało integracji nie sprzyja rozwiązywaniu regionalnych kryzysów migracyjnych.

Słowa kluczowe: UE; ASEAN; kryzys migracyjny 2015

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INTRODUCTION

The year 2015 marks a turning point in the perception of migration crises. While international migrations are well known phenomena from the beginning of time, recent migration waves have completely changed public perceptions, by contributing to the deep polarization of attitudes and levels of social acceptance. Although the study does not aim to analyze the essence and the specificity of modern migrations, it is necessary to stress that the migration flows observed in 2015 were a mixture of well-known push and pull factors (Rosenblum & Tichenor, 2012) influenced by information sharing (new communication devices, social media and Internet propaganda), traffickers and human rights NGO operations, and a growing consciousness of rights and obligations derived from international law. All of these contributed to a large-scale migration that individual states were unable to deal with.

The inability of individual states to deal effectively with transnational challenges (Caballero-Anthony, 2016, pp. 3–19) creates a need for multilateral cooperation. In the case of the 2015 migration crises in Southeast Asia and Europe, their scale, speed and scope made regional responses necessary, yet the results of actions taken by the European Union (EU) and Association of South-East Asian Nations – ASEAN – were unsatisfactory in both cases.

The study aims to analyze the responses of the EU and ASEAN to the 2015 migration crisis and answer two questions: why, despite different legal, institutional and functional governance frameworks, did those two regional cooperation mechanisms prove ineffective in dealing with 2015 crisis? and, why the process by which both organizations made their decisions was so similar?

The paper consists of four parts. The first presents the context, with a brief description of the 2015 crises in Europe and Southeast Asia. The second compares regional migration governance frameworks of the EU and ASEAN according three dimensions: legal, institutional, and functional. The third section analyzes the responses of both regional organizations to the crisis, addressing following questions: how was the problem perceived? what kind of actions were taken to solve it? and what were the results of the actions taken? The final section presents conclusions derived a comparison of the cases.

The research aim will be addressed by a review of both regional organizations' legal regulations before the crisis; analysis of statements, declarations, policies, and new regulations adopted during the crisis as well as actions taken by the EU and ASEAN in response to the 2015 migration crisis. The time frame of the

analysis is limited to the two years: 2015 – when the crisis arose, and 2016 – when the first results of actions taken have occurred.

THE CONTEXT

The definition of a migration crisis adopted by International Organization for Migration (IOM) identifies four elements: scale, speed, scope, and extraordinary results (IOM, 2012). Migration flows can easily transform into migration crises due to a rapidly growing flow of migrants, observed in one time and in one place, that is hard to control and manage and often extends beyond national border. Undoubtedly above-mentioned elements characterized situation the EU and ASEAN have faced in 2015.

The scale. More than one million people arrived in Europe and over 1,5 million applied for asylum in 2015 (IOM, 2015a). According to IOM data, total arrivals to Europe in 2015 exceeded slightly more than one million and reached 1,046,599 (IOM, 2015a). According to Frontex – the EU's Border and Coast Guard Agency – the number of illegal entries into EU territory increased six-fold in 2015: from 282,962 people in 2014 to 1,822,337 in 2015 (FRONTEX, 2016). In some cases, this meant more than a one thousand per cent increase in migrant inflows, especially from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq (FRONTEX, 2016).

The scale of the migration crisis in Southeast Asia was comparable. According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), in 2014 the number of refugees and asylum seekers exceeded 520,000 and most of them originated from Myanmar. In addition, there were 1,5 million stateless persons and 20,000 illegal maritime migrants (UNHCR, 2014). In 2015, the situation did not improve and the number of refugees and asylum seekers remained unchanged (UNHCR, 2015). Most of migrants were members of the Muslim Rohingya minority from Myanmar. The Rohingya exodus re-emerged as a point of concern in Southeast Asia in late April 2015. The oppressive policy of the Myanmar government, which resulted in the withdrawal of citizenship from the Rohingyas, made them stateless and unwelcome in Myanmar (Parnini, 2013, pp. 281–297). Many of them migrated to neighboring Bangladesh, yet harsh conditions there, the absence of prospects for the future, and the activities of people smugglers contributed to their movement towards more promising destinations such as Australia, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

The next big exodus occurred in the summer of 2017, when more than 700,000 people arrived in Bangladesh (IOM, 2018).

The scope. The massive inflow of migrants in 2015 was a burden to only some EU member states, those located at the external borders of the most popular migration routes and those chosen as destination or asylum claims countries. Since the largest number of migrants have entered the EU through the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkan routes, the massive influx of immigrants has been a burden for Greece, Italy, and Hungary, where migrants first arrived. According to the IOM, in 2015, more than 850,000 immigrants arrived in Greece, more than 150,000 in Italy and more than 400,000 in Hungary (IOM, 2015b). This placed enormous pressure on immigration services in those countries and contributed to many social, economic and political issues. The next group of countries where the migration crisis became particularly visible were destination and asylum claim states. According to Eurostat, there were over 1.2 million asylum applications in EU in 2015 compared to 560,000 in 2014 (EUROSTAT, 2016). The highest number of first-time applicants per million inhabitants in 2015 were recorded in Hungary (17,699), Sweden (16,006), Austria (9,970), and Germany (5,441; EUROSTAT, 2016). In absolute numbers, the highest number of applicants were in Germany (more than 400,000), in Hungary (more than 170,000), and in Sweden (more than 150,000; EUROSTAT, 2016).

The same problems were observed in Southeast Asia, where the massive influx of Rohingya migrants was a particular burden for Bangladesh and several ASEAN member-states, including Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. According to the UNHCR statistics in 2018, there are almost 1.5 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh (ASEAN Post, 2018), 150,000 in Malaysia, 5,000 in Thailand, and 1,000 in Indonesia. The total number of refugees and people in refugee-like situation at the end of 2016 was highest in three from ASEAN member states: Indonesia – 197,851; Malaysia – 92,263 and Thailand – 106,447 (UNHCR, 2016a). Despite the relatively low number of Rohingya refugees in the ASEAN member states, the countries affected were unable, for a number of reasons, to effectively address the problem, especially growing number of “boat people” (UNHCR, 2016b).

The speed. The massive inflows of migrants to the EU were unexpected even though the signs of it were observed in many parts of the EU. While there was little change in 2014 during the first five months of 2015, it changed dramatically

in June 2015. During the following months, the number of immigrants increased rapidly, peaking in October 2015. While the outbreak of the crisis is associated with the German Chancellor's September 2015 decision to allow free movement for all migrants to chosen EU states, increased numbers were observed as early as June 2015, when the number of immigrants doubled. Within the next three months it was clear that the rapid inflow of migrants was not a temporary situation that could be prevented by existing policies and regulations but the beginning of a migration crisis. Its speed surprised most of the affected countries as well as EU institutions.

The outbreak of the migration crisis in Southeast Asia in 2015 is associated with the sudden increase of maritime migrants, among whose Rohingya refugees had dominated. It was a direct effect of many factors: continuation of Myanmar oppressive policy towards Rohingya, disclosure of smugglers ruthlessness towards migrants through discovery of mass graves in southern Thailand, and changes in policy towards people smugglers in Thailand. While for many years Thai authorities turned the blind eye for illegal Rohingya migration, the situation changed in 2015. In the face of shocking discovery, Thai Prime Minister ordered fight against people smugglers and tightened border policy. For migrants who had managed to reach the coast of Thailand by boats it was no longer possible to reach Malaysia. They were abandoned by smugglers, and became a huge humanitarian and political challenge for region countries in May 2015. The essence of the migrant crisis in Southeast Asia, unlike the European Union, was not in the sudden increase of a number of "boat people" but in the reluctance and indifference of the region countries, forced to take decisive steps in the face of the inevitable humanitarian crisis.

The results. Member states and EU institutions were both caught by surprise and unprepared for the unprecedented inflow of people. The results of the 2015 migration crisis can be divided into two categories: those for the affected states, and those for the entire EU. For the individual member states, the migration crisis meant the physical influx of immigrants, followed by problems with providing them with food, water, shelter, and other social services. The sudden influx of people has generated high costs, especially for the first arrival states such as Greece, Italy, and Hungary. It has revealed a lack of preparation of immigration services paralyzed by the "flood" of asylum applications and an inability to identify and register all who were crossing the borders. Chaos and improvisation are the best characterizations of the actions taken by individual states in the face

of the crisis. The situation stabilized, yet new problems have emerged: social tensions, terrorist attacks and increased violence and crime. At the EU level, the migration crisis has exposed several problems, from ineffective border protection, through asylum procedures, and the ending of the Schengen Agreement on the internal free movement of people.

The results of Rohingya migration crisis in Southeast Asia were not so severe as in Europe. Due to a number of factors, Rohingya migration has been observed since 1970s. ASEAN member states were aware of the problem, yet due to ASEAN's non-interference principle they did not take decisive steps to solve it until the spring of 2015, when global public opinion saw unpleasant pictures of "boat people" denied access to ASEAN ports. The biggest challenge for the ASEAN member states was not, however, how to provide unwelcome migrants with basic needs, but rather how to prevent them from entering their territory due to the growing perception of the Rohingya as a security threat accompanied by the growing reluctance to accept more Rohingya refugees associated with criminal activities and Islamic fundamentalism (Wolf, 2015). At the ASEAN level, the Rohingya crisis has revealed many problems, including the growing challenge of how to accommodate the principles of respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs with a humanitarian crisis created by one of the members.

THE EU AND ASEAN GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK IN THE FIELD OF MIGRATION

The European Union has the most comprehensive model of regional migration governance in the world. It addresses mobility, social rights, and security and provides supranational enforcement mechanisms (Lavenex et al., 2015). It consists of two governance mechanisms: inward, i.e., the internal movement of EU citizens, and outward, i.e., the migration of people from third states. These cannot be treated separately, but rather as two sides of the same coin.

The free movement of people within the EU (EU nationals) is a part of the broader concept of the single market. It is one of the four fundamental freedoms of the EU's single market, along with the movement of capital, goods, and services (Lavenex et al. 2015). The right to free movement is treated as a fundamental EU principle and enshrined in the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union.

The current governance framework in this area is a result of the evolution of the concept of the free movement of people. Starting with the Treaty of Rome,

when the first provisions were included on free movement of workers, through the Treaty of Maastricht, which introduced the notion of EU citizenship to all nationals of member states, and ending with the Treaty of Lisbon, which confirmed this right.

Without doubt, adoption of the Schengen Agreement and its transfer to the EU *acquis* constituted the key point in establishing a true free movement of people. It applies the same rules to twenty-two EU full Schengen members (with the exemption of Denmark which enjoys an opt-out) plus Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein. Of the six remaining EU members, the UK and Ireland are not part of Schengen, Romania, Bulgaria and Cyprus are due to join, and Croatia has begun its accession procedure. The internal migration mechanism also includes some rights for third country nationals; these are addressed in two EU directives: the EU Long Terms Residents Directive (EU, 2003b) and the EU Family Reunification Directive (EU, 2003a).

While the Schengen Agreement can be treated as a tangible manifestation of the internal free movement of EU citizens, it is inseparable from the European governance mechanism dealing with external migration. The obligations of Schengen membership, including the abolition of internal border controls for all persons, measures to strengthen and harmonize external borders, a common visa policy for nationals of third states, police and judicial cooperation, and the establishment of the Schengen Information System, have profound consequences for effective governance in this area.

The second EU migration governance mechanism applies to third-state nationals who want to enter EU territory. It includes legal and illegal migration policies as well as an asylum policy. Since this study concentrates on the migration crisis, the analysis will concentrate mostly on asylum policy.

The European Union framework on asylum consists of three levels, international, supranational and national (Nancheva, 2015; Langford, 2013), and can be analyzed from legal, institutional and functional perspectives.

Legal. The legal basis for European asylum policy is enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Art. 67 (2) and 78; EU, 2012) and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Art. 18; EU, 2000) with strong reference to core international legal instruments in this area, the Geneva Convention of 1951, the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1967, and the non-refoulement principle. The legal instruments consist of directives, regulations and decisions that cover many issues and that in most cases provide answers to emerging prob-

lems and issues. Most recent are the European Council decisions and proposed regulations that addressed the European migration crisis. EU secondary law has a profound impact on national asylum policy, since it must be transposed to domestic legislation in the context of procedures, reception, treatment, and protection of refugees. The member states' close cooperation on asylum is framed by the Lisbon Treaty, which transformed the measures on asylum into a common policy.

Institutional. While from a legal point of view the milestone for European asylum policy was the Treaty of Lisbon, from an institutional point of view the milestone was the Treaty of Amsterdam, which shifted visa, immigration and asylum policy from the EU's intergovernmental third pillar to the first pillar and provided EU institutions with new competencies in asylum and migration policy. The Lisbon Treaty changed the way the Council of the European Union decides in the immigration and asylum area from the unanimity required by the Treaty of Nice to qualified majority voting. That is, individual member states have no veto power on asylum and immigration and must accept decisions even if they are contrary to their interests. What is more, the institutional dimension of European Asylum policy is strongly influenced by the interplay between supranational and national governance (Nancheva, 2015; Langford, 2013). While member states are bound by European regulations, they are reluctant to further "Europeanize" asylum due to their fears of losing sovereign control over such a sensitive issue as immigration.

Functional. The aim of EU asylum policy is to harmonize asylum procedures in member states by establishing common asylum arrangements. This work was initiated in 1999. During the next six years (1999–2005), several legislative measures harmonizing common minimum standards for asylum were adopted. These include the Temporary Protection Directive that allowed for a common EU response to a mass influx of displaced people unable to return to their country of origin (EU, 2001) and the creation of the European Refugee Fund (EU, 2007) aimed at strengthening financial solidarity between member states. The establishment of the new common European asylum system – CEAS¹ – was

¹ The present rules of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) consist of the following elements: 1/ the revised Asylum Procedures Directive seeks to improve decision-making in the area of asylum; 2/ the revised Reception Condition Directive aims to improve and harmonize reception

completed in 2013 with the adoption of the amended Dublin Regulation and the Regulation on Eurodac – European Dactyloscopy. European regional governance also includes the protection of the EU's external border. Despite the fact the main responsibility still rests with states, some competencies in this area have been granted to Frontex. Its main responsibility is to facilitate cooperation between border authorities in member states. While not considered a part of the CEAS, it plays an important role in border management and fighting against illegal migration fueled by people smuggling.

Unlike the EU, ASEAN does not have an extensive regional migration governance model. It is limited to regulations on labor mobility between member states that cover selected categories of skilled persons for limited periods of time and limited market access (Levenex & Panizzon, 2013). Since ASEAN remains an intergovernmental organization, there are no institutions or bodies responsible for the creation, monitoring, implementation, or enforcement of regional asylum or immigration policy. What is more, there is no division between internal and external migration but rather between economic and forced migration (Petcharamesree, 2016). This does not mean, however, that there is no cooperation in the migration area. As with the previous analysis of the EU, the legal, institutional and functional dimension of ASEAN regional migration governance will be assessed.

Legal. The legal basis for ASEAN's regional migration governance can be divided into two categories. The first consists of regulations on trade, services, and investments, where the problem of labor mobility is addressed. It includes the Framework Agreement on Services (ASEAN, 1995), which stressed the need for a freer flow of labor and professionals among member states, the Agreement on Movement of Natural Persons (ASEAN, 2012a), where the mobility is linked to trade and investments, the Mutual Recognition Arrangements for professional services (Engineering 2005, Nursing 2006; Architectural 2007, Surveying Qualification 2007, Dental 2009, Medical 2009, Accountancy 2009, Tourism 2012), and

conditions (humanitarian and material) offered to asylum seekers in the entire EU; 3/ the revised Qualification Directive seeks to clarify and harmonize the conditions of granting protection; 4/ the regulation on establishing the European Asylum Support Office; 5/ the revised Dublin Regulation to establish the responsibility of member states for processing asylum application (first member state the asylum seeker reaches); and 6/ the revised Eurodac Regulation to create an EU database of the fingerprints of asylum seekers to avoid the multiplication of asylum application by a single asylum seeker in different states.

the Declaration on Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (ASEAN, 2007) signed in 2007 by ASEAN leaders (not yet ratified).

The second category is regulations that address the human rights dimension of migration, however, as Petcharamesree argues, “[...] although ASEAN has shown commitment to human rights and international law the political will to address [it in the contexts of] forced migration is not yet present” (Petcharamesree, 2016, p. 181). This category includes the ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons, Particularly Women and Children (ASEAN, 2004), and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (ASEAN, 2012b). Both documents operate according to the main ASEAN principle of respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs and, therefore, the way they are interpreted and implemented depends on individual member states. What is more, most ASEAN member states are not signatories to the UN Refugee Convention (the exemptions are Philippines and Cambodia) and its Protocol meaning that, from the legal point of view, the problem of asylum seekers and refugees does not exist in ASEAN regional migration governance.

Institutional. The commitment to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs determines the institutional dimension of ASEAN cooperation in the migration area. Unlike the EU, there are no regional institutions responsible for addressing a regional migration crisis. The authority still rests with national governments, yet there are examples of institutionalization of cooperation in the form of ASEAN Commissions on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children and on Human Rights. It should be stressed, however, that both have an intergovernmental character and operate under the non-interference in internal affairs principle (Petcharamesree, 2016, pp. 183–184).

Functional. The reluctance of ASEAN member states to establish a supranational framework for addressing the regional migration crisis is balanced by their involvement in broader regional cooperation. The Bali Process, established in 2002 as a wider Asia-Pacific framework, gathers not only all ASEAN member states but also the ASEAN Secretariat as an observer. This process sought to address the issue of people smuggling and trafficking, yet its value lay in assisting states cope with illegal migration by adopting international asylum management. It is argued that it has contributed positively to finding regional responses to the 2009 “mini migration crisis” in Southeast Asia (Petcharamesree, 2016, pp.

183–185). Since all ASEAN member states recognize that illegal migration and refugee protection require regional solutions, the consensual mechanism based on support and encouragement rather than imposition of constraints on national sovereignty could better facilitate regional cooperation.

RESPONSES TO THE MIGRATION CRISIS

Despite different models of regional migration governance, the EU and ASEAN undertook concrete actions to address and solve the migration crisis in Europe and Southeast Asia. The analysis of the responses is organized around three issues: the perception of the problem, the actions taken to solve it, and the results of those actions.

PERCEPTION OF THE PROBLEM

EU. At the beginning, the migration crisis was perceived as a humanitarian problem that needed more decisive action in rescuing migrant boats. This interpretation dominated public discourse at the European and national level until the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, when a new “security” interpretation was added. At the national level, in most EU member states the problem was interpreted as a humanitarian challenge yet, from the very beginning, it was also viewed as a security challenge in some – Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and later Poland, Bulgaria, Denmark, Austria, and the Netherlands. The interpretation of the migration crisis has strongly polarized public opinion in most EU member states and raised support for anti-immigration movements.

ASEAN. The Rohingya migration crisis in Southeast Asia was interpreted both as a humanitarian and security problem by the most affected ASEAN member states – Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The discovery of mass graves in southern Thailand followed by the rescue of 2000 boat people by Indonesia and Malaysia drew public attention to the Rohingya problem as a humanitarian challenge. However, despite sympathy for the Rohingya, the humanitarian aspects of the crisis were competing with security rhetoric fueled by allegations that the migration of Muslim Rohingya raised the challenge of Islamic terrorism in the region (Wolf, 2015). At the national level, the “security” interpretation of the Rohingya

crisis prevailed. At the ASEAN level, it was interpreted as a political challenge that could be solved through political dialogue rather than political pressure.

ACTIONS TAKEN TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM

EU. At the EU level, the actions taken concentrated on four issues: physical influx of migrants, the protection of the EU's external border, asylum procedures according to CEAS, and maintenance of the internal free movement of people granted by the Schengen Agreement. Four types of actions were taken to deal with the physical influx of migrants:

- rescue operations aimed at boat migrants;
- enhancing the European solidarity quota system to help the states (Italy, Greece, Hungary) where the largest groups of immigrants had arrived;
- a relocation mechanism sought to share the burden of arriving immigrants between EU member states;
- agreements with and support for third-countries (Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan).

Actions regarding the external border concentrated on three problems:

- strengthening the border;
- regaining control of external borders, including effective fighting against people smuggling;
- external border management, including effective registration of migrants and creating hotspots where migrants could be registered.

On October 15, The European Council decided on strengthening the EU's external borders to include an integrated border management system that will go beyond the current Frontex mandate and the addition of hundreds of additional border guards to secure hotspot areas in Greece and Italy. On February 18–19, 2016, the European Council decided to improve external border management, including the need to gradually get back to a situation where all Members of the Schengen area fully apply the Schengen Borders Code, and to make hotspots fully functional. There was also discussion at the Justice and Home Affairs Council on creating a European border and coast guard. The main objective of the European border guard would be to ensure and implement, as a shared responsibility, European integrated border management at the EU's external borders. It would consist of a European Border Guard Agency and national authorities responsible for border management. The European Border and Coast Guard became fully

operational in October 2016 (EC, 2016). Since the beginning of the migration crisis, the EU has initiated operations to fight people smuggling. The EU action plan against migrant smuggling was adopted on May 27, 2015. One month later, the EU launched the EUNAVFOR Med (later Sophia operation), naval operation against human smugglers and traffickers in the Mediterranean. Part of the solution was an agreement with Turkey.

In the case of asylum procedures, the EU discussed reforming the Common European Asylum System. On April 6, 2016, the European Commission presented a project for reform that identified five areas where the CEAS should be changed: adoption of a distribution of migrants mechanism to insure fairness and solidarity in responsibility (change the first state obligation?); replacement of the Asylum Procedures Directive and Qualification Directive with new regulations setting standards on asylum procedures to help eliminate asylum shopping; preventing secondary movement within the EU by making certain rights conditional upon registration, fingerprinting, and staying in the country assigned to the applicant; broadening the European Asylum Support Office mandate by giving it new competencies in policy-implementing and operational (distribution mechanism, harmonization of standards); and reinforcing the Eurodac system. The negative reaction expressed by some member states to the proposal proved that there is strong opposition to the direction of the European Commission's reform proposal.

With respect to the maintenance of Schengen, the EU adopted internal border controls. On May 12, 2015, the Council of the EU adopted a recommendation that allows for the continuation of temporary internal border controls in exceptional circumstances. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway could maintain temporary border controls at specific places on their borders for a maximum period of six months. The restoration of border controls by different European states due to the migration crisis puts the Schengen Agreement into question.

ASEAN. The actions taken at the regional level to solve the migration crisis are described by some experts as "regional deterrence" rather than "regional cooperation" (Mathew, 2015). They concentrated on managing the crisis rather than addressing its root causes. There was little cooperation and the states make decisions unilaterally. Most of the actions taken reflected the security perception of migration crisis: boats were sent back, and migrants were detained, deported, or located in special camps. There were two ASEAN special meetings devoted to

the migrant crisis, in May and December 2015, attended by 17 and 18 regional states, respectively. The results of those meetings included the temporary acceptance of boat people by Indonesia and Malaysia, intensification of search and rescue operations, assistance to states dealing with the crisis, creation of legal channels for migration, financial support for the International Organization for Migration, and launching an information campaign addressing the problem of illegal migration. Since these were proposals and recommendations, their implementation depended on the political will of the involved states. The process of migration crisis solving was included into the institutional framework of ASEAN Ministerial Meetings on Transnational Crime – AMMTC. Two meetings were organized in that format: Emergency AMMTC on July 2015, and 10th AMMTC on September 2015 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The outcome of those meetings was the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on Irregular Movements of Persons in Southeast Asia (ASEAN, 2015), in which, apart from the insignificant commitments, regarding the deepening of knowledge and the dissemination of information on the crisis, ASEAN member states agreed on establishment of Special Task Force to respond the crisis and emergency situation arising from irregular movement of persons in Southeast Asia, as well as establishing trust fund administered by ASEAN Secretariat for voluntary contribution to support humanitarian operations addressed to migrants. There was no addressing of the main source of migrant crisis and no “finger pointing” in the Declaration. What is more, in its preamble the parties expressed their highest concern to the impact of irregular migration on the national security of certain countries, namely Malaysia, Myanmar (sic!), Thailand and Indonesia (ASEAN, 2015).

RESULTS OF THE ACTIONS TAKEN

EU. The actions taken by the EU institutions proved inadequate in solving the migration crisis. The biggest failure was the relocation process. Through the end of 2015 only 272 migrants had been relocated and by September 2017, the deadline for implementation, only 29,000 of the planned 160,000 had been relocated. The other failure was the naval operation against people smuggling that was transformed into a rescue operation. Instead of fighting the smugglers, EU naval forces became their “partners” in transfer of illegal migrants to Europe. The attempts to reform the CEAS also faced strong opposition from member states. There is no consensus on the depth of reform. For some member states,

the European Commission propositions go too far and interfere with state sovereignty. In contrast, full compliance was achieved in external border control. All EU members recognized the need to strengthen the external border and demonstrated the will to cooperate. It should be emphasized, however, that the highest impact on slowing down the migrant inflow to the EU were decisions made by individual states located along the Balkan route (Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, and Austria) to close their borders to illegal migrants and the agreement signed with Turkey.

ASEAN. The actions taken at the regional level aimed to solve the Rohingya crisis in Southeast Asia have also proven inadequate. The biggest failure was ASEAN's inability to develop a common response to the evident violation of human rights in Myanmar that fueled the crisis. The framework of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration was not used, even though its adoption prove the ASEAN member states *de facto* recognize refugee protection as a human right. Instead they chose the framework of the ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons, Particularly Women and Children, as a way to address the security dimension of the migration crisis and "safer" option in the non-interference principle context. ASEAN's political potential to play a greater role in constructing a long-term solution to Myanmar's domestic ethnic problems remained unused (Farzana, 2015). The crisis highlighted the unwillingness to go beyond the non-interference principle. Ultimately, the priority given to unilateral solutions was finally overcome when the negative consequences of illegal migration, especially on the security side, were realized by the states, however, the actions taken did not solve the problem or stop the boat migration in the Southeast Asian region. Two years later, in 2017, more than 700,000 Rohingya minority members fled from Myanmar to Bangladesh.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of the EU and ASEAN responses to the migration crisis indicate that regional solutions proved ineffective. Despite substantial differences between the EU and ASEAN, regional migration governance model was neither able to deliver tools for the effective control and management of the massive inflow of illegal migrants nor to solve the problem at its roots. In the case of EU, the slowing down of the migrant influx was not due to decisions taken at the European level,

but rather to those of individual states that had decided to protect their borders and control their own territory. The question of root causes of the migrant crisis (conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, poverty and lack of perspectives in African states) was not a major issue in a process of migration crisis solving in 2015 and 2016. In the case of ASEAN, mixture of internal and external constraints made it impossible to address both the humanitarian and political dimension of the problem. On the one hand, the lack of the legal framework on refugee or illegal migration made impossible addressing human aspects of migration crisis in a proper way. What is more, “without a commitment to a principled bottom line, it will be [from today’s perspective, it was indeed – K.M.-M.] difficult to achieve regional cooperation on refugee issues” (Mathew, 2015). Only two from ten ASEAN member states are parties to the 1951 Convention on Refugee Status and the Protocol. On the other hand, the issue of sovereignty, ethnic composition and economic development differences resulted in an inability to go beyond the non-interference principle, what in a case of 2015 Southeast Asia migration crisis made impossible the simplest solution – to solve the Rohingya crisis at its roots, i.e., Myanmar policy towards Rohingya minority.

The comparison of the migration governance frameworks and responses of the EU and ASEAN allows us to answer the research questions posed in the introduction. Why did the EU and ASEAN prove ineffective in dealing with 2015 migration crisis, despite different legal, institution and functional governance frameworks in migration? And why the process by which both organizations made their decisions was so similar? The empirical analysis has revealed that national governments rather than regional organizations are still the key players in addressing migration problems, and the failure of collective responses to regional migration crises can be interpreted as a function of the national governments’ fears of undermining their sovereign control over the key elements of statehood: people and territory. In the case of the European Union the main problem was a tendency to “Europeanize” asylum and immigration policy. The pursuit by European supranational institutions to broaden their mandate at the expense of national governments and forcing solutions that did not take into consideration interests of member states can be perceived as the biggest obstacles to common and solidarity actions. Most of the member states saw costs and problems rather than tangible benefits and the solutions proposed by the European institutions interfered deeply with state sovereignty. The European bureaucrats claimed the right to directly influence the states’ ethnic composition, identity or culture. The aspiration of the European Commission to manage the

crisis in a technocratic way where the member states were treated as implementation tools created huge political tension and resistance towards a common solution. "Too much" integration led to a political crisis in which member states wanted to secure their position as the main political agents.

While the failure of "too much integration" can be considered in negative terms – as avoidance of the further broadening of the EU competencies in migration at the expense of member states, the failure of "too little integration" can be perceived in positive terms – as a tendency to secure existing *status quo*, with dominant position of member states, fueled by the fears of creating precedents that will challenge the essence of ASEAN.

ASEAN's failure to address migration crisis can be interpreted as a mirror reflection of the problems faced by the EU – the inability to move beyond the principle of respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. ASEAN is bound by rules that make reaction to human rights abuses committed by its member states impossible. This lack of political will and commitment exposed the weakness of ASEAN's reaction. The lack of illegal migration and refugee governance framework under which the member states would be obliged to take decisive actions, including political pressure and sanctions, etc., towards members that violate international law and human rights, make regional cooperation on refugee issue difficult and limited. Instead, ASEAN member states prefer "quiet diplomacy" that allows violators to save face. The emphasis on state sovereignty and the non-intervention policy is the main impediment to regional cooperation in the ASEAN context. The creation of a regional immigration governance framework does not necessarily mean adoption of European patterns, but rather one that would allow for new interpretations of non-interference principle in the face of humanitarian crises.

What is interesting and to some extent common to the EU and ASEAN, is that states' willingness to cooperate and take collective action increased when proposed actions reflected the security dimension of the migration crisis. In the EU context, actions to strengthen border control, to establish European border and coast guards, to improve migrants' registration procedures and information sharing, or to solve the problem at its source have gained more support from all member states than the relocation mechanism that was perceived as a policy undermining national security and contributing to EU internal tensions. The same can be said about ASEAN, where the security perception of the Rohingya crisis rather than its humanitarian dimension urged states to cooperate more closely.

Is there a necessary level of integration to effectively address regional migration crises? The answer to this question will not satisfy those who seek breakthrough ideas. The analysis demonstrated that in the context of 2015 migration crisis the important issue is not how different the institutional structures of the EU and ASEAN are, but rather how similar the decision-making process or balance of power within the organization is. Regardless of the extent of integration, the member states' ability/inability to take collective action is highly motivated by individual political interests, calculations, social fears, ideology, public opinion polls, election calendar, values accepted or problem perception. This is symptomatic especially in the EU case where, despite the most advanced and comprehensive migration governance framework, failure or success of actions depended strongly on individual member states' political will. It leads to the conclusion, which is also an answer to above-mentioned questions: "too much" or "too little" integration is irrelevant because effectively addressing regional migration crises does not need any level of regional integration, rather high levels of political will and commitment.

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COMMON DEFENCE OF EU COUNTRIES: REALITY OR FANTASY?

WSPÓLNA OBRONA PAŃSTW UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ –
RZECZYWISTOŚĆ CZY MRZONKA?

*Rafał Willa** 

— ABSTRACT —

Limited energy resources, EU member countries' budget capabilities impaired by the financial and debt crisis, Brexit, or the migration crisis that is causing serious consequences, are but a few serious challenges that the Union is going to face within the short-term perspective. One ought not forget about the increasingly powerful and meaningful threats to the Project Europe: rampant terrorism, increasing military activity of Russia (including its actions in eastern Ukraine, Crimea, or on the Sea of Azov), as well as the ambivalent (to say the least) attitude of the current President of the USA towards NATO. Even these few challenges and threats ought to cause for an increase in the decisive and, later on, organizational effort for the purpose of transforming the EU into an entity that shall be able to counteract and react to them. The intention of the author of this article is to provide an attempt

— ABSTRAKT —

Ograniczone zasoby energetyczne, nadszarpnięte kryzysem finansowym i zadłużeniowym możliwości budżetowe państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej, brexit, wywołujący poważne konsekwencje kryzys migracyjny – to tylko kilka pospiesznie wskazanych poważnych wyzwań stojących przed Unią w najbliższym czasie. Nie należy zapominać także o rosnących w siłę i znaczenie zagrożeniach dla bezpieczeństwa projektu Europa: panoszącym się terroryzmie, rosnącej aktywności wojskowej Rosji (w tym o jej poczynaniach we wschodniej Ukrainie, na Krymie czy Morzu Azowskim), a także o co najmniej ambiwalentnym stosunku urzędującego prezydenta USA wobec NATO. Już tylko tych kilka wyzwań i zagrożeń skutkować powinno wzmożeniem wysiłku decyzyjnego, a potem organizacyjnego na rzecz przekształcenia UE w podmiot zdolny do przeciwdziałania im

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to answer the question whether the indicated process is actually taking place.

i reagowania na nie. W zamierzeniu autora niniejszy artykuł ma być próbą udzielenia odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy wskazany proces rzeczywiście zachodzi.

Keywords: Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); PESCO; common defence; security strategy; defence industry

Słowa kluczowe: wspólna polityka bezpieczeństwa i obrony; PESCO; wspólna obrona; strategia bezpieczeństwa; przemysł obronny

Other countries perceive the European Union (EU) as one of the leaders in global economy and trade. This occurs in spite of the crises in the Union – migration, financial, debt crisis, etc. – or in spite of huge dynamics of economic growth in the Asian countries. Still, depending on the entity performing calculations and on the aspects included in them, the EU is considered the second, third, or fourth economy in the world. One should add that this very economy is still highly developed, competitive, and counting over 515 million wealthy consumers, and no country in the world may afford to ignore such factors.

Even though factors such as strengthening economic bonds, elevating economic statistics (including trade and innovation) are incredibly important, they compose the foundation of the European Project and allow for its dynamic development, yet they constitute merely one of the aspects of what needs to be currently understood under the term “Europe”. For this is far more than that. In the course of noticeable progress towards integration of European countries under one roof, many matters were included, such as agriculture, societies, environment, energy, and finally politics and defence. It turned out that it was possible to develop many of them by way of consensus, yet for many years there were many deficiencies in the political and, above all, defence matters. An opportunity to change such a state of affairs was at the moment of adopting (2007) and implementing (2009) the Treaty of Lisbon, “in which the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy was further emphasized” (Cheda, 2018, p. 1), and then a new security policy (2016), as well as “a reconfiguration of the international order – especially in terms of EU safety environment – taking place for over a decade” (Zięba, 2017, p. 45). Has this opportunity actually been used? Did the significance of defence initiatives increase during that time? Is it possible to observe any dynamics of the processes aiming to create the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)? Or perhaps particular interests of individual member countries are still more important, which prevents substantial

reinforcement of the EU's military capabilities? Is it still the case that in the EU there is more dispute rather than action in terms of defence? The hereby text shall attempt at shedding some light on these doubts.

ATTITUDE OF THE USA TOWARDS THE ESDP/CSDP

Ending war activities in 1945, capturing Middle and Eastern Europe by the CCCP, and transforming the countries from these regions into "satellites" by the Soviets convinced the Europeans that their own safety "hangs in an uncomfortable balance between dependence on and autonomy from the United States" (Howorth, 2017, pp. 13, 24–25). However, first mentions about the need of establishing European defence capabilities – which were not very specific at that time – brought about severe alert in the USA. Washington's concern was caused mainly by the fact that EU initiatives could lead to doubling the existing NATO structures, especially bearing in mind that many countries were fulfilling their duties towards the Treaty to an insufficient degree. However, the effect of the fall of the CCCP was that many European societies and consequently many country leaders – not perceiving tangible military threat – eagerly limited the expenditure for defence (reduction of army size, financial cuts for modernization and training, limiting research, etc.) and cynically utilized the "protective umbrella" spread over Europe on the USA's tax payers' expense. During that period, Great Britain was considered the American voice in Europe and it was London that mostly blocked the development of the ESDP (Rees, 2017, p. 562).

It is thus hardly surprising that due to Art. 42 Sec. 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Union respects the right of EU and NATO member countries altogether to maintain individual security and defence policy and respects their obligations towards common defence as part of the Treaty. A similar statement can be found also in the European Global Strategy (EGS, 2016, p. 20). Paradoxically, in Art. 220 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), NATO was not included as an international organization key to the Union (as opposed to the UN, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the OECD), the only mention concerns "proper relations" with other organizations. Nonetheless, NATO is regularly present in the EU's actions concerning the security and defence policy. During a summit in Washington in April 1999, the *Berlin Plus* agreement was signed, which granted the Union access to the NATO's resources, capabilities, and planning data for the purpose of performing crisis manage-

ment without the participation of the USA (each time a separate agreement is required). On the 8th of July 2016 in Warsaw a common declaration on the EU's cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was adopted. According to the established agreements, the cooperation is to concern, among others, developing the capabilities to counteract hybrid threats, extending coordination regarding cyber-safety, developing coherent and complementary defence capabilities, or cooperation of military industries (more: Koziej, 2017, p. 11). In recent time (the 10th of July 2018), on the other hand, both organizations signed a Common Declaration, in which they optimistically welcomed (which shall be discussed later on) the EU's establishing of PESCO and first steps towards establishing the European Defence Fund, considered key (also for the Treaty) for developing European defence capabilities (Muti, 2018, p. 4). However, it seems that in the situation in which the EU intends to further develop the CSDP, one ought to "divide the roles between both organizations in the area of defence more clearly and utilizing system tools, so that they are more complementary and thus would force cooperation, and so that they would not be the same, with similar tasks, thus generating competition" (Koziej, 2018, p. 5).

THE TREATY OF LISBON – KEY REGULATIONS

The legal framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy was established in the Treaty of Lisbon. However, it would not be false to assume, even before getting acquainted with that framework, that during negotiation and implementation processes they must have remained general and abstract to a significant degree. Such that these statements would be acceptable by all member countries. The creators of the framework succeeded in this attempt and thus the Treaty of Lisbon was pushed through.

Even in the Preamble to the TEU it was indicated that EU country leaders are "resolved to implement a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence in accordance with the provisions of Article 42, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world" (TEU, Preamble). In the spirit of political solidarity, loyalty, and respect, also the records of certain articles of the Treaty were maintained, especially Art. 24, Art. 26, Art. 36, Art. 43–46, and Protocols 10 (concerning Permanent Structured Cooperation PESCO) and 11. A key matter

in the Treaty is the condition from Art. 42 Sec. 1–2, which indicates that “The Common Security and Defence Policy shall be an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security (Kącka, 2011) in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States”, as well as that “the Common Security and Defence Policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy”. Confirmation of these regulations can also be found in Art. 2 Sec. 4 of the TFEU.

Such consensual and abstract take on the norms may cause an impression of purposelessness in the reader. What sense does it make to introduce such general, indeterminate records into agreements constituting the EU? Upon their further investigation one may advance a thesis about strong characterization of these records with none other than Union values (Samadashvili, 2016, p. 23; Altafin, Haász, & Podstawa, 2017, p. 123) or excessive focus on institutionalization¹ rather than on creating actual military capabilities (Leonard & Röttgen, 2018). Nonetheless, at the point of practical realization of the CSDP’s premises, their implementation (which shall be discussed later on), such a measure allows to maintain significant flexibility of adopted initiatives. Certainly — according to one of the fundamental rules of law — *nullum crimen sine lege*.

EUROPEAN GLOBAL STRATEGY

The first strategic document concerning the Union’s foreign and security policy was adopted on 12–13th December 2003. It was *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy ESS* (European Council, 2003). In this relatively short document (consisting of only 14 pages) EU leaders stated the objectives of the organization in terms of foreign and security policy, as well as the means for

¹ One might mention here at least the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), European Union Military Committee, and Political and Security Committee. Interestingly, the EUMS is not responsible for operational command during EU military missions – usually the EU transfers the command to the so called framework state (France, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Greece) and after ending the operations, the command is dissolved. Such a solution is disadvantageous, as it does not generate the so called institutional memory and hinders making conclusions for the future.

their realization. The document also indicated key threats to the safety of the continent, i.e., terrorism, distributing weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, fallen states, and organized crime. Therefore, it would not be surprising to state that the presented catalog, due to the dynamics of events in the EU itself, as well as in its direct neighborhood, soon turned out to be insufficient, and the majority of the adopted methods of operation soon ceased to be adequate to the international situation.

Thus, there soon appeared voices of the necessity for its update or even creating a new complex strategy of EU's operation in the international environment. Unfortunately, it was contrary to the document itself, as it was adopted as late as 28th June 2016 (EGS, 2016). And yet again, this is a "typical" European Union document, very general, not specific, avoiding any categorical and straightforward statements – it even lacks an enumerative catalog of threats, which were mentioned in the ESS. To state it briefly, it defines and indicates the interests of the EU and its citizens; explains rules and values for its external actions; presents priorities of international policy activities; and finally characterizes methods and means for achieving the adopted premises. The most important matter about this document is the fact that the new Strategy made way for actuating the processes creating the Union's defence policy (Samadashvili, 2016, p. 34). According to Ryszard Zięba, "it rightly connects the internal and external aspects of safety and assumes that internal safety depends on peace outside the Union's borders. Therefore in order to provide the Union's internal safety it anticipates external activities on a broader scale" (Zięba, 2017, p. 50). The question, whether its records will result in concrete and measurable activities, remains open to a certain extent, as it depends solely on the will of member countries. And past experiences tell us that it is not necessarily bound to happen, as currently in many Union member countries governments are taken over by populists with Eurosceptic attitude.

What might be perceived as obvious, in order to be able to fulfill premises adopted in the Strategy (in addition, in the assumed manner) – and at the same time be a credible partner on the international arena – member countries, and therefore the EU itself, need to have sufficient, adequate, flexible, ready, and mobile military capabilities at their disposal. Replenishing the shortages, a reform consisting on moving away from territorial defence forces towards expeditionary forces – all this costs money (and lots of it) and requires time

(Zięba, 2017, pp. 39–40)². Moreover, a mental change is required in these terms, with regard to the approach to the role of the Union as the global guardian of order (Domachowska, Gawron-Tabor & Piechowiak-Lamparska, 2018, pp. 201–202; Polcikiewicz, 2018, p. 108; Schade, 2018, p. 84). Moderate and discreet optimism of the experts in terms of realizing the Strategy, and thus waking up the CSDP, results from the fact that it was followed by important decisions. In June 2017, during an EU summit: a) it was decided that a cell for military planning (Military Planning and Conduct Capability, MPCC) shall be established; b) the European Defence Fund was initiated (budgeted from the Union's common armament programs); c) the procedure actuating regular structural cooperation (PESCO) was initiated. Thus the strategy is implemented on both grounds: economic and, by way of an agreement with NATO, also international (Koziej, 2018, p. 2; Kuźniar, 2018, p. 65).

FINANCIAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURE

The will to play a key role in the global security environment costs real and very serious money. It is best seen looking at the USA's defence budget, the amount of which is unachievable for other countries. It is enough to mention that in 2017, it equaled to 686BN \$ – only for the sake of comparison one ought to point out that the budget of all European NATO members, including Great Britain, was almost 250BN \$. Therefore the difference is visible in all aspects – number of soldiers, their mobility, training, equipment, or even funds for technology research and development (NATO Secretary General, 2018, p. 108). Other statistics are even more crushing for Europe – e.g., the USA generates around 51% GDP of all members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and yet it spends 72% of the total of their budget for defence. Moreover, if we take a look at the expenditure for defence as a percentage of GDP, the USA are an undisputed leader (they spend 3.57%) yet again. The highest rated European country in this comparison is Greece (2.36%), followed by Great Britain (2.12%), Estonia (2.08%), and Poland (1.99%). The rest of the Treaty's members do not fulfill the obligation of spending at least 2% of GDP on their defence (NATO Secretary General, 2018,

² Also the autonomic Eurocorps was established or the EU Battlegroup was initiated, yet according to the experts, these do not fulfill their expected role.

pp. 33, 109). Similar data, albeit differing by fractions of a percent, has been delivered in the annual report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Among the information in the report we also read that Russia spends 4.3% for that purpose, and China – 1.9% (SIPRI, 2018). The European Defence Agency does not indicate at all what percentage of GDP is spent and which Union countries spend it on defence. We also get to know from the report that in 2016, only 4 EU member countries exceeded or reached the 2% threshold, although their names were not published (EDA, 2018b, p. 6).

EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY

The proof for the will to advance the CSDP, as well as the advantage of the institutional attitude in its creation from the time before the Treaty of Lisbon, is the European Defence Agency. It is an entity the purpose of which is “(a) to contribute to identifying the Member States’ military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States; (b) promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods; (c) propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes; (d) support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs; (e) contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure” (TEU, Art. 45). In other words, it concerns establishing an open market of armament in the Union and effective usage of financial assets in terms of the armament research as well as its purchase (Duda, 2017, pp. 3–5; Rogala-Lewicki, 2017, pp. 155–156). So much for theory, but how does it all look in practice?

Firstly, the EDA actively engaged in the process of creating and actuating of PESCO (which shall be discussed later on). Secondly, it undertook a series of preparatory activities (administrative, financial) for the purpose of actuating another key EU defence initiative, i.e., the European Defence Fund (EDF). Recently, the agency also engaged in preparing the revision of the Capability

Development Plan (CDP)³ or performing the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD). Nonetheless, thirdly, its most important task is coordinating and managing the “97 ad hoc Research & Technology and Capability Projects, 14 Research & Technology and Capability Programmes, 3 Joint Procurement Arrangements and more than 190 other activities related to capability development, research and technology and the defence industry” (EDA, 2018a, p. 3). Thus one may assume that certain actions do take place, but bearing in mind the existing defence needs of the member countries and the EU itself, it does not relatively amount to much. To a large extent these are rather small, not very costly projects, that do not generate arguments between countries and other entities that participate in them. These also do not change the image of moderate capabilities of European armies in a substantial and positive way.

PESCO

Permanent Structured Cooperation, the possibility of which was provisioned for in Protocol 10 of the Treaty of Lisbon, is starting to take real form for the first time since 2017. And this is in spite of the skepticism of certain Union member countries, especially the ones that feel threatened by recent activity of the Russian Federation, and the ones that are members of NATO⁴. Apart from the European Defence Fund, the annual review on defence (CARD) and creating within the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) a cell that on a strategic level is responsible for operational planning and leading military missions (MPCC), PESCO is an initiative that is most certainly to be considered key in terms of strengthening the CSDP and European military capabilities. In brief, its purpose is leading common “development programs and projects in terms of defence technologies, harmonization of military forces technical modernization plans, common purchases of armament, strengthening the interoperability of armies,

³ In the EU we currently have 11 CDP priorities (EDA, 2018c, pp. 6–18).

⁴ The adopted and implemented shape of PESCO caused caution in assessments, because the countries, including Poland, were afraid of: its focus on developing expeditionary military capabilities (and not territorial defence), competition from biggest EU countries’ armament concerns, diagnosing threats to security only on the southern EU border (excluding the so called Eastern Wall; Gotkowska, 2018, p. 11; Terlikowski, 2018a, pp. 1–2). What is more, the following countries do not participate in PESCO: Great Britain (which is leaving the EU), Denmark (maintains a clause excluding from the participation in the CSDP), and Malta (due to lack of armed forces).

and creating international tactical units (e.g., EU's strike groups)" (Terlikowski, 2017a, p. 1). The nature of PESCO is by no means to establish a common army, transform the Union into a military alliance, or create a group of a few countries that would perform deep military integrations within their own circle (Gotkowska, 2018, p. 6). Basically, such inclusive⁵ attitude is aimed at encouraging the participating countries to more substantial engagement in the CSDP and fulfilling the accepted obligations towards the Union, and indirectly towards NATO. This way the CSDP would be beneficial as well.

It may be assumed that at the beginning of 2019, the initiative is bringing slight positive effects. In the first turn, the adopted common included 17 Polish positions (Poland submitted access to 6 and fulfills the role of an observer in 2), in the second turn, 17 more projects were added to the existing list (Poland submitted access to 1 and has observer status in 9 more; Lesiecki, 2018, p. 1). Also, there exists a list of several dozen projects pending access to the basic list. Nonetheless, EU countries still act with significant caution in terms of submitting ideas for common projects, which is evident judging by the fact that the binding list is not extended by projects that are key for "supplementing major shortcomings in European military capabilities, indicated within the context of both, territorial defence and crisis management missions". Among others, it concerns projects such as common development of a new type of a fighter aircraft, tank or transport airplane (Terlikowski, 2018b, p. 1). In addition, the very activation of PESCO projects does not mean that they shall be completed successfully, therefore the comments of President Juncker, High Representative Mogherini, and also President Macron and Chancellor Merkel, who in many places and in many words called the EU countries to full engagement in PESCO and other EU defence initiatives, should come as no surprise (Rees, 2017, p. 563).

⁵ Holding on to the very essence of the TEU in its Lisbon version, PESCO was to be utilized for creating a strong "defence core" of the Union – a small group of countries that were the strongest in military terms, willing to quickly deepen the integration as far as security is concerned. Such an interpretation of the Treaty's regulations caused concern of other countries, this time regarding the creation of a new dimension of multi-speed Europe. For this reason, in order to avoid misunderstandings, ultimately the inclusive approach was opted for (Terlikowski, 2017b; Rogala-Lewicki, 2017, p. 158).

EUROPEAN DEFENCE FUND

In June 2017, the European Commission announced the creation of the European Defence Fund, a financial instrument the purpose of which is to co-finance research and development of military technologies, thus contributing to increasing EU countries' military capabilities. The EDF is the main component of the European Defence Action Plan from 2016, which is focused on the support for the European defence industry. The Fund itself was constructed basing on two complementary constituents – the so called windows: 1) the research window (Research & Technology), and 2) the capabilities window (Research & Development). The first pillar shall include research in terms of innovative defence technologies: “It shall function on the basis of Union grants for projects proposed by international consortia consisting of research institutes, enterprises, foundations, etc., analogically to EU civil framework programs concerning research and innovation (e.g., Horizon 2020)” (Terlikowski, 2017b). The second pillar shall undertake research and implementation works, i.e., tweaking new technologies by building prototypes or implementing them into existing military equipment. In this case the majority of financial funds shall originate from member countries' budgets, concerns, non-public sources, with certain support (max. 20 %) on the part of the EU (Koziej, 2017, p. 10).

For preparatory purposes, in order to fully activate the EDF in 2021, it has been decided that the first pillar shall for the time being be called Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR), coordinated by the European Defence Agency, and shall include years 2017–2019, and the budget shall be 90 million EUR. The second pillar – European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) – shall include years 2019–2020, and its budget shall be 500 million EUR. The EDF shall attain full action capability only after 2021, also the budgets for both pillars shall be increased to the level of accordingly: 4.1BN EUR and 8.9BN EUR. In effect, “the co-financing from the EDF shall generate new investments in defence, with total value of around 50BN EUR (in the budget seven-year period – 2021–2027), which amounts to around 10% of current EU countries' expenditure” (Jaźwiecki, 2018).

It ought to be emphasized that research and development of new military technologies in Europe should include analogical actions undertaken by NATO for the purpose of avoiding doubling of ideas and expenses (Szymański, 2018). At this moment one ought to note that the European Commission aims at reinforcing the effectiveness of executing the so called Military Directive No. 2009/81

by EU countries, which the EC wants to use in order to force them to observe to the rules of competition while making purchases of armament and military equipment (Rogala-Lewicki, 2017, p. 160). Such a task is very important also because “the institution estimates that lack of cooperation of defence industries within the Union annually causes a loss of 25 to 100BN EUR, among others, due to failure to utilize the effect of scale of the Union market and lack of common standards. And lack of these interferes with the fight against duplicating equipment or making common orders for weapons and military equipment even by the allies from NATO” (Jaźwiecki, 2018). The EDF and the directive are supposed to change that. And yet again, a question arises whether the protectionist approach to national armament industries shall not prevail after all...

POLAND VS. EU’S DEFENCE INITIATIVES

For Union partners Poland, its attitude towards European defence initiatives, its role, and contribution towards the CSDP, remain a mystery (Muti, 2018, p. 1). Leaders of integrating Europe would like to have confidence in terms of evaluating the attitude of Warsaw towards deepening of the defence integration, yet this attitude depends *stricte* from political factors, i.e., which party wields power in Poland at the moment. During the years of the PO–PSL (Civic Platform–Polish People’s Party) coalition Poland was perceived as the driving power of European integration and as an enthusiast and leader in terms of building and strengthening the CSDP, yet since 2015 and acquiring power by the PiS (Law and Justice) party, the situation became quite the opposite (Kuźniar, 2018, p. 66). One might add that the situation is far from optimal, be it for the remaining member countries that do not have a way of knowing what to expect from Warsaw, as well as for building the position of Poland in the EU. The close neighborhood with Russia, the geopolitical location of Poland, its social, economic and military potential, are factors indicating that Warsaw ought to be seriously interested in raising EU’s military capabilities. Yet, which is very surprising, Poland prefers to discuss military matters with USA rather than with Union institutions or leaders of European countries, and treats Washington (disregarding the growing unpredictability of its foreign policy) as the sole guarantor of its safety. The same applies for armament concerns – in the eyes of Polish politicians the American ones seem to be of more value rather than the products of the European competition (Zaborowski, 2018, p. 13).

Even though Polish defence expenditure statistics might seem favorable, especially in comparison to other countries of interest, one ought not be fooled by their deceiving charm. Since 2015, the program of modernization of Polish armed forces slowed down significantly, which is best proved at least by canceling the tender for multi-task helicopters for armed forces (including offset), withdrawing from the purchase of Australian frigates, sluggish talks of purchasing artillery equipment, submarines, or a contract for modernization of armored forces, etc. According to press releases, military storage facilities are starting to lack soldier uniforms and old helmets are sand-blasted in order to remove rust... Also, certain accounting tricks are used in order to overvalue real defence expenses – e.g., purchase of airplanes for VIPs was financed by the Ministry of National Defence and they are piloted by officers of the Polish Armed Forces and stationed in a military base, so such expenses were included in the statistics for defence.

Firstly, one ought to return to the path of modernization of the Polish army. This matter is key and constitutes an absolute priority. What is more, the modernization ought to be based on substantial criteria and a long-term strategy, i.e., actual needs of Polish armed forces, adjusting the purchased equipment to systems utilized so far, the ability to maintain them financially, etc. Secondly, although it might sound a bit utopian, one should dismiss the political approach in terms of modernizing the army and military purchases. It is not acceptable that defence matters are dependent on the interests of political parties or their electorate, both in terms of choosing a specific supplier and the country of their origin. Consequently, one also ought to thoroughly restructure the Polish arms industry⁶. As soon as it happens (hopefully rather quickly), more constructive attitude towards EU defence projects and programs ought to be adopted (Zaborowski, 2018, p. 15). These are to no extent a threat to the security of the state. To the contrary, they are a chance for the Polish army as well as the Polish arms industry. Developing common military capabilities, cost reduction, larger integrity of systems, and interoperability are among the obvious benefits resulting from such an activity standpoint. Thanks to that, the Union, understood as an entity consisting of 28 (27) countries, would be able to accept bigger responsibility for its own safety (Muti, 2018, p. 2) and Poland would “gain more influence on

⁶ As indicated by Adam Duda, “this task is made even more difficult by the fact that in recent decades the competitive environment has undergone a process of transformation and consolidation, the result of which was establishing such European giants as Airbus, Leonardo, MBDA, Thales, etc., which [...] deepened the gap in technological advancement between Polish and European companies from the defence sector” (Duda, 2017, p. 6).

strengthening NATO's and UE's political coherence" (Lorenz & Terlikowski, 2018, p. 2). Participation in the aforementioned undertakings should be considered *raison d'état*, as the very partnership with the USA or membership in NATO without serious participation in the CSDP might not be sufficient (Koziej, 2017, p. 13).

FINAL NOTES

Until today, the project under the name "European Union" has definitely undergone a long and difficult road. What seems obvious, certain matters concerning the member countries (such as the common market) were less controversial from initiatives concerning, e.g., safety and defence. In the beginning no one even assumed common activities in this regard – the Europeans were deceived by the illusion that after the fall of the bipolar order, peace (at least in this part of the world) shall prevail forever and that it will be something natural, a matter-of-course so to speak, and no endeavors shall have to be made in order to maintain it (Kuzniar, 2018, p. 56). And as soon as real political activities were initiated, many a time did national interests temporarily halt or even block decisive and creative processes. Therefore, common European output in this regard is hardly surprising, especially in comparison to the economic, social, cultural, etc., output of the Union. This contrast between the economic position of the EU in the world and the lack of real foreign and security policy was starting to become an "increasingly obvious handicap" (Samadashvili, 2016, p. 17).

Nowadays, there is almost no doubt that "without effective security and defence policy the Union shall not be able to implement its plans of being a leading actor on the global international arena" (Zięba, 2017, p. 45). Even though such awareness is existent, moving on to real, rational practical actions, especially while various populists and Eurosceptics are taking over the governments in member countries, the whole European construct seems to be faltering. Faltering really hard. The notions of sovereignty or national subjectivity are again becoming fashionable and attractive to the societies, which is obviously contrary to the idea of community, which the Union, as well as its specific activities, desperately needs. Thus the noticeable stagnation, or even crisis in the integrative processes, since the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon.

In the face of successive, even more serious challenges and threats to the European security, every once in a while this stagnation has been discontinued

by events forcing certain activities, be it declarative or other. More terrorist attacks on EU countries, the tense situation in North Africa and the Middle East generating increased migration to Europe, the armed conflict in direct neighborhood (eastern Ukraine, Crimea, the Sea of Azov), and Brexit⁷, to name just a few, reminded the European leaders that everything is possible in modern international relations. The complexity, instability, and unpredictability are unfortunately key features of the current security environment. And, as indicated by Zdzisław Polcikiewicz: "It also awoke Europeans to the fact that security does not last forever by itself, that it is a state one must actively pursue at all times and by all means" (Polcikiewicz, 2018, p. 98). Therefore, the situation comes full circle.

The initiatives briefly presented hereby, especially PESCO and EDF, the change of attitude of EU and member countries' leaders towards making Europe more independent in terms of security and defence, various threats in the EU's direct neighborhood, or the increasing unpredictability of the attitude of the USA towards NATO and Europe, may become a stimulus to break the impasse and blandness of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU. It is important also to Poland, as the conceivable success in this matter shall mean establishing another (following the partnership with the USA and membership in NATO) pillar of the country's safety. Therefore Poland ought to make haste in order to join them and actively participate in them. Thus it is not about creating a supranational European army or about federalization, but about emphasis on broad and deep cooperation of countries in terms of defence, cooperation of national defence industries, and common defence in the future. So far the road to this objective seems to be immensely long and very bumpy.

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⁷ Quite frequent are the statements that Great Britain's leaving of the EU would somehow make the development of the CSDP easier, because one of the countries that treats building European military capabilities as competition and not supplementation to NATO, shall be gone (Rees, 2017, p. 569; Howorth, 2017, p. 25; Kuźniar, 2018, p. 64).

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GEOPOLITICAL IMAGINATION OF THE POLITICAL ELITES OF THE THIRD POLISH REPUBLIC: AN OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEM

WYOBRAŹNIA GEOPOLITYCZNA ELIT POLITYCZNYCH III RP:
ZARYS PROBLEMU

*Jarosław Macała** 

— ABSTRACT —

The article deals with the issue of the development of geopolitical imagination of Polish political elites following 1989. The source database of the text are the most important official documents regarding the foreign policy of the Third Polish Republic: the policy statements of subsequent prime ministers and the so-called small policy statements of the ministers of foreign affairs. Discourse analysis and system analysis were used to analyse them, treating them as a social construct. Geopolitical imagination placed Poland in Europe, in the dangerous zone between Germany and Russia and on the border of the two civilizations. The escape from this “fatalism of geography” was the main goal of the elites of the Third Polish Republic. Hence the orientation towards the West, to ensure the exit from peripherality, security and development. To justify such a remodelling of their representations, the elites put forward an idealized image

— ABSTRAKT —

Artykuł dotyczy kształtowania się wyobraźni geopolitycznej polskich elit politycznych po 1989 roku. Bazą źródłową tekstu są najważniejsze oficjalne dokumenty dotyczące polityki zagranicznej III RP: *exposé* kolejnych premierów oraz tzw. małe *exposé* ministrów spraw zagranicznych. Dla ich analizy zastosowano analizę dyskursu oraz analizę systemową, traktując treść dokumentów jako społeczny konstrukt. Wyobraźnia geopolityczna lokowała Polskę w Europie, w niebezpiecznej strefie między Niemcami a Rosją oraz na granicy dwóch cywilizacji. Wyjście z tego „fatalizmu geografii” było zasadniczym celem elit III RP. Stąd orientacja na Zachód, żeby zapewnić sobie wyjście z peryferyjności, bezpieczeństwo i rozwój. Dla uzasadnienia takiej przebudowy swoich imaginacji elity posługiwały się idealizowanym obrazem Zachodu. Ułatwiała to akceptację dokonanego wyboru geopolitycznego przez społeczeństwo oraz związane z nim

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of the West. It facilitated the acceptance of the geopolitical choice made by the society and the associated severe limitation of Poland's geopolitical and economic autonomy. The vehicles on the way to the West were bandwagoning towards the USA and Germany, which justified clientelism towards them. In various combinations, the representations about Poland's key role in the post-communist region re-emerged following 1989 to strengthen its position in relation to the West and the East. As for the eastern direction, Poland's goal was to move the imaginary borders of the West towards our eastern neighbours, mainly Belarus and Ukraine. This must have led to the negative reaction from Russia, which considered this area its sphere of influence. Russia was imagined by us to be an alien and enemy, and the change of this state of affairs would be a consequence of the Westernisation of Russia so desired by the Polish elites. It seems that in the years 1989–2015, one could speak of a certain interpretative community, which the LaJ (Law and Justice/Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) governments broke down following 2015. The LaJ foreign policy has become a hostage of those undermining the liberal democracy of internal political system changes. Their criticism in the EU states isolates and pushes towards servility to Washington. In turn, the Three Seas Initiative is too divided and weak to leverage Poland's position. It seems that re-approaching the EU's core may give us some freedom and better protection in external policy.

Keywords: geopolitics; geopolitical imagination; critical geopolitics; Polish foreign policy; Third Polish Republic

silne ograniczenie autonomii geopolitycznej i ekonomicznej Polski. Wehikułami na drodze na Zachód był *bandwagoning* wobec USA i Niemiec, co uzasadniało na ogół klientelizm wobec nich. W różnych kombinacjach powracali po 1989 roku wyobrażenia o kluczowej roli Polski w regionie postkomunistycznym, żeby wzmocnić jej pozycję w stosunku do Zachodu i Wschodu. W przypadku kierunku wschodniego celem Polski było przesunięcie wyobrażonych granic Zachodu na naszych sąsiadów, głównie na Białoruś i Ukrainę. Musiało to spowodować negatywną reakcję Rosji, uważającej ten obszar za swoją strefę wpływów. Rosja była w naszych wyobrażeniach traktowana jako obcy i wróg, a zmiana tego stanu rzeczy byłaby konsekwencją pożądaną przez polskie elity okcydentalizacji Rosji. Wydaje się, że w latach 1989–2015 można mówić o pewnej wspólnotce interpretacyjnej, której załamanie przynoszą rządy PiS po 2015 roku. W ich wyobrażeniach odsuwamy się od zachodniej Europy, zdając się na uległość wobec Amerykanów oraz na współpracę regionalną pod polskim przywództwem. Polityka zagraniczna PiS stała się zakładnikiem podważających liberalną demokrację wewnętrznych zmian ustrojowych. Ich krytyka w państwach UE powoduje izolację i zdaje na serwilizm wobec Waszyngtonu. Z kolei Trójmorze jest zbyt podzielone i słabe, żeby wydzwignąć pozycję Polski. Wydaje się, że ponowne zbliżenie do rdzenia UE może nam dać pewną swobodę i lepszą asekurację w polityce zewnętrznej.

Słowa kluczowe: geopolityka; wyobrażenia geopolityczne; geopolityka krytyczna; polska polityka zagraniczna; Trzecia Rzeczpospolita Polska

INTRODUCTION

The literature on critical geopolitics and geographical or geopolitical imaginations/representations is quite extensive in the West. It illustrates a complicated, interdisciplinary field of research, in which we are dealing with an ambiguous

understanding of key concepts, generally formulated in English. In addition, creating a coherent methodology in the context of interdisciplinary research poses significant problems. In Polish literature, studies in critical geopolitics are not very advanced, which also applies to the title problem. On the other hand, the problem matter of the concept of Poland's foreign policy following 1989 and its implementation has been the subject of numerous studies and publications. Still, it is worth turning to studies on geopolitical imaginations in the Third Polish Republic, which had to re-determine sovereignly the place of Poland in Europe and adjust external relations (Zięba, 2012).

The source basis of the article are the most important documents regarding the assumptions of foreign policy of the Third Polish Republic. Those are the policy statements of the subsequent prime ministers whose delivery in the Sejm constitutes the constitutional duty of a candidate for the head of government. In general, such a program statement has a deliberate structure and hierarchy of content dominated by internal problems. However, there were also more or less extensive remarks about Poland's foreign policy. The second part of the sources is the information presented each year by the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Sejm's forum, i.e., information about Poland's foreign policy (the so-called small policy statement). It is the most important document on the foreign policy of the Polish state in a given year required by law, containing a programmed structure, hierarchy of meanings and an expanded survey of the world.

This study only signals some problems. The research basis method shall be, on the one hand, the analysis of the dominant discourse of the political elites, focused on its study as an instrument of power and politics, and a systemic analysis, treating the geopolitical imagination as an internally complex and related system of social constructs, on the other. The basic research questions are summarized as follows: What framed the shape of the Polish geopolitical imagination following 1989? What did it consist of? How did it affect Poland's foreign policy? As for the main hypothesis, my attempt is to prove its continuity in the Third Polish Republic, which breaks down as a system only during the LaJ government, i.e., following 2015.

GEOGRAPHICAL IMAGINATION

In contemporary science, the increasingly more important role is played by the post-positivism approach, relatively unknown in Poland. It should be noted that its rather characteristic features are: opposition to the positivist vision of the world and science, which also means that social sciences and humanities are not free from values nor neutral. Social reality is not something objective, but it is subject to constant social construction. It also means that social relations consist more of thoughts and ideas rather than of material elements. Then they become an expression of a vision of the world, a specific ideology and political interests, they offer only fragmentary and partial cognition, not a comprehensive and normative one. Human understanding of the world results from the fact that humans developed it, created it in their minds. Hence, the study of language, signs, symbols, beliefs, interpretations, discourses, norms and identities seems so important to understand social relations (Gasztołd, 2018).

For these considerations, the starting point is the change in the meaning of geography, which took place in the second half of the 20th century. It is worth referring to the term of “imaginative geography”, coined in the 1970^s by an outstanding literary scholar Edward W. Said. He argued that imaginative geography is an arbitrary, discursive practice of designating particular spaces that are “ours” and spaces of “aliens” in our minds. As a consequence, “aliens” are accordingly labelled as “them”, and their territory and mentality as “different” and “alien” from “ours” (Said, 2005).

On the other hand, one must refer to the “geographical imagination” consisting of pluralistic geographical representations. The term itself was created by the left-wing geographer David Harvey in the 1970s. For him, geographical imagination was part of human consciousness and identity, enabling each person to recognize the role of space and place in their own biography, to tell what they see around them. For space, of course, is one of the basic physical dimensions of human life, and that is why it becomes deeply permeated by human relations and their products. Hence, it has to be studied in social, cultural and historical as well as national contexts. It is so, as every community, in the course of history, develops its concepts of space and time and adapts to its own goals and values (Harvey, 2005).

Derek Gregory in 1994, in a controversial way, identified imaginative geography with geographical imagination as spatially conditioned by cultural and historical knowledge characterizing social groups. Therefore, knowledge is

produced in which space is both a means and a result of social action and social relations. Showing complicated relations of power and identity in the “us–them” relations, the development of myths, stereotypes, etc. (Gregory, 1994).

GEOPOLITICAL IMAGINATION AND CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS

The notion of critical geopolitics is difficult to define and perceive geographically (Flint, 2008). However, the relation between geographic imagination and the notion of geopolitical imagination coined in this field is unclear. It concerns socially constructed relations between imaginary geography and foreign policy and state security. It expresses in the continuously produced and modified discursive practices a vision of the place of a specific nation and state in world politics and the related relations of power and conflicts in a certain geographical area. Geopolitical imagination in the long run and in a complicated way affects the history and culture of a given society or nation (Potulski, 2010).

The close relationship with practice seems to be important. It provides public justification for foreign policy, creating dynamic structures serving the national interests of individual states. It must, therefore, consider the representation of the territorial limitations of each state and geographic imagination, which are based on national identity and emotional ties with a given territory. Their basis, referring to the famous concept by Carl Schmitt, is the division into allies and enemies, the division into “our” and “their” space (Güney & Gökcan, 2010).

THE MYTH OF THE WEST

The East-West civilization and geopolitical polarization has become the basic criterion for organizing and assessing the Polish geopolitical imagination for the last 200 years. Its essence was the diversification in the Polish discourse into “our”, “better” West, and “alien”, “worse” East, and nowadays between western democracy and eastern autocracy. The imagined place of Poland in Europe was determined by the orientational metaphors in the discourse of political elites, establishing the foundations of self-identification and the main geopolitical axis. Thus, we found ourselves between the two powerful neighbours – Russia and Germany, in the region which “is the point of intersection and the collision of oriental and occidental influences, the line designated on the map of Europe by

unsuccessful attempts at domination” (Škrabec, 2013). Since geography cannot be changed, it is worth changing geopolitics, which framed the direction of building a modern, state-centric geopolitical imagination (Potulski, 2010), to make a departure from the mythologized and enslaving “fatalism of geography” imposed since the period of partitions. To ensure independence and the necessary modernization of the state (Kuźniar, 2008; Zięba, 2012).

A phenomenon closely related to the creation of geopolitical imagination is often a tendency to put other countries and their visions of international relations as a model worth following. In that way, the geopolitical imagination of the Polish elite clearly placed the West at the centre of the world, as an idealized civilization leader, a symbol of freedom, democracy, wealth, stability and security. Also as the winner of the Cold War, dictating the conditions of the new world order and therefore interested in extending the zone of its values and influences to the post-communist countries. The Westernisation desired by the Polish elites meant not only the imaginary shifting of Poland from east to west, but also a clear change in the division into her own and aliens compared to the period of the PPR (Polish People’s Republic). Former official enemies became allies, and the forced hegemon from the communist period was treated as an alien or even an outright enemy.

First, the justification of the Westward course was associated with shared identity. For, with baptism, Poland “became a joint-heir in the tradition of antiquity and Christian identity” and was introduced “into the political bloodstream of the Latin world” (Sikorski, 2008). However, the heart of this “bloodstream” was Western Europe for centuries, developing our inferiority complex especially for the last two centuries. From there, there flowed to us, to the peripheries, the cultural, religious, economic, political patterns, etc., which we critically adapted to our realities.

Secondly, with the necessary systemic and socio-economic change of Poland. After all, we aspired to an inclusive community of the prosperous and stable democratic world, which contrasted with the enslavement and backwardness of the People’s Republic. Since Poland for at least half a century did not enjoy a democratic experience or capitalist economy, there again was the necessity to imitate Western values and models, but this time in a generally uncritical manner (Kuisz, 2016).

Westernisation was presented in the discourse as a unanimous will of the elites and society. This, combined with widespread sympathy, but also the West’s complex in our society, evoked a positive emotional response, united Poles, mobi-

lized social energy, legitimized the choice of the elites and facilitated acceptance of political and economic alliances that were far from partner-like for our state (Skubiszewski, 1993; Miller, 2001).

THE PROTECTORS – THE USA AND GERMANY

The way to the centre, to the West, was to be facilitated by the acquisition of powerful patrons as part of the bandwagoning strategy. Prime Minister Donald Tusk commented on the idea in 2007: “We must and we want to treat our allies seriously, we must and we want to show them solidarity. We would expect the same from them if Poland found herself in need” (Tusk, 2007). There was a dissonance between the words that we “must and want” and “we expect” from them, which illustrated the patron-client relationship.

The key in the discourse concerning the guarantee of Poland’s security and independence was the establishment in the 1990s of allied relations with the world and western hegemony – the USA, a socially idealized symbol of freedom, power, security and prosperity, attractive to many Poles (Kuźniar, 2008). The strongly pro-American attitude of the elites and society facilitated the acceptance of subordination to Washington and its vision of the world, as it was supposed to “contribute to the benefits resulting from the influence of this power on the international order” (Grosse, 2016). It was primarily about the two important geopolitical dimensions. On the one hand, the USA was to pave the way to NATO for Poland and other post-communist countries to obtain effective security guarantees. It meant accepting the American hegemonic vision of the international order, its values and principles, and the threats that lurked on it. On the other hand, the goal was also to strengthen the geopolitical position of Poland for her to become – with the support of Washington – a leader of Central and Eastern Europe, as “close relations with the United States are among the biggest advantages of our foreign policy” (Bartoszewski, 2001).

The vassalisation of Poland in the relations with the USA reached its apogee during the presidency of George Bush junior (2001–2009), deemed to be attentive to “Polish affairs”, which justified the fulfilment of all Washington’s wishes (Rotfeld, 2005). Its symbol was the uncritically accepted American Manichean vision of the world in the form of the war on terrorism (Cimoszewicz, 2003; Zięba, 2012). A narrative was constructed for the public at that time, that in this way, high credibility of Poland was established as an important ally (Rotfeld, 2005).

However, the proof of the actual US recognition for the prestige of Poland was our barely fruitful participation in the American interest in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In them, the global hegemon exploited its satellite and shifted some of the costs of its own politics onto it, which translated into less enthusiastic pro-American social moods and problems of Poland in relations with the most powerful states of the European Union. The elites had to react to this, distancing themselves from some of the actions of the American ally.

Following this trait in 2008, the Civic Platform (CP) attempted to visually limit the vassalisation, as the actual room for geopolitical manoeuvre was small. It created a new narrative for the society, namely that its policy is more focused on Western Europe, and in relation to the USA will be less compliant and firmer, criticizing the servility of the Democratic Left Alliance (DLA) and the Law and Justice (LaJ) governments (Sikorski, 2009). It was symbolic when Donald Tusk's government withdrew the Polish troops from Iraq and voiced its scepticism about the anti-missile shield.

On the other hand, the return of LaJ to power in 2015 made another visual attempt to get closer to Washington in the conditions of a growing threat from Russia and much worse transatlantic relations and isolation of Poland in the EU as a result of criticism of the systemic changes. In the vision of this party, the USA "is today and shall remain in the foreseeable future the main guarantor of world peace" (Szydło, 2015). Hence the belief that Americans, directly and through NATO, shall safeguard Poland's security and strengthen her position in Europe and the region in exchange for the full submission of Warsaw. However, in practice, in the name of internal policy goals, LaJ governments have strongly limited Poland's room for manoeuvre in foreign policy, moving away from core EU countries and relying on US favour which, involved in global politics, has different priorities than Warsaw. LaJ leaders poorly understand that servility towards Americans does not strengthen our position in relations with them.

Since "the shortest route to Europe" led through Germany, striking an alliance with Berlin was indispensable on the way to the western centre, mainly to the EU (Bielecki, 1991; Borodziej, 2006). However, it required a thorough change of some Polish geopolitical representations. For, since the period of the Partitions, Prussia/Germany acted as an enemy, which was even more reinforced by the historical memory of World War II and its consequences (Skubiszewski, 1991).

The elites, in order to create a new vision of Germany in the first decade of transformation, exploited the increasingly stronger social attitudes in Poland to appreciate the normality and peacefulness of the western neighbour and its firm

anchoring in the world of the democratic West. It was accompanied by gestures of admiration for the wealth and power of the FRG, as a desirable model of socio-political and economic changes (Czapliński, 2017). All of the above factors quite successfully demythologized the German threat, motivating the society to move away from the “curse” of mutual history to “reconciliation”, facilitated the acceptance of clientelism towards Germany under the slogan of “geopolitical and economic community of interests” (Bartoszewski, 1995).

However, with our country’s entry into the European Union in 2004, the position of Poland increased, and German aid was less needed in the narrative of our elites. There were two fundamental views on Polish–German relations at that time. One line involved the attempts made in 2004–2007 to relax the dominance of Berlin expressed by the DLA government temporally: “The time has come to define the Polish–German common interests anew” (Cimoszewicz, 2004). In another variant on the part of LaJ (in the years 2005–2007) the categorical: “we must work together to develop new, solid foundations for our strategic relationships” (Fotyga, 2007). It was about constructing the image of greater subjectivity of Poland, which the LaJ government has also been trying unsuccessfully to implement following 2015. At the same time, it triggers anti-German resentments, and the result is the cool-down in the mutual relations.

The government of Donald Tusk, in turn, in 2007–2014 recognized the asymmetric alliance with Berlin as the basis for building Poland’s position in the EU and the condition for faster economic development. In his vision, the difficult history should not be forgotten, yet one was to look optimistically to the future. For the most powerful in the EU, Germany reciprocated with striving for a “partnership dialogue of a strategic nature, following the example of German–French relations” (Sikorski, 2008). The then head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs therefore assumed the community rhetoric: “With Germany we share a common, strategic vision of the future of the Union and similar recipes for getting out of the crisis” (Sikorski, 2013).

After 2015, we started moving away from Germany. On the one hand, this is a consequence of Berlin’s criticism of the political changes in Poland conducted by LaJ. On the other hand, in the discourse run by that party, Germany, as the strongest country in the EU, has become a negative symbol of the policy leading to Poland’s peripheral status in Europe (Morawiecki, 2017).

INSTITUTIONAL TIES WITH THE WEST

In the institutional sense, the symbol of the alliance with the West was an idea of getting closer to it, i.e., “ever closer tying up till full membership with Western and Euro-Atlantic organizations” in the 1990s (Pawlak, 1992). The guarantor of security was to be the North Atlantic Alliance, depicted as the most powerful military alliance in the world and a mainstay of freedom and democracy. “Poland in the North Atlantic Alliance is Poland permanently secure, permanently independent” – Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek announced in 1997 (Buzek, 1997). Washington’s support for the accession to the Alliance in 1999 and the efforts for the said permanence of security prompted those in charge, regardless of their political colours, to fully submit to the American hegemony in the Alliance to prove “allied credibility”. The primary goal was to obtain an insurance policy no longer against the increasingly friendly Germany, but against the threat from the east through Russian imperial policy.

For many years, the Polish integration process was irreversible for the Polish elites and its goal was “safe, democratic and prosperous Europe” (Buzek, 1997). Thus, the elites’ discourse framed the unconditional nature of integration with the EU and the necessary clientelism towards the centre – Western Europe, in order to obtain patterns and support for Polish reforms (Bartoszewski, 1995). On the other hand, in contrast to this message, a forward-looking narrative was presented that after a difficult and painful period of transformation, imaginary and real departures from the Western periphery await us, i.e., rapid civilizational and geopolitical advancement. The elites, in response to public fears, developed the idea that the Union would not be divided into better and worse members, and Poland would play a role “appropriate to her position and significance in Central Europe”, i.e., the most important one (Cimoszewicz, 2002).

The government of the CP-PPP (Civic Platform/Polish Peasants’ Party) in 2007–2015 gradually familiarized the society with the positive effects of the imaginary shift to the West, primarily the EU accession. There was a discussion about how much of the Union and what kind of Poland in it, but the elites created the growing geopolitical and economic position of our country in the Western world. Thus, legitimizing the choice made at the beginning of the Third Independence. Hence the use of the unifying personal pronoun “we” in the discourse, e.g., “We are a part of the West”, “a part of the democratic camp” (Kopacz, 2014).

MOVING AWAY FROM THE WEST

Alongside the positive consequences, as we have become part of the Western dream, our elites have begun to see its numerous weaknesses as well as disputes, divisions and threats, noticeable especially in the last decade: the economic and the migration crises. As a result, the dark image of the West was constructed among some of the right wing elites. The social process has intensified in which dependence on external patterns is beginning to be seen as evidence of weakness and lack of identity. Then there begins a search for roots in one's own history and national identity, accompanied by the so-called dignity narrative. In this narrative, LaJ began to recreate the imaginary border between "us" – Poland, and "them" – Western Europe. As a result, we began to move away from the West of Europe as a centre (Kuisz, 2016).

This is expressed by a certain discursive opposition, which can be called the controversy between the pro-core or anti-core camps, or Euro-enthusiastic and Euro-sceptic camps, that has continued for years now (Turkowski, 2016). Most of the elites shared the vision of Donald Tusk of 2011 that the game is about how to shift more to the West, "how to be in the centre of Europe, how to be a genuine, key player on the European scene" and not "to be on its periphery". Either "you are at the table, or you are in the menu". Poland had insufficient resources and capabilities, and only close cooperation with the core countries (Germany and France) and deepening the integration allowed her to play a major role in the Union (Tusk, 2011). His successors from LaJ do not strive to be at the table at all costs, as the price for them was the submission to the strongest as an illusion of influence, under the banner of "flowing with the mainstream". It turned out that our entry into the Western structures does not mean quick exit from peripherality nor equal participation in the decision-making processes, as in the polarization discourse our part of Europe is still more "eastern" than "western" in the eyes of many politicians in the West (Matyja, 2018). The visible shortage of the Polish sense of subjectivity and co-responsibility was expressed in the narrative that Western Europe should consider the Polish view of its affairs from the perspective of our interests and identities (Morawiecki, 2017).

POLAND – THE CENTRE OF CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE

One of the most important parts of our geopolitical representations is the vision of Poland as the centre – the strongest country and the leader of this part of Europe, geopolitically organizing the contracted space between Russia and Germany, whose pressure the region has been struggling with for centuries. To some extent, it was a filiation of the interwar concept of “Isthmus”.

Leaving the sense of peripherality and threat behind was to be facilitated by regional cooperation, since 1991 it has been focused within the Visegrad Group (V4). To strengthen the weak position of Poland and other peripheral countries of the region on the path to the Westernisation as a condition for security and development in the geopolitical imagination of our elites, they constructed the vision in the 1990s on the imagined common historical and contemporary fate: “To these nations we are connected not only by historical ties, but also by the common concern for security, heading towards the European Union, awareness of the painful problems of political transformation” (Miller, 2001).

However, the strong desire for unity with the West has weakened this image of Poland as a centre. However, in the first decade of the 21st century, the Visegrad Group did not fall apart, although it became much less active. The multidimensional crisis of the Union, visible in recent years, and destabilization at our eastern borders have created in the eyes of some right-wing elites an opportunity for the Polish geopolitical strategy based on expanding our own autonomy. At the end of 2017, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki suggested the idea: “Central Europe is the source of strength for Poland. And only Poland with its own regional policy in alliance with the USA, open to all Central European countries, can be a member of the Union and a subject in international relations” (Morawiecki, 2017).

Poland should – with American support – remain the leader of our region of Europe, now identified institutionally not only within the V4 group, but also – since 2015 – more widely as the Three Seas Initiative, consisting of 12 countries. In the opinion of the LaJ elites, they are generally associated with similar identities and historical experiences. And now the feeling prevails that Poland is still treated by the “old” EU countries as the worse, “eastern” part of the West, to maintain her peripheral status (Morawiecki, 2017). Characteristically, this discourse presents the region as an imagined cultural unity, the unity of goals and interests, combined with the recognition of the central role of Warsaw. Such

a vision ignores many differences and disputes, overestimates the central role of Poland, and underestimates the power of influence of the strongest countries in Western Europe, mainly Germany.

IMAGINATIONS OF THE EAST

Following 1989, Poland returned civilization-wise to the West, which in the 21st century strengthened its geopolitical position towards the East in the eyes of the elites through the system of alliances. It was significant for geopolitical representations. For the goals of Polish eastern policy, framed for many years according to the so-called Jagiellonian idea (although the CP-PPP government declared the use of the more Western Piast Concept) was to move the boundaries of the zone of cultural and political influences of the West to the East, mainly towards Ukraine and Belarus – close to the historical reminiscences from the First and Second PR; and later farther east, e.g., towards Georgia, under the banner of “expanding the areas of security, cooperation and democracy” (Tusk, 2007). It was perceived by Russia as interference in its sphere of influence. This role of the “bulwark” is so deeply rooted in our historical geopolitical representations and national identity, but also that of the “bridge” between the West and the East and in the modern version also the “inspector” who knows what it should be like and therefore quickly determines the difference between the template and reality and administers treatment. In our case, equipped with better western patterns treated as universal and judging others according to them (Czapliński, 2017). Poland, as an example of a successful transformation, was supposed to be an imaginary figure of the West-centre for its eastern neighbours, attracting them with her soft power. Such a paternalistic vision was drawn by, for example, Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz: “We know from our own experience that stability is ensured primarily by democracy and the free market. Therefore, we will continue to support our eastern partners in the work of their reforms, in building the structures of a democratic state of law and civil society” (Marcinkiewicz, 2005).

Among the eastern neighbours the imperial Russia/USSR was identified as a regular “alien” and threat to Poland, in the role of the enemy of Poland and Polishness since the period of partitions, which was somewhat suppressed by the forced friendship during the period of the PPR. Russia in the discourse of the vast majority of the elites was presented as a civilisationally alien and

geopolitically dangerous world to justify Poland's turn to the West (Skubiszewski, 1992).

Despite various fluctuations or varying assessments, the attitude of the "visitor" and orientalisation towards Russia clearly dominated our elites. As a consequence, the weakening of the Russian threat was possible in their visions by adopting the cultural values of the West by Moscow, treated as better and normal. "It is in the Polish vital interest that behind our eastern border the modern Russian state, not seeking inspiration in the imperial heritage, but building its new identity of a democratic, credible and cooperative state, and especially a good neighbour, should develop" (Meller, 2006). Then Russia shall change her geopolitical identity, i.e., abandon "thinking in terms of power politics, spheres of influence, zero-sum games, [...] which – in the realities and the environment of the European Union – should be history" (Sikorski, 2009).

Still nothing like that occurred, and in recent years, the hostile Cold War rhetoric, which justified the annexation of Crimea and Russia's participation in the war in Ukraine, has re-emerged in the image of Russia. Moscow, instead of democratizing and modernizing herself according to the Western model, continues her imperial policy, destabilizes the political order in Europe, exerts strong, negative influence on the geopolitical situation of Poland, works to weaken the EU and transatlantic cooperation (Czaputowicz, 2018). Therefore, Moscow's cooperation with Warsaw has become hostage not only to the geopolitical relations of the West with the Kremlin, but also to the notions of the necessary cultural rapprochement between Russia and the West, strongly limiting the room for manoeuvre in Poland's eastern policy.

SUMMARY

The geopolitical imaginations of our political elites placed Poland in Europe, on the periphery of the West, between Germany and Russia, and on the border of the two civilizations. The way out from this "fatalism of geography" was the main goal of the political elites of the Third Polish Republic. Hence the turn towards integration with the world of the West, to which we have belonged culturally for centuries. It required an imaginary shift of Poland from east to west to ensure her security and development. In order to justify such a reconstruction, the elites used the idealized image of the West that is close to us. It facilitated the acceptance of the geopolitical choice made by the society and the related radical

limitation of Poland's geopolitical and economic autonomy. The vehicles on the way to the West were bandwagoning towards the USA and Germany, which justified clientelism towards them. Poland's position in the West and East of Europe was leveraged by visions of Poland's dominant position in the post-communist region, which intensified during the LaJ government. As for the eastern direction, Poland's goal was to move the imaginary borders of the West to the east, mainly towards our eastern neighbours. This must have led to the negative reaction from Russia, which considers this area as its sphere of influence. Russia was treated, in our representations, as alien, and the change of this state of affairs would be a consequence of the Westernisation of Russia so desired by the Polish elites.

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GEOPOLITICAL DETERMINANTS IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

UWARUNKOWANIA GEOPOLITYCZNE W POLITYCE
ZAGRANICZNEJ FEDERACJI ROSYJSKIEJ

*Michał Romańczuk** 

ABSTRACT

International identity consists mainly of geographical, demographic, historical, political, military, economic, ideological, cultural and psychological factors. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia returned to tradition, not only in the sphere of political, social and philosophical ideas and ideologies, but also in the sphere of culture and religion. In the 1990s, the geopolitics revived. It became the basis for the development of the concept of foreign policy, the National Security Strategy and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. The aim of the research is to analyze geopolitical perspectives in the identity of the Russian Federation and its impact on foreign policy concepts and sources of development of geopolitical concepts in Russia. The post-Soviet area is important for the security of the Russian Federation. Russia perceives armed conflicts in this area as an element of political 'game' in its strategic area.

Keywords: Russian Federation; geopolitics; political concepts; foreign policy; security strategy

ABSTRAKT

Na tożsamość międzynarodową składają się przede wszystkim czynniki: geograficzne, demograficzne, historyczne, ustrojowe, wojskowe, ekonomiczne, ideologiczne, kulturowe i psychologiczne. Po rozpadzie ZSRR powrócono w Rosji do tradycji, nie tylko na płaszczyźnie idei i ideologii politycznych, społecznych oraz filozoficznych, ale również w sferze kultury oraz religii. W latach 90. XX wieku nastąpiło odrodzenie się geopolityki. Stała się ona podstawą do opracowania koncepcji polityki zagranicznej, strategii bezpieczeństwa narodowego oraz doktryny wojennej Federacji Rosyjskiej. Celem badań jest analiza ujęć geopolitycznych w tożsamości Federacji Rosyjskiej i ich wpływu na koncepcje w polityce zagranicznej oraz źródeł rozwoju koncepcji geopolitycznych w Rosji. Obszar postradziecki jest istotny dla bezpieczeństwa Federacji Rosyjskiej. Rosja postrzega konflikty zbrojne na tym obszarze jako element „gry” politycznej na jej strategicznym terenie.

Słowa kluczowe: Federacja Rosyjska; geopolityka; koncepcje polityczne; polityka zagraniczna; strategia bezpieczeństwa

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INTRODUCTION

The conclusion of the Belavezha Accords on December 8, 1991 by the presidents of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus – Boris Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuk, and Stanislav Shushkevich, respectively – sanctioned the collapse of the USSR¹. The so-called post-Soviet area was also thereby created. After the collapse of the USSR and the transformation of its geopolitical environment, the authorities of the Russian Federation had to redefine Russia's identity and role, and its vision with regard to international relations.

The political activity of states is subject to constant transformations due to the dynamic changes that take place in the international environment. In this respect, attention should be paid to qualitative elements in the research, which are difficult to define, but helpful for grasping the driving forces behind the country's international strategy, the way that the country defines its own international position, and its stated roles in international relations (Bryc, 2012, p. 23).

The aim of this study is to analyse the role that geopolitical concepts have played in constructing the identity of the Russian Federation and influencing its foreign policy. Alongside the process of self-identification, states formulate and implement their international objectives, which reflect their shaped identity as, for example, a superpower, a partner, a client, a satellite, etc., and these in turn shape mutual interactions: hegemony, protection, integration, cooperation, rivalry, competition, and isolation (Bieleń, 2006, p. 30). International identity is primarily determined by a variety of factors: geographical, demographic, historical, political, military, economic, ideological, cultural, and psychological.

After the collapse of the USSR, there was a return to tradition in Russia, not only in the sphere of political, social and philosophical ideas and ideologies, but also in the sphere of culture and religion. In the public debates of politicians and academics, the question often arises of the imperatives guiding of Russia's imperial identity. The factors determining Russian imperialism can be found in geopolitics, geography and historical heritage, which was shaped by civiliza-

¹ The post-Soviet region currently consists of independent states such as: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. However, the three Baltic Republics, namely Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, which joined NATO and the European Union, are not considered to be countries that belong to this area. Three regions can be distinguished in the post-Soviet area: the Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan), and Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova).

tional and cultural expansion. Imperial actions can be defined as those aimed at extending the political, military, cultural and economic influence of states with a superpower status, or with aspirations to being such, to areas that do not belong to them. The Russian Federation is experiencing a mythologization of the idea of “imperium”, which harks back to the times of Tsarist Russia and the USSR. This notion of empire is viewed positively, and many Russians feel they are the heirs of a great imperial tradition. Nostalgia for the empire has led to the emergence of a popular view in political and scientific circles in Russia, namely that the imperial path is the only way for modern Russia to develop.

THE IMPACT OF GEOPOLITICAL CONCEPTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL IDENTITY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

After the collapse of the USSR in the last decade of the 20th century, the study of geopolitics re-emerged as an important and influential field of study in the Russian Federation. Geopolitics was used in attempts to explain the reasons for the loss of Russia's international position. For Russian political decision-makers it also became an inspiration and a basis for research carried out for the purpose of understanding the world and creating current and future international politics (Bassin & Aksenow, 2006, pp. 99–100). In Russian scholarship there are three approaches to geopolitics: classical, recent, and the latest (contemporary). The first concerns classical geopolitical theories, the second focuses on economic issues – geoeconomics, while the third is moving away from geopolitical and economic determinants in favour of “geosophy”, which analyses multidimensional space and takes into account cultural diversity in the world. This approach is also called: “the geopolitics of civilisation”, “geoculture”, “geophilosophy”, “geopsychology”, and “the computerisation of geopolitics”. In its most up-to-date conception, Russian geopolitics is an interdisciplinary science that draws on the achievements of economics, geography, international relations, history, political science, national security, and psychology. It also employs the most modern technology and communication. Furthermore, this approach emphasises that power consists not only in material resources, but also in culture, language and religion. In order to undermine the power of a state, it is not essential to inflict material damage. The main target of the attack may be the culture and language of a given country. Hence the actions of the authorities of the Russian Federation, which challenge Western culture and civilisation, and proclaim the inevitable collapse

of the United States of America with its liberal ideals, at the same time exalt and promote its Orthodox civilisation and the multipolar world order, which will consist of different centres, with different ideals and cultures. Due to its geographical location, Russian civilization, with its culture, philosophy, religion and traditions, will have a strong influence on the Eurasian territory, and thus contribute to the growing importance of the Russian Federation in the world in the coming decades (Legucka, 2013, p. 53).

The Russian people do not perceive the state in the same way that the peoples of Western Europe do. In Russia, there is a sense of loyalty to the state and its personification as Mother Russia, as well as loyalty to the authorities and the army, which are the most important components of the state. One can also draw attention to the origin of the term 'state' from the terms 'gosudar', 'gospodar', and 'gospad', which mean, respectively, 'master', 'the head of the family', and 'manager' (Eberhardt, 2006, p. 459). The sense of uniqueness which characterizes the perception of the Russian state among citizens and political elites is bound up with Orthodox messianism, imperialism, the "Russian spirit" and attachment to religion. This is related to the history and geographical location of the Russian Federation, which refers to the previously mentioned "geosophy". The policy of the Russian authorities over the centuries was characterised by strong territorial expansion, beginning in the 16th century during the reign of Ivan the Terrible. European countries created their positions as superpowers through enlargement of their territories in overseas conquests. In contrast, Russia strengthened its position through the conquest of new territories on land and the creation of so-called "internal colonies" (Ząbek, 2010, p. 25). More emphasis was placed on territorial achievements than on the economic development of the country. These activities resulted in the Russian Federation's enduring and specific perception of territory. The territorial size of the Russian state is the main determinant of its position as a superpower in world politics. Therefore, it is not surprising that Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, speaking in his Annual Address to the Federal Assembly in 2005, said: "Above all, we should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and compatriots found themselves outside Russian territory" (Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 2005). Russian society felt humiliated by the disintegration of its great empire. After 1991, Russia lost 5 million km² of territory and returned to the borders of the 16th century, which amounted to retreating from the borders of Europe. Although the

construction of a state of such vast territory had entailed that its citizens lacked personal freedom, it also caused a sense of national pride, as the metaphysical and sacral sphere was identified with territory.

Therefore, protecting its own territory against external threats is a key factor in Russian policy. It is the reason for Russia's passion for militarism and lies behind the creation of "buffer zones" around the state borders. Hence, for the Russian Federation the security of the post-Soviet area is a key determinant of its own development and security. It is primarily geopolitics that leads to the adoption of geographical determinism, which treats factors that result from the shape and character of the territory as absolute features – timeless and unchanging.

The power of the state is also defined through the prism of territory, and this has become another source for the development of geopolitical concepts in Russia. The geography and mythology of territory is bound up with the notion of there being a need for a strong, centralised state power which exercises control over this territory, and the army which is supposed to defend it. Power in Russia thus has a sacral dimension, possessing the legitimacy to use coercion and force, and to exact obedience and fidelity from society. However, the condition for this is that the exercise of power must be effective and bring benefits for the development of the country. It is an element of the social contract, in which individual goals must be subordinated to the interests of the nation as a whole. The Russian view is that the "national idea" thus understood will enable the resurrection of the imperial state (Bäcker, 2007, p. 19). The guiding concept behind Russian defence is that it is crucial to have a strong army. This is due to the country's geographical location, with long land borders and unstable neighbouring regions, which gives rise to a "besieged fortress" syndrome and the associated constant sense of threat from outside. Unlike the United States of America and the United Kingdom, which have better defensive capabilities thanks to their being surrounded by sea, in the Russian Federation the army does not only perform defensive functions: it also has the task of bonding the state and power. This is why the victory in the "Great Patriotic War" is celebrated with such pomp and fervour in Russia. In the times of the USSR, when there was an external enemy that threatened the existence of the state, propaganda justified the need to maintain a large army and to allocate significant financial resources to it. Hence, the Russian army undoubtedly suffered a huge loss of face during the First Chechen War of 1994–1996 (Grabowski, 2011, pp. 25–29).

SELECTED RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICAL CONCEPTS

The first geopolitical concept to be described in writing is the idea of the “Three Rome”², created by the monk Philotheus of Pskov at the end of the 15th century. He expressed the view that following the fall of the ancient Roman Empire in 476, and the Byzantine Empire in 1453, Russia would become the new capital of Christianity faithful to Christ – the Orthodox centre of the world, or “Third Rome”. There will be no fourth Rome. This messianic concept became the official ideology and explanation for the expansive policy of the Grand Duchy of Moscow, later the Russian Empire, and allowed for the “gathering” of all Russian lands under Moscow’s rule. Later, this expansion was continued by Ivan the Terrible and other tsars of Russia (Furier, 2003, pp. 121–124).

The researchers Nicholas V. Riasanovsky and Mark D. Steinberg emphasize that the aim of Philotheus of Pskov was not to create an ideological basis for Russian foreign policy, but only to emphasize that the Orthodox faith was the true one (Riasanovsky & Steinberg, 2009, p. 129). Paul Evdokimov, a Russian philosopher and theologian working in exile in France, was of the opinion that the idea of the Third Rome evoked above all the desire for holiness, which is necessary for defence and further existence of the Third Rome, until the return of Christ (Rażny, 2012, p. 14).

Like the idea of the Third Rome, the myth of “Holy Rus” has also functioned for the centuries. After the collapse of the USSR, the idea reappeared in nationalist circles in Russia at the turn of the 21st century. Michał Soska indicates that it “expresses their desire to build a strong and powerful state on the international arena and to have a special historical mission” (Soska, 2009, p. 10), which refers to the belief in Russian messianism. Later on, this concept was developed by Lev Gumilyov, who defined Holy Rus as synonymous with the superethos of Eurasian civilization, in which the Orthodox Church primarily plays a political role, and only later a spiritual one. Kirill, the Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus’, now appeals to the idea of “Holy Rus”. The policy of the Russian Orthodox Church with regard to the post-Soviet Orthodox states corresponds to the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. After the unification of the Russian Orthodox Church with the

² After the fall of Byzantium, Russia recognized itself as the continuation of the Byzantine tradition. The symbolic manifestation of the continuation was the marriage of the Grand Duke of Moscow Ivan III with Zoe (Sophia) Palaiologina, the niece of the last emperor of the Byzantine dynasty, Constantine XI Dragas Palaiologos. In addition, Russia took on the two-headed eagle in the coat of arms, the title of the tsar (emperor) and the Byzantine court ceremonies.

Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia in 2007, the most important goal of the present patriarch Kirill was to obtain the greatest possible influence of the Russian Church in the post-Soviet countries, especially in Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova (Ćwiek-Karpowicz, 2010).

Kirill is of the opinion that Holy Rus nowadays comprises Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. This is why no autocephalous Orthodox churches can be established in Ukraine and Belarus³ – because Belarusians and Ukrainians should be under the authority of the Russian Orthodox Church. During his visit to Ukraine on the occasion of the 1020th anniversary of the baptism of Kievan Rus, Kirill the Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus' stated in a public speech that: "Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are Holy Rus. Holy Rus is the ideal of love, goodness and truth. Holy Rus is beauty, Holy Rus is strength and we, together with you, are one Holy Rus (Matreńczyk, 2008, pp. 32–33). In another speech, Patriarch Kirill included Moldova in "Holy Rus" stating that Holy Rus is "a spiritual concept and not a political, linguistic or ethnic one, so it may include a non-Slavic country" (Svyateyshiyy Patriarkh Kirill: Moldova – neot'yemlemaya chast' Svyatoy Rusi, 2010). The myth of "Holy Rus" has a religious character – the conviction that at first the people, and later the Russian nation, was called upon to serve God, which manifested itself in the very name of "Holy Rus". In this conception, the emphasis was placed on the role of religion as a factor shaping the geopolitics of a given community. In the process of self-identification, nations create their own identity and historical memory. The geopolitics of religion is therefore a way of thinking about space, territory and national identity (Zenderowski, 2011, pp. 30–32). An example of this is the Christmas greetings from Kirill the Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus', not only to Russians, but also to Belarusians, Ukrainians and Moldovans, emphasizing the unity of Orthodox civilization. In 2010, Patriarch Kirill stated that: "Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, Chisinau and Astana should become centres not only of particular states, but centres of a strong civilisation on behalf of which they are able to speak on an equal footing with other civilisations of the modern world" (*Patriarkh Kirill pryzyvayet strany russkogo mira stat' tsentrami yedinoy moshchnoy tsivilizatsii*, 2010). Any attempt to create separate Ukrainian and Belarusian patriarchates is considered to be an artificial division of Eastern Slavs. Orthodox culture is also the basis of Russian nationalism with its imperial

³ On December 15, 2018, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church Canonical was established, which covers the jurisdiction of Ukraine. This decision met with strong negative reaction from the authorities of the Russian Federation and the Russian Orthodox Church.

identity, which, however, should be treated separately from nationalist organisations (Wierzbicki, 2010, pp. 326–327).

One of the most eminent representatives of Russian geopolitics was undoubtedly Veniamin Semenov-Tian-Shansky. His own research interests focused mainly on the geography of Russia. He formulated a geopolitical concept which is an alternative to Halford Mackinder's theory. He argued that there is a relationship between broader historical and geographical generalizations, which is why geographical factors affect common history and political processes. According to his concept, the "critical" area can be distinguished on the globe, lying between the equator and the northern parallel of 45 degrees, where there are three great oceanic bays: the Mediterranean with the Black Sea, the Chinese (Southern and Eastern) Sea with the Japanese Sea, and Caribbean Sea with the Gulf of Mexico. Around these three strategic bays have developed the three largest civilizations and regional systems. He believed that this area, like the Halford Mackinder theory, plays the role of Heartland. Geopolitical competition takes place over the control of these three "ocean bays". On the other hand, the "ruler of the world" will be the civilization that manages to rule over these three seas simultaneously. In the concept of Veniamin Semenov-Tian-Shansky, one can observe the superiority of the theory of continental power. This theory assumes the primacy of the land by the sea. Countries that occupy the largest area of land will gain an advantage over others (Semenov-Tian-Shansky, 2008, pp. 144–160).

EURASIANISM AND OCCIDENTALISM IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY

Since the 19th century, Russia's identity as a civilization has been the subject of debates and disputes among the Russian intellectual elite – over whether Russia belongs to European or Asian civilisation, or whether it is a different geocultural entity that unites these two great civilisations (Duncan, 2005). For this reason, along with the newly gained freedom of expression and the abolition of censorship in the early 1990s, a debate took place on the fundamental issues of Russian national interests, identity and foreign policy. The conceptions of Russia's development after the collapse of the USSR appealed to the rebirth of the identity and self-identification of Russians. At that time two basic concepts emerged: Atlanticist (also called Occidentalism or Westernism), and Eurasian (Menkiszak, 2005, pp. 275–296).

The Atlanticist concept was based on 19th-century Occidentalism, which proclaimed that Russia should accept the legacy of Western civilisation. The best option for the Russian Federation was said to be the abandonment of cultural isolation, to reject the patriarchal socio-political system associated with the country's Asian heritage and Orthodox faith, and to adopt the European system of norms, principles and values, based on rationalism and integration with Western civilisation (Bryc, 2012, pp. 30–31). The Russian Federation was to be connected with highly developed European countries and to cooperate closely with them, joining economic and political institutions. This cooperation was to have strengthened Russia's position and enabled it to shape the post-Cold War international order. It was also emphasized that the Russian Federation belongs to Western civilization in historical terms. The representatives of this trend were, among others: Dmitri Trenin, Vladimir Baranovski, Andrei Zagorski, Sergey Karaganov, and Alexey Arbatov. The implementation of this approach could be observed in the activities of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in 1991–1996, Andrei Kozyrev, and the Prime Minister in 1991–1992, Yegor Gaidar. However, attention should be paid to the deep asymmetry in the Atlanticist approach to relations with Western and post-Soviet states. The uneven involvement and focus on policy aspects with the so-called countries of the “near abroad” contributed to a loosening of trade, social and political ties with the region (Bieleń, 2006, p. 67). Occidentalists proclaimed the need to reform the Russian Federation following the Western European model, to introduce a free market economy and democracy, which was to contribute to restoring the Russia's superpower status. In the scholarly literature, the period of the Atlanticists in the early 1990s is described as “romantic” (Cziomer & Zyblikiewicz, 2006, p. 390).

The second significant idea in Russian foreign policy is that of Eurasianism. This idea refers to Eurasianist thought from the beginning of the 20th century, as well as to Slavophilia, and is connected with the search for Russian identity. The idea of Eurasianism was created by the geographer Petr Savitsky. It posited that Russia's development is determined by the development of the state's territory. On the other hand, Lev Gumilyov formulated the thesis that Russia-Eurasia should be perceived as an autonomous and self-sufficient cultural type. Another representative of Eurasianism, Aleksandr Dugin, propounds the notion of geographical determinism. In his opinion, there are two hostile civilizations, shaped by geographical location, namely continental and island (oceanic) states. Aleksandr Dugin became involved in the implementation of his theories, which was reflected in the establishment of the pan-Russian Social-Political Move-

ment “Eurasia” in 2001. It stood as a counterweight to liberal and Atlanticist ideology. According to this theory, the Russian Federation, due to its specific Eurasian location, combines the political, cultural and historical traditions of two continents – Europe and Asia – and this has resulted in its uniqueness and civilizational separateness from Europe (Dugin, 2007, pp. 331–336, see: Dugin, 1997). Theorists who are proponents of this idea also argue that Russia will never be just a European or Asian state. The Russian Federation has its own unique identity and national-state interests, which are geopolitically inextricably linked to the Eurasian territory. For this reason, Russia should follow its own “third way” of development, hence it is not possible for Russia to adopt the Atlanticist model of socio-political development. This is a clear reference to the idea of the “Third Rome”. Eurasianism contains both messianic and imperialist concepts. The development of the Russian Federation depends above all on its “internal” power, connected with Orthodoxy and its own specific system of the state’s functioning. The representatives of the Eurasian concept were first of all: Aleksandr Dugin, Lev Gumilyov, Natalya Narochitskaya, Aleksey Mitrofanov, and Elgiz Pozdnyakov. Gennady Zyuganov, who is considered to be an extreme representative of this trend, should be identified as a political implementer of this concept. He published a manifesto entitled *The Geography of Victory*, in which he proclaimed the advent of the era of geopolitics. The idea is distinctly anti-Western. Zyuganov is in favour of seeking allies in order to counteract the hegemony of the USA. A similar rhetorical tone is employed by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, who creates and influences Russia’s foreign policy through the Duma Committee on Geopolitics. He appeals to the imperial heritage of Tsarist Russia, as well as to Soviet times. The concept of Eurasianism asserts that the Russian Federation is a separate civilization, which should focus on expansion and the restoration of the control of influence and reintegration at the political, military and economic levels of the Eurasian territory (identified with the post-Soviet area). This entails involvement in armed conflicts in the area, assigning Russia the role of guarantor and protector, preventing post-Soviet states from strengthening cooperation and competition for influence in the area with other states, such as Turkey, Iran, China, and the USA (Trenin, 2001, pp. 50–65). It can be said that the geopolitics of the “near abroad” advocated in this idea has grown to the rank of an ideology, which is supported by nationalistic sentiments. The representatives of this concept indicate that it is possible to ally with some European countries in order to divide transatlantic unity, such as in the framework of cooperation with Germany and France. Eurasians were also

in favour of increasing contacts with Asian countries. In addition, they have also expressed the view that India and China are essential pillars of the security system in Eurasia and a counterbalance to relations with the United States of America. Relations with the countries of the Middle and Far East were supposed to provide a balance to Eurocentrism and give Russia room for manoeuvre in international relations (Nizioł, 2004, pp. 159–169).

From the above considerations we can conclude that the mythologized conception of Eurasia was aligned with the geopolitical aspirations of the Russian Federation to integrate the post-Soviet area, and it thus became a priority in its foreign policy, as well as a factor that could bring about the restoration of national identity and pride. The proponents of Eurasianism also emphasized the confrontational aspect of the rivalry between the world's civilisation centres, in which the division into bad "Atlanticists" and good "Continentalists" was clear.

In addition to these two geopolitical concepts, the new so-called "third way" should also be mentioned. This "third way", navigated between East and West, is also known as "geopolitical realism". It was on this basis that the concept of "dynamic balance" in the Russian Federation's foreign policy was developed. It emerged during the rule of President Vladimir Putin, its aim being to strengthen, by all possible means, the Russian Federation's position in international relations. This approach avoids extreme nationalism, Eurasianism and Atlanticism, although it is moderately patriotic. From Eurasianism it draws the perception of Russia as a unique state, but rejects, *inter alia*, the inevitability of the confrontational relations with Western countries. According to this doctrine, the Russian Federation should be an important link in a new, multipolar world (Karaganov, 1994). This approach is supported by the current Russian political elites. It has become the foundation for shaping the foreign and security policy of the Russian Federation. Apart from Vladimir Putin, the representatives of this trend include Gleb Pavlovsky, Dmitri Trenin, Sergey Karaganov, Sergey Ivanov, and Igor Ivanov. This concept is also inscribed in the principle of "sovereign democracy", the creator of which is Vladislav Surkov, a close associate of Vladimir Putin. This principle asserts that state institutions should be strengthened by centralizing power, limiting the political role of regional elites and counteracting ethnic and regional separatism, which may destabilise the country. The state should play the main role in the economy and the organisation of social life. In this context, reference was made to paternalism, which was to become the foundation of the ideology of the new Russia (Bieleń, 2006, pp. 79–81). "Sovereign Democracy"

holds that the Russian Federation cannot adopt the Western model of the political system because of its civilizational differences. The overriding aim is not, as in the democracies of Western countries, to protect equality and individual freedoms, but rather to ensure the security and sovereignty of the state. On the one hand, the main task should be to resist external pressures, mainly from the USA and Western European countries, which seek to limit Russian sovereignty, and, on the other hand, to counteract internal pressures in order to preserve Russia's own national identity and to continue to conduct an independent foreign policy, which should be differentiated and tailored to European and Asian countries (Wierzbicki, 2010, pp. 315–316).

It is said that the means by which Russia should pursue these objectives are primarily the modernisation of the state and its industry and internal reform, but while maintaining autonomy in political and economic decision-making, and without adopting Western cultural models and values. Nor should it give too much prominence to either its European or Eurasian side. The Russian Federation should use its own potential (mainly raw materials) and use pragmatism in politics to establish relations of “partnership” and “balance” between the European Union, the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. However, such cooperation must not be based on being subordinate to any of these countries. In the actions of President Vladimir Putin thus far, there is evidently a policy of balancing between East and West, flexibly adapting to the changing political situation. Priority has also been given to economic matters and the consolidation of large state-owned enterprises such as Gazprom, Rosneft, etc. Vladimir Putin is creating the image of himself as the defender of Russia's interests on the world stage so that Russia can regain the international position it deserves. In his rhetoric, the Russian President uses a kind of ideological-political syncretism, combining many programmatic concepts, striving to create a strong state with the status of a superpower (Bieleń, 2006, pp. 83–87).

The doctrine of the “third way” in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation involves the implementation of four main objectives. The first is the restoration of Russia's position as a leader in the post-Soviet sphere, through the use of economic instruments in foreign policy. In the long term, the objective is to transform this area into an integrated region, along the lines of the European Union, under Russian leadership, which would become one of the “centres” of a multipolar world. The second goal is to use Russia's geopolitical advantages: nuclear weapons inherited after the collapse of the USSR, which are to be used as an element of deterrence; a permanent seat on the UN Security Council with

the right of veto; a flourishing arms industry and arms trade; the deployment of military bases outside its borders; and the continued cooperation with traditional allies, e.g., Iran, Cuba, or Serbia. The third objective is cooperation with Western countries on various levels, while at the same time contesting the unilateralism of US policy. The fourth and final objective is to activate cooperation with the “emerging powers” in the world, i.e., India, China, and Brazil, in order to prevent Russia’s foreign policy from being too Eurocentric and to promote multipolarity in the world. The aim is also to exploit the geopolitical communication opportunities between Europe and Asia. This would strengthen the Russian Federation’s position as an intermediary in trade and services on the international market (Legucka, 2013, pp. 76–77).

Konstantin Sorokin, the main theoretician behind the concept of “dynamic equilibrium”, argues that there are three geopolitical strategies for action: expansionist, subservient, and positional. Sorokin suggests that the Russian Federation is currently conceding to all the major powers. For this reason, Russia should adopt a positional strategy. In this case the main objective would be to keep as many countries in the post-Soviet area as possible within the orbit of Russian influence. This is to be achieved primarily through economic and military cooperation. President Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Security Conference held in Munich on February 10, 2007 can be regarded as a political action that is aligned with this theory. At this time, he stated that the violent efforts of the US to solve international problems intensifies the efforts of many countries, including North Korea and Iran, to possess nuclear weapons in order to deter a possible attack (Pacula, 2007). The Russian authorities are developing an imperial instinct, which is conducive to the creation of superpower tendencies, and thus to a return to the politics of power. The representatives of Eurasianism have been accused of neo-imperialism and the desire to rebuild Russia’s power.

In addition to the concept of Atlanticism and Eurasianism, in modern Russia there is also the concept of “Island Russia”, promoting moderate isolationism (see more: Sykulski, 2014, pp. 106–111). Due to the natural resources of Russia and the vastness of its territory, this trend has a long tradition in this country. Until the reign of Peter the Great, Russia was isolated from the rest of Europe. In line with the Russia–the Island concept, Russia is a unique world, separate from civilization and from Europe and Asia, not matching any political alliances. This concept is combined with the figure of Vadim Tsymbursky. The idea of “Island Russia” was created after the collapse of the USSR (see more: Potulski, 2010, pp. 204–205). Russia after 1991 lost its status of Russia–Eurasia, and became

Russia in Asia, a Russian island in the heart of the land with foreign-minded youths (Chechens, Tatars). Russia ceased to be a superpower. Russia is a separate “ethnology platform”. It is surrounded by other platforms: Romano-Germanic, Arabic-Iranian, Chinese, and Indian. “Island Russia” separates itself from other platforms by the Great Limitrof – the “geopolitical strait”, or the territorial ring stretching from Central and Eastern Europe, through the Caucasus to Central Asia. Vadim Tsymbursky from the Great Limitrof secrets western territories – the strait. In his opinion, they coincide with the area of Central and Eastern Asia. In addition to “Island Russia” and large areas in the east, the existence of western territories – the straits – is a factor constituting the Russian geopolitical identity (Cymburski, 2014, pp. 70–79). Russia as a geopolitical object can be described by means of three features. First of all, it is an integral geopolitical niche of the Russian ethnos, lying to the east of the Roman-Germanic ethno-civilization platform. The second feature of Russia is the size of the difficult to develop space in the east. Finally, the third constitutive feature of Russia is the separation of the country in the west from Romano-Germanic Europe, the homeland of liberal civilization, a belt of peoples and territories adjacent to indigenous Europe, but not part of it. The insularity of Russia is also expressed in the basic types of wars that happened to it against states from the neighboring ethno-civilization platforms. Fighting with Russia or going on distant peripheries, without jeopardizing the vital centers of Russia, or the enemy, having managed to break into these centers, is cut off by “straits” from its back bases, surrounded and choked by foreign spaces. The concept of “Island Russia” has not become the dominant paradigm in Russian foreign policy. The reason for this is that the Russian geopolitical tradition is aimed at conducting global policy.

CONCLUSION

Geopolitics occupies a very important place in Russian politics. Reference is still made to the classical approaches, especially to concepts that give Russia a “privileged” position. Here, it is worth mentioning Halford John Mackinder’s theory of “Heartland”. Russian geopolitics demonstrates a sentiment for territory, which Russians view from a metaphysical perspective. Geopolitics is seen in a dualistic way, as both a blessing and a curse for society. After the collapse of the USSR, geopolitics was reborn in the Russian Federation with redoubled force. It became the basis for the development of the concept of foreign policy, the National Security

Strategy and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. In international politics, it was the basis for formulating together with other “players” – China, the USA, India, and the EU – a plan to implement the idea of multipolarity in international relations. In the Russian consciousness there is also a strong fear of being surrounded by enemies, hence the importance of the post-Soviet sphere for the security of the Russian Federation. Russia sees armed conflicts in this area as part of the political “game” in its strategic area. The involvement of states outside the region in these conflicts is perceived as interference in its internal affairs. The Russian Federation, together with the post-Soviet area, is still a strong geopolitical and geostrategic complex, which has an impact on world events. It should be pointed out that this influence is both creative and destructive. It is currently difficult to indicate which one is predominant. According to this geopolitical conception, Russia is clearly predestined to play a significant role in the post-Soviet area. Its main task is taken to be the reintegration of this area, with the core of this integration including Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, in addition to the Russian Federation.

The Russian Federation strives to create its own cultural space, to give the Russian language the status of a means of global communication and to build its own cultural system, which would be resistant to external actions. Its aim is to create a strong international identity and emphasize the threat of the world’s Westernization, thus reducing the influence of other cultures and creating a unipolar world dominated by the West. The Russian Federation is striving for a state of affairs in which civilizational spheres of influence would co-exist and the balance of power between civilizations in international relations would be maintained.

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THE USE OF FREEDOM OF ARTISTIC EXPRESSION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NECESSITY OF RESPECTING HUMAN RIGHTS (THE POLISH PERSPECTIVE)

KORZYSTANIE Z WOLNOŚCI WYPOWIEDZI ARTYSTYCZNEJ
W KONTEKŚCIE KONIECZNOŚCI POSZANOWANIA PRAW
CZŁOWIEKA (POLSKA PERSPEKTYWA)

*Kinga Machowicz** 

— ABSTRACT —

Works of art often refer to privacy or the freedom of conscience and religion. The goal of the study is to contribute to the discussion on resolving conflict situations arising from the way of reception of art and to point out circumstances worth taking into consideration while choosing measures intended to prevent conflicts or at least minimize the effects of conflict situations that have already occurred. That is why it appears indispensable to consider difficulties in defining art-related concepts basing on social science, and to present artistic creation as a form of expression, as well as to analyze the determinants of the freedom of artistic creation as a law-protected interest in the political-legal system in the situation of conflict with other human rights.

Keywords: human rights; freedom of expression

— ABSTRAKT —

Dzieła sztuki często nawiązują do prywatności lub wolności sumienia i religii. Celem opracowania jest przyczynienie się do rozwoju dyskusji na temat rozwiązywania konfliktowych sytuacji wynikających ze sposobu odbioru sztuki oraz wskazanie okoliczności wartych uwzględnienia podczas wyboru działań mających zapobiegać konfliktom lub przynajmniej minimalizować skutki już zaistniałych sytuacji konfliktowych. Dlatego jako niezbędne jawi się rozważenie trudności w definiowaniu na gruncie nauk społecznych pojęć związanych ze sztuką oraz przedstawienie twórczości artystycznej jako formy wypowiedzi, a także przeprowadzenie analizy uwarunkowań wolności twórczości artystycznej jako dobra chronionego w systemie polityczno-prawnym w sytuacji konfliktu z innymi prawami człowieka.

Słowa kluczowe: prawa człowieka; wolność wypowiedzi

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INTRODUCTION

Freedom of expression is one of personal human rights, and one of the forms of expression is artistic expression or art. Significantly, the concept of art or even the work of art is not defined in the legislation. In contrast, there is rich literature on the conflict between the freedom of expression and other human rights. With regard to analyzing the position of the protection of one form of expression, i.e. artistic creation, in the spectrum of human rights protection, one may however feel still unsatisfied to some extent. On the one hand, art is covered by guarantees provided for freedom of expression, whereas on the other hand, while interacting with other human rights, it may violate the rights of other individuals.

Furthermore, it appears that artistic creativity may, in a highly spectacular way, interact in conflict particularly with the right to private life and the freedom of conscience and religion. That is why the goal of this study is to contribute to the development of discussion on resolving conflict situations arising from the ways of receiving works of art referring to a person's privacy or to phenomena being part of the realization of the freedom of conscience and religion, as well as to show circumstances worth taking into consideration while choosing measures intended to prevent conflicts or at least minimize the effects of conflict situations that have already occurred. The article was written by the descriptive method, interpretation of legal acts, and critical analysis of literature, including judicial decisions. Although judicial decisions do not have the quality of the sources of generally applicable law, they come from the established uniform jurisprudential line and for that reason they can be a significant support in interpreting legal norms.

The Level of A Scientific Discipline and Definability of Art-Related Concepts

Art or artistic creation is concepts that are utilized by different disciplines. At the same time, these terms are not, by assumption, easy to define. We may even wonder if at all and, possibly, to what extent, it is necessary to define them. For there is quite a large number of concepts that legislation does not specifically define but leaves their meanings assigned by natural language. Contracts for specific works have been regulated by law and the concept of work has been defined. Even though these definitions make it possible to provide legal protection, they are unable to convey the essence of the specificity of art as a social phenomenon. Political and legal sciences face the same challenge: "In the humanities and in social science it is far more difficult to establish indisputable truths than in exact science, natural science, medical science or technical science. Social processes

are far less verifiable objects of research, they are more diversified, more ambiguous than the objects of inquiries by mathematicians, physicists, or engineers” (Sobczak, 2008, p. 58). The definition of art given below is one of many, but is a quintessence of the elements discussed in literature: “Art is a re-creation of things or construction of forms or expression of experiences – if the product of this re-creation, construction, expression is able to enrapture, or move, or shock” (Tatarkiewicz, 1988, p. 52). For years, the conceptions of what the author of a work of art is, and what the creation process actually consists in, have changed (Wilkowski, 2014). Therefore art, as activity consisting in imparting a view or an idea and intended to produce a reaction to this communication is a form of expression. This observation stems both from the ways of defining art and from the distinct wording of legal provisions at different levels.

When defining the objectively significant elements of a specific work contract, the legislator has decided that its inherent element is remuneration. There are different motivations for, ways and currency of remuneration for creative activity (Wilkowski, 2015). However, the fact of not receiving remuneration is not an element that excludes some phenomenon from the sphere of art. Polish language knows the expression: ‘create for the drawer’ [create for one’s own pleasure or without a chance/hope for publication]. The author thus assumes that s/he will not reveal his/her creative output for some time, thereby depriving him/herself of the possibility of obtaining remuneration for the use of his/her work. A shocking example pointed out in literature is the creative activity of concentration camp prisoners, who turned precisely to artistic creation as the most personal form of objection towards inhuman treatment (Bieczyński, 2011).

In respect of artistic expression, the inquiries of social sciences primarily focus, however, on the issues connected with the commission of insult to religious feelings, plagiarism, forgery of works of art or dissemination of pornography, and on the questions of labor law and social security with regard to persons who earn remuneration from their creative work, as well as on the issues of violation of personal interests such as dignity (reputation, renown) or image (usually in relation to politicians in the context of satirical or caricaturing expression as the disapproval of their public behavior).

ARTISTIC CREATION AS A FORM OF EXPRESSION

One of the forms of artistic creation (and thereby one of the forms of expression) is so-called artistic provocation. *Provocation* means to challenge someone, to deliberately taunt them, insidiously incite, or instigate someone to take actions or decisions detrimental to them (or to a third party) (Kopaliński, 1972). At present, it is regarded as an admittedly controversial (due to its shocking, explicit character) but nevertheless as one of means of artistic expression. By assumption, the goals of art should draw on the first of the dictionary meanings: to challenge or deliberately taunt in the sense of putting sufficient pressure on the receivers so that, at least in a given moment, they will focus their interest on the phenomenon indicated by the artist. If this is not the case, then we can assume that we are not dealing with art but with pseudo-artistic activities that are not accorded legal protection.

Other forms of artistic creation include satire. It is assumed that if, with satirical convention in mind, it is possible to ridicule a person; it is, however, inadmissible to present them in a manner that leads to reviling and showing contempt for them in an extreme way (Tymiec, 2006). Nevertheless, despite appearances, there is also a positive program in satire, but it is generally well concealed. It is rather the receiver of a satirical work who, by themselves as it were, are expected, by accepting the satirical author's negative assessments as their own, to arrive at the conclusions approved albeit not directly formulated by the satirist. It is on this that the power of satire is based, and it is where its danger lies with regard to individuals and groups who become the butt of satirical comment, not to say attack. That is why satirical works are so readily received by the society and so fiercely fought against by those who have been stung by satire (Sobczak, 2016). A caricature is, however, a humorous, derisive emphasis on and exaggeration of characteristic features of a person, a thing or events, mainly in fine arts and literature (Kopaliński, 1972).

FREEDOM OF ARTISTIC CREATION AS A LAW-PROTECTED
INTEREST IN THE POLITICAL-LEGAL SYSTEM

The political system of the Republic of Poland is based on the principle of a democratic state ruled by law, from which follows the state's obligation to respect human rights. However, only few of them are absolute. Rights that may conflict with other law-protected interests in the political-legal system (includ-

ing the human rights of other individuals) may be restricted. Furthermore, the legislature assumed the possibility of introducing restrictions without a priori granting precedence to other rights that they value highly. Each time, the situation requires an individual settlement in the circumstances of a specific conflict. A constitutional principle (Article 14) is also to ensure freedom of the press and other means of social communication.

Article 31 of the Constitution provides for the limitations of human rights (including freedom of expression). It permits the imposition of limitations on the whole category of human rights, which are not absolute rights. Norms that guarantee the protection of particular rights have to be interpreted in conjunction with this provision. Everyone is thus obliged to respect the freedoms and rights of others. Restrictions upon the exercise of constitutional freedoms and rights may be imposed only by statute and only when they are necessary in a democratic state, *inter alia*, to protect public morals or the freedoms and rights of other persons. Such limitations may not, however, violate the essence of freedoms and rights.

Under Article 54 of the Constitution, the freedom to express opinions, to acquire and disseminate information is ensured to everyone. Article 73 of the Constitution stipulates that the freedom of artistic creation, scientific research, and dissemination of their results, the freedom to teach as well as enjoy the products of culture shall be ensured to everyone. The combination in Article 73 of the foregoing five freedoms can be justified by their shared feature, which is creative activity (Jabłoński, 2002). A common feature of any creative activity is to satisfy the factors of creativity, originality and independence (Szewc, 1997). Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in turn guarantees everyone the right to freedom of expression. This right includes freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas. The exercise of these freedoms, carrying with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society, *inter alia*, for the protection of morals, for the protection of the reputation and rights of others. Under Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right includes freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.

Under Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, every person has the right to hold opinions without interference. Everyone has

the right to freedom of expression; this right includes freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his/her choice. The exercise of these rights carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, which should, however, be explicitly provided by law and are necessary:

- a) for respect of the rights or reputations of others;
- b) for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals.

Interference with human rights cannot be unlawful or arbitrary.

ARTISTIC CREATION AS A POTENTIALLY PRIVILEGED EXPRESSION IN THE SITUATION OF CONFLICT WITH OTHER INTERESTS PROTECTED BY LAW

It is often assumed that, on account of its uniqueness or social function, art is so exceptional a phenomenon that it is not subject to generally accepted social norms, particularly legal ones. "This understanding of a creative act, placing it beyond the scope of conceptual cognition and ethics, gained popularity throughout the nineteenth century. The figure of genius – continually evoked by critical-artistic discourse, estheticians, and by artists themselves – deeply influenced the perception of the artist's social role in Western culture (Białkowski, 2010). In contrast, court practices adopt an entirely different point of view: "The artistic form or scientific objective of an insulting act do not by themselves exclude criminal responsibility for insult to religious feelings or for public insult to an object of religious worship" (Decision of the Supreme Court..., 2015). The cited fragment is only one of the excerpts from the uniform line of judicial decisions. It confirms the abandoning of the conception of art as a phenomenon free from any limitations. This conception was particularly advocated by artists themselves. "Kant separated ethical from esthetic categories. He was the first to prove that good and beauty do not need to go hand in hand, that they are independent of each other [...]. From this, artists drew conclusions to their advantage: total freedom of morals, and rights to moral opposition [...]. What used to be the play of Dada artists and surrealists in 1920 became a socially dangerous movement of confounded young people mooning about the world's roads and towns fifty years later. What conclusion can be inferred from this? A strange one but not without

reason: although ethical laws do not influence the value of a work of art, yet art as a social phenomenon, as a communication of ideas, has to respect ethical laws because otherwise it turns harmful, and artists have the same moral obligations like all others” (Estreicher, 1990). At the same time, it is an offence to publicly display pornographic material in such a manner that it may be imposed upon a person against their wish (Article 202 of the Criminal Code). The content of the norm is in accordance with the limitations on human rights provided for in international law because it takes into account the necessity of protecting public morals, but literature emphasizes that the systematic broadening of the content of Article 202 (Criminal Code) should be seen as a threat to the freedom of artistic expression. The motifs of human nudity, human sex life and accompanying feelings have been present in art for centuries. Broad freedom should be accorded to creative activity except for the rationally specified protection of minors against presentation of pornographic materials. The argument in favor of this reasoning is the absence of criminal intent on the part of the artist. Each case should obviously be examined *ad casum*, taking into account other factors essential to its actuality (Żarnowska-Grabarz, 2017).

On the other hand, with regard to other sensitive issues, the need to use extreme media of artistic communication is called into question. “It is highly debatable, however, whether the opinions by an artist in a discussion on such important issues as antisemitism, crisis of religious values or homophobia need to be expressed by means of artistic expression operating on the edge of the law” (Gienas, 2010, p. 8). It is conceded that Strasburg’s judicial decisions based on the question of freedom of expression clearly distinguished between artistic expression and other forms of expression, making the extent of the accorded protection conditional upon the results of assessment: “However, in cases of ‘pure’ (non-political) artistic expression, censored to meet religious or moral objections from a section of society, the [European] Court [of Human Rights] accords much less protection. Whether speech is classified as ‘political’ or ‘non-political’ is therefore crucial when the Court assesses the legitimacy of an interference with free expression” (Lester, 2014, p. 76).

The protection of political speech is usually linked with journalism practiced in accordance with the rules of this profession: “New Journalism is serious journalism, treating their audience and subject seriously, practiced by serious journalist conscious of the goals and techniques of their work. Equivalents of this kind of journalism can be the categories of quality, involvement, opinion-forming, neutrality, localness, and good citizenship” (Hofman, 2016). In the

judicial decisions of the ECHR, this kind of journalism is therefore more likely to be accorded protection than artistic expression.

It follows from the presented arguments that freedom of expression is interpreted in legal regulations not as absolute freedom but as one of human rights that may be restricted under specific circumstances. Furthermore, international obligations indicate that it is responsible expression that is protected. Artistic creation is one of many forms of expression; consequently, it may be restricted under the same terms as the other forms. There are therefore no legal grounds for treating artistic communication in an especially privileged way.

CONCLUSIONS

In the case of conflict between freedom of expression (including artistic creation) and other human rights, there is no model solution that would a priori give priority to freedom of expression or to the other rights. The situation of a particular conflict always has to be assessed in relation to specific circumstances. In accordance with the established, repeatedly confirmed decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, the state is less able to interfere in the freedom of expression in the case of more or less closed events (e.g., those by-tickets-only). In Poland, this mode of action is suggested by the judicial decisions made in recent years in cases which provoked public debate on the restrictions on artistic expression. It was the acquittal of artist Dorota Nieznalska charged with offending religious feelings through the controversial installation "Passion [Pasja]" and the acquittal of singer Adam Darski accused of offending religious feelings through the act of tearing up the pages of a Bible during a concert, whose visual and sound recording was prohibited. In contrast, singer Dorota Rabczewska was validly found guilty of offending religious feelings when, during an interview, she said that the Bible had been written by pot-smoking men drunk with wine.

Taking account of the essence of the phenomenon which is art and of general situational determinants, it can be expected that the conflicts in question cannot be avoided. What is left is to relieve tensions. An element conducive to easing conflicts is complex (rather than fragmentary) education on human rights. Such education should clearly show that the exercise of one's own rights also involves one's obligations. In turn, resolving arisen conflicts should take into account the European standards developed in judicial decisions since there are situations when the state enjoys a wide margin of assessment. They apply to freedom of

thought, conscience and religion because in Europe there is no uniform view on the social role and importance of religion. Freedom of religious beliefs is at the same time one of the most important elements determining the identity of believers and the conception of their life. That is why the national authorities, when undertaking inference serving to protect the rights of believers, retain a significant freedom of assessment, like in the case of restrictions intended to protect morals. A national judge is in a better position than the international court when trying to identify and assess the needs existing in a given country (Kamiński, 2003).

Shocking means of artistic expression cannot be justified only by the need to promote the artist's name. The general principle should be also applied of achieving the intended goal by using sufficient means but, at the same time, as little shocking as possible. Economy in the use of too drastic means of expression may also serve to preserve art as a form of expression that genuinely influences the audience, thereby contributing to enriching freedom of expression as a human right. The excessive use of stimuli may blunt the perception of the receivers, and, consequently, limit the possibility of reception of artistic communication. The public are often simply tired of too many stimuli. The existence of such risk is at least indirectly evidenced by widely-received works created using minimalist means of expression.

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THE CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH TO EUROPEANISATION *AD PERSONAM*: TOWARDS SOCIAL FUNCTIONALISM

PODEJŚCIE KONSTRUKTYWISTYCZNE DO EUROPEIZACJI
AD PERSONAM. W KIERUNKU SOCJOFUNKcjONALIZMU

Janusz Ruszkowski* 

ABSTRACT

Europeanisation is a process, but theory of Europeanisation is a theory of impact and influence configured as a feedback between the EU and its member states, as well as international organisations, third states, and furthermore, between the EU and persons (both citizens of the EU and the citizens of the states outside of the EU).

In researching the impact of European integration (and the EU itself) on specific persons, one should note that, for instance, Europeanisation of the Council of the EU officials is neither top-down nor bottom-up Europeanisation, nor is it *ad extra* or *ad intra* one. The purpose of this article is to sequentially examine only one type of Europeanisation, namely *ad personam* (EAP), with the use of tools applied in constructivism. The study of *ad personam* Europeanisation is conducted here on the example of the Council of the European Union (CEU) officials.

Keywords: Europeanisation; theory of European studies; constructivism; social functionalism

ABSTRAKT

Europeizacja jest procesem, ale teoria europeizacji jest teorią wpływu rozumianą jako sprzężenie zwrotne pomiędzy Unią Europejską a jej krajami członkowskimi oraz organizacjami międzynarodowymi i państwami trzecimi, a ponadto pomiędzy UE a osobami (zarówno obywatelami UE, jak i obywatelami krajów spoza UE).

W badaniu wpływu integracji europejskiej (w tym Unii Europejskiej) na osoby (tutaj przede wszystkim na urzędników Rady Unii Europejskiej) powinno się zauważyć, że nie jest to europeizacja *top down* ani europeizacja *bottom up*, zresztą nie jest to także europeizacja *ad extra* ani *ad intra*. Celem tego artykułu jest zbadanie tylko jednego typu europeizacji, którym jest europeizacja *ad personam* (EAP), przy użyciu narzędzi należących do teorii konstruktywizmu.

Słowa kluczowe: europeizacja; teoria studiów europejskich; konstruktywizm; socjofunkcjonalizm

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METHODOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS

Even a preliminary research on categories and definitions of the core meaning of Europeanisation justify the constructivist approach to processes of Europeanisation. In theoretical approaches to Europeanisation some findings and categories recur (Graziano & Vink, 2007; Ladrech, 1994; Radaelli, 2003; Risse, Cowles, & Caporaso, 2001; Bache & Marshall, 2004). First of all, Europeanisation is a process. Secondly, it consists in affecting and exerting influence. Thirdly, it is conducive to a transference of elements of institutional culture (including the culture of responsibility), which contains norms, patterns, rules, standards, values, principles, actions, procedures, obligations, behaviours (styles of behaviour), common beliefs, interests, and information¹. Next, it anticipates implementation of the elements of institutional culture. Finally, it creates a noticeable effect. It seems that these are the main categories of Europeanisation, which may be understood as “hard”, in other words, essential to this approach and necessary for the analysis. It is therefore worthwhile to consider what constructivism might bring to the study of Europeanisation. Even this short list of “hard” categories of Europeanisation seem to show that in this research it is advisable to at least experiment with constructivist tools. This concerns mainly such categories as “influence” (impact) and “transfer”, as well as implementation of elements of institutional culture, especially those which have ideational features (patterns, values, norms, obligations), but also others, which might be ideational to some extent (rules, standards, principles).

What is more, two other categories should not be omitted, as they have important explanatory function in research on Europeanisation. These are, namely, “reference points” (*référentiel*), and “the bandwagon effect”. „Reference point” is considered by the researchers of Europeanisation processes, as it concerns initial contextual conditions (structure) from which the process of Europeanisation starts, and which has the power of influence. Internal (normative) “culture” of a given institution, the European Union legal system, or, for instance, the value system of the EU, may be the reference point. On the other hand, “the bandwagon

¹ In this case, the institutional “hard reality” is linked to such elements of internal culture of a given institution. What should be understood as “internal culture of an institution” (or “internal institutional culture”) is a widely understood political, legal, informational, axiological and personal reality and ideation, attesting to the identity of the given institution (and distinguishing this institution from others), comprised of many elements (e.g., norms, patterns, rules, standards, values, principles, actions, procedures, obligations, behaviours, information, and so on).

effect” is one of the most crucial end results of the influence of Europeanisation processes. It constitutes an absorption, and then regular replication of transferred elements (values, norms, regulations, and so on) of the institutional culture (including the culture of responsibility). There are three types of replication: full, selective, and contextual one. The full replication is a reflection of all transferred models, while selective replication consists in exclusionary mimicry of transferred models, depending on ability or will. Finally, the contextual replication is a non-recurring mimicry of given behaviour or model, which only takes place in a (single) specific case.

Researching Europeanisation processes with the use of constructivist tools is a measure which requires many tests and attempts to find mutual connections between these two theoretical approaches (on the condition that Europeanisation may be considered a theory, e.g., a specialist one (Ruskowski, 2012, p. 17), or in a narrower sense, between its components, i.e., tools and categories).

The purpose of this article is to sequentially examine only one type of Europeanisation, namely, *ad personam* (EAP), with the use of tools applied in constructivism. The study of *ad personam* Europeanisation is conducted here on the example of the Council of the European Union (CEU) officials². The Council, like any institution, is characterized by its particular institutional culture and, as predicted by constructivism, is both connected to and constituted by a wide social environment (Jepperson, 2001, p. 6; Ruskowski, 2013a, pp. 9–27, 2010, p. 41). Thereby, the CEU is, on the one hand, the Europeanizing reference point (*référentiel*), and on the other, it possesses a large dose of constructivist naturalness, which makes the processes affecting the subjects operating within the CEU also socially natural. If to a socially generated institution its soft understanding, which dominates in constructivism, is added (e.g., via ideas, social and cultural norms, regulations and routines of behaviour and actions which apply in the CEU), then human interactions will be the source of norms, which create normative environment and in fact have a strong influence. Therefore, an institution such as the CEU, even if it obviously impacts the actors’ actions, is not the only one to do so.

² In this article the term “official” is used, as the term “officer” would be imprecise, suggesting that the person is employed full-time in the internal structures of the Council. However, the CEU, besides the actual full-time employees, includes also the ambassadors of the member states or their deputies, in both COREPERs, as well as ministers of the state members in the compositions of the Council who are not its full-time employees.

Europeanisation of the CEU officials is unusual, as so far none of the known trajectories of Europeanisation can effectively explain a direct influence of the European integration on persons (including the officials operating in the EU institutions). For this reason then, the author of this article first searches for a trajectory of Europeanisation which is more adequate to his research objectives. Subsequently, such Europeanisation is explained with the use of two fundamental tools of constructivism: the logic of appropriateness and socialisation. Finally, the constitutive features of the constructivist process of socialisation are mixed with their neofunctionalist equivalents (which are classic in European studies), in order to examine if such a procedure might provide an explanation for the Europeanisation process in persons.

EUROPEANISATION *AD PERSONAM* IN EUROPEANISATION STUDIES

Theory of Europeanisation³ is a theory of impact and influence configured as a feedback between the EU and its member states, as well as international organisations, third states, and between the EU and persons (both citizens of the EU and the citizens of the states outside of the EU) (Levi-Faur, 2007, p. 102)⁴. Europeanisation, affecting, for instance, states and regions, also impacts people, hence its evident sociological inspirations and aspirations.

The process of Europeanisation has two inner trajectories (within the EU) and two outer ones (outside of the EU). The first inner trajectory is described as top-down Europeanisation, and it consists in “downloading” European political and legal models as well as values to the political systems of the EU member states or states outside of the EU (input effect), with impact on the domestic inter-institutional relations (Bursens, 2007, p. 118). In this way, the political, legal and economic dynamics of the EU becomes a part of the state politics (Ladrech,

³ Europeanisation may be defined depending on its wider or narrower understanding. Europeanisation *sensu largo* is the impact of Europe as a historical, cultural, social and institutional whole, while Europeanisation *sensu stricto* is limited to the European Union only, therefore also called ‘EU-isation’. This article will focus on the latter, narrower sense.

⁴ D. Levi-Faur introduces several research postulates into current studies on Europeanisation. According to Levi-Faur, what shall constitute a significant challenge for scholars of Europeanisation is a comparative analysis, founded on three redeployments: 1) from the government to the governance; 2) from national levels to regional or global levels; 3) from a unitary state to a disaggregated state.

1999, p. 71). Such a model is based on an export (transfer) of European solutions to states' political systems, on which it has a crucial impact. The second inner trajectory is described as bottom-up Europeanisation and denotes the system of internal management of the EU by "uploading" functions, tasks and responsibilities of the member states (or national institutions) onto the European level in order to minimise the costs of adjustment and harmonisation (output effect) (Bulmer, 2007, p. 48).

According to James Caporaso, the first wave of European integration was dominated by inductive and bottom-up (Caporaso, 2007, p. 26)⁵ thinking, which means that initially it was focused on the process "from state and society of the member states to the regional organization", and then from regional organisations towards institutions created within the framework of these organizations, in other words, "from the member states to the centre" (Caporaso, 2007, p. 26).

Besides the aforementioned internal trajectories of Europeanisation, the outer trajectories should be also mentioned. The first one, called Europeanisation *ad extra*⁶, takes place when solutions, policies and models of operations undertaken in the states outside of the EU (also on other continents)⁷ are Europeanised. The second trajectory, which is Europeanisation *ad intra*, takes place when third states determine integrational processes within the EU or apply to use instruments of the EU (financial, political, etc.), by which they mobilize the potential and influence of the EU (Borkowski, 2013, p. 136)⁸.

⁵ Traditional theories of integration are characterized by the bottom-up analysis. Besides, the literature features an analysis of intra EU, conducive to a comparative examination of political systems and top-down analysis, which should be used in the research of Europeanisation processes.

⁶ Europeanisation is a process which is not limited to the EU or Europe only (as it has been mentioned already, it is territorialized and multi-directed). The virtues of Europeanisation may be exported outside of the EU, to non-member states in Europe and beyond the European continent, to other regions or to international organisations. Such virtues, although assumed and accepted also outside of Europe, are nevertheless characterized by specifically European spirit. Europeanisation *ad extra*, or the so-called "outer" or "outside", is therefore another type of Europeanisation which shows the influence of European integration on the integrational relations, organisations, states, regions, etc., beyond Europe. Europeanisation *ad extra* is a form of an "exporting" of Europeans organizational, normative and axiological models to the outside of the EU.

⁷ Therefore, a claim that every Europeanisation influences the creation of supranationality is at best common.

⁸ For instance, in 2004, after the accession of 10 states to the EU, Russia refused to accept the national veterinary certificates of some member states of the EU, demanding unified EU certificates.

Although Europeanisation is a process with strong sociological features, as by influencing institutions, states and regions, *de facto* it influences people, yet none of the Europeanisation types mentioned above, either those of inner or outer trajectories⁹, is adequate and, at the same time, useful in research. Looking for an explanation of the situation in which the process of Europeanisation

⁹ Of course, it is noticeable that there are specific correlations between Europeanisation of inner trajectories and that of outer trajectories. For instance, *ad extra* and *ad intra* Europeanisations are outer reflections of top-down and bottom-up trajectories respectively, raising a doubt if demarcating outer trajectories is necessary (while the earlier top-down and bottom-up may be also used to countries outside of the EU). There are, however, several reasons why such a division is advisable. First, outer trajectories specify the impact of Europeanisation by specifying its objects (on the one hand, member states, on the other – third states). Secondly, Europeanisation process with inner trajectories is much more intense and has a bigger power of intervention (impact) than the process of Europeanisation with outer trajectories. Thirdly, Europeanisation with outer trajectories has a wider territorial impact (with a smaller intensity of influence), which makes Europeanisation with inner trajectories more condensed (concentrated), while those with outer trajectories are more diffused. Next, Europeanisation of inner trajectories is *de facto* the EU-isation, or Europeanisation of integrated Europe (auto-Europeanisation or even meta-Europeanisation), while Europeanisation of outer trajectories may be additionally divided into extra-European, which is an extension of “Europe beyond Europe”, and European, which will concern European states which do not belong to the EU (Europeanisation of the non-integrated Europe). Finally, only Europeanisation of inner trajectories may be divided into pre-access and post-access one, while such a division in Europeanisation of outer trajectories (with some exceptions of several associated states which might become members) practically cannot be made. These specific features of both trajectories of Europeanisation compel their clear separation. These are just some important differences which make the division of Europeanisation into inner and outer trajectories necessary, even if both of them share some “family resemblance” (this resemblance, however, concerns only the direction of their influence, or a simplified feedback, from states to the EU and from the EU to the states).

Additionally, existing research justifies demarcation of Europeanisation with outer trajectories, although using Europeanisation inside the EU (EU-isation) does not demand additional explanation, as for many scholars in European studies it is a natural starting point. Of course, this is correct. James Caporaso defines *intra EU*, which is conducive to comparative studies, at the same time being also conducive to a comparison of Europeanisations of inner trajectories (Caporaso, 2007, p. 26). P. Mazurkiewicz also believes that “Europe is nothing but a constant process of auto-Europeanisation. Europeanisation is an inner process in Europe. This movement indeed constitutes Europe. Europe does not exist prior to Europeanisation. Europe is the result of Europeanisation” (Mazurkiewicz, 2001, p. 17). This is research conducted already in the 21st century. The most recent theoretical approach to Europeanisation is social functionalism (Watanabe, 2010; Olsen, 2002). The research underlines the importance of all effects of Europeanisation, which might be divided into voluntary or imposed, and into intended (consciously planned) and unintended (unplanned and involuntary).

To justify demarcation of Europeanisation with outer trajectories, one should mention, among others, Johan P. Olsen, who remarks that among the potential meanings of the term ‘Europeanisation’ there is the change and expansion of the outer borders of the EU and export of the political organization model of the EU beyond its borders (Loužek, 2006, p. 184).

directly affects people, we may notice that the types of Europeanisation processes examined so far do not reflect the essence of this impact. In researching the impact of European integration (and the EU itself) on specific persons, one should note that, for instance, Europeanisation of the Council of the EU officials is neither top-down nor bottom-up Europeanisation, nor is it *ad extra* or *ad intra* one. This begs a question, what type of Europeanisation is that which affects the CEU officials (or officials in other institutions of the EU)? There is a possible answer, which leads towards Europeanisation *ad personam* (EAP) (Ruszkowski, 2013b).

EAP is much more useful and effective in research focused on persons (i.e., officials in European institutions or citizens of the EU, as well as citizens of the third countries), as it constitutes in acquiring European line of action (conversations, deliberations, compromise), and European codes of behaviour and values (solidarity, cooperation, and so on). EAP is therefore the most sociological type of Europeanisation. The enumerated elements may indicate that *ad personam* Europeanisation is an autonomous trajectory of impact of the European integration (or, to be more precise, of the EU itself), because it is not equivalent to any of the Europeanisation trajectories known so far.

The study of Europeanisation *ad personam* shows that this process has the strongest and quickest impact on the officials in the EU institutions¹⁰ (Europeanisation of the first degree, i.e., directed at a subject closest to the centre), then the elites in the member states and widely understood citizens of the EU (Europeanisation of the second degree); next, persons residing in the EU states but not their citizens (Europeanisation of the third degree); and finally, the slowest and the weakest (if any) impact is had on the citizens of the third states, outside of the EU (Europeanisation of the fourth degree, i.e., concerning the subject most removed from the centre)¹¹. Almost identical stratification is

¹⁰ In this group one may also distinguish officials of various levels and institutions, which may be correlated with the quality and the effectiveness of their Europeanisation and cause important differences in the impact of this process. These issues are the subject of this article further on, in the subsection concerning the Council of the EU and its multi-level internal structure, which has direct effect on the quality of Europeanisation *ad personam* of its officials.

¹¹ Gradeability of Europeanisation *ad personam* is partly correlated to the multi-level approach, as the three degrees of multi-level governance (MLG): supranational (or, more widely understood as Europeans), and national. Obviously, multi-level Europeanization (MLE) is a separate issue to be examined. After all, the fact that *ad personam* Europeanisation is of a multi-level character is also

evident also in the Europeanisation of language¹², which is immanently linked to *ad personam* Europeanisation. Obviously, the Europeanisation of language of the officials of the EU institutions is the quickest, while that of the third state members is the slowest.

This type of gradeability of *ad personam* Europeanisation allows to understand the differences in, on the one hand, the impact of this process, and on the other – in the level of its absorption by individuals. Therefore, the institutional environment, its internal culture and normative density are more conducive to Europeanisation *ad personam* than the wider and less structured environment outside the EU institutions, and even more so the environment outside the EU as such. The environment creates the so-called reference points (*référentiel*) in the process of *ad personam* Europeanisation.

Additionally, what takes place in EAP of the first degree is the phenomenon of “learning”¹³, which is not so often evident in EAP of the second and third degrees. The officials of the given institution “learn” its internal rules, regulations and standards and acquire roles and behaviours observed among other officials. One may venture a claim that they learn the institution in which they work. “Learning” may also take place by means of “imitating” or “mutual learning”.

Interactions on the level of the EU and on the level of its institutions become points of reference for officials of this institution via actions and procedures which modify the behaviour of these officials, or via their acquisition, implementation (in constructivism: internalisation) of institutional models and values, and finally via socialisation. The reference point or reference (*référentiel*) (Radaelli & Pasquier, 2007, p. 37), as a term which is considered by *ad personam* Europeanisation studies, becomes a crucial, if contextual, initial condition for this type of Europeanisation. Europeanisation connected with the quality of institutionalization is very close to constructivist studies, as constructivism is a sociological theory of institutional dynamic, and therefore constitutes

evident in its presence on various levels of the CEU structure (so-called intra-institutional stratification) (Ruszkowski, 2013b, pp. 35–36).

¹² What is meant here is not learning foreign languages, but acquiring official and administrative vocabulary, or at times even a whole intra-institutional slang.

¹³ That is, gradual acquiring and consolidating skills. More on “learning”, including “rational learning” characterized by objectivity, which features also in constructivism (Weyland, 2009, p. 397). One may also mention “social learning” (Checkel, 2001, p. 53), or the politics of disseminating knowledge (as well as politics based on knowledge).

a type of institutionalism, or rather a combination of social institutionalism and structuralism (Trzaskowski, 2005, p. 381). “Constructivism considers the process of institutionalization in categories of ‘institutional isomorphism’. Institutionalization is understood as a constraining process, which forces actors or organisations to copy institutional solutions characteristic of other organisations which function in a similar environment. Organisations take shape from other, similar organisations, which are perceived as more successful or more legitimate” (Trzaskowski, 2005, p. 381). Reflective constructivism is focused on interactivity and, above all, on understanding the importance of formal and informal norms.

Studying *ad personam* Europeanisation with the application of constructivist approach shall be effective depending on how many ideational, identity or, e.g., axiomatic elements may be found in reference points (*référentiel*) that could be constituted by, e.g., institutions, their internal culture and normative density. What is significant, the reference point is an equally important category in constructivist processes (e.g., socialization) as it is in Europeanisations studies, which makes the point of applying constructivist tools to researching Europeanisation even more compelling.

THE MAIN TOOLS OF CONSTRUCTIVISM APPLIED TO EUROPEANISATION *AD PERSONAM*. THE LOGIC OF APPROPRIATENESS

At this point, it is necessary to mention two fundamental principles of constructivism, following Alexander Wendt. According to the first principle, “the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces”, while according to the second one, “the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature” (Wendt, 2003, p. 1). These principles also include the foundations of the constructivist logic of appropriateness.

Searching for a connection between *ad personam* Europeanisation and constructivist socialization should begin from establishing the first factor which influences socialization and its effectiveness, that is, the logic of appropriateness. Defining the logic of appropriateness which organises politics, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen recognised that “political institutions are collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of

relations between roles and situations. The process involves determining what the situation is, what role is being fulfilled, and what obligations of that role in that situation are. When individuals enter an institution, they try to discover, and are taught, the rules. When they encounter a new situation, they try to associate it with a situation for which rules already exist. Through rules and a logic of appropriateness, political institutions realize both order, stability, and predictability, on the one hand, and flexibility and adaptiveness, on the other” (March & Olsen, 2010, p. 160). Therefore the „logic of appropriateness” is defined by the values, rules, norms, procedures and activities considered to be internal of a given institution and appropriate and correct for its officials. Undoubtedly, the officials’ behaviour in international institutions is gradually rule-governed (North, 1990, p. 42).

Institutional and constructivist behaviour of individuals is shaped by the logic of appropriateness, in turn defined by values (norms, behaviours) considered to be internal for the given institution. The logic of appropriateness dictates to behave according to a given situation and one’s role (position, job title, function) and according to the rules binding in a given environment (surroundings) (North, 1990, p. 33). At that point, some obligatory actions take place; however, these are not actions which would result from stable interests or needs. By shaping institutional behaviour, an institution may either limit or enable a political change. In the logic of appropriateness, institutional behaviour is dictated by establishing the parameters of acceptable behaviour (Peters, 1998, p. 8). The logic of appropriateness is a system of internal procedures, activities and values, based on the situation in a given institution, which is its starting point and, at the same time, social environment (in Europeanisation nomenclature it would be called the reference point, *référentiel*) with specific procedures, norms and values, and which at the same time forces officers who operate in this institution to fulfil specific roles and activities according to values. This kind of institutional culture causes a diffusion of elements of this culture (norms, rules, values), which may lead to it being accepted by the officials, or, in other words, internalisation.

If the official follows the norms and models of a given institution, considering them as their own, it means that the process of internalisation is effective, as it creates specific behaviours. This process is, at the same time, internalisation of norms, values and rules accepted by the officers as those which co-create their institutional identity.

Following J. Checkel, A. Skolimowska points to two types (stages) of internalisation¹⁴; the first one is blind internalisation, during which the agents [officials – J.R.] are passively subjected to intersubjective meanings. They adjust their behaviour to new rules by learning their roles and acquiring knowledge, which will enable them to act according to others' expectations. What may also occur here is behaviour according to the logic of consequences¹⁵, signified by rejecting instrumental calculation in favour of the will to play a specific role in the community. The second type/stage is acceptance of the community and its values by the actor as right and correct. At this stage, the actor accepts interests, or even identity of the community as their own (Skolimowska, 2013, p. 231).

The officials' behaviour according to the logic of appropriateness is dictated by establishing the parameters of acceptable action (Peters, 1998, p. 8) and their ability to adjust to institutional roles. The officials do that following the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 2010, pp. 166–168) when it comes to their behaviour. The logic of appropriateness requires one to behave according to given situation and one's function (position or job title) (March & Olsen, 2010, p. 23). Then, some obligatory actions take place, although these are not actions which would result from stable interests or needs. As a result of behaving according to the logic of appropriateness, proper actions take place, or proper roles are played by the officials, adequately to the given institution, while the officials share the values preferred in this institution. The effect of this process is socialisation of people (officials), who, accepting procedures, norms and values of the institution, adjusted their actions and roles to them (see: Figure 1).

¹⁴ A. Skolimowska's viewpoint identifies internalisation with socialisation (Skolimowska, 2013). It seems, however, that these two processes are distinct (which is discussed further on in this article). Socialisation, besides internalisation, includes also mimicry and identification. More on the topic, see: Zamecki, 2011, p. 33.

¹⁵ Logic of consequences has rationalist provenance and was already known among functionalists and neofunctionalists. Progressing from the logic of consequences towards logic of appropriateness takes place during the process of learning and mimicry, as shall be discussed further in this article.




Figure 1. The Process of Socialisation

Source: author's own elaboration.

SOCIALISATION

Claudio M. Radaelli and Romain Pasquier state that the impact, one of the key phenomena in Europeanisation and an important explanatory category, does not necessarily stand for strong stimulus¹⁶, but often denotes a subtler influence of socialisation¹⁷ processes, ideational convergence, learning and interpretation of paradigms and political ideas (Radaelli & Pasquier, 2007, p. 39; Zamęcki, 2011, p. 33). Those softer features become a matter of a consensus. Such an understanding of the term 'impact' as a key category in Europeanisation is a clear link between Europeanisation and constructivism, and at the same time, it suggests a research method which should not ignore constructivist tools.

In constructivism, following the logic of appropriateness, in other words, behaving according to procedures, norms and values, leads to an internalisa-

¹⁶ Here it is necessary to indicate two types of impact in Europeanisation studies: 1) horizontal impact, created as a result of cooperation between member states, where the repertory of Europeanised fields may be widened; 2) vertical impact, created as a result of transposition of elements created in the EU and their implementation on other levels of multi-level governance in the EU.

¹⁷ Socialisation is often described as communisation (Parsons, 1964).

tion of actions, values and roles, and as a result, to socialisation of the officials. Socialisation constitutes acquiring rules, norms, behaviours, values – ideas and identities become a matter of consensus, as the actors internalise them (i.e., consider them to be their own) (Skolimowska, 2013, p. 230). However, first, these procedures, norms, rules, models or values have to be created, so that later the structure (institution) will be able to dictate them to their officials and create internal (within the structure) institutional environment (reference point).

Defining the process of socialisation (on the basis of the logic of appropriateness), including its components, offers a visual such as the one provided in Figure 1.

Three mechanisms leading to socialisation may be established: 1) strategic calculation, where the subjects calculate whether a given behaviour is going to get them social benefits (better status) or material (financial) benefits; 2) role playing, where the subjects cannot participate collaterally in all forms of negotiations and manage every issue, start to use normative models functioning in their environment, which enable and automatise negotiations; 3) normative persuasion, where the subjects present arguments and attempt to convince their opponents and their interests and preferences are open to redefinition (Kirpsza, 2014, pp. 88–98; Skolimowska, 2013, p. 232).

Socialisation (and its mechanisms) defined in such a way is important for the staff of the EU institutions in its internal administration system. If we ask officials in the EU institutions where they get their skills, values, information, and so on, we certainly notice that the source of these attributes might be either personal predispositions (e.g., to learning), or social circle, environment, in this case – the institution and its social environment (reference point).

If the officials of the EU change their behaviour within a given institution as a result of many interactions, it means that stable structure of this institution and models produced by it had the largest impact on this change. As a result, individual identity of an official becomes identical to the fragment of a supra-individual structure (Trzebiatowski, 2012)¹⁸. The officials learned the previously created rules of the institution, acquired and implemented them in their behaviour, thanks to which they gained intellectual, physical and moral

¹⁸ These models are, after all, the elements of this structure, so they constituted a pre-socialisation, outer context for the officials.

qualifications to operate within this institution¹⁹. New ideas, values and rules developed in the institution may boost standards of behaviour according to the logic of appropriateness and be conducive to quicker “acquisition” of officials.

EUROPEANISATION *AD PERSONAM* OF THE OFFICIALS IN THE COUNCIL OF THE EU AND CONSTRUCTIVIST SOCIALISATION

If our reference point becomes the Council of the EU as a social output structure, which constrains and shapes behaviours of individuals, we will notice that the behaviour of its officials depends on the intra-institutional level on which they operate. Using multi-level intra-institutional stratification, we may indicate three internal levels of the CEU: 1) political level, 2) coordinating level, 3) working level (Ruszkowski, 2013b, pp. 35–36). Therefore, the actors adjust to institutional and collective roles that they want to play, depending on the level of operation within the CEU, following the logic of appropriateness in their behaviour.

Ministers related to ten configurations of the EU operate on the political level. Due to the logic of appropriateness, the same representatives of state governments who are intragovernmental actors in their own countries, become extra-governmental actors in the CEU, particularly on the first, political level, and on the third, working level, and are subject to other rules and norms, typical for the new environment. Particularly on the third (working) level, the process of socialisation and Europeanisation of the officials, who may not always be representatives of their governments, might also evoke destatization behaviour, which practically indicates a possibility of separating, to a certain extent, from the country of their origin.

It seems that the main mechanism which leads to socialisations of ministers on the political level, which is the most intergovernmental one in the CEU, is “strategic calculation”, that is, behaviour which may benefit their represented national state the most. In the language of Europeanisation it means that the impact of the environment of the Council and its institutional culture is not strong because the ministers are not present in the Council every day, but only during the proceedings in their respective composition, and thus they are relatively immune to the elements of this culture and learn it slowly (or incidentally),

¹⁹ Thereby a fragment of the structure, which previously was outer and pre-socialisational, becomes an inner part of the officials.

as they are strongly politicised, therefore their absorption ability is not high. As a result, Europeanisation (*ad personam*) of ministers on the political level is weak (Ruszkowski, 2014, p. 111)²⁰, and mimicry in their behaviour is situational, that is, takes place only in specific situations (e.g., when approving a legal act).

The deputy heads of representatives of the state members in the European Union (in COREPER I) and heads of permanent representatives of the member states in the EU, usually as ambassadors (in COREPER II) operate on the second, coordinating level of the Council. The mechanism which leads to socialisation of the officials on the level of the CEU is normative persuasion, with features of subjectivity, which is behaviour consisting in presenting arguments and convincing other officials to accept them, with everyone's readiness to redefine (or even abandon when persuaded) one's interests and preferences. In the language of *ad personam* Europeanisation, it means that there is noticeable impact of the environment of the Council and its institutional culture on the officials (who are permanently located in Brussels and meet more often than ministers), and the absorption of the elements of this culture is partial (as diplomats operating on this level are still representatives of their national states), yet the Europeanisation effect is evident (due to the fact that, among other things, diplomats are less politicised than ministers) (Ruszkowski, 2014, p. 111). On this level, the mimicry, learning the institution and its language are selective, which is the result of the specificity of working in CORPERs, which means that diplomats copy mainly these behaviours and activities which are indispensable for effective performance of tasks.

Finally, in the third, working level, the experts (specialists, professionals) are located in working teams and committees as well as ordinary and treaty committees of the Council. The fundamental legislative work happens on this level; legislative records are born here, which later are moved to the coordinating level (to COREPERs) or, in some cases, omitting the coordinating level straight to the political level (this concerns only six treaty committees, allowed for in the primary law). The latter type of direct interaction between working and political levels is an example of bypassing the coordinating level (Ruszkowski, 2014).

The mechanism of socialisation, which affects the officials in these committees is role playing. The officials in the treaty committees are more strongly impacted by it, as these committees are outside the control²¹ of COREPER, and

²⁰ This also concerns Europeanisation of nomenclature.

²¹ The phenomenon of being outside the control of the supervisor is known in *Principal-Agent Theory*. For more information, see: Ruszkowski, 2010a, 2008.

therefore more independent. The mechanism of role playing involves the officials following the models operative in the CEU, thus the roles played are considered proper and right in this environment and fulfil expectations. In the language of Europeanisation it means that acquiring (implementation) of the elements of the institutional culture is effective, learning the internal institutional culture (as well as the culture of responsibility) is fast and continuous (which results from the long stay of the officials in Brussels) and the mimicry effect is full, which means that Europeanisation is strong (this concerns also the official language)²².

Table 1. Mechanisms of Socialisation on Particular Levels within the CEU

Levels of management in the CEU	Structure of the Council	Officials	Socialisation mechanism
Level I – political	compositions of the Council	ministers	strategic calculation
Level II – coordinating	COREPER I and II	ambassadors and their deputies	ormative persuasion
Level III – working	teams and working committees	experts, specialists, professionals	role playing

Source: author's own elaboration.

The behaviour of the officials according to the logic of appropriateness is therefore most evident on the working level and on the coordinating level in the intra-institutional stratification. Additionally, it is practically on these levels that the main decisions concerning a legal act are made, as it is later only that it is approved on the political level with (*B Points*) or without (*A Points*)²³ discussion. Therefore, the essence of the appropriate behaviour in the environment (community) of a given official in the Council is Europeanisation via socialisation. This means that due to the social environment in which an official operates (accepting norms which apply in this environment), they are subjected to quicker (working and coordinating level) or slower (political level) Europeanisation *ad personam*²⁴, which consists in acquiring standards of operations (talks, delibera-

²² For more on Europeanisation on this level, see: Ruszkowski, 2014, p. 111.

²³ Without discussion means that these points may be taken over by other compositions of the Council (usually deliberating earlier) than those which in terms of “fields” (contents) should be responsible for them.

²⁴ It is difficult to apply Europeanisation types known in European studies literature to the officials of the EU institutions who reside outside their native state permanently or for an extended

tions, compromise) and European values (solidarity, cooperation, and so on) by those officials in the EU institutions. Therefore, Europeanisation is a wider process than socialisation, and thus more exogenous, while socialisation is, in comparison, a process which takes place in a narrower endogenous context (in a given institution), conducive to internalisation of rules. *Ad personam* Europeanisation “feeds itself” on socialisation and supports it (and, conversely, a certain kind of feedback may be observed here), whereas socialisation may be Europeanisation *ad personam* or may cause it (as well as Europeanisation may determine socialisation).

In case of the Council of the European Union, the analysis shows that the officials on the third (working) level in the intra-institutional stratification socialise and, as a result, Europeanise quicker, while ministers on the first (political) level do it slower. Officials on the second (coordinating) level are susceptible to the Europeanisation process more than ministers, but less than experts in the working teams and committees.

What follows from the above is the fact that not every type of socialisation is Europeanisation *ad personam* (for instance, socialisation of the officials working in the Secretariat of the United Nations will not be Europeanisation *ad personam*), but every Europeanisation *ad personam* is “a peculiar socialisation”, which in turn is a result of behaviour in accordance with the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 2010, pp. 160–168). “A peculiar socialisation” *de facto* signifies Europeanising (or, more precisely, Euroising) socialisation, determined by the process of European integration, with the EU as its key project.

A comparison of constructivist socialisation and Europeanisation *ad personam* indicates some rather important similarities between these two processes. Above all, both processes are of a social nature and that determines all other

period of time. Top-down Europeanisation concerns the impact of the European integration (or, more narrowly understood, the EU) on the member states and their political, legal and economic systems, etc., that is, from “top” to “bottom”. Bottom-up Europeanisation is a process of an opposite trajectory, that is, one which concerns Europeanisation of elements constituting member states (or regions) as a result of transfer of proposals, solutions and responsibilities to the EU, from “bottom” to the “top”. The outer trajectories of Europeanisation, too, such as *ad extra*, that is, influencing third states not belonging to the EU and international organisations, *ad intra* as an opposite kind of influences, that is, one of the third states and international organisations on the EU, extending and determining its mobilization and activity, are not adequate to Europeanisation of the officials of the EU institutions (Ruszkowski, 2013b, pp. 49–52). This is why the attempt to reflect the essence of the strongly personalized impact of the European integration on its officials in the EU institutions as Europeanisation *ad personam* is so crucial.




Figure 2. The Process of Socialisation and Europeanisation ad personam: A Comparison

Source: author's own elaboration.

analogies between them. Constructivist social environment, which impacts (influences) socialisation process, is an equivalent of the reference point (*référentiel*) in Europeanisation, which is the European Union and its institutions (or internal structures of these institutions). Constructivist diffusion of the behaviour models, values and norms of a given institution is very similar to the transfer of elements of institutional culture (including culture of responsibility) in Europeanisation. Constructivist internalization is (at least in assumption) close to the implementation (adaptation, absorption) of models and rules in Europeanisation. Finally, the effect, that is, constructivist socialization (Figure 2 is a consequence of Figure 1, hence such an order) and Europeanisation *ad personam* are practically the same, although the rule has to be born in mind which says that each Europeanisation *ad personam* is socialisation, but not every socialisation is Europeanisation. Of course, EAP of the first degree is a more intense and more effective socialisation than one which occurs in EAP of the second, third and fourth degrees, because the Europeanisation power of the EU institutions is stronger than that of the institutions outside the EU (which may

be observed on the example of the speed of “learning” and role playing, in a form of mimicry, or in the behaviour of the officials from the EU institutions). Such powerful impact must have an influence on the political or technocratic identity of the officials.

After having conducted the analysis of the phenomenon of the Europeanisation of the first degree one cannot forget, however, that EAP of the second degree affecting the elites and citizens in the nation states²⁵ is equally interesting (although it was not the focus of this analysis). Generally, interactions, e.g., between the (political, economic, social) elites operating in the member states, evoked by the European integration, may also be observed. These interactions are of a cognitive and normative nature, being a process thanks to which convictions, norms and values are spread and institutionalised. The European Union may create normative frameworks for socialisation of political leaders, high-level civil servants, parliament members, political experts, lobbyists, journalists, etc., who later may evoke a change of political paradigms, ideas, authorities and their legitimisation in their countries. This body of leaders may be transformed into new elites with Europeanised outlooks, behaviours, values, interests, etc. These elites may be joined by new leaders, e.g., technocrats supported by the EU regulations. Under the influence of the *ad personam* Europeanisation the elites are transformed, and so is their identity²⁶. Undoubtedly, Europeanisation *ad personam* consolidates the technocratic approach in political activities. New technocrats on the national level, due to political competences and legitimisation provided by the EU (and its sector policies), may act as proponents of the new political order, in which new types of activities, discussions and legitimations will take place. In turn, new elites may become mediators (*mediateurs*) of the new, dominating reference point (*référentiel*)²⁷. What it means in the research on the process of Europeanisation with the use of constructivist tools has been demonstrated above.

²⁵ This type of Europeanisation obviously has features of top-down Europeanisation, but it is aimed at persons, so it has a strong social character. It may even be called top-down *ad personam* Europeanisation (this phrase, however, cannot be used in the case of *ad personam* Europeanisation of the first degree).

²⁶ It must be remembered that, e.g., in the perspective of neofunctionalism, the elites behave rationally and follow the logic of consequences.

²⁷ When mentioning elites or new elites, one has to take into account the fact that elites appear on many levels (supranational, national, regional), and interactions between elites may have not only horizontal (single-level) character, but also vertical one, that is, multi-level. One may then speak of multi-level elites (Radaelli & Pasquier, 2007, pp. 43–44).

These constitute (or may constitute) the results of EAP of the second degree, which here have been only signalled and require more research (as EAP of the third and fourth degrees do). Yet, this short reference to EAP of the second degree was not random, as it showed that Europeanisation *ad personam* may lead to various effects depending on the level of EAP. For this reason, socialisation, as an effect of Europeanisation, is also gradable.

CONSTRUCTIVISM OR SOCIAL FUNCTIONALISM IN THE *AD PERSONAM* EUROPEANISATION STUDIES?

The foundations of the research on Europeanisation processes may be found in functionalism, and particularly in neofunctionalism, in which both the spill-over effect, (theoretically) correlating with the transfer of elements of the institutional culture, as well as stressing the role of non-state actors (including institutions and their officials) may be supported by contemporary Europeanisation studies. David Mitrany attempted to elucidate the transfer of values, as well as social processes of various degree of complication, behaviour management and social needs. If transfers within the framework of Europeanisation processes (irrespective of their trajectories) include (formal and informal) norms, values, models, etc., then one may speak of some theoretical connections, including explanatory ones, between neofunctionalism and constructivism, which may be important for the research on Europeanisation processes.

In keeping with the research scheme of this article, one should note that in constructivism the Council of the EU is a structure (social environment) which establishes the norms of behaviour of the officials (agents) in accordance with practices, norms and rules which dominate there, that is, are accepted and replicated since its beginning (in other words, in accordance with the logic of appropriateness). On the other hand, in neofunctionalism, the Council of the EU is a non-state agent, and its officials act more in accordance with the logic of consequences. Constructivism also explains the effect of transferring from the logic of consequences to the logic of appropriateness, which appears throughout the “learning” process, mimicry and replication of particular behaviours, including role playing (see also: Skolimowska, 2013).

Constructivism discerns the transmission of institutional standards (of institutional culture) and their diffusion and internalisation among the officials,

which leads them to their inter-institutional socialisation on many levels within the CEU. Therefore, besides the transmission of norms and their internalisation, a constructivist effect of diffusion of norms, models and values, “spilled-over” onto individuals (officials) under the influence of both institutions and other individuals may be observed in the CEU. Such mutual impact of institutions on individuals and among the officials in the CEU is a specific type of the neo-functional “spill-over” effect, yet in the personal and identarian dimension. Inter-institutional “spill-over” mechanism in the CEU is based, on the one hand, on the spilling over of standards applying in the institution onto the individuals (officials), which emphasises stability and unchangeability of the institution, irrespectively of possible rotation of individuals, and on the other hand, on the spill-over of behavioural models from individuals to other individuals (from the CEU officials to other CEU officials), where even the possible rotation of the CEU officials does not affect the institutional culture of the environment and memory of the institution. This two-tier spill-over of standards and models illustrates inter-institutional Europeanisation *ad personam*, which in both cases is directed at individuals (officials), and which *de facto* is inter-institutional socialisation of individuals with Europeanisation effect.

Ad personam Europeanisation in the CEU shows that officials of this institution are not isolated individuals, nor are they autonomous individuals, as they have obligations towards the institution and other officials they work with (two reference points). Therefore, Europeanisation *ad personam* in the CEU confirms the two-tier spill-over of standards and models in an institution. The speed in which the CEU officials are converted to need ideas and values depends on the intra-institutional level on which they operate. The Council of the European Union, as a stable and multi-level institutional structure renders its officials’ behaviour dependent on the stable intra-institutional rules. This is the principle of the logic of institutional stability, that is, a “strong dependence” of the actions of officials on the stability of the institution. These findings connect the explanatory elements of constructivism and neofunctionalism. In a somewhat hybrid manner, these two areas of explanation may be called social functionalism (Watanabe, 2010; Olsen, 2002; Skolimowska, 2013) (or rather, social neofunctionalism).

The correlation between constructivism and neofunctionalism is summarized in Table 2.

Neofunctionalism has perceived the importance of socialisation, particularly within the framework of emerging supranational solutions (systems) (in case of

Table 2. Binds of Social Neofunctionalism (Connections between Constructivism and Neofunctionalism)

Constructivism	Neofunctionalism
Structure	Institutions (including NGOs)
Agent	Officials in institutions
Logic of appropriateness	Logic of consequences
Diffusion of norms	Spill-over
Socialisation	Europeanisation <i>ad personam</i> (socialisation)

Source: author's own elaboration.

the EU institutions it would be Europeanisation *ad personam*²⁸). Participation of officials in new supranational systems allows a development of new perspectives and new definitions for this situation. Officials in institutions are particularly keen to show the spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding, which neofunctionalists called *spirit de corps*²⁹.

As a result, constructivism is not the only valid theoretical approach in the research of Europeanisation *ad personam*; social functionalism (or social neofunctionalism), which cumulated the constructivist and neofunctionalist approach, is a more flexible and encompassing approach. In the study of Europeanisation processes, social functionalism allows to explain the effects of Europeanisation, which may be divided into voluntary or imposed, and intended (consciously planned) or unintended (unplanned), which means that it has also some predicated potential, allowing new research and finding new solutions.

²⁸ Neofunctionalists also used the term: *transgovernmental socialization in EU affair*, which has a positive impact on the creation of supranationality (see: Beyers, 1998, p. 12).

²⁹ Thereby neofunctionalists claimed that representatives of national states in European Communities socialize as European actors, and the differences between definitions of national and transnational interests are suppressed. That was the opinion, for instance, of L.N. Lindberg and S.A. Scheingold (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970).

CONCLUSIONS

Adopting the term ‘Europeanisation *ad personam*’ seems justified in the research on Europeanisation of persons (including, for instance, officials in the Council of the EU), as none of the so-far known trajectories of Europeanisation is appropriate to research this phenomenon.

Ad personam Europeanisation is *de facto* sociological Europeanisation, at the same time being particularly conducive to be studies with the means of constructivist or social functionalist (social neofunctionalism) tools. Social phenomena of “mimicry”, “learning”, “Europeanisation of language”, correlated with ideational elements of institutional culture, their transfer and implementation, also occur in EAP. Therefore, the logic of appropriateness and socialisation, as analytical tools of (primary social) constructivism become extremely useful in the study of Europeanisation *ad personam*, with the caveat that every *ad personam* Europeanisation is a type of socialisation, but not every socialisation is Europeanisation *ad personam* (or Europeanisation at all).

This attempt to assist research of *ad personam* Europeanisation with the use of constructivist tools (particularly the logic of appropriateness and socialisation) shows that, as institutions such as the Council of the EU are perceived as normative and collective entities, with their own identity affecting the preferences of the actors, then the connections between Europeanisation (not only *ad personam*) and constructivism are evident. Constructivist socialisation process can therefore be correlated to the process of Europeanisation *ad personam*.

Finally, mixing constitutive features of the constructivist process of socialisation, classic to the Europeans studies, with their neofunctionalist equivalents in order to examine if such a measure would help optimise explaining the process of Europeanisation *ad personam* has shown that there are some connections between constructivism and neofunctionalism, which may become a basis for a social functionalist approach, which offers a specific set of explanatory avenues.

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EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH AS POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE SECOND POLISH REPUBLIC

BADANIA WSCHODNIOEUROPEJSKIE JAKO DZIEDZINA NAUK
POLITYCZNYCH W II RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ

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ABSTRACT

After the times of partitions and reunification of partitioned territories, organisation of science in the Second Polish Republic had become a political task, to which the scientists of all disciplines devoted themselves with great engagement. Historical studies had a special position in this process. They served finding the identity of society and the legitimacy of the modern Polish national state. On this basis not only close connection between science and politics were formed, but also personal links with often unclear boundaries between scientists and politicians. Considering the historical burden on relations to eastern neighbours, especially to Russia, research on Eastern Europe had a special responsibility. It provided the political argumentation for the Eastern European paradigms of Poland, as a location on the border of the Western civilisation, serving as a protection wall against Russian danger which proved to be especially dangerous in the form of Bolshevism for the whole area of Europe. In this field the traditional research on Russia cooperated equally close with politics and formed new fields

ABSTRAKT

Po okresie rozbiorów i ponownego zjednoczenia podzielonych terytoriów organizacja nauki w II Rzeczypospolitej stała się zadaniem politycznym, któremu naukowcy wszystkich dyscyplin poświęcili się z wielkim zaangażowaniem. Studia historyczne zajmowały w tym procesie szczególną pozycję. Służyły odnalezieniu tożsamości społeczeństwa i legitymizacji współczesnego polskiego państwa narodowego. Na tej podstawie powstały nie tylko ścisłe powiązania między nauką a polityką, ale także osobiste powiązania z często niejasną granicą między naukowcami a politykami. Biorąc pod uwagę historyczne obciążenie relacji ze wschodnimi sąsiadami, zwłaszcza z Rosją, na badaniach nad Europą Wschodnią spoczywała szczególna odpowiedzialność. Stanowiły one polityczną argumentację dla wschodnioeuropejskich modeli Polski jako miejsca granicznego cywilizacji zachodniej, służącego jako mur ochronny przed zagrożeniem rosyjskim, które pod postacią bolszewizmu okazało się szczególnie groźne dla obszaru całej Europy. W tej dziedzinie tradycyjne badania nad Rosją pozostawały w ścisłej wspól-

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of research, like formed in Poland Sovietology. In this constellation Poland decisively determined the level of research in Europe.

Keywords: history of science; Sovietology; East European history; Russian studies; Polish historical research

pracy ze sferą polityki i tworzyły nowe dziedziny badań, jak ukształtowana w Polsce sowietologia. W takim układzie Polska zdecydowanie określiła poziom badań w Europie.

Słowa kluczowe: historia nauki; sowietologia; historia Europy Wschodniej; rusycystyka; polskie badania historyczne

The Eastern European dimension of the Polish state is a constitutive element of developing its power politics. Its identity-constructing role is not only essential during the state setup in the primary sense but also a decisive factor in the modern nation-building process. The certainty of belonging to the West European-Latin cultural sphere results in an exceptional geopolitical situation, which, given historical experiences, requires a specific degree of legitimacy. Under these conditions, both politics and society are facing the extraordinary challenge of permanently clarifying and assuring this position in response to situational dynamics. This is why science and research (and historical research in particular) play a key role in this area.

Since the beginning of the existence of the idea of a modern Polish state, ideas of *lebensraum* in the East have always been related to the expansion of the Russian empire. Without taking this into consideration, any effort to establish a cultural-geographical demarcation of Eastern-Central Europe remains incomprehensible and abstract. It is this division of Eastern Europe into the Polish-Lithuanian-dominated historical space and Russia, perceived as the actual Eastern Europe that resonates in Polish ideas of statehood restoration – notwithstanding the fact that this concept remains contradictory in the context of nation-state building and cannot separate power-political and cultural-geographical dimensions from each other. Exactly this is reflected in the approach of Polish Eastern Europe research. It also highlights the importance of dealing with one's own East. Its potency and structural significance in the Polish understanding of the state were defined a priori through Russia's imperial ambitions. Research in the field of Polish state-building plans based on the common distinction between a Jagiellonian federative and a Piastic unitary project time and again underestimates or completely omits the diverse nuances, interpretations, and overlaps in and between the camps. However, they determine the East as the key to positioning Poland as an occidental European country.

The emergence of an Eastern European research with an interdisciplinary character, its functionality in politics and its position in the scientific system is inseparable from Prometheism as both a model of action and an option of a Polish Eastern policy in the Second Republic. It provides a useful tool to identify institutions and individuals who published in scientific journals focused on the European East and took on a leading role in the effective propagation of an image of the Eastern Europe. In this political environment, beyond the elementary turning points of 1918, 1926 and 1935, a milieu developed that represents a close connection between political public, scientific expertise and political engagement, placed the East in the history of the modern Polish state and described it as an extremely flexible concept of thought. This is accompanied by the development of a peculiar type of researcher closely connected to and practicing politics, and of politicians as scientists who provide deep insight into the process of how politics influences research and how effectively science is involved in politics. As has been amply demonstrated for other European countries, the Polish case also shows that in the context of the configuration of a territorial state, close cooperation and synthesis of scientific justification and political reasoning are associated with a political determination of research, a sense of political entitlement of science, networking and personal contacts.

ASSIGNMENT AS A SELF-COMMITMENT

The Polish national movement was well prepared for the situation of a possible restoration of statehood in the First World War. After the uprising period, the politics of organic work created its own, modern social structures, which created good conditions for the establishment of a state. The concessions of the partition powers during the war concerning the restoration of a Polish state confirmed, despite all the questionability, at least a general awareness in Europe to resolve the Polish question, which put the Polish state project in a fairly comfortable position. On this basis, the Polish elites developed enormous activities to legitimize the state and territory. Apart from the fact that the modern nation has a great need for legitimacy, the determining political circles were strongly aware that Poland's reunion after partitions and different development processes that had taken place in the territories controlled by Russia, the Habsburgs, and Prussia required special identity-building justifications and rituals. A sound declaration of territorial claims was also necessary *vis-à-vis* the victorious powers, which had

to formally determine the shape of the future Polish state. Above all, however, it was the geographical position between neighbours traditionally hostile to Polish statehood that explains this strong need for legitimacy and that generated particularly close relationship between science and politics. History and geography became those appellate bodies (Schweiger, 2014, p. 7) that had to prove the state and territory to be almost natural and undeniable. These historical-geopolitical approaches reflect the imperative of security policy connected with the founding of the Second Polish Republic.

Very much in the tradition of the partitions era in which the sciences, in the sense of organic work, were an essential part of the cohesion of the Polish people in the partition territories and an integral factor in the organization of society (Buszko, 1983, pp. 132–145; Bieńkowski, 1983, pp. 157–177; Juzwenko & Wrzesiński, 1979, pp. 125–146), the sciences were assigned a central function in the construction and design of the Polish state. There was no doubt about their defining social role. However, discussions in the newly formed bodies arose as to how it should be performed without restricting the freedom of science. Historians in particular developed a strong sense of responsibility towards statehood and society. This was initially expressed in relation to the question of the eastern border, but, at the same time, it was already very generally articulated as a mediator of national values and in the service of national education (Suleja & Wrzesiński, 1990, p. 156; Grabski, 2000, p. 166). In the very lively methodological discussion among Polish historians during the First World War, the Kraków legal historian Stanisław Kutrzeba had already pointed out the role of history in shaping everyday life and its influence on politics (Kolbuszewska, 2005, p. 173; Serejski, 1963, p. 612). The platform for a broad debate on the role of science in the construction of the new Poland was provided by the journal *Nauka Polska*. The journal was published as a yearbook by the Mianowski Support Fund for Scientists, which had already been instrumental in the preservation and formation of a nationally oriented Polish science during the partition period and practically figured as a “Ministry of Polish Sciences”. The yearbook set out to report on the requirements, organization and tasks of the sciences, taking into account the social and psychological aspects as well as questions of scientific organization and effectiveness abroad¹ (Hartmann, 1962, p. 20). Well-known historians took this opportunity to express their views on the role of histori-

¹ *Nauka Polska: jej potrzeby, organizacja i rozwój: rocznik Kasy Pomocy dla Osób Pracujących na Polu Naukowym imienia Doktora Józefa Mianowskiego. I–XXIV (1918–1939).*

ography and the state of its development. The focus was on the relationship between the historical sciences and state and society, and the objective of the emancipation of the historical sciences from the partition-related regionalization and the external influence by the emerging state. It is particularly noteworthy that these reflections were always linked to a methodical and thematic orientation that considered both the international state of the art and the unique position of the Polish national sciences.

Already in the first volume of 1918, Jerzy Kochanowski devoted broad space to the relationship between “Polish thought” as Polish subjectivism and the objective approach to historical phenomena as a method of a general synthesis of history (Kochanowski, 1918, pp. 225–236). Although he does not question objective synthesis as the basic principle of historical research, he makes a purely practical case for a “Polish synthesis” of history. He justifies this above all with the traditional and defining foreign interpretation of both Polish and general history through the partition powers (in particular, German historical studies) and through the geographic and historical conditions of the existence of the Polish nation, which (through its cultural competence *per se*) gains an interpretative power, at least in its historical and power-political development space. Thus, he also sees in the study of the general history of Slavdom as one focus of Polish historical research and defines this field of research as a task in order to break the prevailing German and also Russian monopoly, and take it out of the “hands of foreigners” (Kochanowski, 1918, p. 229) who had developed a fundamentally unfriendly and hostile perspective on history. Nor should one ever turn a blind eye to the fact that Poland is permanently threatened by these neighbours. At the same time, however, Kochanowski is no less concerned with the application of sound research standards of analysis and comparison that would enable Polish scientists, through “Europeanising the level of Polish sciences” (Kochanowski, 1918, p. 231), to stand in front of the “high altar of civilization” (Kochanowski, 1918, p. 226) equally entitled as the representatives of other countries. For Kochanowski the immediate task is to concentrate on Polish history in the Slavic context through the development of the sources and the historical and geographical determination and legitimization of the Polish state (Kochanowski, 1918, p. 235).

An explanation of both of these issues through the history of the Polish people, and thus from a sociological-ethnological perspective, is a central demand of the contribution of Jerzy Smoleński in the same volume (Smoleński, 1918, pp. 237–242). In doing so, he not only ties in with the internationally

established approaches to popular research but also directly serves the aspect of cultural impact. Polish history in particular can not only be explained by individual aspects of its political and economic history or the development of society, but history as a science must open up to the full spectrum of the life of the population. As a consequence, Smoleński's contribution is a plea for a cultural history, or a history "from below", by seeing only the possibility of collecting the cultural achievements of the Polish people in order to consistently analyse Polish history. These achievements could then serve as evidence of their individuality and creative abilities. He refers to international research and calls for greater consideration of ethnology for Polish historical research. The quintessence of his reflections is the establishment of the uniformity and individuality of the Polish people from a regionally determined ethnic diversity, from which the medieval Polish state developed. The Rzeczpospolita, on the other hand, evolved from a state of many peoples who did not assimilate and retained their individuality in a "common territory of state-parliamentary life" (Smoleński, 1918, p. 242). The Polish cultural superiority alone ensured the permanent expansion of civilization in the eastern territory in the Western European spirit. This civilizational element was also the decisive factor for Smoleński for a moral unification, which for him stood above a merely state-based unity and was able to secure the cohesion of the Rzeczpospolita beyond the loss of state independence.

A year later, Tymieniecki's contribution (also in *Nauka Polska*) initially completes the inventory of historical sciences (Tymieniecki, 1919, pp. 148–172). Very much like his colleagues, he confirms the great potential of Polish historical research and sees good conditions for the organization of a potent historical science in the Polish state. Without renouncing the reference to the international standard, however, he is even more focused on concentrating on Polish history with his own powers. The foreign influence, especially the German one, on the interpretation of Polish history must be eliminated once and for all, and the reflection on one's own must take absolute precedence. For example, all publications should only be published in Polish and there should be no publications in other European languages (Tymieniecki, 1919, p. 166). The author sees the greatest challenge in overcoming the contradiction between scientific theory and life-worldly practice, which in his view is particularly pronounced in Poland. This "iron door" between the world of scientists and practical life must be pushed open (Tymieniecki, 1919, p. 151). He puts the social function of the sciences at the heart of his argument and demands that the sciences should get closer to life: "The people have the right to demand of the historians that the views

of historians on their own history are accessible and understandable to all” (Tymieniecki, 1919, p. 152). He sees this not only as a central task but also an important expression of regained state sovereignty through the possible practice of self-interpretation. The practical consequence is then not only an independent analytical preparation of one’s own history but also a methodically demanding scientific journalism in a generally understandable form, which would overwhelm the historian. Although he continues to perceive historical science and journalism as two separate and independent forms that cannot replace each other, he does indeed concede a dissolution of the clear boundaries in the context of the specific requirements and the consideration of historical experience. This view proved to be very decisive for the dissemination of historical knowledge in the Second Republic not only on the journalistic level but it also affected the relationship between research and politics in general.

These basic trends of stocktaking and initial reflections on a strategy of the Polish sciences were confirmed and extended at the First Polish Congress of Science in Warsaw in April 1920 (*Nauka Polska*, 3). Under the theme of “Science and State”, Tymieniecki formulated as a central thesis that the sciences have to serve society and, above all, the state, and that a scientific programme for legitimizing the borders of the Polish state should be developed. At the congress, the committee of the Mianowski Fund called for the development of “close-to-life sciences” and defined the social and historical sciences as the central instances for imparting scientific knowledge to the wider society (Suchodolski, 1992, p. 85; Jacewski, 1978, p. 95). The renowned social and economic historian from Lwów, Franciszek Bujak (Shelton, 1989, p. 56; Krzoska, 1994, p. 431), designated himself as the spokesperson and subordinated historiography to the nation-state task and saw the historian’s task as the protection of their own nation from the interests of others. According to Bujak, this national task consisted primarily of a special attentiveness of research towards the East and the Slavic people (Bujak, 1920, pp. 64–74). Another renowned historian, Władysław Semkowicz, saw the way to realize these tasks in the necessary overcoming of any particularism and the planned scientific organization through the cooperation and unification of forces, for any “individualism must lead to anarchy in the field of scientific work” (Semkowicz, 1920, pp. 109–118).

When the Secretary General of Polska Akademia Umiejętności, the forerunner of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Stanisław Kutrzeba, considers it the main task of science to serve the state (Kutrzeba, 1920, pp. 83–97), this is certainly not to be regarded as a servile cliché. It rather expresses the close connection

between society and the state. This view was also evident in almost all other talks referring to “society”. People, nation, society and the state are thought of in close symbiosis, if not used interchangeably. Although these proposals were also met with scepticism, they highlighted the widespread logic of a state commitment and the widespread obligation towards the new state as a task. The Congress and the discussion in the *Nauka Polska* did not leave the slightest doubt about this. In parallel with this human science perspective, the technical sciences emphasized the need for close links with the economy but not, however, without insisting on the autonomy of the sciences (Jaczewski, 1987, p. 222). The natural scientists in general resisted such functionalization. This led to a permanent conflict in which the Warsaw historian Marcei Handelsman took an important position for social scientists, stressing the purposefulness and social significance of research while insisting on preserving the individual freedom of the researcher (Handelsman, 1925, p. 3). This issue led to repeated conflicts between science and the state, as the Second Congress in 1927 shows, but the argument of service to the state ultimately prevailed. This was certainly also linked to the construction of science funding, which was primarily administered within the discretion of the ministry. The criticism was not primarily directed against state governance and influence but rather against a lack of interest on the part of the state authorities in science and the notorious under-funding (Jaczewski, 1987, p. 223).

The analyses and recommendations of these very influential historians are certainly programmatic in nature (Grabski, 2000, p. 166). It would be exaggerated, however, to conclude that the development of Polish historical studies of the interwar period was aligned accordingly. The external conditions were too unstable, and the impact of political dynamics on the financing of science too big. It seems certain, however, that the formulated basic positions represented guidelines providing strong orientation for both historical sciences and political journalism. This refers above all to the civilizational role of Poland from the cultural and geopolitical point of view and the positioning of a Polish statehood in the European West-East dualism, which granted Poland a high degree of independence associated with a genuine leading role. At the same time, it is also the orientation towards a broad scope of the historical sciences and, as it were, their opening up to both political exploitation and social functionality, combined with the task of the publication of historical insights by social elites (Kolbuszewska, 2005, p. 172). Moreover, science was concerned with international impact from the outset, which is certainly related to the young Polish state’s claim to visible positioning in the context of other states, but is also due to the strong networking

of scientists, who had gained high reputation during partition time abroad and brought it into the scientific structure.

STATE IMPULSE AND "POLITICAL THINKING"

From 1919, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education (Ministerstwo Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego – MWRiOP) formally took over the management of the Polish scientific establishment and founded its own science department for this purpose (Jaczewski, 1987, p. 206). However, the relationship between state and science remained relatively disordered and, together with the ongoing economic difficulties of the state, caused some displeasure. Above all, it was about planning security and overcoming permanent under-funding, which was in strong contrast to the state's demands and the development of society. It was precisely this problem and, above all, the danger of falling further behind internationally that was the starting point of an initiative of scientists organized by the journal *Nauka Polska* in 1928 (Vol. 10). Well-known scientists from all fields lamented the current situation in which the sciences could no longer keep up with the real and necessary development of society and thus addressed the very point that was always emphasized by state and politics. They strongly criticized the relevant ministries and called for a decidedly better endowment of the scientific institutions and a visible increase in the number of staff. From the human sciences, sociologists spoke out particularly clearly, underscoring the practical socio-political importance of sociology for the modern Polish state. The scientists also formed organizational structures and were able to exert massive pressure on the state authorities, not least because they acted unanimously. Against the background of a significantly improving economic situation in the country, the ministry reacted quite quickly to the demands, in turn stressing the importance of science and the close connection to the state. The Sanacja [Sanation] fully laid claim to economic progress and thus also legitimized the marked increase in its influence in all spheres of politics and society. In the same year, visible measures were taken to meet the demands. One can speak of a visible improvement in the situation, which also benefited the human sciences. In particular, the history and culture of the Slavic peoples should be promoted. At the same time, however, the continuing structural weakness of scientific life in eastern Poland was also pointed out, Wilno and Lwów, of course, holding a special position.

The state's grip on the sciences was particularly evident in its influence on structural and personnel decisions. Walery Sławek, a close confidant of Piłsudski, renewed the principle that science should serve the state, formulated after the founding of the state, and now connected it directly with Piłsudski's intentions, which served as a yardstick. In his role as organizer of the Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government (BBWR), which acted openly anti-democratically and considered it his main task to directly influence politics according to Piłsudski's vision, Sławek also tried to attract scientists. Given the dissatisfaction with the scientific policies of the governments, he was fairly successful. The Sanacja also benefited from the dislike of the type of nationalism proposed by the National Democracy, which was fairly widespread among the intelligentsia. This made the Piłsudski's camp an acceptable alternative, especially since it was oriented towards and closely connected to the person of Piłsudski but politically quite heterogeneous. Thus, it was neither possible to form a solid front of the intelligentsia behind Piłsudski nor to force it into line as in dictatorships. However, the political commitment of academics and their role in state and parliamentary bodies was not insignificant. A representative example of active work in the government camp is the professor of canonical law at Wilno University and its later vice-chancellor Professor Stefan Ehrenkreutz, initiator and president of the Scientific Research Institute for Eastern Europe in Wilno (Kornat, 2000, pp. 3–119).

1928 was undoubtedly a pivotal year in the negotiation of the relations between the state and the sciences. One key result was the creation of the National Cultural Fund which, although it offered a good opportunity to improve the financial resources of scientific institutions, also enabled public authorities to have a major influence on the management of funds. Due to the visibly improved financial resources, numerous institutes were newly established and international scientific cooperation intensified. However, it was only a short-lived upswing. In the autumn of 1929, Poland was also considerably affected by the Great Depression and funding for science was cut drastically and for a longer period. The pre-crisis level was not reached again until 1937. Political strife increased dramatically at the beginning of the 1930s, and scientists positioned themselves more strongly. Stefan Ehrenkreutz, for example, led the Group for Culture and Education of the Ministry of Education and, together with other influential professors, took an important position in this crucial but ultimately anti-democratic instrument. The conflict between science and state continued to escalate, and protests increased with the result that the relevant state agencies

responded with increased pressure on oppositional professors, the liquidation of some chairs and the obstruction of disloyal professors. Halecki and Handelsman, for example, were denied stays abroad.

SCIENTIFIC QUESTIONS AND "GEOPOLITICAL IMPERATIVE"

The greatest challenge of the new Polish state was to bring together the three parts of Poland that had existed before reunification. This was primarily a structural problem of socioeconomic unification. But it was no less the task of a spiritual-intellectual self-determination and the search for a unification of thought. Not in the sense of levelling, but as a strategy of thought that seems appropriate for a modern Polish nation-state. This is certainly not a specifically Polish problem and concerns *cum grano salis* all modern nation states, or all modern nationalization processes. Determining what belongs to one and separating it from the foreign is the core problem. However, this process, despite its comparability, had a specific dimension in Poland under the conditions of the partitions. Not least because the partition of the traditional Polish state territory, and thus also the various forms of the segregation of society, took place in a period that was generally crucial for the design of modern societies and the development of modern nation states, including a completely new system of relationships. Economics, technology, science and thought developed rapidly, and participation in this development was in no small measure decisive for the possibilities of power-political development and positioning in the international system. In Poland, for example, the foreign influence on the sciences, especially the social sciences, was perceived as a curse and a blessing in equal measure. The top intellectuals had enjoyed their education in the metropolises of the partitioning powers. The universities in St. Petersburg, Berlin and Vienna were centres of thought and home to the most innovative minds of their time. Polish intellectuals, especially historians, thus contributed state-of-the-art social science research to the new Polish state. At the same time, the self-image of this state was strongly influenced by an emancipation from this external influence, which required the intellectual elites to distance themselves clearly from the partition powers in every respect. Since a denial of the intellectual contributions did not seem to make much sense and because they were also needed as intellectual tools for the construction of the new state, this distancing manifested itself above all in the attempt to bind all intellectuals to state and nation through "Polish thinking" as a methodical

leitmotif and a focus on national history, the depiction of which should no longer be left to Germans and Russians. What mattered was not only to dominate this field of research but also, in the sense of establishing “Polish thinking”, to address actively the formulated points of view of the neighbours. This included an intense and permanent observation of their activities in this field.

It is no wonder, therefore, that research fields that dealt with the neighbours were established quite quickly. The geopolitical paradigm foregrounded Germany and Russia. The national historical aspect dominated here, too. This means that there was less concern with the history of or the knowledge about the neighbour than with its role in the development of the Polish state and its influence on its social design. The task of this research was also practically oriented from the outset and had to serve the development of the new Polish state. Research took on tasks that went far beyond the field of “pure” historical research, connected itself closely with politics and also aligned itself with the different directions of “political thought”. At first, most of the attention was devoted to the western neighbour. It was not only thought to pose the greatest potential threat for the young Polish state, but this focus was also in line with the nation-state model realized by the founding of the state in 1918, which was favoured by the Polish national democracy and considered Piast Poland as the systemic and territorial model. The task of such Western research then also consisted in the legitimization of the territorial changes in the German-Polish border area and the closely related examination of German influence on Polish history and, above all, any form of the *Kulturträgertheorie*. In the 1920s, a number of organizations and institutes were created, devoted exclusively to this task: the Society of the West Territories’ History Enthusiasts (Towarzystwo Miłośników Historii Ziem Zachodnich) – 1922, the Baltic Institute in Toruń (Instytut Bałtycki) – 1925, the Silesian Institute in Katowice (Instytut Śląski) – 1934, and the Committee for the Study of the History of Silesia (Komitet Badania Historii Śląska) – 1928. In addition, there were a number of journals that assigned themselves to these fields of research. The newly founded University in Poznań was also committed to Western research. The first general congress of Polish historians after the war took place in Poznań and dealt with Western Slavdom and its assertion against the German influences in the western Polish territories (Serejski, 1963, p. 22). Increasingly, the confrontation with the *Drang nach Osten* (‘urge to the East’) has moved into the focus of research assuming an almost natural German aggressiveness. This Western research then found its almost classical expression

in the founding of the West Institute in Poznań and the person of Zygmunt Wojciechowski, and is well-reflected in the research literature.

Historians and geographers saw it as their most noble task not only to scientifically substantiate the claim, even the necessity, of the incorporation of the Kresy into the new Polish state, to prove their reasoning with the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Empire and to support it with geopolitical imperatives. But they were also involved in the decisive political camps and acted as experts in determining committees. With Oskar Halecki and Eugeniusz Romer, leading authorities in their field whose international reputation was beyond doubt, were mustered. Their virulent preoccupation with the East was also due to the experience they had gained in Galicia as an intellectual and political centre of partitioned Poland. In the Habsburg-governed part of Poland, the quasi-autonomy provided structural conditions to engage intensively with the restoration of the Polish state. This was the centre of the national movement with the universities of Kraków and Lwów providing the intellectual site of the scientific foundation of the future territorial form (Maternicki, 1990, pp. 11–45; Wandycz, 1992, p. 1015).

As the heartland of the Kresy, however, the eastern dimension of the Polish state was also lived and experienced here, and the exploring of the relationship with Russia as well as the attitude to the Ukrainian question were central aspects of everyday politics. Zygmunt Wojciechowski, who used his concept of “mother countries” (a country that is “responsible” for another, usually smaller country) to propagate Western thought in the sense of a Polish western border along the river Oder and the Baltic Sea and who became the father of Western Research, stems from this intellectual milieu (Krzoska, 2003, p. 43).

Romer studied in Lwów and began his scientific career there. In 1910, he was appointed as chair of the Institute of Geography. From research stays with Albrecht Penck in Vienna, he took his first suggestions for a *Volks-* and *Kulturboden* perspective on geography. Romer was heavily involved in the patriotic movement and saw his main field of activity in promoting Poland's future borders (Zierhofer, 1967, p. 328).

He characterised his main work, the *Geographical-Statistical Atlas of Poland* (Romer, 1916), to be charged with the “dynamics of Polish statehood” (Romer, 1988, p. 103). He later also played an important role in the border determinations at the Paris Peace Conference. Heavily influenced by Friedrich Ratzel and German *Länderkunde* (country studies, i.e., regional geography), he assumed a geographical determinism of statehood (Romer, 1939; Wapiński, 1989, pp. 66, 92, 157, 227, 337) and understood the Polish state as a natural geographical entity

essentially within the borders of 1772 (Romer, 1916, p. 19). This meant that any changes to this construction contradicted the nature of Polish statehood, and were thus unnatural and endangering its existence. Poland as a “land between the seas” was an integral part of Romer’s Western Europe as its easternmost part. Thus the location and justification of Poland’s eastern border took on a special significance in his argument concerning the shape of the new Polish state. Russia is the East. All ethnic factors only played a subordinated role in this approach or were completely disregarded. The physical geography of the state alone was the ordering element, and all possible national factors would be “amalgamated” by the attractiveness of Polish culture (Romer, 1918, p. 359). So when Romer spoke of an “urge to the East”, he did not associate a civilizational mission but a natural expansion task of Poland as a Western European project with a permanent character. Romer derived the conviction that geography could serve as a firm appellate body of Polish territorial form and state legitimacy from the purely objective and neutral character of geography as an unadulterated science, which in the struggle for the Polish independence must be put at the service of the state.

Many of these ways of thinking by Romer and his geography can also be found in Halecki’s historical argument. Specialized in Jagiellonian Poland, he saw this model as the future for a Polish state. He was a member of the Polish National Committee and, as an expert of the Polish delegation, campaigned at the Paris Peace Conference for “historical rights” of the Polish state in Galicia and Volhynia (Bömelburg, 2007, p. 107).

The advocacy of a state federation of Poland with Lithuania and the Ukraine as a major European power brought him into the closest connection with Piłsudski’s political camp at an early stage. While, in contrast to Romer, he acknowledged distinctive national interests of Lithuanians and Ukrainians, he saw it not as an essential problem in view of the decentralized organization of the state but as an “internal question of the common state” (Halecki, 1918, p. 1). In doing so, he left no doubt about the clear Polish character of the state and, similarly, saw Romer’s cultural dominance of Polishness as a self-regulating element. Far more than Romer’s, Halecki’s historical perspective was strongly characterised by the conviction of a key position of the eastern territories of the Polish state. On the other hand, however, he was also very close to Romer, deriving this fixation from a special bond between region/nature and the population, as a source of life of Polish statehood. With the ideal type of the Polish-Lithuanian Union as a model and orientation towards the borders of 1772, Halecki connected a historic mission of the Poles in the East (Halecki, 1920, p. 8). It consisted, above all, in the

ability to pacify this transitional area between Poland and the East, which in itself appears unstable; and only a Polish state that exists there as a leading power can exercise an antemural function and balance the opposition of East and West. This function includes a permanent battle with Russia seeking dominance in Eastern Central Europe, and it will mobilize all the internal forces of the state, thereby, for Halecki, assigning both an internal and external function to this historical constellation of Polish statehood.

Like Romer, Halecki was convinced of a national task of science and argued for history to put itself at the service of politics. For him, an active participation in the political process of creating and consolidating the new Polish state was beyond question. The conviction that shaping the relations with the East played a special role was underlined by his active participation in Polish Eastern politics in the early 1920s. When analysing the writings of such exposed researchers as Romer and Halecki, it is difficult to maintain the view that they were exclusively committed to science. The political purposefulness of their research did not allow for any kind of “neutrality”. It was a self-formulated task to serve the state project and to set out basic patterns of thought with regard to the position to the European East, which, well beyond the normal reach of scientific historical-geographical research, influenced social perspectives and political attitudes (Zernack, 1991, p. 72).

Similarities in Romer and Halecki’s view on the role and meaning of the East are unmistakable. What Romer claimed to be the natural geographical physiognomy of the Polish state was historically charged by Halecki with the Polish-Lithuanian ideal. The result was a geopolitical imperative of Polish statehood, which decisively shaped the Eastern European research in the Second Polish Republic and formed not insignificantly the spiritual roots for what was later called Prometheism. From the outset, the subject of this research included not only historical, geographical, and political considerations, but there was always self-determination, even self-assurance – not only in the territorial dimension of the state but also in finding an identity. A comparison with Eastern Europe supported the self-image of Poland as European. Poland as an integral part of the Latin West or the Occident was not only proof of cultural quality but also provided the legitimacy of a function in the East which combined a European protection function and a cultural mission (Wierzbicki, 1993, p. 272).

Eastern European research developed a special understanding of space of a dispositive character *vis-à-vis* the Kresy. The Kresy were seen as a transitional space or inter-space, endangered by imperial claims of Russia and entitled to

Poland. Poland fulfilled a traditionally orderly function (pacification) in this area, thus securing its own existence and a Latin Western cultural mission as the only force capable, through its culturally Western character, to protect European values from danger from the East and to take on this European obligation. The position towards this space follows from a permanent confrontation with Russia as the actual Eastern Europe presenting a major threat potential. Due to this bipolar Eastern European perspective, it is difficult to speak of uniform Eastern Europe research at the beginning of the 1920s because different perspectives were developed and a uniform research approach did not exist. Eastern European research existed in the dualism of one's own and the foreign, and developed an internal and an external perspective.

It was only later, towards the end of the 1920s, but above all dominant in the 1930s, that research aimed at Russia and its eastern neighbours developed complementary to Western research. This focus is certainly related to the seizure of power by Piłsudski in May 1926 and (again) a stronger orientation towards the East. In 1927, initiated by Poland and under the direction of Marcei Handelsman, the first congress of historians from Eastern Europe took place in Warsaw, and in 1930, Eastern European Institutes were founded in Warsaw and Wilno, as well as a number of journals devoted exclusively to questions of Eastern Europe. The University of Wilno played a key role in Eastern European research, and Lwów and Kraków were also assigned such a research focus – but without living up to that as expected. With the stronger turn to the East, the preoccupation with the “Jagiellonian idea” as a model of Polish state constitution became popular once again, placing the eastern expansion of the Polish state and the ideal image of a community of different peoples in the focus of historical considerations. Just as the Piastic example for the West, the Jagiellonian model did not only serve to legitimize the existing state constitution but also served more ambitious goals of a concept of big-power politics, and similarities between this power-political habitus and the “urge to the East” were quite present (Serejski, 1963, p. 24).

The focus of research on the Piastic and Jagiellonian ideas went far beyond the dichotomy of regional research priorities and dominated all historical research. Here, in a way, the processes of modernization of the Polish social sciences (Kolbuszewska, 2005, p. 172; Niederhauser, 1988, p. 110) were consolidated and, simultaneously, the traditional schools of the optimistic and pessimistic view of Polish history dissolved (Maternicki, 1961, p. 335). Without achieving formal party-political conformity, the basic political positions of the National Democracy and the Piłsudski's camp found expression and historical legitimacy,

and perspective here. Strongly taken with the defined task of social functionality, historical consideration not only underwent a pronounced politicization but was also required to assign itself to political purposes and to consider respective guidelines. Moreover, it broadened forms and levels of representation, which opened up personal access with a high acceptance of opinions that could not be necessarily assigned to the academic camp. This did not mean that scientific journalism should not meet research standards, but the boundaries between influential opinion-forming and source-based studies were not necessarily questioned. Methodically, this phenomenon is further consolidated by the fact that the practical claim or direct exploitability, and the social benefits of research require less a chronological or historical treatise but are rather object-oriented. And only then, against the background of historical argumentation, research serves legitimacy purposes. This does not have to lead to a shallow argument with a merely propagandistic character, on the contrary, arguments are usually fiercely debated and profoundly supported with historical facts, which in turn requires expertise with a research background. And this is where historians, publicists and politicians meet in a wide variety of publications. This means that despite all the political inspiration, the publications cannot be denied a scientific character because their authors often have a scientific background and claim to work scientifically. Thus, scientific reasoning, object determination and description become a means of addressing current social tasks under certain political conditions.

This dissolution of the border between journalism and science, and the establishment of a close connection, if not mutual dependency, is one of the most important results of the abandonment of positivism and the modernization of the historical sciences at the turn of the century. It is an integral element of the greater focus on the more recent history of Poland and its embedding in European history, especially in the geopolitical context of the central location between East and West. The intensive reflections on the Europeaness of Poland and the efforts to prove to belong to the Western-Latin cultural sphere in the interwar period can only be understood in this context, too. The modernization of Polish historical research and its practice in the Second Republic also means the definitive departure from the idea of historical research as a science committed only to objectivity. Instead, it receives a certain place in state and society where historians have to share their social function with others in the field of historical journalism and to compete to dominate (public) opinion – not only on the basis of the differentiation of one's own subject but also with authors whose journalism

has been fully granted a research background or a professional competence. In the end, their social classification, acceptance and effectiveness will ultimately become decisive. The social pressure was correspondingly high. The crucial factors in the development of research were precisely the expectations of politics and society. These increasingly teleological expectations were unambiguously geared towards clear answers to the current needs of the time and affected by the political narrowing in the Second Polish Republic. All of this narrowed the scope of historical research, hampered method discussions and ultimately the creative development of research. Historical research could particularly flourish in fields where the degree of correspondence between the requirements of research and political demands or special interests was particularly high – and that was the Eastern European research in the 1930s.

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POLITICAL COMMUNICATION



MEDIA POLITICAL BIAS: IN SEARCH OF CONCEPTUALIZATION

MEDIALNA STRONNICZOŚĆ POLITYCZNA:
W POSZUKIWANIU KONCEPTUALIZACJI

*Rafał Klepka** 

ABSTRACT

The manner in which the media presents its recipients with political content has a strong impact on knowledge, attitudes, opinions and electoral behavior. The content of the media cannot be a full reflection of political reality, but the way in which the reality presents it may be closer or more distant from the idea of objectivity and neutrality. The category describing the scale of deviation from the idea of a balanced presentation of content is the media political bias. The aim of this article is to present this concept and determine the specific features of media political bias, its main determinants, elements of the media which make us deal with biased content, and the relationship between the concept of media political bias and other selected theoretical concepts regarding media.

Keywords: media; political bias; media content; objectivism; framing

ABSTRAKT

Sposób, w jaki media prezentują swoim odbiorcom treści o charakterze politycznym, ma silny wpływ na wiedzę, postawy, opinie oraz zachowania wyborcze. Zawartość mediów nie może stanowić pełnego odzwierciedlenia rzeczywistości politycznej, jednak sposób, w jaki rzeczywistość tę prezentuje, może być bliższy lub dalszy od idei obiektywizmu i neutralności. Kategorią opisującą skalę odchylenia od idei zbalansowanej prezentacji treści jest medialna stronniczość polityczna. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przybliżenie tej koncepcji oraz określenie specyficznych cech medialnej stronniczości politycznej, jej głównych uwarunkowań, elementów przekazu medialnego, które sprawiają, że mamy do czynienia z treścią o charakterze stronniczym, a także związku między koncepcją medialnej stronniczości politycznej a innymi wybranymi koncepcjami teoretycznymi dotyczącymi mediów.

Słowa kluczowe: media; stronniczość polityczna; zawartość mediów; obiektywizm; *framing*

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INTRODUCTION

Contemporary political reality is more and more connected with the world of media (Klepka, 2018b, pp. 9–10). It is extremely difficult, especially in democratic states, to find cases in which citizens who take part in elections and referendums shape their knowledge, beliefs, assessments and, consequently, political decisions in a different way than through the media. The existing relationship between political processes and the media makes it necessary to study interrelations between them as important for understanding contemporary political phenomena. At the same time, researchers dealing with political processes, as well as scientists conducting media analyzes, journalists, media recipients and even politicians, very often emphasize that the media is unreliable, manipulative, false, present some of the truth and remain unobjective. Expectations of objectivity formulated for the media appear as often as reflections proving that objectivism is impossible to achieve, because media messages, even for technical reasons, are not able to fully reflect the political reality. The presence of a kind of paradox based on the formulation of expectations, despite the awareness that they cannot be realized, is an important, though not the only reason why the issue of media political bias appears as a valuable and cognitively rewarding research problem. Nevertheless, questions about the possibility of precise, scientific operationalization of the concept that would go beyond the colloquial, intuitive understanding of the essence of media bias remain relevant.

Polish researchers, both politics and the media, have repeatedly addressed the issue of bias in the media on the occasion of analysis of the political communication strategy (Kolczyński, 2007), the functioning of the Polish media system (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2011) and selected media concepts (Zawalska, 2013). One can also find studies on the content of the media, which used the category of political bias in more or less distinct way (Kolczyński, 2017; Radek, 2013). Research on this subject in the US and Western Europe is much more often carried out, being the subject of lively debate which takes place among scientists as well as politicians, employees of media institutions, journalists and ordinary media recipients (Street, 2001; Curran, 2011; McQuail, 1992; Ruschmann, 2006). Publications being the result of this research are of a theoretical, followed by a methodological and finally empirical nature, thus they build conceptualization and conceptual grid, define research methods and tools, and analyze content of a specific medium, or comparably several media, to capture existing patterns

(Groseclose & Milyo, 2005b; Haselmayer, Wagner, & Meyer, 2017; Ho et al., 2011; Jak, Oort, & Dolan, 2014; Mayer, 2005).

The aim of this article is to present the basic conceptualizations and ways of defining the specific features of the media political bias, its main conditions and elements of the media message, which make us deal with biased content. The findings presented in the article refer to traditional media, in particular, television. Regardless of the growing role played by new media, according to most studies, television is the main source of information on politics (Klepka, 2018a, pp. 15–18). In addition, due to the framework of the study, the presented concepts relate to the media in democratic countries. It should be emphasized, however, that also in this group of countries there are many differences that allow for the separation of model media systems, taking into account the complexity of relations between the media and politics (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, pp. 21–45).

BIAS AS THE OPPOSITE OF OBJECTIVITY AND BALANCE

There is a relatively large ease in an intuitive understanding of the concept of media bias. We deal with it in a situation where one's rations, views, political parties, ideologies, value systems, religions, nations, professions are favored, presented in a good light, while others are criticized, discriminated, presented in a negative way (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2011, p. 70). Therefore, the bias may concern not only politics, but also religion, attitudes, nationalities or advertised products (Guo & Lai, 2014).

In the case of media political bias, it should be noted that, as Tim Groseclose and Jeffrey Milyo point out, we deal with it mainly in information programs and media dealing with political issues, unlike other forms of media bias that may also occur in entertainment programs, TV series or commercials. Political bias understood in this way, according to American researchers, means the inclination of the media message in such a way that it becomes left-wing or right-wing and consequently favors one of the political parties (Groseclose & Milyo, 2005b, p. 306). Political bias, therefore, allows to talk about the division into liberal and conservative media or pro- and anti-, with the given prefix being a given political value or an important theme from the current political agenda. In the USA, the most popular theoretical concepts referring to media bias often formulate the assumption that mainstream media are predominantly liberal or rarely that they

mainly promote conservative values (Groseclose & Milyo, 2005a, p. 1192; Lee, 2005; Mayer, 2005).

Ewa Nowak-Teter emphasizes the differences between slant, which means the inclination, distortion and one-sidedness of the relationship in which some elements are emphasized, and ignores others, from bias, defined as consistent and long-lasting one-sidedness of the message. The researcher points out, however, that in the Polish literature on the subject, the persistence of a particular power or political reason has often been described as political bias (Nowak-Teter, 2017, p. 105).

Bias in the subject literature is often defined as the opposite of objectivity (Cushion & Thomas, 2017, p. 2). It should be pointed out here that the difficulty in assessing whether the message fulfills this criterion is far-reaching. The choice of events or words for presentation, the shortness of media forms, or cultural diversity are factors that make it difficult to assess whether the material presents objectively political reality. There is no doubt that the comprehensive selection of sources and their confrontation with each other favor a multilateral view of the given issue. Researchers sometimes also have to refuse to treat as certain information from government documents or state offices, which should also be subject to journalistic verification (Puglisi & Snyder, 2016, p. 649). The constructivist stand, in turn, assumes – in a far-reaching simplification – that reality is not directly accessible to the individual, while learning about the world is an individual construction of meanings. Observation of the world is therefore its construction and depends on the observer. Constructivism recommends looking from the outside on the problem of media objectivity, because according to this position, the mass media is not about reflecting reality, but only about its construction, and therefore it cannot be indicated to what extent it is objective, because reality is not available for the observer (Fleischer, 2005, p. 10, 2007, p. 29; Michalczyk, 2010, p. 107).

Most often, defining media bias is accompanied by an indication that the media should be balanced. This postulate can be understood in many ways. On the one hand, as a balance, on the other as equality in access and the manner of presenting specific parties, candidates or political reasons. Only in some cases, balance and equality can be interpreted in the same way. In majority political systems with two political parties, such a solution seems obvious (D'Alessio & Allen, 2000). Balance consists in a relatively equal time and manner of presenting each of the two political parties. There is a possibility of using a similar way of understanding the balance in two-block systems, when there are many parties,

but the division axes also allow for a relatively equal presentation of each block's reasons (Hopmann, Van Aelst, & Legnante, 2012, p. 244).


Determining what is the balance in multi-party systems is a much more difficult task. It certainly does not mean the same as equality. By presenting during the electoral campaign the conventions of the two main parties competing in the elections and devoting 70% of their broadcasting time to them, the information program may follow the principle of balance, because these conventions were the most important political events of the day, and smaller groups were not active that day. Such an arrangement of an information program in a multi-party electoral system does not mean equal treatment of the parties, because the smaller political groups participating in the elections did not have the chance to present their program to the extent comparable with the two main parties. In the opposite situation, if each of the ten political parties taking part in the election were devoted in the information program to 10% of the airtime, it would turn out that full equality does not mean balance. In the case of two parties, an important political event took place, but the others would have to be presented only in order to fill in the airtime in the right proportions. In the case of small parties just aspiring to be on the political scene, the creation of journalistic material of significance and size analogous to that devoted to large political parties could be an extremely difficult task or even impossible for an experienced team of journalists. This state of affairs means that the political relevance of a party determines its rank in media political programs. In other words, the balance means that more time and attention is devoted to larger parties already with their representatives, incumbents and well-known politicians, while the pretenders, representatives of small groups and political novices are condemned to less attention of the media (Bennett, 1990; Hopmann et al., 2012, p. 245).

The difficulty of clearly defining media political bias results in some researchers treating it as imperfections resulting from the lack of journalistic norms or their failure to comply with media. They point to the lack of journalistic ethics or precision in journalistic codes. Often bias is also treated as a departure from journalistic professionalism. In normative conceptions there are often presumptions that bias is a consequence of the fact that media employees remain in too close relations and dependencies with political actors and the demand that political journalism should be only informative, so it should be crucial to separate facts from values and assessments (Asp, 2014, p. 261).

As the most coherent and still valid concept one should recognize the findings made in the 1970s by researchers from the Glasgow Media Group, who

indicated that “Contrary to the claims, conventions, and culture of television journalism, the news is not a neutral product. For television news is a cultural artifact; it is a sequence of socially manufactured messages, which carry many of the culturally dominant assumptions of our society. From the accents of the newscasters to the vocabulary of camera angles; from who gets on and what questions they are asked, via selection of stories to presentation of bulletins, the news is a highly mediated product” (Glasgow University Media Group, 1976, p. 1). This position proves that the expectations of neutrality from media messages about politics are, in fact, exaggerated and impossible to implement.

For a better understanding of the media specificity of political bias, one should point to its gradual nature. Thus, every media message is situated in the area of the continuum between full objectivity and extreme bias (Louw, 2005, p. 78; Curran, 2002, p. 155; Klepka, 2017, p. 157). This assumption is illustrated by the diagram below.



Scheme 1. Continuum between Objectivity and Political Bias in Media Coverage

Source: own study.


TYPES OF MEDIA POLITICAL BIAS

Researchers of media political messages analyzing the issue of bias also try to organize existing concepts in various ways, creating typologies of the phenomenon itself and its basic dimensions. Two, often hard to distinguish, forms of media bias can be indicated. The first of them, which should be described as unintentional political bias, to a large extent remains independent of the creators of the media. It is a consequence of the fact that the media image of a phenomenon always remains a fragment and an abbreviation. Each journalist or editor, regardless of intentions, will select a different part of the speech, illustrate his statement with another politician, because of the limited duration of the material or the volume of the article will omit the selected fragment. This kind of bias can

be regarded to a certain extent as a natural consequence of the media coverage of reality (Łódzki, 2017, p. 123).

The intended political bias should be treated differently. It involves presenting political phenomena in such a way as to favor the selected side of a political conflict, a political party or supporters of a particular solution while at the same time negatively evaluating the opposite party, or omitting information about its existence altogether (Toggle, 1998, p. 65). David N. Hopmann, Peter Van Aelst and Guido Legnante point to three basic dimensions of the intended political bias (Hopmann et al., 2012, p. 247). The first one refers to the visibility of political actors, who can be given more or less attention, thereby rewarding or eliminating their points of view. The sound of materials presented in the media plays a significant role. Using an innumerable range of resources, it is possible to evaluate a particular political actor in an unambiguously favorable or critical manner. The role of journalistic commentary, narrative, confrontation with the past or other political actor will play a huge role (Donsbach & Patterson, 2004, p. 251). Finally, the third dimension concerns the selection of problems that will be addressed. Purposeful selection can lead to the elimination of selected points of view or over-representation of materials dedicated to a specific issue.

Dennis McQuail proposes a more complex typology of political bias, making the criteria of its division intentionality, as in the previous typology, but also adding a second criterion, that is, openness. On this basis, he distinguishes propaganda, ideological, unmistakable and involuntary bias (McQuail, 1992, p. 191). The specificity of this division is illustrated in the diagram below.



Scheme 2. Types of Political Bias


Source: own study based on McQuail, 1992, pp. 191–193.

The implicit but intentional propaganda bias relies on such a media message formulation to smuggle in as many things as possible that would support a particular party, point of view, or worldview. The ideological bias, also hidden, but also unintentional, relies on the formulation of certain value judgments, which reveal itself only during careful reading of the newspaper or several analysis of media coverage, they are a consequence of what the editors treat as obvious and clear, and the adoption of such assumption has biased character. Intended and overt partiality is undoubtedly the explicit communication of the editorial line or views expressed by the journalist, and even encouragement to vote in the elections for a specific political party or candidate. Finally, involuntary bias, i.e., unintentional and explicit, is conditioned by restrictions on the duration of the broadcast or the volume of the newspaper and is associated with the necessary choices and abbreviations, which inevitably affect the accuracy of the media message.

POLITICAL BIAS AND OTHER MEDIA CONCEPTS

The concept of media political bias remains in various relationships and dependencies with other theories of media functioning (Baran & Davis, 2011, p. 16; Michalczyk, 2015, p. 7). Most of them belong to the medium-range theory, and thus interdisciplinary scientific concepts referring to a selected aspect of the media phenomenon of political bias. The complexity and multidimensionality of bias itself is well illustrated by the diagram presenting elements of the process of production of media political messages and their reception by media consumers.

The diagram presents both factors that can influence media bias, as well as the most important stages of media coverage from the political events to the reception of the message that concerns them. Almost every stage of content creation can lead to action, which in turn will lead to the material being biased. The selection of events, topics, problems or politicians to which the media devotes their attention is the subject of research into the concept of gatekeeping and the theory of the value of information. Gatekeeping explains “the process by which countless occurrences and ideas are reduced to a few messages we are offered in our news media” (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009, p. 75). Leading researchers conducting analyzes within this concept consider the selection processes on five different levels: individual, communication routine, organizational, social institutions,



Scheme 3. Elements of the Process of Production and Reception of Political Media Messages That May Affect Their Bias

Source: F. Hamborg, K. Donnay, & B. Gipp, Automated Identification of Media Bias in News Articles: An Interdisciplinary Literature Review. *International Journal on Digital Libraries*, 16.11.2018; S. Park, S. Kang, S. Chung, & J. Song, *NewsCube: Delivering Multiple Aspects of News to Mitigate Media Bias*.

and social system. The choice of topics to be addressed for issue or publication depends on the characteristics of the person making the decision, its demographic profile, life experience, professed values, attitudes, professional experience, further from the routine of the media organization, unwritten rules, such as the priority of specific topics, resignation from others, limiting selected issues as uninteresting to recipients, or placing emphasis on messages from a specific range of issues. The next level involves decisions about the choice of subject with the economic interests of the media organization, its target market, competition, advertising market and knowledge about the expectations of recipients, as well as the place of media organization among other institutions, advertisers and their goals, government, interest groups and interconnected networks. The last level is connected with the most widely understood surroundings and its features, such as the state supervision system over the media, the political system, the economic system in a given country, the influence of culture or ideology.

Research devoted to the mere selection of content allows to find numerous general trends that make media policy messages biased. The exemplification of Stuart N. Soroka's research can be indicated as the conclusion of the study of the existence of "negativity bias" consisting in much more frequent news in the media, such as irregularities, scandals, campaign mistakes or improperly spent funds, than messages that would carry positive content behind them (Soroka, 2016). Other studies show that in the course of election campaigns, the media pay more attention to incumbents and more often talk about them positively (Eraslan & Ozerturk, 2017), and that the media are eager to write more and give their messages a positive tone when the message concerns a party supported by most recipients of a given medium (Haselmayer et al., 2017).

The process of selecting information should also be associated with the theory of information value, which proves the existence of a relationship between the characteristics of a specific political event and the probability of its presentation in the media. The concept assumes that particular attention is drawn to conflicts, negative events, recent events, scandalous ones, and referring to the audience's experiences (Allan, 2004, p. 57). Such patterns of selection of the presented topics undoubtedly affect the presence and constant repetition of information about selected problems, politics or parties and the omission of others.

A concept that indirectly also refers to media bias is the agenda setting (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). According to it, the media create in our minds a map of important and less important things, which is additionally perpetuated in the minds of people constantly using the media. The rank and importance of topics is determined by the frequency of their occurrence, the order of the information provided, which creates order in the minds of recipients, giving the importance of topics from the most important to the less important to the trivial ones. Messages that start major news releases, journal cover art or the problems of the most extensive articles in weekly magazines are considered more important than the information that was provided at the end of the site or about which only one column was written in a newspaper or magazine. Thus it creates an agenda of important matters for the recipients that in an automatic way positions the rank of topics, political parties or the politicians themselves.

The media theory which is extremely often associated with media political bias is framing. This concept refers to the framework in which a given topic or policy is presented in the media and how it is perceived by the recipients. Robert Entman emphasizes that framing is a ubiquitous process in politics and policy analysis. It consists of selecting several aspects of the perceived reality and com-

binning them in a narrative promoting a particular interpretation. The framework can be selected from four functions: defining the problem, determining the cause, passing moral evaluations, and presenting remedies (Entman, 1993, 2010). The message concerning a politician or a party may adequately refer to positive traits, such as honesty, efficiency or economy, as well as to past events, when a party or politician lost, made a mistake, were involved in a specific political scandal. Including the appropriate scheme means that the recipients evaluate positively or negatively, give them specific opinions, connect with past events and the relevant fragment of knowledge, shape the assessment, attitude and point of view.

The concept that explains why the media in a systemic way present the reality in a non-objective manner remains the propaganda model of Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky. It was created in the 1980^s in the USA and concerned non-state media, however, a significant part of the arrangements made at the time remained valid and could be related to the state media in Europe to a significant extent. According to the model, empirically tested many times, there are five filters that determine what messages will appear in the media: ownership of the medium, medium's funding sources, sourcing, flak, and anti-communism or "fear ideology" (Herman & Chomsky, 1988, pp. 1–35). The propaganda model is still the starting point of many studies referring to political bias in the media.

CONCLUSIONS

Presented theoretical considerations do not pretend to a full analysis of concepts relating to media political bias. They can, however, be a starting point to determine the essence of the problem. Terminological findings should favor the creation of methodological proposals relating to how to study media political bias, using what methods, how to construct research tools. At the same time, it seems that studies of this kind cannot be limited only to qualitative research, but should also be quantitative. In this context, it is reasonable to ask the question about the possibility of measuring the media political bias. With the right tools and research methods, political scientists and media experts would be able to compare the direction and scope of political bias of various media and make comparisons between different media, as well as research in different periods of time. Properly constructed methodological proposals would allow conducting empirical research in several basic directions: determining the level and direction of political bias of selected types of media, specific television and radio stations,

broadcasts or magazines. In addition, well-designed research would enable conducting media analysis of bias in particularly important periods, such as the time of electoral campaigns.

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POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN THE PERIOD OF THE CONSTITUTION REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN IN POLAND IN 1997

KOMUNIKOWANIE POLITYCZNE W OKRESIE
KONSTYTUCYJNEJ KAMPANII REFERENDALNEJ
W POLSCE W 1997 ROKU

*Dominik Szczepański** 

— ABSTRACT —

The aim of the article was to present the means of political communication in the 1997 referendum campaign in Poland, and to find answers for the following questions: 1) who was the creator of political messages?; 2) what was the ideological structure of communication?; 3) what channels did the authors of political message make use of?; 4) in what way did the recipients decode the message?; 5) what was the effect of the political messages?; 6) did the referendum campaign influence the result of parliamentary elections – and if so, to what degree?

The answers acquired in that way will contribute to exposing full perspective of political communication.

Keywords: political communication; constitution referendum; campaign; political parties; constitutional coalition; anti-constitutional block; president

— ABSTRAKT —

Celem artykułu było ukazanie sposobu komunikowania politycznego podczas kampanii referendalnej w Polsce w maju 1997 roku oraz uzyskanie odpowiedzi na następujące pytania badawcze: 1) kto był kreatorem komunikatów politycznych?; 2) jaka była kompozycja ideowa komunikatu?; 3) jakimi kanałami posługiwali się autorzy komunikatów politycznych?; 4) w jaki sposób odbiorcy dokonywali odkodowania przekazu?; 5) jaki skutek wywołały nadane komunikaty polityczne?; 6) czy i w jakim stopniu kampania referendalna miała przełożenie na wynik wyborów parlamentarnych?

Uzyskane w ten sposób odpowiedzi przyczynią się do poznania pełnego obrazu komunikowania politycznego.

Słowa kluczowe: komunikowanie polityczne; referendum konstytucyjne; kampania; partie polityczne; koalicja konstytucyjna; blok antykonstytucyjny; prezydent

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According to the definition provided by Stanisław Michalczyk, political communication should be understood as “the process that relies on information exchange between political leaders, media and citizens, concerning events and affairs that take place in the range of public politics” (Michalczyk, 2005). Such perspective of communication implies that we are dealing with bilateral character of the relation that can undergo within the triad that encompasses: 1) political elites, 2) citizens-voters, and 3) media that serve an indirect role in this process and serve to transmit information (Garlicki, 2010).

The players are politicians and citizens (public opinion), and between them there is the third group, i.e., the media (Ulicka, 1996). The entities that communicate between each other participate in a permanent communication process that takes place according to fixed rules of legal, moral and custom character (Marciniak, 2012). Those entities also have certain tasks to fulfil, large part of which can be described as common (e.g., political socialization, informing and forming opinions on current political affairs), but also separate and complementary (e.g., “media present the offer of the political parties, set the importance hierarchy of public issues, reinforce the relation between politicians and citizens; media and public opinion can legitimize the activities and decision of the authority, and the politicians themselves, by means of communication activity, form the image of politics, explain political decisions, share opinions with the society” [Marciniak, 2012]).

This complementarity was visible during the constitution referendum campaign in Poland in May 1997, which was a result of Polish MPs preparing a new basic law (Chruściak & Osiatyński, 2011). The constitution, which was passed on 2nd April 1997, required, according the Law of 23rd April 1992 on the procedure for preparing and enacting a constitution of the Republic of Poland, together with later amendments, social ratification in a nation-wide referendum, which was appointed by President Aleksander Kwaśniewski on 25th May 1997. Considering the fact that approval of voters, expressed in a voting act, is a necessary element in the process of enacting constitution, the referendum has to be classified, thus, as on obligatory one (Repel, 1997).

When focusing primarily on the essence of the institution of referendum, it must be noted that it was (and still is) a direct form of participation of citizens in the public life. In Poland, especially after 1989, a nationwide referendum was seldom implemented and concerned mainly polls in 1996, 1997, 2003, and 2015¹.

¹ During the Polish People's Republic, the institution of referendum was rarely used. The first one was held on 30th June 1946, as a result of which the communists paved the way for the establishment

There have been many more local referendums, the subject of which was, among others, recalling an organ comprising a unit of municipal government before the end of its term, or self-taxation of citizens (Piasecki, 2005; Sękowska, 1996). As far as the range of the term *referendum* is concerned, it can be defined, most generally, as “the system form that ensures direct decision-making of voters, by means of voting, about different issues of the public life (concerning a country or a particular territory) being the subject of voting (e.g., constitution, standard laws, etc.) and with the effectiveness indicated in the voting act” (Musiał-Karg, 2008; Rytel-Warzocho, 2011).

The initiators, and then supporters or opponents of holding a particular referendum were, in general, political parties. An exception, in this regard, was the referendum to approve constitution. From the perspective of party interests it was treated as an instrument more needed by the parties than voters who were driven, to a large extent, by the trust toward main parties of the political struggle.

This instrumental treatment of the institution of referendum by the political parties was nothing else than down-to-earth calculation of potential gains and losses, estimated and dependant both on current political situation, real possibilities of weakening political competitors, the level of inner-party conflicts, and the perspective of consolidating the public opinion.

THE CONSTITUTION REFERENDUM – CAMPAIGN BEFORE THE CAMPAIGN

Formal commencement of the referendum campaign was a pre-campaign before the upcoming parliamentary elections². In its course there occurred instances of public presentations of candidates running for a post of MP or a senator, or informing the society about the party congresses held. This period was also preceded by consolidation processes at the political stage, in result of which new political bodies were formed.

of a political system in Poland based on the hegemony of one party, while the second one was held on 29th November 1987 and was related to the second stage of the reform which saved the socialist economy (Siedziako, 2018; Dudek, 2004).

² Work on the constitution in the years 1993–1997 took place under certain political conditions. The Sejm majority was held by post-communist groups, which had 376 seats in the National Assembly, which gave them the required two thirds of the votes to vote on the constitution (Tomaszewski, 2007; Kowalczyk, 2016).

These factors contributed to enlivening the discussion on the character of the referendum itself, including mobilisation of own electorate and undecided voters. A party that also participated in the referendum campaign was the Catholic Church, the expression of which were statements of the Polish Episcopal Conference, commenting current affairs in the country and presenting the official stance of clergy towards the discussed issue (Piasecki, 2005).

The choice of the constitution referendum date was preceded by a dispute of tactical nature. The Democratic Left Alliance [Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej – SLD] – Polish People's Party [Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe – PSL] coalition that held power at that time suggested holding constitution referendum simultaneously with the parliamentary elections planned for September 1997, which was met with a positive response of, among others, the deputy head of the PSL parliamentary club, Aleksander Bentkowski, who claimed that it would lead to saving a lot of organisational expenditures and, therefore, increase the turnout. In reality this meant a sociotechnical action based on the intention to make use of the supporters of passing the constitution, who probably would vote in the elections for the government coalition parties. There also appeared the second idea connected with appointing the date of referendum for June 1997, which would overlap with the pilgrimage of Pope John Paul II to Poland. The leaders of main political powers, especially Union of Freedom (Unia Wolności – UW), were afraid of polarisation of the Polish political stage and its division into two opposing blocks. The politicians of the Labour Union (Unia Pracy – UP), who actively got involved in modifying the project of concordat, or the leaders of PSL, who despite forming the governmental coalition with SLD emphasised their own contribution into preparation and passing the new constitution, had similar thoughts (Szamik, 2016; Sieklucki, 2006).

According to the Law of 29th June 1995 on referendum, the campaign was set 20 days before the day of voting. In paragraph 38 of this act it is stated: "referendum campaign serves to present and explain, by the institution holding the referendum and the State Election Commission [Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza], respectively, the content of questions and variants, as well as problems put to vote, and presenting the stances of political parties, non-governmental organisations and other entities concerning the issue referred to by the referendum" (*Ustawa...*, 1995). Due to the above, both supporters and opponents of passing, by means of referendum, the new constitution had 180 minutes of airtime in the public TV, as well as 240 minutes in the public radio (*Rozporządzenie Krajowej Rady Radiofonii i Telewizji...*, 1994).

Detailed information on the use of the airtime was provided by the report of the National Broadcasting Council [Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji] on the annual period of its activity, in which it was indicated that only 7% of the airtime in TVP (24 minutes) was dedicated to special broadcasts devoted to the issues of the referendum procedure (voting procedure, registers, lists of voters, or certificates on the right to vote). Most airtime was devoted to the auditions of the National Broadcasting Council, which comprised, in total, approximately 93%, as well as proclamations of the President of the Republic of Poland. With regard to radio broadcasts, the proportions were identical (*Monitoring konstytucyjnej kampanii referendalnej...*, 1998). The remaining airtime was used by the political parties and other entities in order to present their own political formations and their programs, which indicated objectification of the institution of referendum and the citizens.

A separate category was the form of explaining the issues of referendum by the political actors taking part in the campaign. The formula of short, three-minute TV broadcasts turned out to be a significant obstacle, as the politicians representing opposing political options who appeared in them caused unnecessary chaos and information pollution. The same thing concerned presentation of particular content of the subject of the basic law regulation. This situation did not, however, concern radio broadcasts in which the listeners were informed and provided with specified information on the subject of discussion and what the statements of politicians concerned. Limiting too much the airtime turned out to be a drawback in running a fully professional information campaign. In reality it may be said that such behaviour of politicians did not comprise an argument encouraging the voters to take part in the referendum, and, therefore, did not increase the interest in the referendum campaign.

CONSTITUTIONAL COALITION

The referendum campaign comprised an intense political struggle characterised by frequent tensions between supporters and opponents of the new constitution. The then-division of the political stage did not go along the traditional left-right division line, or the post-communist and post-solidarity groups (Tomaszewski, 2007). The constitutional coalition, as well as the anti-constitutional opposition were formed by the groups coming from different ideological groups.

The supporters of passing the constitution were: UW, UP, PSL, SLD, National Party of Retirees and Pensioners [Krajowa Partia Emerytów i Rencistów – KPEiR], Polish Socialist Party [Polska Partia Socjalistyczna – PPS], as well as the President of Poland, whose information activity was clearly noticeable in the TV and radio broadcasts. An additional argument for the activity of A. Kwaśniewski for passing the new constitution was sending to Polish households almost 11,5 million copies of the basic law, which also included a letter from the President encouraging the citizens to support the constitution in the upcoming referendum.

In the case of political parties that were both in the coalition as well as opposition, we can speak of a relatively boring, although occasionally very aggressive referendum campaign. Financial savings were the dominant topic – perhaps due to the upcoming parliamentary elections. This was visible in the form of a low number of information posters and party materials. The debates that took place were characterised by a lack of vigour and arguments for passing the constitution, as well as disputes presented in the press, including party and union press.

With regard to the activity of the UW, group one should emphasise that both in the rhetoric of party leaders as well as in numerous documents, the contribution of the party in preparing and enacting the constitution was emphasised (Szczepański, 2013, 2014). Emphasizing convergence between the constitution of the Republic of Poland with the project of the basic law handed in by the parliamentary club of the Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna – UD) in 1994, or the fact of reporting the preamble by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, which was, by the way, passed by the National Assembly³, can serve as examples. As presented by the publishing houses, T. Mazowiecki was called “the father of the new constitution”. When asked about that, Mazowiecki stated: “if I answer that I feel I am the father, then one may think that I am conceited, and if I answer that I am not, then some may think that I distance myself from this constitution” (Artymowski, 1997).

An additional activity undertaken by UW was founding, in the middle of April 1997, an Advisory Committee of UW on the constitution, together with

³ The author of the preamble proposed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki was a publicist of “Tygodnik Powszechny”, Stefan Wilkanowicz, who in 1996, in the abovementioned newspaper, published the article *Moja prywatna preambuła*. The text of this preamble was handed over to T. Mazowiecki by the Head of the Polish Episcopal Conference – bishop Tadeusz Pieronek. The final version of the preamble passed by the National Assembly was a result of backstairs discussions and talks held by the leader of UW with Marek Borowski from SLD (Borecki, 2007).

Ewa Łętowska, Henryk Samsonowicz, Kazimierz Kutz, Krzysztof Pawłowski, and Andrzej Wajda. Its members included “persons of universal respect and authority”, and the aim of this committee was encouraging the citizens to take part in the referendum and to vote for passing the constitution (*Komitet Doradczy...*, 1997). Apart from that, since the beginning of January to the end of April 1997, UW was issuing unrelated prints entitled *Co zrobiliśmy, by konstytucja była lepsza* [„What we did to make constitution better”], in which the presented statements were used in the referendum campaign (*Co zrobiliśmy...*, 1997).

In the issued leaflet, UW informed about what the constitution was providing Poland and all the Poles with. Apart from considering a range of rights and civil liberties the authors of the leaflet pointed to constitutional guarantees, such as equality before the law, protection of the institution of marriage understood as a relationship of a man and woman, or the opportunity to submit a complaint into the Polish Constitutional Tribunal by a citizen if his or her rights were violated. The supporters of UW were making use of the authorities, e.g., Leszek Balcerowicz, Hanna Suchocka, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, and Jan Nowak Jeziorański (*Referendum konstytucyjne...*, 1997). In the summary of the referendum campaign, compiled by the electoral team of UW, it was stated that politicians of UW “were speaking with one voice” about the constitution, whereas in the party bulletin the undertook effort was assessed in the following manner: “finally, after seven years, the works on the new basic law ended with success. The foregoing political quick fix has passed in perpetuity. Despite the campaign that has been crude, deceitful and deprived of logical arguments on the part of constitution opponents, the greater part of society which voted was in favour of the constitution passed on 2nd April by the National Assembly. [...] We, the Freedom Union, have a particular reason to be content. [...] The Union not only supported the constitution, but it also co-created it. Tadeusz Mazowiecki is called by the press ‘the father of the constitution’ for a reason” (Golański, 1997).

Noticeably smaller engagement was observed among the UP community. The party MPs in the Sejm of the 2nd term submitted the initiative of constitution referendum, they were against passing the concordat and were also for separating the Church from the state. In the prepared handout entitled *Konstytucja Twoich Praw TAK dla nowej Konstytucji* [Constitution of Your Rights. YES to the New Constitution], the leaders of UP emphasised that adopting the new basic law will comprise a pass to join united Europe and support for the state that is „1) safe, independent and sovereign, 2) democratic and law-abiding, 3) guaranteeing citizens’ rights and liberties, 4) fair for all the citizens, 5) efficiently organised

and ruled, 6) valuing its own tradition and culture” (*Konstytucja Twoich Praw...*, 1997).

The handout also emphasised the contribution of UP in the enactment process of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. This also concerned the provisions regarding social rights (important for people of low income, including students), as well as the provision of free education (Kostrzębski, 1997). In the rhetoric of UP leaders the constitution opponents were discredited. It was put as “do not trust opponents of the constitution, calling for its rejection. Do not let Poland, which was the first to liberate from communism, to remain, as the only country, with constitution regulations from the times of Stalin” (*Konstytucja Twoich Praw...*, 1997). This statement was addressed to the groups concentrated around the Solidarity Electoral Action of the Right (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność – AWS), and the Movement for Reconstruction of Poland (Ruch Odbudowy Polski – ROP), calling for rejecting the constitution in the referendum.

Similar activity was demonstrated by PSL. The agrarians were in favour of remaining the Senate in the foregoing form. The regulations concerning, among others, free healthcare and free education, or the Polish language as the official one, were introduced (Urbaniak, 1997). In the *Resolution No 6 of the Chief Council of PSL Concerning the Standpoint of PSL Towards the Enacted Constitution and the Constitution Referendum*, utter respect was expressed to the MPs and Senators of PSL for their contribution and work on the new constitution, especially for introducing to it references to God and Nation, emphasizing Christian and cultural heritage, or introducing the institution of family farm as the basis of the state agrarian system (*Rezolucja nr 6, 1997; Ludowcy w Sejmie...*, 1997). PSL was encouraging to take part in the referendum only in party documents, while during the referendum campaign the leaders of PSL distanced themselves from the constitution, which was incomprehensible to public opinion, especially because PSL was perceived as one of the co-authors of the new basic law (Pastuszka & Machynia, 1997).

Unlike PSL, the leaders of SLD had a different approach to the issue of referendum. In numerous party resolutions, Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej – SdRP) emphasized the importance and necessity of passing the new constitution (*Uchwała Rady Naczelnej Socjaldemokracji...*, 1997; *Uchwała Rady Naczelnej SdRP...*, 1997). What was not present in the party rhetoric was significant compliance towards PSL and UW regarding the issues of passing particular wordings of the constitution, which was

treated as a form of a historical compromise being the highest political priority (Sosnowska-Materska, 2006). Pertaining to the constitution referendum, the leader of SdRP, Józef Oleksy, wrote: “the compromise arrangements concerning disputed wordings were determined by the feeling of responsibility for Poland. Party disputes were off the radar” (*List przewodniczącego Socjaldemokracji...*, 1997). Apart from justifying a wide range of constitution rights and guarantees, the leader of SdRP appealed to the party members, voters and all the citizens to participate in the referendum on passing the constitution.

An important agitation-informative role for passing the basic law by the nation was played by the “Trybuna” newspaper, where representatives of SLD and UP used to present their comments. A separate category were arguments and disputes of renown figures connected with the left, including the interviews with the head of state. Attacks of the representatives of AWS and ROP on the president were commented, especially for his participation in the information campaign, which was recognized by PKW [State Election Commission] as acceptable due to lack legal regulations forbidding the president running a campaign for voting in a referendum (Wąsik, 1997).

The least information on the means of political communication is available in the case of KPEiR and PPS. According to Antoni Malinowski, Piotr Ikonowicz – the leader of PPS – was in favour of passing the new constitution through a referendum, which was determined mainly by the possibility of weakening the monopoly of the right wing for patriotism. The axis of the dispute was not the basic law content, but its “authorship between the democratic constitutional group and the non-parliamentary anti-constitutional group” (Malinowski, 1997). Due to the above, P. Ikonowicz came to the conclusion that right-wing groups, such as ROP or „Solidarity” concentrated around AWS, called for the catholic constitutional order and to win they had to form an alliance with the Catholic Church that involved the whole clergy. The leader of PPS claimed that the result of the constitution referendum would not influence results of the parliamentary elections. The successors of the referendum success were supposed to be, in his view, only the parties responsible for passing the constitution, and SLD in particular. Therefore, PPS considered passing the constitution in the referendum as essential, as it would enable to weaken the right side of the political stage.

THE ANTI-CONSTITUTIONAL GROUP

Most postulates and arguments against passing the constitution, which were provided by the anti-constitutional group, were of general character. The opposition was formed by: AWS supported by the Civil Committee for Saving Poland, ROP, Non-partisan Support for Reforms [Bezpartyjny Blok Wspierania Reform – BBWR], Confederation of Independent Poland [Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej – KPN], Conservative Coalition [Koalicja Konserwatywna – KK], Real Politics Union [Unia Polityki Realnej – UPR], and the Catholic Church as an entity strictly cooperating with AWS. One may also include in the anti-constitutional group the Civil Movement for Uninominal Electoral Posts, whose activity in the campaign period contributed to the agitation discrediting the basic law passed on 2nd April 1997.

A wide electoral coalition, which was AWS, called for rejecting the constitution in the referendum in a decisive manner. The reason for that was the idea conceived within that group that relied on integrating the post-Solidarity groups, emphasizing “an alternative program of working for Poland” (Piasecki, 2005). The second important reason was rejecting by the Sejm – within the minority proposals – a civic project of constitution prepared by “Solidarity” (Dabertowa, 2005). Within AWS it was thought that if the basic law passed did not include any of the postulates included in the civic project, then the referendum was to be boycotted. Several days later, M. Krzaklewski changed his mind and was encouraging to take part in it and to vote for rejecting the constitution (*Czas na akcję...*, 1997). Additionally, AWS acted against the president, accusing him of direct agitation for passing the constitution by the nation, which, in consequence, led to filing a protest to PKW by M. Krzaklewski. He meant not only the agitation itself, but also the letter of the president sent to over 11 million citizens for the money of taxpayers (Tomaszewski, 2007).

The referendum campaign of AWS was run parallel in two ways. The first one was at the central level and concerned directly the initiatives undertaken by M. Krzaklewski. The next example was presenting the constitution in the worst light, and passing it in the referendum was treated as “Bolshevik storm”. In the appeal issued already in April 1997, Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” (Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy „Solidarność” – NSZZ „Solidarity”) announced that enactment of the constitution can be reverted “only with the effort of the whole nation, such as the Bolshevik invasion was countered in 1920. Similarly like then, it is necessary to appeal to the divine

providence and enthrone the Christ in the name of the Polish Nation. The date of the referendum was also supposed to be symbolic as it coincided with the 46th International Eucharistic Congress in Poland. They called then to enthrone the Christ so that he would support the efforts of patriots in rejecting the constitution” (Tomaszewski, 2007).

The second way referred to individual activities of AWS members. Those were referred to, in a special way, by the Civil Committee for Saving Poland, whose representative was Krystyna Czuba, who was also in charge of the AWS committee for media. She was the author of the brochure entitled *Project of the New Constitution against Poland, for Dechristianising and Partitions of Poland*, in which she alleged that passing the constitution was a threat, among others, to introduce atheism (Art. 53, Para. 5), losing sovereignty (Art. 90), deprivation of child custody (Art. 48), preserving political dominance by the post-communists (the statement concerning proportional representation, Art. 87, para. 1), and that the president would hold unlimited power, exercising tyranny (Art. 134, Para. 3) (*Projekt Nowej Konstytucji...*, n.d.). When analysing the information presented in the brochure, one should consider that majority of the postulates indicated lack of understanding of the basic law content or its superficial reading. The intention of the brochure was to discredit the constitution.

Many issues addressed by AWS were also addressed by ROP. This concerned the protests against the President of Poland. ROP involved in collecting 250 thousand signatures under the petition to carry two projects of constitution to referendum voting – one passed by the National Assembly, and the second one – a civic project. While ROP presented an uncompromising stance towards any constitution compromise, AWS remained unambiguously silent and procrastinated with adopting a position. For Jan Olszewski the situation meant “a compromise between faith in God and atheism” (Malinowski, 1997). Due to this fact, ROP stated: “In the referendum of 25 May say NO to them – because Poland is not for sale” (Tomaszewski, 2007). The party, as the only one in the whole campaign, presented the most substantive arguments. These were, among others, providing the possibility, without a consent on the part of the Polish nation, to transfer the authority to an undefined international organisation (Art. 90, Para. 1, and Art. 91, para. 3); freeing the government from a concern for the state economic circumstances and living conditions of people (Art. 146, Para. 4); depriving the government and Sejm of the influence on the value and power of the Polish currency, passing the control over it to the Monetary Policy Council (Art. 227, Paras. 5–6); preserving the proportional representation (Art.

96, Para. 2); disabling independent upbringing of children (Art. 48, Para. 1, Art. 53, Para. 3) (Dudek, 2007; Tomaszewski, 2007; Podgórskańska, 2004). Similar arguments were present in the leaflets made by ROP, which were dominated by demagoguery. As noticed by Tomasz Słomka (1997), “the criticism had no reflection in the real content and philosophy of the constitution being the subject of voting in the referendum”.

Slightly smaller activity was demonstrated by other parties, namely BBWR, KPN, KK, and UPR. Those parties, except KK, claimed that there was no need or basis for a constitution compromise. In the handouts it was indicated in a general way that the voters should not vote for passing the constitution. These were arguments indicating the possibility to lose sovereignty (Art. 90), creating a threat to state security, preserving system and economic dysfunctions, lack of protection of property of State treasury (Art. 218), questioning parental authority, forcing citizens to compulsory military service, or giving power to party institutions (proportional representation) (*Komunistycznej Konstytucji...*, 1997). For the conservative liberals from UPR, the basic law included too many negative statements rather than positive ones. This also concerned the civic project, which was commented on by the leader of UPR, Janusz Korwin-Mikke, in a negative manner. In his view, both documents preserved “socialism” and “syndicalism” (Borowik, 2011).

The politicians of KK had a different approach towards the issue of constitution and participation in the referendum. Aleksander Hall claimed that the basic law passed in April 1997 comprised a constitution of four political parties and was their constitution “from top to bottom”. He also claimed that voting for the constitution was a choice that was harmful to Poland (Borowik, 2011). This politician also stated: “There is a constitution. It does not satisfy me; not because it was passed by a parliament dominated by the left, but for substantive reasons. It deserves, however, serious reflection. The decision on what to do in the constitution referendum should be made in a mature way. The emotions that accompany the constitution debate are a bad advisor” (Hall, 2000). Almost 20 years after those events this politician stated: “On 25th May, I voted for rejecting the constitution [...]. With hindsight, I think that it ended up well. Despite its weaknesses (I have not changed the opinion on them), the constitution of 1997 was a big step in a good direction, when comparing with the previous legal situation. The time of system quick fix was ended. It is highly doubtful whether the parliament of the next term would be able to pass it” (Hall, 2011).

A significant role in the period of the referendum campaign was played by the Catholic Church, especially the Council of the Polish Bishops' Conference. It expressed its stance already on 16th January 1997, in which it referred to the axiological level of the basic law. The Council decided that one could not "include in the constitution a statement recognising it as the highest law in the country in the absolute sense, and recognise the man as the highest lawmaker" (Delong, 2016). The bishops, on the other hand, paid attention to the reduction of the sources of human rights, in particular the paragraph on the protection of human life, recognising only marriages of people of different sexes and duties resulting from it – religious and moral upbringing of offspring. Therefore, the presence of the Catholic Church during the referendum campaign was seen in the form of support provided to the parties and coalitions in the anti-constitutional block. As it was put by Marek Delong, "the bishops clearly opted for one of the sides of the constitution dispute, while in September they remained reticent in articulating their political preferences" (Delong, 2016). An accurate evaluation of the participation of Catholic Church in the referendum campaign was indicated by Roman Graczyk. He stated that this role was destructive, which could be noticed in the form of numerous instances of ignorance and blindness on the part of the Church. He also claimed that "one must conclude, regretfully, that the Church involved in the issue that it was not particularly competent about, and even turned out to be remarkably incompetent. It fought against the constitution that was far better than both the regulations that were then in force, as well as the civic project supported by 'Solidarity' and then AWS" (Graczyk, 2000). Thus, one needs to conclude that in the case of the Catholic Church and its participation in the referendum campaign, the dispute over the constitution was characterized by too excessive emotional load and exaggerated political expression, which caused confusion of the public opinion (Kowalczyk, 2016).

In the case of the representatives of the Civil Movement for Uninominal Electoral Posts, the stance against passing the constitution in the referendum was opted for. The main arguments that were used were "NO to proportional constitution", "NO to proportional representation", "Enough with party cheating!", "Enough with party corruption", "Enough with party-proportional constitution!" (Dlaczego „NIE”..., 1997). The argumentation provided the information that the constitution preserves the authority of people "handed over by the collapsing communist empire. We want Poland to finally have a chance to choose its own, authentic political elite. Such a chance would be provided by the plurality voting system, hence the one based on the single-member constituencies" (Dlaczego

„NIE”..., 1997). The second of more important postulates presented in the basic law was getting rid of national lists and introducing instead 460 single-member constituencies. One should add that in the period of the referendum campaign the movement repeated its appeal to the society.

REFERENDUM RESULTS AND FINAL CONCLUSIONS

On 25th May 1997, the fate of the new constitution was resolved. The voter turnout on this day was just 42.86%. 52.71% of citizens voted for the constitution, and 45.89% of the votes were against it. There were 170,000 invalid votes. Almost two months later, the Supreme Court dismissed the AWS applications for annulment of the referendum result. As emphasized by A. Piasecki, this application had a propaganda and symbolic meaning, because its groundlessness resulted directly from the 1995 referendum act (Piasecki, 2005; Dudek, 2007).

Several conclusions can be made when assessing the referendum campaign. First of all, the campaign was an example of failed mobilization of electorates of individual political actors. Secondly, the weakness of both the constitutional coalition and the anti-constitutional block was noticeable, characterized by the fact that both blocks had no idea how to convince voters that their decision – for or against the constitution – had any meaning for the state. Thirdly, representatives of political actors mistakenly assumed that the citizens, along with receiving the text of the Basic Law, would read and understand it. It was also wrong to discuss the content of articles by politicians without a specific indication of what the record is about (applies to television broadcasts). Fourthly, the marginal leaflet and poster campaign contributed to the poor voting result. And finally, political actors used the period of the referendum campaign to run a campaign related to elections to the Sejm and the Senate.

Responding to the questions set out in the introduction, it should be noted that the creators of political messages were political actors (the President of the Republic of Poland, political parties, and coalition committees), trade unions, social movements, as well as the Catholic Church. The composition of the ideological message consisted of the following elements: 1) television statements; 2) radio messages; 3) newspaper articles; 4) party materials (including leaflets, posters, emblems, programs and acts); 5) dialogue of politicians with citizens and voters during numerous meetings. The most frequently used transmission channels were: 1) traditional media, i.e., television, radio, and press; 2) own media

of political actors (party and trade publications, etc.); 3) meetings of politicians with voters and the happenings organized in this way; 4) the use of ambo by the clergy as a place of agitation against the enactment of the constitution.

Doubts may arise from answering the question about the effect of political messages, because the result of the referendum showed that the social response to political communiqués was feeble. In the referendum itself, inefficiency was visible in the area of political communication dictated by the lack of proper political communication, lack of determination of the right voter (mainly referred to as so-called undecided voters) and lack of skills to overcome own limitations (mainly referred to the above-mentioned actors involved in the referendum campaign), stereotypical thinking and rising above party (political) divisions. Answering the last of the questions, it should be stated that the parties in the constitutional coalition lost in the parliamentary elections, the exception in this regard was the UW, which formed a coalition with the AWS after the winning elections. In the case of the anti-constitutional block, only the AWS succeeded, which immediately before the elections called to create the post-August Polish camp that could remove the SDL–PSL coalition from power.

After the parliamentary elections in 1997, the parties and entities calling for the rejection of the constitution accepted the current state of affairs and did not take any action to change the Basic Act. The AWS postulate from the period of the referendum campaign, which dealt with the superiority of the civic project over the constitution of 2nd April 1997, and the possible change of the constitution if AWS gained power, might have seemed surprising. The political practice of 1997–2001 almost completely revised this idea.

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SWEDEN'S IMAGE POLICY IN THE TIMES OF REFUGEE CRISIS

POLITYKA WIZERUNKOWA SZWECJI W DOBIE KRYZYSU
MIGRACYJNEGO

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— ABSTRACT —

Sweden has a substantially long tradition of conducting an image policy using both public diplomacy and nation branding. The refugee crisis is a significant challenge for maintaining a strong nation brand and positive perceptions of this country, mostly owing to contradictions between the declared values of Sweden's image and nation brand and the real steps undertaken by the government to limit refugee immigration. The aim of this article is to discover potential correlation between the refugee crisis and changes within Sweden's image and the strategy for promoting the country abroad, as well as Sweden's methods and forms of international communication.

Keywords: Sweden; image policy; refugee crisis; nation branding; public diplomacy

— ABSTRAKT —

Szwecja posiada stosunkowo długą tradycję realizowania polityki wizerunkowej zarówno poprzez dyplomację publiczną, jak i branding narodowy. Kryzys migracyjny stanowi istotne wyzwanie dla utrzymania silnej marki narodowej oraz pozytywnego postrzegania tego kraju na arenie międzynarodowej, głównie ze względu na przeciwności, jakie pojawiają się między założeniami przyświecającymi kreowaniu marki narodowej i wizerunku Szwecji a realnymi działaniami podejmowanymi przez rząd w zakresie ograniczania napływu uchodźców. Celem artykułu jest znalezienie potencjalnego powiązania pomiędzy kryzysem migracyjnym a zmianami w wizerunku Szwecji oraz zmianami, jakie zachodzą w obrębie strategii promowania Szwecji poza jej granicami oraz metod i form komunikowania międzynarodowego.

Słowa kluczowe: Szwecja; polityka wizerunkowa; kryzys migracyjny; branding narodowy; dyplomacja publiczna

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INTRODUCTION

Since 2012, intensive migration flows in Europe have been observed mostly owing to local conflicts in North Africa, especially the civil war in Syria. In 2015, more than a million refugees reached Europe. In 2015 and 2016, around 1.3 million asylum applications from citizens of non-member countries were registered (Eurostat, 2017). Sweden was one of the most popular states among refugees, and at the peak of the refugee crisis in 2015 it received 162,877 first-time asylum applications. This intensification of refugee inflow resulted in the introduction of temporary restrictions within Sweden's immigration and asylum policy (Ministry for Justice, 2017), and therefore a reduction in the numbers of refugees entering the country. In 2016 and 2017, the number of applications was reduced to only 28,939 and 25,666, respectively (Migrationsverket, 2017). Taking these numbers into consideration, as well as the legal changes introduced by the government, it is evident that the refugee crisis caused Sweden to react to new challenges to its international image and position caused by the intense influx of refugees.

The aim of this article is to investigate and analyze potential changes in Sweden's image policy and international communication strategy in light of the refugee crisis. The research is based on several research questions: Can we observe any changes within the image policy or communication strategy of Sweden that were caused by the refugee crisis? If any changes were made to Sweden's image policy and external communications, what are the main objectives of such changes?

METHOD

In order to find answers to the research questions listed above, an analysis of the most significant government documents was conducted. The selected documents included statements, information, and guidelines from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as well as documents and branding and promotional strategies from the Ministry for Justice. Documents from both the present and past were used. This allowed for the observation of changes in image policy and communication patterns. Additionally, in order to answer the question concerning potential changes in the perceptions of Sweden and its international position, an analysis of chosen branding and soft power rankings was conducted. The author decided

to select the following four rankings: Nation Brands Index, Country RepTrak, The Good Country Index, and Soft Power 30, as these are some of the most recognizable and reputable rankings. Country Brand Index was not included due to the time frame – the last ranking encompasses the 2014–2015 period, and therefore it lacks the most current data that would allow us to assess the potential influence of the migration crisis. One of the most significant studies included in this analysis is the Swedish Institute's report concerning the influence of the refugee crisis on the image of Sweden.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Modern states notice the need to manage their international image, as positive perceptions of a state can contribute to the state reaching its political, economic, and cultural goals (Kaneva, 2011; Melissen, 2005; Dinnie, 2016). According to Peter van Ham (2001), having a bad reputation or none at all can be a serious handicap for a state that wishes to be significant in the international arena. Therefore, image and reputation became significant elements of state's strategies. In a globalized world there is no time for in-depth analysis of information, therefore perceptions of other states or nations are based mostly on clichés or stereotypes that shape opinions and influence decision-making process to much extent (Anholt, 2007). The main methods of image management are related to public diplomacy and nation branding. James Pamment outlines soft power concept and development communication encompassing development aid as well, when talking about politics of image (Pamment & Wilkins, 2018). Both share the same goal – to promote a certain and desirable image of a state – though they have different origins and use different tools. Nation branding derives from marketing and serves mostly economic goals, while public diplomacy is mostly related to building cultural relations and serving political goals (Melissen, 2013). What is more, both branding and public diplomacy are complementary as they are both aimed at foreign publics and foreign perceptions are a base for their actions. Therefore, when nation branding and public diplomacy are used together, they can be perceived as complementary tools for managing a state's image and, through this, attracting other societies, companies, students, investors, etc., and enhancing a state's international position. Providing long term approach in both areas is one of the conditions of effective image management (Melissen, 2005). However, in case of branding strategies, when faced with unexpected

circumstances, they can be perceived as an *ad hoc* tool of responding to potential challenges or threats.

We can identify many stakeholders engaged in promoting a certain vision of a state and engaged in conducting the image policy. Those are ministries, cultural institutions, agencies, trade boards and chambers, interest groups, NGOs and companies, just to name a few (Anholt, 2007). Image policy allows to coordinate their actions, at least to some extent, and create more coherent strategy of building state's image and reputation. The main difference between public diplomacy and nation branding is that the first is more about building and maintaining positive relations with other actors, while latter about projecting identity (Melissen, 2005).

The idea of soft power is inseparably related to nation branding and public diplomacy. The concept of soft power resources is widely defined by Joseph Nye (2004) and is significant in the light of the refugee crisis, as Sweden is one of the most popular destination countries among refugees. The core resources that are used in the branding of Sweden are convergent with the aspects attracting migrants – mostly related to social aspects and society in general, e.g., the welfare state, tolerance, egalitarianism, etc. Therefore, image management will be of extreme importance in the time of intensified migrations in Europe. In spite of an already established and well-functioning system of nation branding and public diplomacy, Sweden is facing new challenges concerning effective international communication, especially when it is willing to discourage rather than attract migrants. Such aspects of both nation branding and public diplomacy have not yet been well analyzed.

IMAGE POLICY IN TIMES OF REFUGEE CRISIS

Sweden has been building its international image since the interwar period, before the terms branding and public diplomacy were even used. However, the official branding of Sweden did not begin until the 1990s, when the Council for the Promotion of Sweden Abroad was established. It entered a new level when Simon Anholt and Mark Leonard engaged themselves in building Sweden's brand. Their work resulted in introducing the first Swedish brand platform built on the uniform Swedish identity and supported by regularly analyzing the image of Sweden. The strategy for the promotion of Sweden that was introduced in 2014 focused on displaying certain parts of the Swedish identity to make them

the most influential and recognizable abroad. Additionally, a visual identity has been added to the branding strategy based on the national flag and colors as a strengthening factor (Söderhavet, 2014). The core areas of Swedish identity included society, innovation, sustainability, and creativity. Society is therefore presented abroad as based on human rights and equal opportunities and gender equality. Advanced welfare and broad social security are the aspects to be highlighted (Government Offices of Sweden, 2014). The core idea is to attract talent and investments through social security and stable economy, however, especially welfare state can work as an incentive for migrants and refugees. Other profile areas best describing and promoting Sweden are innovation, where Sweden is presented as one of the most innovative countries in the world with world-leading innovations within automotive industry, sustainability encompassing – among others – green buildings, battery driven vehicles, renewable energy use and characteristic bond between society and nature. Creativity is the last profile area. Here creative industries are listed, especially film, music, design and fashion (Government Offices of Sweden, 2014). From the perspective of refugee crisis, the society profile area seems to be of great significance as it encompasses characteristics of Swedish society that can attract migrants. The aim of promotion strategy was to create a consistent message concerning Sweden. The image which was supposed to be created with the use of strategy was exhibiting Sweden as an open and innovative society being a hub for innovation and co-creation. Creating such image of Sweden was significant for achieving political objectives, promoting trade, attracting investment, tourists and talent, and encouraging cultural and scientific exchange. All of these elements for the promotion of Sweden abroad have been sustained in the newest strategy, which was proposed in the middle of 2017, following the most intense period of the refugee crisis in Europe (Government Offices of Sweden, 2017a). Although theoretically the content of communicated areas and core values did not change, different dimensions of those were highlighted. Sweden is supposed to be communicated as development-oriented country and the Swedish model is showed more in terms of contributing to economic growth and stability as well as innovativeness rather than social security. Also the aims of the strategy changed slightly with the special focus on current challenges of negative rumors and outright information, especially concerning the aspects of migration and integration (Government Offices of Sweden, 2017a).

Since 2014 parliamentary elections, Sweden has been ruled by a center-left coalition with the dominant position of the Swedish Social Democratic Party

(SAP), which declared its positive attitude towards refugees, appealing to human rights and moral responsibility. However, the third parliamentary party is the Sweden Democrats (SD), with social support reaching almost 20% in November 2015 (Statistiska Centralbyrån, 2016). The party of the Sweden Democrats is the only far-right and nationalist party in Sweden. Since the strategy for Sweden's brand is based on the idea of "Open Sweden", it came to no surprise that when migration started to intensify, Sweden, along with Germany, declared its openness and willingness to provide support for refugees. However, when the Swedish asylum system and integration system turned out to be unprepared and ineffective in the face of such an intense inflow of refugees, the government decided on a U-turn concerning Sweden's openness towards newcomers (Witte & Faiola, 2016). Legal changes within immigration and asylum policies were introduced by the government, which seems to clash with the image policy of presenting Sweden as an open and tolerant country. Such dissonance can have a prominent influence on perceptions of Sweden abroad. The crisis of tolerance both in society and among politicians can be observed as the electorate of SD has grown along with the influx of refugees. Also, the government decided to initiate border controls and a restricted asylum policy, including, among other things, limiting the possibilities for achieving residence permits and using family reunification procedures. What is more, even Magdalena Andersson, the Minister for Finance, admitted that Sweden made a mistake by accepting so many refugees and that the integration system in Sweden is not functioning effectively (Olsson, 2017).

The threats to Sweden's image as an open country stemming from the refugee crisis are hard to ignore and are noticed in Sweden. In one of his studies, James Pamment interviewed senior advisors and heads of departments responsible for Sweden's image policy. One of the senior representatives of the Swedish Institute indicated that: "Sweden is no longer what the nation perceives itself to be; i.e. open, tolerant, and with strong focus on the right to asylum. Instead, we are perceived as closing our borders" (Pamment, Olofsson, Hjorth-Jenssen, 2017). Such a statement is evidence for the impact that the refugee crisis has on Sweden and its international image. Taking into consideration the importance attached to having a strong nation brand (www.se.se), at least some changes within the promotion strategy should be introduced in order to mitigate problems related to such dissonance between the written promotion and branding strategy and the actual actions of decision makers.

One of the means for softening the negative reception of legal changes within Sweden's asylum policy is to highlight other aspects of Swedish openness.

Therefore, Sweden refused to change one of the core values that contribute to its identity and nation brand. Open Sweden is still an element in the construction of Sweden's image abroad, though it is used in different terms than before. The aspects of free trade, openness to innovativeness, and contributing to the creation of a global marketplace of ideas play a leading role in Sweden's current communication with the external environment, moving the focus away from welfare, tolerance, openness, and egalitarianism (Interview, 2017). The statement of a UD-KOM representative presented below seems to confirm this new communication strategy: "Naturally, in the situation that emerged, our government had to take certain decisions to control the situation, but that does not mean that our core values are not still there. There are other ways in which we are open [...] such as free trade [...]" (Pamment, Olofsson, Hjorth-Jenssen, 2017). After the migration crisis hit Europe, the image of Sweden changed. However, this change was not necessarily as significant as many may have expected. For instance, in two rankings measuring reputation and being a good country, Sweden's ranking dropped from first place to third and sixth place, while in the two following rankings its position did not change. The table below shows how Sweden's position changed during the migration crisis in the chosen rankings:

Table 1. Sweden's positions in chosen rankings 2015–2017

Ranking	Position in 2015	Position in 2016	Position in 2017
Country RepTrak	3	1	3
The Good Country Index	6	1	6
Soft Power 30	9	9	9
Nation Brands Index	-	10	10

Source: Author's elaboration on the basis of chosen rankings.

In 2017, the Swedish Institute decided to conduct a survey concerning the image of Sweden after the migration crisis. In the survey, citizens of seven European countries (Norway, Denmark, Poland, Great Britain, Turkey, Germany, and Hungary) were interviewed and asked questions concerning, among other things, the perception of the Swedish migration policy, Swedish society, Sweden's handling of the migration crisis, and how the media talk about Sweden. The general perception of Swedish migration policy in the past several years as a result of the refugee crisis is not explicit. A large part of the respondents perceived Swedish attitude towards refugees as being open at first, but then restricted (37%). The

second largest group (32%) thought that the Swedish migration policy was open during the whole migration crisis and that Sweden received large numbers of immigrants (*Bilden av Sverige efter Flyktingkrisen*, 2017). Therefore, the opinion concerning changes within the Swedish migration policy seems to be quite valid, as the migration crisis caused the introduction of some restrictions within its migration policy. The respondents were asked if their opinion on Swedish society have changed in the last two years, and more than half (64.4%) declared no change in their perceptions. At the same time, the general opinion of Swedish society was rather good – nearly 70% of the respondents declared positive perceptions (indicating from 5 to 7 on the seven-score scale, where 7 equals ‘very positive’). Changes in perceptions of Swedish society within the last two years were most positive among Germans and least positive among Norwegians (*Bilden av Sverige efter Flyktingkrisen*, 2017). When their similar attitude towards the refugee crisis is taken into consideration, the Germans’ positive perception of Swedish society should not come as a surprise. In contrast, the Norwegian government is rather critical of Swedish migration policy, and its own migration policy is more restrictive (The Local, 2016).

The respondents were asked for their thoughts about the media reporting on Swedish society within the past two years, and 34% of them indicated the migrant crisis as one of the topics in the media influencing the image of Sweden. While immigration was listed in second place among the topics connected with media coverage, only half of the respondents referred to problems caused by immigration. The outcome of the Swedish Institute’s report seems to contradict the interviews conducted by James Pamment. One of the interviewed representatives indicated that the media frequently reported about Sweden’s method of dealing with the refugee crisis in a negative manner, often displaying Sweden on the verge of societal crisis as the result of an asylum policy that was too open (2017). Examples of such media behavior can be seen in articles tackling the phenomenon of sexual harassment during the youth music festival in Stockholm (Sveriges Radio, 2016) or Donald Trump’s statement regarding the open asylum policy in Europe and terrorist attacks, suggesting that even Sweden has such problems (Chan, 2017).

Dealing with disinformation in the international media could be a serious challenge for the Swedish institutions responsible for managing the nation brand or image in general. In dealing with this problem, the opinion of the Minister for Justice, Morgan Johansson, which was published in *The Wall Street Journal* in March 2017, can be considered. He spoke, among other things, about the incor-

rect opinion of Sweden as a country with a high level of crime deriving from a large amount of asylum immigration and associated with the political discourse of the Sweden Democrats Party. He also added: "Sweden has given protection to 143,000 Syrian men, women and children since 2011. We are proud of that, because many of these people might otherwise have perished in Homs or Aleppo. Now these people must get a good start in Sweden. The number of jobs has increased by more than 150,000 since 2014. Unemployment has fallen, growth is high and our public finances are sound" (Government Offices of Sweden, 2017b).

In order to tackle the problem of misinformation in the media, significant changes within the external communication of Sweden were introduced, such as establishing a task force devoted to coordinating migration, including informative and communicative activities. The idea was to provide objective information concerning current legal solutions within the migration and asylum policies. Starting in June 2016, the websites of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, social media channels, and embassies transmitted targeted messages. The targeted groups are people planning to travel to Sweden as asylum seekers. The core idea of ensuring such informational assistance is to prepare potential migrants for what is expected of them in Sweden, especially taking into consideration that their expectations may not be met in reality. A significant nexus within the task force is the Migration Agency, an implementing institution responsible for asylum procedures and one of the most direct platforms providing information for refugees in reception centers (Pamment, 2017).

The Swedish Institute is one of the most significant institutions responsible for managing the image of Sweden. It has become engaged in the task force on migration efforts and it is one of the most active actors managing Sweden's image in the context of the refugee crisis. The crisis forced new initiatives to be undertaken by the Swedish Institute and NSU in order to tackle the problem of the potential worsening of Sweden's image abroad as a result of the refugee crisis. On the platform www.swedes.se, a new short promotional film *This Is Sweden* was published. The film shows different ways of seeing Sweden: generous parental leave, same-sex marriages, quality, innovativeness, sustainability, equality and ethnic diversity, the specifics of the seasons in Sweden, and tourist attractions (Swedish Institute, *This Is Sweden*). This is one of the tools used by Sweden to communicate its core values to the outside world and accentuate all of the positive aspects of the Swedish society and nation.


The platform www.sweden.se is also used in other ways to manage Sweden's image in terms of migration. The phenomenon of migration is highlighted

here as a process that is strongly related to Sweden. The history of migration to Sweden is introduced. What is interesting is that in the introduction to the Sweden and Migration section, the refugee crisis is mentioned as a challenge for Sweden; however, it is necessary to notice the personal stories of refugees and the general complex reality. The integration issue is highlighted as well, as according to data from 2015, every sixth person in the Swedish population was born outside of Sweden (Statistiska Centralbyrån, 2016). Currently, what disturbs Swedes the most and causes intensified integration debate is the growing number of beggars. Another problem deriving from the refugee crisis is the number of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum. In 2015, 35,000 children reached Sweden without parents or legal guardians, and 6,853 children were granted asylum in 2016. The argument given for restrictions within the asylum policy is to limit immigration and therefore find resources needed for providing for the refugees who have already arrived. Another argument for introducing restrictions is not taking responsibility for the refugee crisis and not fulfilling the agreed shares of refugees by other EU countries (*Immigration to Sweden*). In this way, Sweden via the Swedish Institute is trying to explain itself and legitimize its decisions regarding the country's asylum and migration policies. This is done using a double-track approach. The first step is to give information concerning migration traditions to Sweden, showing the country's long tradition of being open, tolerant, and caring. The second step seems to be based on admitting that many challenges and difficulties are caused by such an intense refugee inflow and that the country is unable to deal with those challenges on its own. Such a strategy seems to build a new and authentic image of Sweden in which the tradition of humanitarian aid and compassion are still present but have been adjusted to reflect the new reality.

Sweden still wants to be perceived as a country that is ready to support those seeking asylum in spite of the legal changes introduced by the government. One method of such an image policy is to show that Sweden and its government are still open for refugees and recognize their problems, fears, and expectations. In order to show the human face of the refugee crisis, a special project has been introduced called *Portraits of Migration*. The project encompasses the histories of twenty different people forced to leave their countries and flee to Sweden. They share their stories, reasons for migration, and their journey to Sweden, often describing the trauma they have endured (*Portraits of Migration*). The idea of showing the refugee crisis and refugees themselves in more human manner is also realized within MIG Talks, which is one of the tools allowing for a discussion

on migration and the refugee crisis. Additionally, a conference scenario with the same name (MIG Talks) has been elaborated in order to initiate a dialogue about migration and integration. Such a conference event provides an opportunity for exchanging information, experiences, and different perspectives on migration between newcomers, inhabitants, and public actors. There are manuals, discussion templates, communication plans, and visual materials available for those who are interested in organizing such event (www.sharingsweden.se). The Swedish Institute has additionally created a website, www.sharingsweden.se, where public actors can download many different ready-to-use promotional materials, in addition to the MIG Talks materials, that support Sweden's external communication and spread knowledge concerning Sweden abroad. Here, visual materials concerning the brand of Sweden, famous Swedes, society and welfare, tourism, education, sustainability, freedom, innovation, culture, gender equality, creativity, and many others can be found. Within aspects related to migration, special materials needed for organizing the *Portraits of Migration* exhibition have been prepared by the Swedish Institute. The first exhibition was organized in Tallinn in May 2017 at the Museum of Occupations.

Additional efforts have been undertaken by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which first prepared a guideline for public diplomacy in 2012 (*Offentlig diplo-*



Picture 1. The exhibition at the Museum of Occupations in Tallinn, Estonia

Source: www.sharingsweden.se; photo: Mona Loose.

mati: Vägledning och checklista, 2013), and in 2017 prepared a potential guide including questions concerning communication within public diplomacy, such as the usage of social media, visual identity, and relations with the media (*Checklista för kommunikationsfrågor vid utlandsmyndigheterna*, 2017).

CONCLUSIONS

Taking into consideration the considerably long tradition of image policy in Sweden, both in terms of public diplomacy and branding strategies, it is no surprise that the refugee crisis resulted in some changes within Sweden's communication and image patterns. The biggest challenge to Sweden's international image and position seems to be the visible contradiction between the image of Sweden as an open, tolerant, and caring country and the actual steps undertaken by the government through legal changes to its migration and asylum policies.

It is hard to emphasize how and if Sweden's image has changed. Ranking outcomes do not give a clear and explicit answer concerning the current position of Sweden. In some rankings, Sweden's outcome worsened between 2016 and 2017 (Country RepTrak and The Good Country Index), while it remained unchanged in others (Soft Power 30 and Nation Brands Index). Also, a study conducted by the Swedish Institute in 2017 did not show a significant change in respondents' opinions concerning Sweden in light of the refugee crisis. Nevertheless, the topic of migration, integration, and the refugee crisis did occur in the respondents' answers, especially as the topic present in media coverage and therefore one that influences the image of Sweden in the media. Negative way of presenting Sweden in the media and reporting false information concerning the country's domestic situation and suggesting that the polarization of Swedish society and social unrest are growing seem to be the most significant threats to Sweden's brand and reputation.

The country's external image and nation brand have been in construction since the interwar period. They have existed, to a great extent, on the basis of both the welfare state, social justice, tolerance, and openness (Marklund, 2013; Musiał, 2002). Current legal changes within the migration and asylum policies have resulted in – at least partial – closing of this state. Such a situation is contradictory to the branding strategy and the image that Swedes are willing to sustain. As a result, new forms of external communication have been established – a special task force consisting of, among other things, the Swedish Institute,

new forms and platforms for communicating the current Swedish legal system and its migration and asylum policy, accentuating the human face of migration by organizing informational and social campaigns, and organizing events that provide opportunities for discussing different aspects of migration. All of the changes introduced after the peak of the refugee crisis aimed to explain the reasons for the adjustments made within the migration policy while also accentuating the fact that Sweden was still one of the European states accepting large numbers of refugees. The main improvements in the branding strategy and public diplomacy concerned organizational and institutional changes. The core elements of the branding strategy did not change significantly – the basic values and profile areas stayed unchanged in comparison to the previous branding strategy. What is interesting in the new communication patterns in Sweden is that most of the efforts concentrate mostly on creating tools and mechanisms that are useful for institutions engaged in Sweden's branding or communications process, e.g., embassies. Therefore, ready-to-use promotional materials, instructions, and scenarios for promotional and informative events have been prepared and made available on www.sharingsweden.se for all actors, both public and private, interested in promoting Sweden in a broader sense.

At the same time, it is worth mentioning that the last two branding strategies particularly highlight aspects such as an innovative and creative society while also minimizing the focus on aspects of the welfare state. In an interview with the director of the Department of Intercultural Dialogue at the Swedish Institute, a suggestion was made that Sweden is trying to slightly modify its international profile. According to the Swedish Institute representative, Sweden is mostly associated with its welfare state, the third way or Swedish model, and underestimated in the fields of innovativeness, creativity, and sustainability, which are the new focus areas for the country's branding and communication strategies (Interview, 2017). Such a shift in the elements highlighted in the strategy may suggest that Swedish authorities do not want to focus solely on aspects that are attractive to migrants, especially those connected with the wide social support of the state. Trying to dissemble or at least avoid accentuating aspects that are attractive to migrants may be a very natural method of discouraging them from coming to Sweden or at least limiting immigration.

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POLEXIT NARRATIVE: A CASE STUDY IN TERMS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

NARRACJA POLEXIT – STUDIUM PRZYPADKU W ZAKRESIE KOMUNIKACJI POLITYCZNEJ

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ABSTRACT

The issue of researching a narrative in terms of political communication, still being discussed by political sciences as a phenomenon classified between media science and political science, has become a challenging field. Mainly due to political reality, where a word “narrative” has emerged as a very common one. The Polesxit narrative, a fairly new political phrase, is an example of it. Taking a narrative into account in research of political science might be fascinating not only in terms of methodology itself, but in terms of real political consequences, including the EU-Poland relationships. So that, the questions here are how to study a narrative in relation to politics, and how a created story – here in case of a hypothetical Polesxit and not infrequently soaked with generics and populism – influences political reality, including the misunderstanding of the European integration process.

Keywords: political communication; narrative; Polesxit; the EU–Poland relationship; political struggle

ABSTRAKT

Kwestia badania narracji w ramach komunikacji politycznej, będąca wciąż przedmiotem dyskusji w naukach politycznych jako zjawisko wciśnięte pomiędzy nauki o mediach i nauki o polityce, stała się ciekawym wyzwaniem. Głównie z powodu rzeczywistości politycznej, w której słowo „narracja” stało się dość powszechne. Przykładem tego jest narracja polesxitu, stosunkowo nowa fraza polityczna. Uwzględnienie narracji w badaniach politycznych może być fascynujące nie tylko pod względem metodologii, ale również pod względem realnych konsekwencji politycznych, w tym relacji między Unią Europejską a Polską. W związku z tym warto podjąć próbę odpowiedzi na dwa pytania: jak badać narrację w odniesieniu do polityki oraz jak stworzona opowieść – tutaj w przypadku hipotetycznego polesxitu i nierzadko nasiąknięta ogólnikami i populizmem – wpływa na polityczną rzeczywistość, w tym na nierozumienie procesu integracji europejskiej.

Słowa kluczowe: komunikacja polityczna; narracja; polesxit; relacje UE–Polska; walka polityczna

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INTRODUCTION

Narratology, as a field primarily concerned as associated with literature, has been increasingly discussed as a research method implemented in political communication. An attempt to bring narratology closer to the theory of political communication has not been a simple task, especially due to some sceptical political scientists. But the fact is that in political cycle a word “narrative” has emerged as a common word, a word from non-literal areas of research. Undertaking research is more tempting due to the fact that the term ‘Polexit narrative’ is – from the scientific point of view – a fairly new phenomenon, especially interesting for a political scientist, who is increasingly required to present a broad, interdisciplinary research approach, and who is aware of potential criticism from traditional political scientists. While researching narrative we may find some references to theories concerning political science: constructivism as an interpretative approach, defining the study of way of thinking about both political phenomena and political statements; the sovereignty as a social construction; politicians’ activity on the basis of behaviourism; and finally the theory of the European integration (Czaputowicz, 2008). It, again, demonstrates the need to maintain a broad, interdisciplinary approach to the subject of this study.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

According to J.H. Kołodziej (Kołodziej, 2017), I assumed that political narrative is a certain content which contains information and assessments of selected events, political actors and their actions, which dynamically change the reality; this content is expressed through a story in a way that lets one impose a framework of its interpretation and of its understanding. It is a cognitive meta-category that combines various elements into a whole and so that let us understand the political reality.

To research the Polexit narrative, I took into account both Gerard Genette typology (Genette, 1980) and J.H. Kołodziej’s assumptions (Kołodziej, 2017). I considered elements typical for narrative means, such as mood, instance, levels, and time (Guillemette & Lévesque, 2006), but I implemented them to politics. Recognizing the importance of the experts’ opinions (often used in politicians’ activities) and the importance of public opinion (creating stories adequate to social moods), I proposed additional research. They might be implemented in case these elements appear in relation to a studied narrative.

Table 1. Political Narrative as a Cognitive Meta-category – General Framework

Research topic	Political institutions and political actors Media institutions			
Subject of analysis	Communication behaviour of political actors, content of political statements and programmes Content of media messages			
Created story	Information and assessments of selected events and political actors and their activities			
Elements analyzed	Distance and functions of the narrator	Narrative voice, perspective and time of narration	Embedded narrative and metalepsis	Narrative order and speed, frequency of events
	<ul style="list-style-type: none">– direct speech: the quotes of official political statements, interviews, short statements for media– indirect speech: paraphrased statements, describing statements for other media– the narrator tells, comments, assesses	<ul style="list-style-type: none">– present/absent in a story,– time: past, present, future, mixed,– the level of knowledge of the narrator	<ul style="list-style-type: none">– a basic story/a story in a story,– breaching of narrative levels	<ul style="list-style-type: none">– relationship between an event and talking about it,– relationship between the duration of an event and talking about it,– number of stories of an event/events
Social interpretation and understanding	Message resulting from the story			
Additional research				
Experts institutions	Content of experts opinions implemented into political statements (if there are any)			
Society attitude towards information and assessments of selected events and political actors	Results of public opinion polls (useful also in the analysis of a message resulting from the story)			

Source: own concept based on G. Genette typology and J.H. Kołodziej's assumptions, <http://www.signosemio.com/genette/narratology.asp>.

HYPOTHESIS, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODS

The political narrative about the EU-Poland relationship in terms of some difficult issues, such as migrant crisis and humanitarian aid or the sovereignty of the state and judicial system (a content), caused that the Polesxit narrative permanently entered the language of the public debate (events, political actors and their actions). Even if it could be described – so far – as abstractive and based on the politically emotional case of the UK (a story), it found fertile ground including a general negative attitude towards the EU and some difficult challenges the EU has to face. Conducting an inappropriate story aimed at reinforcing these negative opinions of “the sovereign” may lead to a misunderstanding of the integration process, its benefits, but also challenges, including sacrifices, concessions and inconveniences; and when it comes to the case of “exit” – it may lead to the irreversible consequences of this society’s decision (imposing a framework of interpretation and understanding). And it certainly will not be beneficial for the perception of Poland in the EU environment.

With this hypothesis I created some research questions: What Polesxit narrative results from the analysis of official political statements and selected media messages? How is it created by the ruling party, and how by the opposition? What is the significance of the Poles’ opinion about the EU membership and is this narrative to lead to change this opinion? What might it cause in the future?

Within case study method, I aimed at confirming or not the hypothesis that the political narrative of Polesxit, even if it is the form of political struggle, may lead to misunderstanding of integration processes and to negative perception of Poland. I assumed that the narrative concerning Polesxit was mainly co-created by the policy and the interests of Poland’s right-wing government. I also took into account the Polish opposition’s narrative, as well as the Polish society’s attitude towards the EU, its challenges, and a hypothetical Polesxit – all as additionally significant in the whole matter. As a background for my considerations, I analysed official political programme of the ruling party and some official political statements concerning Polish foreign policy tasks. To answer research questions completely and comprehensively I analysed some media messages from both pro-government media and not, assuming and realizing that the domain of contemporary media is the mutual citation and that official political statements are often the base for creating media reports.

As Polish society is the main recipient of messages in the Polesxit case, I used the Google search engine to find sources of the word “Polesxit” in domestic media.

While collecting data, I divided the sources into pro-government media and not, and then the politicians' statements of the ruling party and the opposition – so that I managed to have a balanced analysis of the narrative and to keep research objectivity. Media reports referred to poll results, so that is how I could quite easily find another data. All within the assumptions that as well as for me, the materials were supposed to be accessible for the Polish society.

The research period was 2018 as it was the hottest time for the EU and the UK negotiations on Brexit (it revved the discussion about other “exits”), as well as it was the time when the EU–Poland relationships have significantly deteriorated (hard scuffles about migrants and humanitarian aid, the case of the judicial system in Poland). However, I also referred to earlier materials to show that the problem was increasing, and that the adoption of a particular research period was imposed due to some facts mentioned above, but also to maintain research discipline.

THE BASIS OF POLISH GOVERNMENT'S NARRATIVE

Jacek Czaputowicz, the Foreign Minister, emphasized in his speech on foreign policy tasks in 2018 that the EU membership brought Poland many benefits: economic, political, social, and that a strong EU was Poland's goal (Czaputowicz, 2018). “We are a part of the EU” – said on another occasion, and with conviction, the Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki (Morawiecki, 2018b). During the 27th Economic Forum in Krynica, the Polish President highlighted that Poland was happy about its presence in the EU and that Poland wanted to be stronger in the EU and wanted the EU to be stronger (Duda, 2018). Also the Minister of Investment and Development declared that we were in the Union and we wanted to be in the Union (Kwieciński, 2018). Finally, this was generally confirmed by Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the ruling party, who said (a couple of times) that we wanted to be in the European Union and that the fact of real belonging to Europe was a membership in the EU (Kaczyński, 2018).

This general narrative corresponded to the assumptions of national European policy, which – being somewhere at the interface between domestic politics and foreign policy – concerned the functioning of certain rules and law, but also certain political, social and cultural visions (Dulak, 2017). It indeed enabled a broad understanding of integration processes, and the word “but” might have become crucial in the whole matter.

POLISH "BUT" VS. HYPOTHETICAL "EXIT"

Firstly, according to the ruling party's political programme published before the elections in 2015, the principal goal of Poland's foreign policy would be restoration of the subjectivity of the state in international relations. What does it mean when the EU membership is mentioned? This membership should be "treated as a tool to realize Polish national interests", and "not as the end of Polish subjectivity". The EU should be an organization of sovereign state members, not a federal state (PiS, 2014). Thus a reflection of this approach might be found in many political statements, interviews and speeches – all that created the narrative of the ruling party. J. Czaputowicz also confirmed that point of view when delivering his speech on foreign policy tasks: "Guaranteeing national independence and sovereign statehood is Poland's natural reason of State" (Czaputowicz, 2018). The Prime Minister suggested that the ruling party wanted Poland's presence in the European Union, but "on the principles of full sovereignty and independence", and the Polish President asked whether the EU imposes too much on the countries that belong to this organization (Morawiecki, 2018b; Wprost.pl, 2016). On another occasion he even talked about the EU as "the community from which there are little results for us" (Duda, 2018).

Besides that, the EU–Poland relationships have – not only in words – deteriorated in recent years, mainly due to some controversial reforms enacted in Poland by the ruling party Law and Justice (PiS). The reform of the judicial system in Poland led the EU to the commencement of the implementation procedure of the Article 7 (it can be used against Poland as a member state with a risk of "breach of the rule of law"). The European Commission decided to take Poland to the Court of Justice of the European Union over this judiciary reform. It caused an avalanche of comments, including some negative ones and addressed to the EU. Wanting to cool down the already cold EU–Poland relationships a bit, the Foreign Minister assured us that his country would not ignore the ruling of the EU Court of Justice (Morawiecki, 2018a). Notwithstanding his words, it is important to quote his previous point of view: "The European Commission is not a supra-government, and the European Parliament is not a supra-parliament empowered to instruct national governments and parliaments" (Morawiecki, 2018).

At the same time, other PiS politicians presented different opinions, including suggestions to ignore the Court of Justice's decision. What is more, some of them claimed that Brussels had no right to interfere in Poland's internal affairs

and that the European Commission took responsibility for the “development of actions” between Warsaw and Brussels (Newsweek.pl, 2018; Koduj24.pl, 2016; Onet.pl, 2017).

Secondly, as a member of the EU, Poland is a donor of development aid. The majority of Polish assistance is channeled multilaterally, including flows through the EU budget. As Poland was not in favour of deeper integration in all the EU policies, development cooperation was mentioned as an unquestionable area for expanding cooperation (MFA, 2015). The problem has arisen – only or until – in the discussion of issues related to development, such as migrant crisis.

Even though mass migration has become a bone of contention in the entire EU, Poland has shown quite significant non-solidarity attitude within its narrative. There were various arguments to refuse relocation: they were not refugees, but illegal immigrants; they were dangerous to our citizens; Poland had accepted many immigrants/refugees from Ukraine, they were terrorists, supporting them was very expensive, it is better to support them in their countries and places where they live. But some stronger words were also spoken. “Muslim refugees will Islamize Poland”, “It’s not a knock at the door, it’s just forcing them”, “Take them all to Germany!”, “This is a cattle and should be treated like a cattle” (about immigrants), “Immigrants can bring unknown diseases”, “These people can’t be civilized” (Dziennik.pl, 2017; Dachnij, 2018; Strzałkowski, 2018).

This narrative was so strong and full of non-solidarity in its overtones that it covered some facts that could have been favourable for the government. According to its declaration, Poland was supposed to increase its humanitarian aid. Indeed, in 2017 it amounted to almost 174 million PLN and compared to the previous year it was an increase of 46%. The plan for 2018 was about doubling Polish humanitarian aid (a report on it is supposed to be published in September 2019; Wgospodarce.pl, 2018; Money.pl, 2018).

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE RULING PARTY AND THE OPPOSITION

As far as it concerned Polexit, politicians of the ruling party claimed that the idea they wanted Polexit to happen was as preposterous as they would aspire to “solar system exit” (Tarczyński, 2018). Simultaneously they sharply and strongly criticized the opposition, claiming that it unleashed more hysteria and created a narrative just to threaten citizens. According to PiS’s narrative, the opposition

dreamed that PiS would like to leave the EU and all the fuss around Polesxit was only the opposition's will to create "a clamour" (Dorzeczy.pl, 2018; Wpolarityce.pl, 2018; Newsweek.pl, 2018).

Undoubtedly, the opposition has implemented Polesxit into its narrative, and suggested that the government wanted to lead Poland out of the EU. It was said that the European policy of the current government was leading Poland to a chasm, Polesxit would cause a lot of tragedy, Poland was drifting towards the East and its self-destruction was coming; Poland has been becoming the pariah of Europe and the EU could not be fooled by the marionette dance of the PiS government (Tokfm.pl, 2018).

POLITICS EXPRESSES THE WILL OF THE "SOVEREIGN"

The Polish government claimed that its decisions and actions were an expression of the will of the majority of the society, called in practice "the sovereign" (Polskatimes.pl, 2016). That is the reason why I decided to implement polls results into this particular research, expecting interesting results concerning narrative. And indeed, an analysis of this "will" identified both some facts and some discrepancies. Knowledge of them might make it possible to understand such and not a different narrative, created for political purposes.

Poles, like the citizens of other Eastern Europe countries, claimed that they do not want to leave the European Union. In Poland, depending on polls results presented by different research centres, between 70 and 88 percent of its citizens supported EU membership (Forsal.pl; Szpyrka, 2018). What is interesting, is that Poles' support for the EU was definitely higher than the EU average.

According to Poles' opinions on the most urgent topics that the EU should be focused on, development (as well as economy) was in the second position. They confirmed this tendency also in other polls: to the question: Should Poland support developing countries?, the majority of them answered: yes, it should (Szpyrka, 2018; TNS Polska, 2015). Where is this "but" then?

Well, when the majority of Poles declared they did not want the euro currency, it seemed that it could be the biggest bone of contention in the EU–Poland relationship. But mass migration quickly proved something different. The vast majority of Poles (71% of those surveyed) did not agree to accept immigrants from Muslim Countries, and they were against their obligatory relocation. Being aware of the fact that Poland lacks hands to work, they were willing to accept

Ukrainians, but not people from Africa or the Middle East. Besides, if they were about accepting anyone from abroad at all, instead of immigrants they preferred repatriates (Dorzeczy.pl, 2017; Rp.pl, 2017; Typinfo.pl; Natemat.pl, 2013).

When it was about the EU–Poland conflict in the context of the implementation of Article 7, Polish society was divided. According to the survey conducted on behalf of *Rzeczpospolita*, one of the biggest opinion-making daily newspapers in Poland, 48% of the respondents believed that the blame lies with the Polish government, 21% – that the EU bears the blame, and 24% – that they both share the blame. These results were compatible with political preferences of Poles (Dąbrowska, 2018).

The “Sovereign” also appeared in the mouths of PiS’s politicians in the context of Brexit, which – in some points of view – showed that Europeans no longer wanted the Union like that before. Besides, the Polish President asked (rather rhetorically) whether the EU worked in a non-democratic way, taking decisions arbitrarily in Brussels without consulting them with citizens. He paid his respects to the Prime Minister of the UK for making a decision to announce a referendum on Brexit. Moreover, when it is about the entire EU, PiS’s opinion was clearly presented: “The Republic of Poland takes the position that the European Union can be strong only thanks to the real support of its citizens, who are able to confer a democratic mandate on their elected governments” (Wprost.pl, 2016; polska.pl, 2018).

CONCLUSIONS

Research confirm the thesis that conducting an inappropriate story on the EU–Poland relationship may lead to misunderstanding of the integration process and to irreversible consequences of Poles’ decision in the future, as well as to unbeneficial perception of Poland in the EU environment.

The analysis showed that the Polish political narration was rather populist and/or general than substantive and/or detailed. Undoubtedly it was mainly based on an internal – sometimes very dirty – political rivalry with a word “but” within as a main point of political considerations (a content based on “but” in terms of migrant crisis and humanitarian aid or the sovereignty of the state and judicial system). What is more, it showed both political unpredictability (of political actors and their actions), inconsistency of the narrative (a story), and it was difficult to assess what was more dangerous for further European integration. Especially

that the narrative fell on fertile ground, politicians benefited from the failure of the entire EU as well as from weakening the confidence of many citizens in an integration project; and thus a story could be created. At this stage of political debate it was hard to recognize if the government deliberately had conducted “but” narrative towards the EU (to gradually change Poles’ opinion about the EU membership – a part of imposing a framework of interpretation and understanding), but it certainly brought some social confusion (lack of political cohesion as it was in the case of political opinion on Poland’s accession to the EU before 2004).

Moreover it led to the perception of Poland as the next country to leave the EU (a part of imposing a framework of interpretation and understanding). The opinions about Poland such as: “a country that only takes”, a country with the motto: “take as much as possible, give as little as possible”, and a country that wants the UE to “leave it in peace” (Wyborcza.pl, 2016; Telewizjarepublika.pl, 2017), ceased to be a surprise.

Referring Polesxit narrative to the varieties of political narration proposed by J.H. Kołodziej and its seven criteria, it has been seen that this narrative is multi-faceted (different aspects of the EU–Poland relationships), as well as long-term and forward-looking (it has been conducted since 2015, seems to be continued, it refers to the future), offensive and defensive, tactical (striving to change public opinion), but chaotic and aggressive (strong words, non-diplomatic words), and – what would be treated here as the eighth criterion – saturated with elements of fictional populism, defined as a populism saturated from factual narratives, partially fictionalized, to narrations based on any configuration of untrue and populist elements (Kołodziej, 2017).

The method adopted in the subject may be applied to other political narratives. It would be challenging to analyse it in the case of Polesxit narrative after the elections to European Parliament in May 2019 (the leading politicians of the ruling party are candidates). And interesting when examining the Polesxit narrative in terms of pro-government recipient and not – the results would probably show a political division in Polish society, said to be huge as never before.

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DIPLOMATIC SUBJECTIVITY OF FIFA IN THE CONTEXT OF SELECTING WORLD CUP HOST*

DYPLOMATYCZNA PODMIOTOWOŚĆ FIFA W KONTEKŚCIE
WYBIERANIA GOSPODARZA MISTRZOSTW ŚWIATA
W PIŁCE NOŻNEJ

*Michał Marcin Kobierecki*** 

— ABSTRACT —

The goal of the research was to investigate FIFA, one of the most important international sports organisations, from the perspective of its diplomatic subjectivity. It is a case study concerning the process of selection of the World Cup hosts by FIFA, in reference to the engagement of presidents, prime ministers and other representatives of national authorities of states that hosted FIFA World Cup in bidding for the tournament within last the 30 years. The hypothesis that was verified within the research assumed that through selecting World Cup host FIFA obtains diplomatic subjectivity. This refers to research questions concerning the willingness of state leaders to engage in contacts and negotiations with sports officials and reasons for such engagement.

Keywords: sports diplomacy; sport and politics; FIFA; public diplomacy; diplomacy

— ABSTRAKT —

Celem pracy jest zbadanie jednej z najważniejszych organizacji sportowych, jaką jest FIFA, z perspektywy jej dyplomatycznej podmiotowości. Badanie stanowi studium przypadku poświęcone procesowi wybierania gospodarzy mistrzostw świata w piłce nożnej w kontekście wspierania poszczególnych kandydatur przez prezydentów, premierów i innych przedstawicieli władz państw, którym ostatecznie przyznano organizację mistrzostw świata w ostatnich 30 latach. Hipoteza, która została poddana weryfikacji, zakładała, że poprzez wybieranie gospodarzy mistrzostw świata w piłce nożnej FIFA uzyskuje podmiotowość dyplomatyczną. Wiąże się to z pytaniami badawczymi dotyczącymi gotowości przywódców państwowych do angażowania się w kontakty i negocjacje z działaczami sportowymi oraz przyczyn takiego zaangażowania.

Słowa kluczowe: dyplomacja sportowa; sport i polityka; FIFA; dyplomacja publiczna; dyplomacja

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Contemporary diplomacy is characterised by its diffusion. States are no longer the only diplomatic actors, since a growing role of non-state subjects such as sub-national and regional authorities, international organisations, multinational corporations, celebrities and non-governmental organisations can be observed (Adler-Nissen, 2016). International sports organisations are formally international non-governmental organisations that are not bound with any territory. This type of subjects, together with transnational corporations, are, according to Beata Surmacz (2015), key non-state diplomatic subjects. The goal of the research presented in the article is to investigate the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), one of the most important international sports organisations, from the perspective of its diplomatic subjectivity understood as a capability of becoming the subject of diplomacy, which on the other hand, in case of such actors as international sports organisations, can be assessed on the basis of states' (the primary diplomatic subjects) willingness to engage in diplomatic contacts with them. The purpose of the paper is therefore to analyse if and how representatives of states such as presidents or prime ministers engaged in contacts with FIFA in connection with the selection of the FIFA World Cup host.

The research concerns one of the factors of diplomatic subjectivity of international sports federations (IFs), which is the right to select the hosts of sports events. Others include, for example, decisions to affiliate or not national sports federations, negotiating with other international actors including states, capability of exerting pressure on governments and other states' authorities, etc. When selection of hosts of sports events is considered, the FIFA World Cup belongs to sports mega-events, which can be described as a short lasting events but with social dimension going beyond the time of their occurrence, which offer entertainment for a mass audience (Palmer, 2013). By the example of state leader's engagement in bidding for the World Cup, the research aims to investigate FIFA's diplomatic significance. This refers to research questions concerning the willingness of state leaders to engage in contacts and negotiations with sports officials and reasons for such engagement. The hypothesis to be verified assumes that through selecting the World Cup host FIFA obtains diplomatic subjectivity.

The research refers to modernist approach of the study of international relations, particularly to institutional liberalism and interdependence liberalism. This approach is connected to broadening the field of research and taking into consideration not only states, but other subjects as well. The theoretical concept of multistakeholder diplomacy, represented, for example, by Brian Hocking, was

particularly important for the research. It assumes the complexity of processes connected with pursuing politics, the need for wider cooperation and the engagement of many new actors in diplomatic processes (Beacom, 2012).

The research presented in the article is the case study concerning the process of selection of the World Cup hosts by FIFA, in reference to the engagement of presidents, prime ministers and other representatives of national authorities of the states that hosted the FIFA World Cup in bidding for the tournament in recent years. The research relates to the World Cups that were held since 1994 and will be held in the future but their hosts have been selected already, so the timeframe of the research encompass the period between 1988 (the decision on the 1994 World Cup) and 2018 (decision on the 2026 World Cup). Such timescale allowed to include up to date events and at the same time to make observations concerning numerous bidding processes within previous 30 years. The research referred to winning bids only, as these cases of state authorities' engagements could be retrieved from available sources.

Investigation included observation of the engagement of key state figures in the process of bidding for the event. This included participation or giving a speech during the ceremony of selecting the World Cup hosts, belonging to bidding committees, as well as other forms of lobbying by state leaders such as meeting with FIFA officials or posting on the Internet. The data have been acquired from secondary sources mostly, such as articles in the media or scientific articles or chapters. However, certain primary sources have also been used, such as the FIFA documents.

The presented methodology has been based on the assumption that diplomacy of the non-state actors such as international sports organisations is the spin-off result of the state's public diplomacy. States within their public diplomacy and nation-branding endeavours seek arenas for presenting themselves to the external publics in a desirable way. A sports mega-event such as the FIFA World Cup can be therefore perceived as a good way of promoting a state. IFs are, on the other hand, in possession of those events, which for instance means they have the right to select their hosts. This relation makes IFs the external stakeholders of state's public diplomacy. As a consequence, states within their desire to host sports mega-events become petitioners of the sports organisations and look for their support, thus engaging in contacts and negotiations with IFs, i.e., FIFA, in case of this particular research.

The article refers to the category of sports diplomacy, which is understood differently by various authors. For instance, it can be perceived as a whole range

of international contacts between people connected with sport and politicians, that are motivated by foreign policy concerns and have implications for general relations between states (Merkel, 2016). However, apart from understanding it as a form of state's activity, it can also be perceived as the diplomacy that international sports governing bodies are engaged in. Stuart Murray and Geoffrey Pigman (2014) distinguished a category of *international sport as diplomacy*, by which they meant diplomatic representation, communication and negotiation between non-state actors that take place as a result of ongoing international sporting competition. According to this approach, international non-state sports actors such as the International Olympic Committee or FIFA practice a distinct type of diplomacy which includes undertaking negotiations with governments, local and regional sports organisations, sponsors, media firms and organisations of global civil society. This article obviously refers to this form of sports diplomacy, since an international sports organisation is the main subject of research. Still, its diplomatic subjectivity will be observed in reference to its contacts with states' political authorities.

The state of the art concerning the diplomacy of international sports governing bodies is being developed lately and several valuable research have been published. Most of them, however, refer to the International Olympic Committee. One of the most important works on the issue is Aaron Beacom's book *International Diplomacy and the Olympic Movement: The New Mediators*, in which he employed multistakeholder diplomacy model to analyse the Olympic Games as a diplomatic event on their own right. Other papers worth mentioning are articles by Verity Postlethwaite and Jonathan Grix (2016), or by Steve Jackson and Marcelle Dawson (2017). Among the studies dedicated to FIFA as a diplomatic actor, papers by Christiane Eisenberg (2005), or Heidrun Homburg (2006) should be mentioned. These and similar investigations, although valuable, are not very numerous and there still remains a number of gaps in the state of the art. The available research concerning the diplomacy of FIFA tends to focus on its role concerning state's attempts to use membership in IFs to foster international and national legitimisation. As for the selection of the World Cup hosts, authors tend to focus on bribery scandals and lack of transparency. Presented research aims to fill one of the gaps and to analyse the diplomacy of FIFA from an explicitly political science perspective.

THE PROCEDURE OF SELECTING WORLD CUP HOST

Before moving to the main analysis, in order to fully understand the FIFA diplomacy concerning selection of the World Cup hosts, it is important to review the selection procedure. The FIFA World Cup is a sports mega-event under the ultimate control of FIFA. The decision on the venue is made by FIFA – the supreme authority of FIFA comprised of member associations, each having one vote. Another FIFA body engaged in the bidding process is the Council, consisting of the FIFA President, 8 vice-presidents, and 28 other members. The Council issues specific regulations for establishment of the bidding procedure, reviews the bids and submits up to three of them to Congress for the final decision (FIFA, 2018). In theory, the process is ultimately democratic, although it has been changed lately, partly in response to numerous bribery scandals within FIFA.

Previously the decision on the World Cup host was made by the Executive Committee (EC) – 24-member predecessor of the FIFA Council. The procedure was changed after the controversial selection of Russia and Qatar as the World Cup hosts in 2018 and 2022 respectively (Becker, 2013). The goal of the article is to assess how FIFA played a role of a diplomatic actor through selecting the hosts of the World Cup, it will mostly relate to the previous bidding rules. However, since the Council remains active within the selection process, the situation will probably remain similar in the context of FIFA's diplomacy. The changes FIFA underwent were supposed to tackle bribery, not the diplomatic capabilities.

While selecting the hosts of the World Cup, FIFA is supposedly focused on organisational capabilities. According to FIFA Statutes, the decision on the venue “aims to achieve the objective of securing the best possible hosting conditions in the host country” (FIFA, 2018, p. 61). This is also connected to the expectation of political engagement by the state, as formally it is the member association, not the government, that bids for the World Cup. Nevertheless, FIFA officially declares in its bidding instructions that “the broad support and acceptance by the main political parties, further stakeholders and organs in the Host Country and the Host City Authorities in each of the Host Cities, together with the strategy, vision and related objectives of the Government as reflected in its Government Vision Statements” is regarded as an important factor for success in bidding for the World Cup (FIFA. *Structure...*). The fact that FIFA, a sports non-governmental organization, expects declarations of support from political subjects has a diplomatic significance on its own merit. Accordingly, with the understanding of sports diplomacy as a diplomacy with sports organizations

as its actors, it engages governments (primary diplomatic subjects) and other political actors in communications, negotiations and generally contacts with FIFA. Interestingly, these relations are asymmetrical, with governments acting as sports organizations' petitioners.

The brief review of the FIFA World Cup selection procedure reveals to some extent how the whole process works. The decision, which in many cases is very important for states and their governments, is made by a number of sports officials from different countries. Today it belongs to a wider group of delegations from virtually every country, while in the past it was in hands of few FIFA leaders. However, despite recent changes within FIFA aimed at democratisation of the procedure and securing greater transparency, the system remains blurred with strong position of the FIFA President and other leaders. This situation obviously makes FIFA President an object of states' endeavours and treating him similarly as a diplomatic representative of a state.

POLITICAL LEADERS' ENGAGEMENT IN BIDDING FOR THE FIFA WORLD CUP

The first FIFA World Cup included in the research refers to the tournament held in the United States in 1994. Selection of the host was a surprise since the country is not regarded as a "football nation", but FIFA is believed to have wanted to support development of football in the US. What is more, the country already had non-sports infrastructure and the available stadiums were easy to adjust for the needs of football matches (Nadel, 2014). Although in the US sport does not belong to the explicit sphere of interest of the federal government, American President Ronald Reagan backed American bid with videotaped two-minute speech which was broadcasted to the EC (Lewis, 2015). The direct support or lobbying for the American bid by the members of American federal administration was rather limited then, however still visible.

The state leaders were much more engaged in bidding for the FIFA World Cup held in France in 1998. Interestingly, the event had an explicit nation branding and public diplomacy objective for France. The tournament was intended to showcase French industry and high technology including construction, high speed TGV trains, telecommunications, etc., and to stimulate investments and tourism, although internal political goals were also visible, such as associating national and local politicians with a major world event (Dauncey & Hare, 1999).

As to the national leaders' engagement in backing French bid, earlier the Prime Minister and at the time of FIFA's decision the mayor of Paris Jacques Chirac was very active, which included direct negotiations with FIFA President João Havelange. French President François Mitterrand was also engaged and awarded Havelange with highest French order Legion of Honour. It was interpreted as an attempt to counter Noble Peace Prize nomination by the Swiss – an incentive by another bidder for the World Cup (Sugden & Tomlinson, 2017). A much more proactive stance of French political leaders in backing the French World Cup bid could therefore be observed comparing to the previous World Cup. Interestingly, the 1998 tournament had much more explicit public diplomacy and nation-branding goals than the one in 1994. It should also be mentioned that in European states, governmental engagement in elite sport is more direct than in the US, which could also be the reason.

The situation before the host of the 2002 World Cup was selected was extraordinary. The bidding process could be described by a fierce competition between South Korean and Japanese bids. This ended up with a solution to co-host the event by both countries after Japanese eventually agreed (Longman, 1996). But before it happened both individual bidding committees enjoyed a strong backing from the states' authorities. In case of Korea, Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hong-Koo became the chairman of the bidding committee. The committee also engaged people from the Korean Foreign Ministry and placed secretaries in embassies of each country of the members of FIFA EC. Apart from that, Korean President Kim Young-Sam held meetings with members of FIFA EC and went jogging every day with a "2002 World Cup" t-shirt. The Japanese bidding committee was composed of sports officials rather than politicians, but in response to South Korean former Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi was appointed as honorary chairman (Butler, 2002). Despite a different character of both bids, as we now know they ended as a joined bid and can definitely be described as one that was backed by national political leaders. Worth to mention that like the France '98 World Cup, it also had public diplomacy and nation-branding goals. Most of all, it is associated with fostering Japanese-Korean friendship. As Korean President stated in the telegram after receiving the right to co-host the tournament, "I believe that the co-hosting of the 2002 World Cup will serve as an occasion to further solidify the friendly relations of Korea and Japan" (Varcoe, 2002). However, this goal appeared after the idea of co-hosting had been realized, whereas governmental engagement was visible even before that. It is however believed that from the Korean perspective the tournament, apart from fostering proximity with Japan,

resulted in boosting the country's image abroad and brought a number of direct and non-direct economic benefits including expansion of tourist infrastructure and improvement of Korean brands and products (Merkel, 2008). Again, state engagement in the World Cup bidding process was accompanied by public diplomacy and nation-branding goals of bidding for the event.

Another European World Cup finals were held in 2006 in Germany. The tournament had explicit public diplomacy and nation-branding objectives. They included impacting positively on the country's poor image abroad and increasing tourism and inward investment, although this appeared to be the secondary goal to increasing Germany's international prestige (Grix, 2012). Concerning the state leaders' engagement in the bidding process, a strong support by German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder could be observed. The head of German government visited FIFA headquarters a day before the selection of the World Cup host (FIFA, 2000), although this was just one of his activities. Earlier he met with FIFA President Sepp Blatter in Berlin in October 1999. During the meeting Schröder assured of "the unrestricted support of the bid by the entire German government" (FIFA, 1999). Schröder had also made numerous trips to promote the bid (Kirschbaum, 2016). He was also a member of German delegation to FIFA EC before its final decision (Millward, 2000). The connection between the World Cup host branding and public diplomacy goals and the engagement of state officials could also be observed then.

While discussing the bidding process for the 2006 World Cup, it is worth to mention that other bidders were also excessively supported by political leaders. England's bid was supported by Prime Minister Tony Blair who met with outgoing FIFA President Havelange in London (Sugden & Tomlinson, 2017), while the events shortly before FIFA decision were reported to be even more interesting. South African bid was backed by former President Nelson Mandela, who supposedly called the King of Thailand and the Emir of Qatar for their support. The King of Belgium had called Belgium FIFA EC member Michel D'Hooghe, after which he sustained his support for German bid (Bose, 2000). The whole process of looking for votes by respective bidders revealed a close bond between sport and politics despite their declared distinctiveness. It has also shown how bidding for sports events is associated with international negotiations.

2010 marked the first ever sports mega-event held in Africa, although this was clear even before the final decision by FIFA which in response to controversies with selecting the 2006 host assured that an African nation would host the event in 2010 (Matheson & Baade, 2004). South Africa won over Morocco 14–10 in the

first round of vote (FIFA. *Factsheet...*). During the bidding process South African state support was very strong. Its delegation to Zurich included former President Nelson Mandela and current President Thabo Mbeki (Jackson, 2009). Like four years earlier, hosting the tournament had diplomatic and branding purposes for the state. The main theme was connected to African unity. Mbeki already in his speech after South Africa's election said that it was "an African bid and the World Cup would be an African World Cup hosted in partnership with all of Africa's nations" (Ndlovu, 2010, p. 147). The event is also believed to have been used to highlight economic successes, diplomatic importance and soft power (Schausteck de Almeida, Bolsmann, Marchi Júnior, & de Souza, 2015).

Brazil hosted two of the most important sports mega-events within two years. First, in 2014, the FIFA World Cup was held in this South American country, while two years later Rio de Janeiro organised the Olympic Games. The FIFA World Cup had explicit branding goals from the moment Brazilian bid was submitted. The tournament was supposed to be an opportunity to show the world the Brazilian growing and stable economy, as Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva stated when the bid was confirmed (Schausteck de Almeida, Marchi Júnior, & Pike, 2014). Similarly to the Rio Olympics in 2016, the World Cup was regarded by the government as a cheap means of improving the state's image, credibility, economic competitiveness (Murray, 2018). Brazilian World Cup was therefore a strictly public diplomacy and nation-branding endeavour by state authorities.

When bidding for the FIFA 2014 World Cup is considered, Brazil was the only candidate to hosting the event. This was the result of the rotation principle introduced by FIFA in 2003 and the tournament was supposed to be held in South America (FIFA. *Factsheet...*). In such situation, less intense political engagement in supporting the bid would be expected. On the contrary, the bidding campaign was fully endorsed by the national government (Horne & Silvestre, 2016). When FIFA inspection committee visited Brazil, it reported having met with the President of the Republic, various government ministers, state governors and the mayors of the prospective host cities. According to the commission their commitment spoke in favour of Brazil's hosting the World Cup (FIFA, 2017). The personal support of President Lula da Silva was also very clear (FIFA, 2008). On the occasion of awarding the tournament to Brazil he declared that football was "more than a sport for Brazilians, it is a national passion", although his support started much earlier when in 2004 he attended a friendly match between Brazil and Haiti as part of the United Nations mission led by Brazilian troops (Horne

& Silvestre, 2016). The governmental and presidential support for the Brazilian bid was very strong.

Situation with Russia, the next World Cup host, was fairly similar as the two major sports events were held there in a very short period. First Sochi hosted the Olympic Winter Games in 2014, while four years later Russia organized the FIFA World Cup. Russian Prime Minister at the time of bidding, Vladimir Putin, was very strongly engaged in applying for both of these events. Concerning the World Cup, Russian proposal was prepared by Minister of Sport Vitaly Mutko by the order of Putin (Sputnik News, 2009), whose personal activities included meeting with FIFA President Sepp Blatter in Moscow in 2009 (FIFA, 2009). He was not present in Zurich when the final decision was made, but once Russia was selected he flew to Switzerland immediately to join in the celebrations. In one of the interviews at the time he said: "We can organise a great World Cup and we want people to discover Russia" (FIFA, 2011, p. 72). The whole bid can therefore be described as very strongly supported by the government, or even state led, with a very strong support of Vladimir Putin. This is another similarity to the Brazilian case.

It may be assumed that like in Brazil, both sports mega-events held lately in Russia were supposed to have significance in terms of public diplomacy and nation-branding. Such was probably the objectives of bidding for both of them. However, according to Müller (2017), in the end such goals were only subsidiary concerning the World Cup, due to growing international apprehensiveness of Russia's aggressive foreign policy. However, before the Crimea crisis both events were believed to have branding and diplomatic objectives connected to the goal of enhancing Russia's negative international image (Grix, 2015). Therefore, even though in the end Russia's 2018 World Cup was not explicitly a public diplomacy and nation-branding event, such were the goals at the bidding stage and this could explain such strong engagement by state authorities including Vladimir Putin.

During the same meeting FIFA EC selected Qatar as the host of 2022 World Cup. The decision was controversial, particularly because of the tiny size of Qatar and the hot climate. The bidding process has also brought allegations of corruption and "buying" votes. From the perspective of Qatar, the application was strongly supported by national leaders who personally backed it. When the decision was announced, Emir of the State of Qatar Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani and his wife personally took the World Cup trophy from FIFA President Sepp Blatter (Swart, Bob, & Turco, 2013). State engagement in the bidding

was much more intensive though, as Emir's son Sheikh Mohammed bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani became the chairman of the bid committee (Kummels, 2013). As a member of the Royal House he should also be regarded as a state representative.

Although the World Cup in Qatar will be held in a couple of years, it can already be stated that public diplomacy and nation-branding belonged to the prime motivations of bidding and future hosting. After Qatar was awarded the tournament Sheikh Mohammed bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani declared that one of its most important aspects is that it would "enable us to sweep away outdated prejudices" (FIFA, 2011, p. 72). Other public diplomacy and nation-branding goals include showcasing the country and the region as a peaceful environment rather than a place of political conflicts, which is connected to an attempt to boost the level of incoming tourism (Brannagan & Giulianotti, 2015; Henderson, 2017).

The last of the bidding processes included in the research relates to the World Cup in 2026. It is the first World Cup to be awarded by FIFA according to the new regulations, with the whole FIFA Congress to decide upon the host. The decision was extraordinary as well, since for the first time the tournament was awarded to 3 states: United States, Canada, and Mexico, although majority of matches will be played in the US which can be assumed as the leader of the bid.

American elite sport has always been separated from the federal government. This could also be observed in the earlier American bid for the 1994 World Cup, in which federal engagement was rather minor, although there have also been cases when American presidents backed American bids for sports mega-events in a more direct way, for example Barack Obama lobbied the IOC Members to vote for Chicago as the host of 2016 Summer Olympics (Markovits & Rensmann, 2010; Cooper, 2013). When it comes to the 2026 World Cup, Donald Trump's engagement was rather untypical, since he shared veiled threats towards countries who might vote against the bid through Tweeter (Critchley, 2018). Apart from that, Trump has sent letters to FIFA President Gianni Infantino to support the bid. After the awarding Trump tweeted that he "worked hard" on the successful bid (Schad, 2018). The application was also supported by Mexican and Canadian political leaders. President of Mexico Enrique Peña Nieto and Canada's Prime Minister Justin Trudeau declared via Tweeter their support for the North American bid (Kasraoui, 2018). The application therefore did have some support from the political leaders, but on the other hand, tweeting or signing letters

cannot be assessed as a strong and formal engagement, and consequently, as an indication of treating FIFA as a diplomatic actor.

In multi-national bids, public diplomacy and nation-branding objectives are more difficult to observe. Still, after United States, Canada and Mexico were selected as the World Cup hosts, the comments included statements that it could restore harmony between these nations, undermined as a result of Donald Trump's policy (Bilefsky, 2018), although of course such goals should not be regarded as lying behind the idea of the joint bid. Other public diplomacy and nation-branding issues have also been raised, for example, that the tournament was an opportunity to "put Canada on the world stage" was mentioned by Canadian politicians (Katsarov, 2018). Head of Mexican football federation has also mentioned that the World Cup will be used as a "platform to unite the world around football" (Graham, 2018). Some public diplomacy and nation-branding goals attached to the future North American World Cup can be observed then, but they appear to be less evident than in some of the World Cups analysed above.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of state leaders supporting the bids from their countries to host FIFA World Cups from the last 30 years has confirmed their engagement. Virtually every of the successful bids was at least to some extent supported by figures such as presidents, prime ministers or other prominent political leaders. Of course, the level of this engagement was different in various cases. It has been observed that there was a connection between state leaders' personal engagement and public diplomacy and nation-branding goals of organising particular tournament. The World Cups with explicit objectives of boosting state's international image and prestige were more likely to be supported by political leaders. This tendency may be derived from national interests connected to such initiatives. Mega-events such as the FIFA World Cup obviously have great impact on nations hosting them. However, such events formally are not organised by states but by national sports bodies, even though governmental support is one of FIFA's expectations from the bidder.

The level of state leaders' engagement in bidding for the FIFA World Cup, and its character, speak in favour of the hypothesis that through selecting the World Cup host FIFA obtains diplomatic subjectivity. State leaders personally

lobby for their national bids to host this tournament because their states have interest in hosting them. Internationally such interests are most commonly about boosting national image. FIFA in this context becomes states' public diplomacy and nation-branding external stakeholder, with the World Cup as a sort of soft power asset that belongs to FIFA but is desired by states.

The form of contacts between state leaders and FIFA officials is sometimes similar to diplomatic contacts. As stated, state leaders often personally met with FIFA Presidents, invited them to their offices or houses. Their activities also included persuading FIFA members to vote for particular location and presenting bids to FIFA Executive Committee. All this shows that even though states are the most important subjects of diplomacy, in the context of bidding for the FIFA World Cup their leaders approach sports officials to get their support. At the same time, the World Cup bidding process, even after the reform within FIFA, puts its President as an important subject of the final decision. As a result, he is often treated similarly as a representative of a state. All these considerations and observations indicate that in the context of selecting the World Cup host, FIFA obtains diplomatic subjectivity.

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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AS TAIWANESE DIPLOMACY'S ESSENTIAL TOOL

DYPLOMACJA PUBLICZNA JAKO ISTOTNE NARZĘDZIE
TAJWAŃSKIEJ DYPLOMACJI

*Robert Rajczyk** , *Grażyna Piechota*** 

— ABSTRACT —

The working paper consists of the analyses of different forms of Taiwanese public diplomacy and it also contains a future development scenario as far as such an essential tool of foreign affairs is concerned. The research project has been conducted from many points of view. There are institutional, strategic and operational dimensions of public diplomacy with the engagement of government officials and agencies, NGOs, public institutions and citizens as well. Having analysed the whole activity concerning public diplomacy, the main conclusion ought to be made, i.e., the official development assistance and humanitarian aid shall be provided as the most effective tool to enhance Taiwanese international visibility.

Keywords: public diplomacy; Taiwan; Republic of China; NGOs; IGOs

— ABSTRAKT —

Artykuł prezentuje wynik analiz dotyczących różnych form dyplomacji publicznej prowadzonej przez Republikę Chińską na Tajwanie oraz możliwości rozwoju tego procesu. W toku badań wyróżniono trzy poziomy analityczne: strategiczny, instytucjonalny i operacyjny, obejmujące aktorów publicznych i niepublicznych zaangażowanych w realizację dyplomacji publicznej. Pomoc rozwojowa oraz pomoc humanitarna stanowią w przypadku Tajwanu najistotniejszy czynnik wzmacniania obecności Republiki Chińskiej na arenie międzynarodowej.

Słowa kluczowe: dyplomacja publiczna; Tajwan; Republika Chińska; NGO; IGO

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INTRODUCTION

The analysis of Taiwanese Public Diplomacy's role in Taiwan's foreign affairs and its efficiency is the core idea of this working paper. That is why another purpose is to determine the main problems and obstacles of Taiwanese Public Diplomacy in order to discover the possibilities of resolving them and try to forecast the future development in correlation with the international legal status of the Republic of China (hereinafter known as the ROC).

The Republic of China is officially not recognized as an independent state within the UN system. According to the authorities in Beijing, Taiwan is a rebellious province of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter known as the PRC), whereas following the 1992 Consensus both countries have accepted the One China idea. The latter means that there is only One China but the PRC and the ROC identify themselves as China. It stands for the important issue in international relations. The common official recognition of the PRC and the ROC is accepted neither by Beijing nor Taipei. The One China policy has been supported by the political doctrine of "One Country Two Systems". It might be described as a concept of coexistence of socialism in mainland China and capitalism in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. Nevertheless, the ROC has been existing as a *de facto* state.

In 1945, the Republic of China has become the founding member of the United Nations and one of the permanent members of the Security Council. Because of the world's geopolitical situation and confrontation between the Soviet Union and its allies versus the Western democracies Taiwan withdrew from the United Nations upon the UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 dated 25 October 1971. Since then there have been several attempts to join the UN supported by Taiwan's allies. The Republic of China has diplomatic relations with eighteen countries in the world, including the Holy See in Europe and: Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Solomon, Tuvalu, Belize, Dominican, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Burkina Faso, and Swaziland (Eswatini). The relations with the other countries of the world are designed as cultural and economic ones. Due to that, Taiwan is one of the main actors of international affairs both in governmental and non-governmental international organizations¹.

¹ Taiwan has full membership in 37 intergovernmental organizations and their subsidiary bodies. It also enjoys observer or other statuses in 21 IGOs and their subsidiary bodies.

ROC is a member of several international organizations such as WTO or Asia Development Bank. „Republic of China is a member of those organizations usually as Chinese Taipei or Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. The Asian Development Bank is the only exception. Republic of China is designated there as ‘Taipei, China’. It might be misinterpreted as belonging to China whereas ‘Chinese Taipei’ is related to the Chinese culture” (Rajczyk, 2016, p. 75). In other international organizations Taiwan has the status of an observer, i.e., the World Health Assembly of the World Health Organization.

The system of exchanging information – the global information system – plays the key role in the modern world. The country’s position in the global market or geopolitical relations depends not only on the economic potential that is depicted by the competitiveness of the country but is also based on the national brand and national image. Nowadays, during the era of mass communication and post-information revolution period described by the enormous development of social and content media, an e-image is much more important than at any time earlier. Different tools such as mass media or soft power are triggering this phenomenon. The latter is done by many subjects of international affairs, e.g., states, countries, international organizations, either governmental or non-governmental, and citizens.

Public Diplomacy is “one of soft power’s key instruments, and this was recognized in diplomatic practice long before the contemporary debate on public diplomacy” (Melissen, 2005, p. 4). According to Paul Sharp, Public Diplomacy is “the process by which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented”. Hans Tuch defined that as “a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies” (Tuch, 1990, p. 3).

In this working paper, Public Diplomacy shall be defined as a way of soft power that gives the state an opportunity to influence as well as to shape the world wide public opinion and helps to build a desired image of the country.

RESEARCH’S METHODOLOGY

The working paper will cover the hypothesis: the specific international status of Taiwan determines the tools that Taiwan uses in its Public Diplomacy. Therefore, there are research questions as follows:

- How is Taiwan's Public Diplomacy conducted? What are the subjects of Taiwanese Public Diplomacy?
- What methods and techniques are used?

The survey shall obtain the Taiwanese authorities' reactivity to the important events and phenomena in the world, e.g., the Summer Universiade 2017 in Taipei and its impact on the global image of the Republic of China and its international recognition, as well as the interconnection between those issues and the activity as far as Public Diplomacy is concerned.

As an introduction to the project, an important division shall be made. The composition of Public Diplomacy consists of many sub-disciplines such as: cultural, economic, scientific or digital diplomacy. The studies will cover only the English content.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY INSTITUTIONS

The ROC's Public Diplomacy shall be considered in its three aspects: institutional, strategic, and operational. The first one depends on the Constitution of the Republic of China. According to this document, the President of the Republic of China is the Chief of State and he or she represents the Republic of China in foreign relations. The Executive Yuan plays a role of the government with the Prime Minister as a leader, whereas the Legislative Yuan is the parliament. The government takes efforts in Public Affairs while the parliament develops the congressional diplomacy. There are the Department of Information Services, the Department of Information Management and the Department of Public Relations in the structure of the Executive Yuan. As far as the institutional aspect is concerned, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall be mentioned here. The MOFA maintains diplomatic relations with eighteen states throughout the world as well as with the rest of the world in the formula of international relations: economic and cultural. The Institute of Diplomacy and International Affairs is supervised by the MOFA. As far as Public Diplomacy is concerned, the IDIA provides workshops concerning that subject. Moreover, there are also Public Diplomacy Coordination Council and the Department of International Information Services. Both institutions' tasks include well-planned centrally coordinated Public Diplomacy agenda, e.g., e-diplomacy or foreign media service. One of the Deputy Ministers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supervises those two institutional bodies.

National branding is one of the important issues related to Public Diplomacy efforts. There is the Taiwan Tourist Bureau in the structure of the Ministry of Transport and Communication responsible for the touristic promotion of the Republic of China. Nevertheless, according to President Tsai's inaugural address, the economic development is one of the most important issues for the government. The Bureau of Foreign Trade of the Ministry of Economic Affairs has been responsible for the foreign trade promotion.

Radio Taiwan International is another institution that could be involved in Public Diplomacy's activity. It broadcasts its programs in 13 languages providing the latest news from Taiwan to the listeners throughout the world and bringing the Taiwanese point of view on global issues to the audiences abroad.

The activity on the institutional level is state-subordinated due to all the above-mentioned institutions' subjection to the government or having the status of a public institution.

The non-governmental activity is the second aspect which enhances Taiwan's international visibility. For instance, it is the humanitarian aid conducted, among others, by Taiwan International Health Action or other NGOs and non-profit organizations such as TAITRA or Tzu-Chi, Taiwan's largest Buddhist charity.

Non-governmental organizations in Taiwan have been dynamically developing since the end of the martial law. Bonnie S. Glaser in her considerations devoted to the Taiwanese civil society emphasizes that: "Since martial law was lifted in 1987 and movement toward democratization made in the 1990s, Taiwan's domestic and international NGO participation has flourished. Today Taiwan has over 40,000 NGOs, some 2,100 of which operate internationally. Many of Taiwan's nongovernmental representatives are warmly received abroad, especially in humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, health aid, and environmental activities. This has provided Taiwan a degree of access to organizations and countries it otherwise would be denied" (Glaser, 2013, p. 29).

The development of civil society in the Republic of China has been politically supported since the turn of the 1980s and the 1990s, seeing in the organizations' activity not only the possibility of enhancing governance as a system of managing public affairs on the national ground but seeing in the subject of organizations' activity and their international presence chances to achieve image objectives – engraving in the consciousness of the international community that ROC is the only democratic China. Moreover, perceiving their role as actors supporting the subjectivity of Taiwan in international relations and thus the chance for public diplomacy.

The International Cooperation and Development Fund of Taiwan should be mentioned here as a unique example. It is an independent organization with the status of a consortium of juridical persons. It develops agricultural, educational, environment, public health and medicine, information and communication technology's themes with the MOFA's cooperation that has commissioned some funds.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), since 2000 creating the committee for non-governmental organizations, has undertaken effective attempts to globalize the perspective of activity carried out by the Taiwanese NGOs, thus assuming their use in public diplomacy. Taiwan has been engaged in projects aligned with the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) such as: international humanitarian aid and medical assistance, eradicating poverty and disease, promoting democracy and human rights, and environmental sustainability. Activities undertaken by the MOFA concern both the support for Taiwanese organizations and starting cooperation with global non-governmental organizations and also carrying out educational activities making it possible for the employees of administration, the third sector, schools and students to increase their ability to participate in international affairs and extend international perspectives of their activity. Currently in the world there are almost 400 active Taiwanese organizations.

The activities of Taiwanese non-governmental organizations on a global scale are concentrated around two main issues. The first one is promoting democracy and human rights and support for and cooperation with global NGOs, what politically situates Taiwan (and lets it be perceived in this way) as the only democratic China. In Taiwan, international meetings and conferences devoted to NGOs and INGOs take place. Also offices are opened by global NGOs such as Reporters Sans Frontiers that protect democracy, freedom and human rights, what is a clear signal to acknowledge Taiwan as a country where such values are followed. Another area are actions aimed at the international community as an example of building "people-to-people diplomacy", which is based on organizing humanitarian aid for countries that are in need, taking part in removing the effects of disasters and also medical, developmental and environmental aid. This aspect of mainly aiding and humanitarian and development activities is aimed at building the awareness and enhancing the positive image of Taiwan directly among the beneficiaries of the Taiwanese NGOs.

As Bonnie S. Glaser (2013) points out: "Greater NGO participation has increased Taiwan's international profile and provided an avenue for Taiwan

to interact with states around the world in a cooperative fashion. Taiwan's international NGOs have also enabled the island to engage in unofficial forms of international and people-to-people diplomacy, which has promoted better relations with countries both in the Asia-Pacific region and around the world" (Glaser, 2013, pp. 30).

Both spheres of NGOs' activity in the international arena are thus concentrated on the activities that should be treated as soft power activities – image enhancement, promoting positive message about a country, as well as establishing relationships between societies and building trust in the national brand. According to Steve Tsang (2008): "[T]he soft power [is] inherent in Taiwan's impressive democratization, and [this is] one way of asserting influence that the ROC government used effectively for decades even before the advent of real democracy in Taiwan. [...] Indeed, considering its inability to gain international recognition or membership of the UN, and given that its need to defend itself against China completely absorbs its considerable military capabilities, soft power is of greater importance to Taiwan than to any other country" (Tsang, 2008, pp. 9–10). Kelly Gerard (2014) claims that the role of civil society organizations is growing thanks to including civic institutions into political processes: "Regional and global governance institutions have increasingly included Civil Society Organizations in policymaking. Scholars have documented this trend, highlighting its growing prevalence and limitations. [...] It also highlights the vast spectrum of mechanisms for civil society participation that exists across institutions, and the subsequent differing abilities of CSOs to influence policy and shape political outcomes" (Gerard, 2014, pp. 173–174). Non-governmental organizations as the ones active outside government relations but serving political functions have become an actor thanks to which participation of Taiwan in international relations is possible. This is emphasized by Gary D. Rawnsley (2014), writing: "Public diplomacy from civil society and among NGOs can be considered a by-product of a nation's soft power because their work reflects a democratic culture that encourages pluralism, diversity and charity. They are also largely immune from changes in ruling parties and their ideological positions. For this reason, Taiwan's civil society offers soft power advantages over the PRC where the government manages the non-governmental sector, and therefore lacks the kind of credibility that would make it an agent of soft power. Moreover, the non-governmental sector is able to forge and sustain meaningful long-term relationships with groups and individuals overseas" (Rawnsley, 2014, p. 164). As Wen-Jong Juang (2015) analyzing the political role of Taiwanese NGOs remarks,

their role will be rising: “As NGOs become increasingly professional and independent with enhanced capabilities for policy analysis they will be considered as taking a dominant and representative role on certain issues. This recognition will facilitate the promotion of their preferred policy solutions and as a result the goals of the organization will be accomplished” (Wen-Jong, 2015, p. 166).

Another important factor achieved through the inclusion of media in providing information devoted to the activity of Taiwanese non-governmental organizations is the narration of the history of Taiwan, which emphasizes the shift from authoritarian rule to representative democracy. Democracy and its values have become an actual Taiwan’s export commodity.

Activity of the Taiwanese civil society which has become the promotor of Chinese democracy leading to polarization of the ROC and the PRC in the reception of the international community is also used in the soft power for the benefit of conducting politics in Taiwan, limiting the influence of mainland China on the internal policy of the ROC.

As far as the strategic dimension is concerned, steadfast diplomacy is the key issue of the presidency of Tsai Ing-wen (term 2016–2020)². The full international recognition of the Republic of China is one of its key political issues. That agenda also refers to the content of the strategic communication. The analysis of the content of websites and profiles in social media of the President, the Executive Yuan, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has revealed that Taiwanese authorities are focused mainly on improving the economic potential of the Republic of China using the social media. Nowadays, the Tsai’s administration social and content media is a platform for real communication as it was during the electoral campaign in 2015. It refers to the WHA’s issue. Because of the opposition of the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan was excluded from the annual meeting of the WHA. The President’s reaction was expressed on Twitter several times in different languages, including English, in order to gain as much coverage in social media as possible.

The dilemma of the international status of Taiwan and its correlation with the foreign policy and communication efforts is a key issue here. Flexible or

² Steadfast diplomacy is Tsai’s political concept which aims to “advance mutual assistance for mutual benefits. The policy is also defined as firm in purpose and is targeted at building robust relationships with diplomatic allies and countries that share the common values of freedom and democracy. Under this approach, the focus of the country’s diplomatic work is shifting from the one-way provision of foreign aid to two-way dialogue, with bilateral cooperation projects taking into consideration the development of both industries and markets” (Foreign Affairs, 2018).

viable diplomacy initiated in 1993 is the main way of conducting the Taiwanese diplomacy (Yahuda, 1996, p. 285). It means that efforts are focused on improving the economic potential and the presence in the international community. The latter could be described as a “southward policy” which means “a desire to avoid becoming excessively dependent upon economic ties with the mainland”, whereas the steadfast diplomacy might be considered as a step to gain the full international recognition of the ROC (Yahuda, 1996, p. 290).

As far as the foreign policy agenda is concerned, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is reporting the agenda’s purposes regularly to the Legislative Yuan. Public Diplomacy is developed in these documents, i.e., the role of Taiwanese NGOs in international humanitarian affairs and creating the positive image of the ROC.

Continuing to promote participation in international organizations through pragmatic approaches is supposed to be one of the most important purposes of Taiwanese foreign policy. Due to that, Taiwan is able to function and coexist in the international community, e.g., in international aviation, maritime transport or navigation, etc.

EXECUTIVE DIMENSION OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The operational aspect of public diplomacy brings the analysis of different projects implemented by many institutional subjects as well as citizens.

The type of public diplomacy refers to the tool that has been used. So the Public Diplomacy consists of, e.g.: cultural diplomacy, economic diplomacy, NGO diplomacy, scientific diplomacy, citizen diplomacy, digital diplomacy, Public Affairs, as well as national branding or event marketing. The latter helps to build the national brand especially due to, e.g., international sport events. Moreover, event marketing, or sport diplomacy ought to be mentioned. There is a tight correlation between national branding and the signification of international events such as Universiade, for example. The 2017 Summer Universiade gives the Taiwanese authorities a brilliant possibility to promote Formosa (the old name for Taiwan) as a touristic destination both for the academic sports fans as well as for the academic athletes. Because of Taiwan’s unique status in international affairs, Taiwanese competitors attended the Universiade under the name of “Chinese Taipei”. The differentiation between Taiwan, the Republic of China, and “Chinese Taipei” is important for increasing the country’s brand awareness. It might also be a way to influence the international community to

persuade the discussion about Taiwan's status in international affairs. Besides official promotion about the Universiade, there were many examples of guerrilla marketing, such as transforming Taipei's metro into a "swimming pool". The event was widely open for the public. The tickets, for instance, were available in every shop via payment machines.

As far as the issue of Taiwan as a tourist destination is concerned, the content of mass media and social media about Universiade has been prepared in a professional way. It contains layout that is easy to navigate and is friendly to users. What is more, there are plenty of useful pieces of information designed for the fans or tourists. Tourism is supposed to become an important part of the state's economy, that is why the touristic promotion is a key issue in Public Diplomacy due to its connection with people-to-people relations, which help to build the image of the national brand. The latter could also be valuable³.

Nowadays, selling emotions is the key to persuade tourists to come and visit a destination. So the storytelling about a place plays a significant role. Although historical monuments and buildings are also important but without the plot, the promotion is not as effective as it could be with the storytelling. The dilemma is how to attract the desired audience. Nowadays, the Internet is supposed to be the main source of information. It means that the role of recommendation and sharing the opinion of Internet users is much more reliable than any other slogans or leaflets. Besides the emotions, the desired audience ought to be reached in its typical information milieu. The Taiwan Tourist Bureau has several websites dedicated to different aspects of Internet communication. Profiling the content towards the desired audience is a key issue that guarantees the success in that process. Each of the websites emblems the unique approach of publicity and symbolizes the trends in modern communication, e.g., Trending Taiwan is a tool of digital diplomacy or a website designed as a platform to find an interesting event (www.eventtaiwan.tw) – an example of event marketing and place marketing. Trending Taiwan features captivating videos and information which introduce diverse and intriguing aspects of the Republic of China (Taiwan). The international visibility and the Taiwanese contribution or participation in the international community is also under consideration during the analysis of Trending Taiwan.

³ Taiwan's nation brand value is estimated at 469 billion USD, according to the *Nation Brands 2016. The Annual Report on the World's Most Valuable Nation Brands* (2017).

The core idea of Taiwan's touristic promotion is coherent with the content. The slogans such as: "Taiwan. Touch Your Heart", "Time for Taiwan – Time for Celebration", or "Time for Taiwan", "Anytime for Taiwan", and "Taiwan. The Heart of Asia", have been corresponding with users' interests and modern trends in communication. All those projects mentioned above concerned bringing the emotions to the participants. The content is managed with videos and photos. This trend of visualization correlates with the model of social or mass media coverage requirements. The webpage about Taiwan's tourism ambassador OhBear is also the example of this phenomenon and helps to sell Taiwan's tourist brand with the mascot. Besides, the fondness for mascots has been a social phenomenon throughout the East Asia, especially in Japan, Mainland China, or the Republic of China.

The storytelling and the wide use of the Internet are the most important tools of promotion nowadays. The digital diplomacy – the diplomacy via social and content media made by different subjects, either governmental or non-governmental, e.g., citizens – is a key instrument to communicate the ideas because of the social media popularity. After all, the results gained by the digital diplomacy efforts might be considered helpful in persuading the international public opinion that implies the possibility of changing the foreign governments' policy towards the host of digital diplomacy.

The national brand built by efficient communication influences the country-of-origin effect, which is extremely vital for the country's economy. There are many instruments to promote country's brands and products. International trade provides different possibilities, i.e., participation in international affairs due to the economic potential.

The promotion of the Taiwanese trade is done in many ways: as economic diplomacy on the one hand, or as corporate diplomacy on the other. There are a few projects concerning trade promotion abroad, e.g.: Taiwan Excellence, Trade Show or Taiwan Product Center, Global Government Procurement Project and trade missions or even the online catalogue of Taiwanese products.

The Taiwan External Trade Development Council (TAITRA) and the Bureau of Foreign Trade of the Ministry of Economic Affairs coordinate all of them. Furthermore, the Taiwan Excellence program is a project designed to support the Taiwanese products in order to build reliable relations with customers abroad based on the country-of-origin effect. For example, in July 2017 in Malaysia, which is believed to be one of the most efficient emerging markets, Taiwan Excellence in Kuala Lumpur Monorail – a unique means of transportation popular

among tourists – organized the promotional campaign. Taiwan Industry Image Enhancement Project (IEP) is another example of enhancing the innovative image of Taiwanese industry. The project is targeting 15 countries. Taiwanese economic diplomacy is supposed to be treated as an effective one due to the position of Taiwan's economy in the global economic exchange as well as the image of Taiwanese brands mainly in the IT industry (HTC, ASUS) or bicycle industry, e.g., Giant, or Merida. Nonetheless, the efficiency of the country-of-origin effect is exercised by an image of the brand. In such a case, the corporate diplomacy plays a significant role because of the Corporate Social Responsibility's activities (Tang & Li, 2011). Sometimes, corporate diplomacy merges cooperation between a state-owned promotion agency and private entrepreneurs. The example comes from Singapore where the campaign with the slogan "Rediscover Taiwan" was launched on billboards sponsored by the Taiwan Tourism Bureau accompanied with the promotional campaign of Taiwanese private airlines in July 2017.

Eventually, both tourist promotion and trade promotion are exercised via Internet due to its position in global network of communication. The emotions are sold in both cases. In the first one, the emotions are concerned with storytelling, in the other, with the product's Public Relations. It has been exercised through the new media, content media and social media as well. Usually, the state-owned television or radio channels exercise mass media diplomacy. In Taiwan, there is Radio Taiwan International, which broadcasts its program in several foreign languages and offers content via mobile applications in these languages in order to provide the listeners with a wide range of Taiwanese culture, history and society issues throughout the world. The Taiwan Broadcasting Service (TBS) is a public television consortium that consists of the Chinese Television System and the Public Television Service. The former began its history as a joint venture of two Taiwanese ministries. The latter is the first independent public broadcasting institution in Taiwan. It holds public television channels in Taiwan, does not offer the channel for diaspora or foreign audiences, media diplomacy is developed through satellite broadcasting or Internet streaming, for instance to Mainland China. What is more, Taiwanese media stand for the alternative and objective source of information for the Chinese compatriots living in Mainland China, Macau, and Hong Kong.

Cultural diplomacy is also related to media coverage. The content that has been broadcast via mass media to the audience abroad (foreigners or diaspora) involves promotion of the culture. Although there is no television channel designed for these viewers in Taiwan, some productions are distributed with

the worldwide online streaming platform Netflix or due to the international co-production. International cultural exchange shall be mentioned and programs developed for foreigners on the spot such as “Mandarin On-the-Go” that is a Mandarin learning program which invites foreigners to learn about Taiwan’s culture. They promote not only the Taiwanese culture but also Taiwan as a sovereign country raising the foreign audiences’ awareness of the ROC and its successful existence in the international community.

As far as the culture is concerned, the religion is a part of it. The religion could be a link between the nations or people of the same confession. The example comes from Mainland China where for example Buddhism, a traditional religion, was revived due to the engagement of a religious foundation from Taiwan which had sponsored the process as well as the charity (Yun-han, 2011, pp. 127–130).

The charity activity also plays an important role in public diplomacy. Usually it has been exercised by private individuals – entrepreneurs – but mostly by the NGOs as NGO diplomacy. Humanitarian aid or charity networks provide the possibility to raise Taiwan’s presence in the international community. These activities are politically neutral and provide Taiwan with a good image. The same situation appears with the development aid. Taiwan is a very active country in this field⁴.

Sport, culture and science are said to be non-political activities. They regard people-to-people relations during the individual contact. “The Youth Ambassadors” program shall be mentioned here. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China launched it in 2009 to promote Taiwanese soft power and over 1400 students have been involved in it since its beginning. It shall be pointed out here that the Youth Ambassadors project is open especially for participants of non-Taiwanese ethnic origin. They are more efficient in communication and cooperation with people of similar ethnicity or compatriots abroad.

Citizen diplomacy is also endorsed by the volunteers who work and help to promote their country and shape its image abroad. There are: Taiwan Youth Overseas Service, and TaiwanICDF Overseas Volunteers Service, for example. Together with participants of the Youth Ambassadors project, the volunteers work on enhancing the awareness of Taiwanese sovereignty and Taiwan’s unique status in international relations. That might influence public opinion. Then the people may persuade or motivate its own government to make some decisions concerning the enhancement of the ROC’s presence in the international community.

⁴ See more about the Taiwanese humanitarian aid in: *Passion and Care. 2000–2006: The Story of Taiwan’s Global Health Humanitarian Aid* (2007).

Scientific diplomacy is yet another way to practice Public Diplomacy. It mainly consists of the students and academics' exchange programs that are usually sponsored by the state-based subjects, i.e., public institutions or NGOs. Scientific research symbolizes the freedom of demonstrating the plurality of thinking. Taiwan offers scholars a wide range of scholarships. The review of the list of recipients and topics of their projects shall be interpreted as an analysis of contemporary Taiwan and its achievements as well as its history, the role in international affairs, and is related to Taiwan's democracy or human rights because of Taiwan's status of being the only one Chinese democracy. The results of the international academics' research projects mean Taiwan's inclusion into the international academic mainstream. The international scientific exchange programs provide the opportunity to share Taiwanese history, culture and values throughout the wide audiences in different countries and to promote Taiwan as a tourist destination. The advertisement based on the personal recommendation is much more reliable than any other means of promotion so it is an excellent way to point out the Taiwanese brands or Taiwan as a sovereign state. The scientific diplomacy also has its practical dimension that might be important to solve the global issues such as global warming or natural disasters.

INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The Public Affairs' aim is to inform foreign governments or citizens publicly. It could be called information policy or propaganda. Besides the social or content media, it consists of, e.g., official publications. The "Taiwan Panorama", widely available in foreign Taiwan's offices around the world, or "Taiwan Today" and the "Republic of China. Yearbook" are the examples of shaping and framing Taiwan's image through the audiences outside Taiwan. Those periodicals are delivered to the readers in a few foreign languages. Their content covers regularly the most important events in Taiwan in politics, culture, sport, economy, society, and environment. All of these publications including "The Republic of China (Taiwan) at a Glance" are available on-line for free in popular foreign languages.

The Public Diplomacy Coordination Council and the Department of International Information Services in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs perform Public Affairs duties successfully.

Although, Yun-han Chu notes that many “[...] of the island’s social actors pursue their own political, social, and/or cultural agenda when they become involved in cross-Straits cultural exchange” (Yun-han, 2011, p. 121). That is why the strategy is important in making Public Diplomacy. So the key issue must be obviously set up. According to Taiwan’s international status, it could be culture – the traditional Chinese one and modern Taiwanese – or the efficiency of democracy as a concept contrary to the People’s Republic of China political regime. Due to that, more attention is being paid to Taiwan and its unique international status. Setting up culture and democracy as narratives helps to persuade audiences around the world to sympathize with the ROC.

According to Katarzyna Pisarska’s parallel model, the Taiwanese public diplomacy might be classified as a constructive one. The constructive type of public diplomacy consists of:

- values and ideas as key actors,
- cooperation to redefine the international system as a key interest,
- power-sharing schemes of sources of power,
- contributing to the public global good,
- collaboration and networking as a mode of communication,
- humanitarian and development aid as a preferred instrument (Pisarska, 2016).

Effective public diplomacy requires legitimacy from the society. Pisarska stands for three aspects of public diplomacy’s domestic outreach:

- identity – defining a platform in order to strengthen the nation,
- informative – explaining foreign policy to domestic publics,
- cooperative – engaging civil society in state Public Diplomacy and supporting independent NGO diplomacy.

Reconciliation could be the value to be developed for Public Diplomacy. It may help to frame news from Taiwan in the global mass media circulation. The DPP’s administration promotes ethnic diversity of the country in an institutional way. There are: the National Day of Indigenous People on August 1st, the Hakka Affairs Council and the Council of Indigenous Peoples in the structure of the Executive Yuan as well as a nationwide radio station for them or even a television channel and virtual museum. Moreover, the ethnic history of Taiwan comes up as an issue in public debate as a tool to distinguish Taiwanese culture. It was shown to the world during the opening ceremony of the 29th Summer Universiade in Taipei in 2017.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Despite the unique status in international affairs, the international visibility of the Republic of China is not questionable due to the efforts made by the government, civil society and citizens.

Public Diplomacy starts on the individual level due to the digital diplomacy that should be considered as the most effective one because of its reliability. Citizen diplomacy or NGOs' diplomacy shall be separated from the government's activities in order to maintain credibility.

But the cooperation and integration of efforts must be done on the domestic level. Bonnie S. Glaser recommends some issues to improve Taiwan's participation in the international NGOs such as continuing to block China's efforts to interfere in Taiwan's international presence as well as lobbying to expend Taiwanese participation in regional NGOs (Glaser, 2013, pp. 39–41). Glaser also notices that NGO participation abroad has benefited Taiwan but it has not been an effective substitute for official status in multilateral institutions (Glaser, 2013, p. 31).

According to the performed SWOT analysis presented below, the main Taiwanese public diplomacy's obstacles are of socio-economical nature and they also involve China's political pressure on the international community.

Table 1. Taiwanese Public Diplomacy SWOT Analysis

	Positive	Negative
Internal	<p>Strengths</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • stable democracy • ancient culture • well-developed civil society • innovation economy • hi-tech • hospitality (people-to-people diplomacy) • fellowships • NGOs' diplomacy 	<p>Weaknesses</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • low birth rate • low economic growth • unemployment • brain drain
External	<p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • expats: Contact Taiwan Program • development assistance • humanitarian aid • working holidays program 	<p>Threats</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • unique international status • instances of PRC's interferences

Source: authors' own elaboration.

Public diplomacy is a tool to enhance relevance and prevent marginalization in the region and the world stage at large. Despite the predicament and due to the high level of economic growth, Taiwan is faced to be a vulnerable, reliable, responsible and significant member of the international community. The official development assistance and humanitarian aid shall be provided as the most effective tools in order to enhance Taiwan's international visibility. The specific international status of the ROC does not determine public diplomacy's activity. The content depends on state authorities' political agenda. Notwithstanding the political ideology, Taiwan's public diplomacy conducted by the government or public institutions subordinated to authorities is state-based and centrally coordinated. It means an unequivocal message and integrated efforts that ensure the efficiency and depict the ROC as a modern economy with a stable and liberal democracy. That is the core idea of Taiwanese public diplomacy supported by other non-state based actors (citizens, NGOs, etc.) who have been involved in the process of communication because the success in public diplomacy is not possible without the individual aspect in that process. It requires the civil society's involvement. The acceptance of the society is the crucial issue in Public Diplomacy's achievements. Nowadays, it is a trend to facilitate the value of soft power for East Asian countries (Lee & Melissen, 2011, p. 8).

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REVIEWS



System bezpieczeństwa zbiorowego w XXI wieku, eds. Beata Piskorska, Agnieszka Magdalena Zaręba, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2018, pp. 295

Piotr Majewski* 

The issue of collective security systems seems to be gaining more and more attention from social science researchers nowadays. Supporters of postmodern paradigms, convinced of the growing importance of non-state actors in shaping international relations, attempt to redefine the category of this concept. Nowadays, collective security notion is not limited only to the existence of military and political alliances, inter-governmental organizations or multi- and bilateral conventions and pacts. Extending the catalog of aspects of this concept to the activities of ideological movements, transnational corporations and even individual human requires the creation of a new theoretical framework for it. New and unprecedented threats such as international terrorism, cybercrime and environmental problems are also important in this mat-

ter. Therefore, when constructing a comprehensive picture of the 21st-century security status, it is necessary to take into account the aforementioned contemporary conditions of the international system.

In a collective work edited by Beata Piskorska and Agnieszka Magdalena Zaręba entitled *System bezpieczeństwa zbiorowego w XXI wieku* [Collective Security System in the 21st Century] a difficult task was undertaken to present the problem in a multifaceted manner. With the exception of two subsections and the abstract, the work is written in Polish. The book is basically a collection of articles written by various authors, which are divided into five thematic chapters. Although the scope of implemented research problems is very wide, the articles are very loosely connected, even within the chapters. There is a lack of a frames that would bind the work together, which seems to be making the work quite imprecise. Dispersing the authors' attention among many areas and disciplines

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(some chapters are of economic, historical or sociological nature) does not fully cover the topic and weakens the internal cohesion of the work. Of course, this is somewhat unavoidable in the case of collective work, however, it would be worth focusing on a more precisely defined research field, so that the subject of research is carried out to the fullest extent possible. Many of the problems and hypotheses posed are descriptive, but often this is due to the specificity of the topic chosen, and not to the inappropriate selection of methods and tools. The bibliography is rich and varied, although it would be more convenient for the reader if the list of sources was always placed at the end of a given subsection, since they are autonomous.

The first chapter entitled “Nowe uwarunkowania bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego” [New Determinants of International Security] is devoted to the aforementioned definition of a new systemic dimension of the examined issue. Its subsections, however, are purely casuistic – these are only four examples of events or processes that determine the shape of the modern international system. There is therefore a lack of a sub-chapter in which its holistic character would be specified. However, the examples given are quite diverse, which widens the research perspective. This chapter discusses religious fundamentalism and its impact on the development of international terrorism, the state of war-torn Libya, which after the fall of the Gaddafi regime turned into a failed state, the

issue of military security of the Scandinavian countries and the use of direct action by ideological and political movements on the example of the ecological organizations. Two of the subsections are strictly descriptive, while the other two are more inclined towards the formation of theoretical concepts. Historical analysis in the part of the chapter concerning Libya and Scandinavia was carried out thoroughly and on many levels, taking into account both internal and external determinants. The subsections dealing with direct action and religious fanaticism have a decent theoretical background, although they are based more on dictionaries than on scientific papers. However, they have a logical and coherent theoretical grid, which greatly facilitates the correct formulation of their own definitions and capturing the essence of the studied phenomena.

The authors of the texts included in the second chapter, entitled “Podmiotowy i przedmiotowy wymiar bezpieczeństwa narodowego” [Subjective and Objective Dimension of National Security], focus only on two entities: the Federal Republic of Germany, and the European Union. Again, this seems to be far too narrow for a research, especially since the first two sub-chapters are limited only to the soft power aspects in Germany’s foreign policy (the role of the foundation in shaping the image abroad and public diplomacy coordinated by the government) and the next two to the EU global strategy, repeating the same issue twice. Interesting, however, is their

analysis of four potential development directions for the EU, outlined in the report "The European Union in a Changing Global Environment: A More Connected, Contested and Complex world" that is meant to be the basis for forming its new security strategy. The authors, by analyzing the EU's political, military and economic potential, and the current challenges they face, unanimously pointed to the likelihood of the Union taking a direction to move away from the archetype of the "civil power" towards the classic "global power" and the development of hard instruments of influence in international relations.

The third chapter is devoted to presenting selected concepts of collective security. Interestingly, only one sub-chapter deals with the theoretical approach, introducing the views of Michel Foucault on the issue of security concept under the liberal system. The content presented in it, however, is indirectly related to the issue of collective security, as it mainly refers to political discourse and the issue of power-citizen relations. On the other hand, the remaining subsections present two practical models of regional security policy of Great Britain and Egypt. Here we are presented with a specific and multifaceted analysis combined with an explanation of the historical context of the existing situation. In addition, the authors attempted to formulate prognosis about potential strategies that could be chosen by the countries they studied in the near future. However, the entire chapter lacks a presentation of concepts re-

garding the global security system. Perhaps it would be worth considering to include analysis on the role of the United Nations or NATO cooperating with other Partnership for Peace countries as stabilizing mechanisms and as a consultative space in combating new threats to international security.

The fourth chapter focuses on significant problems facing global security, whose genesis is geographically limited to the post-Soviet zone. Due to the superpower status of the Russian Federation and the ongoing war in Ukraine, this area is of particular importance for the international security science. Of course, for similar reasons, as equally vital for changes in the context of new threats, regions such as Middle East, Maghreb or the Pacific area could also be included in separate chapters, however, due to the geographical proximity of Poland and the impact of these phenomena on our country, the choice of only this region seems to be justified. The authors devoted their subsections to the issues of the Ukrainian nuclear program in face of the conflict with Russia, the diaspora of the citizens of the former Soviet Union and the Ukrainian war itself, analyzed in terms of the interests of foreign powers supporting one of the parties to the conflict. Therefore, they have presented a variety of challenges for the modern international system. While threats and challenges of economic, ecological, demographic, military, political or social nature identified by the authors do not constitute a full catalog of challenges related to this area, however, they point to

many issues vital for the countries of the region.

The last chapter, entitled “Wielowymiarowe aspekty bezpieczeństwa” [Multidimensional Aspects of Security], is devoted to three issues; the issue of the occupation of Polish territories by the Third Reich presented from the point of view of international law, the security doctrine based on national unity of the Polish People’s Republic, and the institutional dimension of the EU’s financial security in the face of the euro-zone crisis from 2008. Again, one can notice a wide thematic dispersal in the presented content, especially in the context of the chapter title. Attention should also be paid to some problems related to the concept of subsections. The hypothesis according to which during the Nazi occupation in Poland the provisions of the Hague Convention were violated, seems to be almost banal and too obvious. The content of this part of the publication is not very much related to both the research area of the chapter and the entire work, because it has a purely historical nature and its scientific problem is more legal than one belonging to the field

of security sciences. The second subsection, on the other hand, seems to belong more to the area dealt with under chapter three, because it is a presentation of a specific, historical concept of internal security, not its aspect. The last part of the chapter contains both theoretical and institutional introduction and a presentation of the practical dimension of the European financial security system. It provides the reader with substantial analysis accompanied by an emphasis on the EU financial system’s weak points.

The authors of the work undertook an extremely difficult task. Unfortunately, it does not seem to fully solve the main research problem, because it does not present a comprehensive and clearly outlined vision of the modern collective security system. However, as a collection of thematic articles, it is a valuable resource for many disciplines and thematic areas. It indicates some of the main issues and problems of modern world system as well as cover some of the least explored areas. The work could certainly be useful as a base for future, more precise research on the field of modern collective security system.