Not exactly eye to eye

AS AMERICAN officials saw it, simply holding such a large, high-level and broad-ranging meeting with their Chinese counterparts as the one in Beijing this week was worth cheering. Amid unease in America over China's growing muscle, both governments hoped to demonstrate a reassuring bonhomie. American smiles, however, might have been broader had they persuaded the Chinese to use their clout to rein in a belligerent North Korea.

It was one of the biggest-ever gatherings of cabinet-level American officials in China. Some 200 Americans, including the secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, and the treasury secretary, Timothy Geithner, took part in the “Strategic and Economic Dialogue” on May 24th and 25th. The dialogue was launched in Washington last July as an annual chance to ensure that the wide range of bureaucracies involved in the relationship work in harmony.

Since the first meeting, discord has been on the rise. American officials were frustrated by what they saw as Chinese obduracy at the United Nations climate-change negotiations in Copenhagen in December. In January China suspended high-level military exchanges with America in response to President Barack Obama's decision to proceed with long-discussed arms sales to Taiwan. It fumed over a meeting in February between Mr Obama and the Dalai Lama, even though the president had delayed it in deference to China. Disagreements over China's rigid exchange rate and signs of protectionism in both countries have exacerbated strains.

In recent weeks China has been trying to show that it still values the relationship. After much procrastination, Hu Jintao, the president, attended a 47-nation nuclear-security summit in Washington in April. The same month, perhaps not coincidentally, America's treasury department delayed a report which might have accused China of manipulating its currency. (Mr Geithner believes quiet diplomacy is more likely to help relax China's grip on the yuan.) Earlier this month China indicated it would back tougher UN sanctions against Iran, though details have yet to be worked out.

But recent tensions on the Korean peninsula have demonstrated how reluctant China remains to form a true strategic partnership with America. Just as the Chinese and American teams were beginning talks in Beijing, South Korea's president, Lee Myung-bak, announced a range of retaliatory measures against the North because of a murderous torpedo attack in March on the Cheonan, a South Korean patrol ship. Mrs Clinton declared the situation on the peninsula “highly precarious” and said China and America should “work together” to deal with the crisis. Chinese officials also talked vaguely of working together, but showed little evidence of solidarity.

From Beijing, Mrs Clinton went to Seoul and then home, where on May 27th the administration was to unveil its new national-security strategy. She travelled with no assurance—at least in public—of Chinese backing for attempts to put further pressure on North Korea. Chinese officials merely repeated the stock phrases they trot out whenever trouble occurs on the peninsula, about the need for restraint from both sides. China has neither openly backed assertions that the North sank the ship, nor so much as hinted at disapproval of North Korean behaviour.

In fact, China has painted itself into a diplomatic corner. Early in May it hosted a rare foreign visit by North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Il. It received him courteously despite the suspicions about the Cheonan incident. China even kept President Lee, who visited Shanghai for the World Expo at the end of April, in the dark about Mr Kim's forthcoming trip. It cannot have foreseen that, a week after Mr Kim's departure, pieces of the incriminating torpedo would be dredged up from the seabed.

Much has changed since 2006, when North Korea conducted its first claimed nuclear test. Then China was far more willing to criticise its ally. It supported a UN resolution imposing economic sanctions. But it drew comfort from the South's continued eagerness to engage the North, and felt it still had cover for keeping close ties. Victor Cha, an Asia expert in America's National Security Council in the previous administration, says China's response to the Cheonan affair suggests that its Korea strategy is stuck in “cold war communist-ally days”. He says it also indicates that, despite China's greater swagger on the world stage recently, it is “not ready for prime time”.

Chinese officials, however, are aware of the potential dangers ahead in North Korea, even if they are loth to discuss them openly. A Chinese participant in the talks with America privately accepts that concerns about the transition from Mr Kim to his successor are “understandable”. China is also anxious to avoid confrontation with America. During the talks, senior Chinese military officials held their first meetings with American counterparts since the spat over arms sales to Taiwan in January. On North Korea, the Americans have the impression that China will agree, if not to a resolution from the UN Security Council, then at least to a critical statement from its president—a slap on the wrist, in diplomatic terms, but better than nothing.

Chinese officials were at pains to reassure their guests that they understood their concerns about the Chinese currency and new “indigenous innovation” policies that foreign companies fear could lose them business. Mr Geithner said China's response on this had not fully allayed American worries, but was “progress”.

Much more reassurance will be needed from both sides in the America-China relationship. Mr Obama's line in his state-of-the-union speech in January that “I don't accept second place for the United States of America” caused quite a few ears in China to prick up. Unspectacular though the fruits of this week's dialogue were, a senior Treasury official defends the need for such meetings. They will, he says, raise the chance that China will decide to operate within the global system rather than build its own alternative way of pursuing its interests. The Americans live in hope.