China and the United States, Part 2 - Countries' relationship as complex as ever
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The steadily downward trend in Sino-American relations was to be at least partially halted as a result of geopolitical and political developments, two in particular.
The first was the fact that the 1960s had seen a major falling out between the Soviet Union and China. The relationship had never been an easy one but was to break down completely in the midst of a war of words over communist ideology. Leaders on both sides condemned each other in the most vituperative terms for deserting the true path of Marxism-Leninism. And the two sides came to blows in a brief border war. What this all meant in geopolitical terms was that the unity of the communist camp of nations had been badly fractured and that China was now more isolated than ever, its only remaining adherent being tiny Albania.
The second development was the accession to office in Washington of Richard Nixon and of his National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. Among Nixon's numerous qualities and shortcomings was a well-earned reputation for being rabidly anti-communist. No matter what initiatives he took in relations with the Soviet Union or China, no American right-winger could accuse him of being "soft on communism." This was important in what was to unfold. So, too, was the fact that Kissinger was a noted academic theorist of the balance of power in international relations.
From the perspective of Nixon and Kissinger, the Soviet Union represented a direct threat to the security and interests of the United States, whereas China did not. Perhaps a more favourable balance of power could be achieved for the United States by reaching an accommodation with China. From the Chinese perspective, the idea had two merits. It would help put an end to China's isolation and would provide a useful bulwark against the Soviet Union. For both countries, it represented the triumph of the old adage "the enemy of my enemy is my friend."
And so in 1972, after months of secret negotiations, the almost incredible occurred: President Nixon paid an official visit to Beijing, where he was warmly greeted by Chairman Mao. The Nixon visit ushered in a new era in relations. The two countries eventually established full diplomatic relations and ceased to demonize each other in their public pronouncements. The United States put paid to its policy of trying to isolate China and allowed it to take its seat in the United Nations. During the 1970s and 1980s, exchanges of visits at the political level became almost routine, the trading relationship increased apace, and thousands of Chinese students were sent to American colleges and universities. And in what was perhaps the most extraordinary breakthrough of all, the two governments agreed to co-operate in the sensitive field of intelligence, with the Chinese allowing the Americans to set up monitoring stations on their territory to replace those that the United States had lost in Iran following the fall of the Shah.
Despite these positive developments, the relationship was to be far from problem-free. It would continue to be held hostage by two enduring issues: Taiwan and human rights.
Even after establishing full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, the United States continued to maintain its 1955 treaty of friendship and alliance with Taiwan, despite the strong objections of the Chinese government, which regards Taiwan as a province of China. Every time the American government announces the sale of modern military equipment to Taiwan, the announcement is greeted by vociferous protests by the Chinese government and frequently by the cancellation of planned official visits in both directions. The United States, for its part, is prone to issuing strong warnings to Beijing whenever it seems to be gearing up for military action against Taiwan. Thus, in 1996, President Clinton dispatched an aircraft carrier battle group to the Taiwan Straits in a clear warning to China not to attack Taiwan. And, of course, the Taiwan issue is not likely to go away any time soon. It remains a red flag to Chinese nationalists and to the Taiwan lobby in Washington.
The second Achilles heel in the relationship is the issue of human rights. China's rather lamentable record in this field is the subject of almost constant criticism by American politicians, journalists and academics, some of whom advocate the termination of virtually all relations with China to protest its human rights violations. While the American government is usually able to manage such pressures through the exercise of quiet diplomacy in its dealings with the Chinese authorities, there are times when Chinese actions are sufficiently egregious to make this impossible, e.g. at the time of the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. The Chinese, for their part regard any criticism of their human rights record as highly offensive and a totally unacceptable form of interference in their internal affairs. They certainly do not consider that they have to listen to lectures by western countries responsible for the Atlantic slave trade and the Opium Wars. The chasm between the two sides on human rights is very deep, indeed, and the issue, like Taiwan, is unlikely to disappear soon.
The advent of the 21st century has seen some new elements injected into the relationship. In the process of becoming the world's second-largest economy, China has become a major trading partner for the United States, and by far its largest source of imports. American investments in China have grown significantly. Giant corporations such as General Motors and Ford have established large manufacturing plants there and see the Chinese market as holding a key to their future prosperity. What is more, Chinese banks now hold treasury bonds representing a not insignificant proportion of the United States' national debt. In brief, what is being created is a relationship of economic interdependence from which traders, manufacturers and consumers in both countries benefit. And there are strong lobbies in Washington that advocate ever deeper economic ties with China.
At the same time, there are elements in the U.S. Congress engaged in a campaign of China-bashing reminiscent of the Japan-bashing of the 1980s. They accuse China of undervaluing and manipulating its currency with the result that China enjoys large surpluses in its trade with the United States. They also accuse China of violating American intellectual property rights and of engaging in industrial espionage. Then there are American labour unions, which charge China with stealing American jobs in the manufacturing sector and which demand that their government take punitive protectionist measures against Chinese exports to the United States.
So much for new complexities in the economic arena. They are matched by new complexities in the political and military arenas. China's economic prosperity has allowed it to invest heavily in its military forces. The country's armed defence budget has increased by leaps and bounds over the past 20 years, rising from $31 billion in 1994 to $216 billion in 2014. These increased investments have led to impressive improvements in the equipment and training of all of China's armed forces. The growth in China's military power has been accompanied by signs of increased assertiveness in its region, particularly in its maritime boundary disputes with Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. These countries, as well as other neighbours of China such as India and Thailand, are distinctly apprehensive about the speed and dimension of China's military buildup.
These apprehensions are shared in many quarters in the United States, where fears are expressed that China may soon be able to challenge the United States' once-dominant position in the Asia-Pacific region. In response to this new reality, the United States has renewed or enhanced its security arrangements with Japan, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. The most recent review of U.S. defence policy concluded that it should attach a much higher priority to the Asia-Pacific region than to Europe. This was followed by President Obama's announcement of a "pivot to Asia," involving an increase in the deployment of American economic, diplomatic and military resources to the region.
But if there is apprehension in Washington, so, too, is there in Beijing. The Chinese see these recent American moves as little more than a hostile attempt to contain China, in much the same way as the United States sought to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War. For Chinese nationalists, this is anathema. Already nurtured on the story of the wrongs done to China by the United States in earlier centuries and unforgiving of American support for Taiwan, these nationalists see the United States as trying to deny China its rightful place in the world. And by all accounts, the nationalists are a rising force in China.
All of this suggests that despite the evidence of increased political and economic co-operation in the relationship, it is also a relationship mired in deep mutual suspicion. How will it evolve in future? Here the responses are distinctly varied.
At one end of the spectrum are those who predict that the rise of nationalist forces in China will lead inevitably to confrontation and conflict with the United States. At the opposite end of the spectrum are those who point to the fact that the Chinese leadership has placed the emphasis on domestic economic development, has eschewed foreign adventures and has pursued a prudent and pragmatic foreign policy. To adherents of this school of thought, the two countries will see it as being in their national interest to co-operate closely in ensuring a stable and peaceful world order. In between these two extremes are many others who see alternating periods of co-operation and testy competition, not devoid of crises. In this scenario, the two countries watch each other warily, ever on the lookout for an attempt by one to gain advantage at the expense of the other. Pushed to its extreme, this can result in a game of geostrategic chicken, with important implications for international peace and security.
Which of these scenarios is the most likely to materialize? Anyone attempting a firm answer to this question has gifts of foresight that this lapsed historian does not possess.
Louis A. Delvoie is a Fellow in the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen's University.
