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Executive-secretary of the UN Climate Conference Yvo de Boer
Executive-secretary of the UN Climate Conference Yvo de Boer lets his frustration show on the final day of the summit. Photograph: Olivier Morin/AFP/Getty Images
Executive-secretary of the UN Climate Conference Yvo de Boer lets his frustration show on the final day of the summit. Photograph: Olivier Morin/AFP/Getty Images

Copenhagen climate failure blamed on 'Danish text'

This article is more than 13 years old
The UN's climate change chief blamed a secret draft treaty, leaked to the Guardian, for the summit failure

Drip by drip, the full story is emerging of last December's global diplomatic debacle in Copenhagen, when instead of setting the world on a new low carbon path and tackling climate change, 130 world leaders ended up with a weak deal and no prospect of a binding agreement for another 18 months.

The latest revelations come from the man at the very heart of the debacle, UN climate chief Yvo de Boer. Normally the model of a discreet and guarded international bureaucrat, his confidential letter of explanation to his colleagues, written only days after the meeting ended, displays a mix of bemusement, clarity and exasperation. "How could several years of negotiation and high level diplomacy be allowed to end up this way?", he asks. The letter appears in a new Danish book by journalist Per Meilstrup.

His letter puts the blame squarely on Danish PM Lars Løkke Rasmussen and his presidency of the summit. He identifies the war which had been going on between Rasmussen's office and Danish climate chief Connie Hedegaard's team in the energy ministry. Hedegaard stood down halfway through the summit.

The key event, he suggests, was Rasmussen's draft text. This, known widely as the "Danish text", was due to be wheeled out just when the talks reached a deadlock, as they were bound to do. The trouble was, implies De Boer, the text was clearly advantageous to the US and the west, would have steamrollered the developing countries, and was presented to a few countries a week before the meeting officially started.

De Boer, the experienced diplomat, could see the Danish text it would be a disaster and says that the UN tried desperately to stop it but failed. Within days the worst had happened. The text had been leaked to the Guardian, put on the internet and had outraged the 157-odd countries who had not seen it. From then on, the meeting was polarised.

"[the Danish text] destroyed two years of effort in one fell swoop. All our attempts to prevent the paper happening failed. The meeting at which it was presented was unannounced and the paper [was] unbalanced," wrote De Boer.

But De Boer much further, describing the diplomatic abyss that was opening up as the "most un-transparent backroom dealing I have ever seen" and admitting for the first time that having 130 or more heads of state at the meeting was a dreadful mistake.

"Inviting heads of state seemed like a good idea. But it seriously backfired. Their early arrival did not have the catalytic effect that was hoped for. The process became paralysed. Rumour and intrigue took over", he said.

But also leaked to Per Mielstrum, was the final Danish text, reworked after the leak to the Guardian. This was the Danish government's last-ditch attempt to put the talks back on track. It was due to be tabled on the last Wednesday of the summit, but by that time it was too late. According to Mielstrum, who interviewed most of the leading players, Denmark had by then lost the trust of rich and poor countries.

Mielstrum says: "The developing countries did not want to negotiate a text, which they, tactically or honestly, said would be "just another Danish text" like the one leaked to the Guardian in the beginning of the summit. Denmark's closest allies from the US, the UK and the EU - Stern, Miliband and Carlgreen of the EU - also rejected the tabling. The three had a meeting with the presidency in the evening, where they warn against tabling the text.

"This was called "the fatal wound" in the Danish delegation, and one official said: 'Our friends abandoned us'. The text had been prepared through more than a year and had cost enormous amounts of energy in the Danish government. It was the jewel in the crown of the presidency's strategy - but was never used," said Mielstrum.

The irony, he says, "is that the text is quite good and balanced. If it had been presented and been the basis for negotiations from Wednesday and on, it might actually have led to a significant and successful outcome of the [summit] and a much stronger outcome than The Copenhagen Accord."

Extracts from the confidential letter sent by UN climate chief Yvo de Boer to "colleagues and friends" in the UN in the days after the Copenhagen climate change summit ended

Per Meilstrup's Climate Wars, the runaway summit is published by People's press. The website also hosts de Boer's letter and the final Danish text documents.


Everyone recognised that CoP15 would be significant. This led to a heightened sense of nervousness among Parties [countries] throughout the year. A few unfortunate moves aside, The Danish Presidency managed to build quite a lot of trust in spite of this. At the pre-CoP there was, I think, broad support for a package of decisions that would lay the foundation for the subsequent adoption of a new legal instrument under the Convention and something close to consensus on a second Kyoto period.

The Danish paper presented at an informal meeting a week before the CoP destroyed two years of effort in one fell swoop. All our attempts to prevent this paper happening failed. The meeting at which it was presented was unannounced and the paper unbalanced. It also revealed that there were two schools of thought within the Danish Presidency.

Earlier references to a politically binding agreement (an oxymoron if ever I saw one) had already heightened nervousness. Now it became clear that a comprehensive package was perhaps not everyone's view of a desirable outcome. Subsequent announcements of papers that never came but still some saw, had two significant impacts.

First delegates were ready to embrace enthusiastically what they had thus far resisted: text from Michael and John. This attempt by Parties to get things back under their control had two important consequences. First it gave us two documents (or sets of documents) that we can continue to work with. Secondly suspicion that something else was being cooked behind the scenes, the early arrival of Ministers and the launch of a process among a small number of Heads of state paralysed the ability of Parties to make advances on the key political issues in the informal plenary and some of the contact groups. Smaller group meetings did not enjoy consensus. Ministers had turned their attention to their Heads of state. The focus of the process shifted. The first layer broke down.

The second layer was mixed with the first. It centred around a view from within the [Danish] PM's office that the outcome of the CoP should be a declaration rather than a package of decisions. Although a second Danish paper never formally saw the light of day at the beginning of the second week, consolations were taking place. The announcement of the Prime Minister taking-over [from Connie Hedegaard], shifted attention away from the formal process. 24 hours were lost in trying to establish some kind of small group process. When Connie finally managed to arrange a meeting with the G77 on how to proceed, the process under the PM had taken over.

Another 12 hours had passed, the PM finally managed to bring a small group together. This group was built around the Copenhagen Commitment Circle, a small number of HoS [Heads of State] that had been regularly discussing progress in the run-up to the CoP. Seeing that further work in this group would undermined trust and transparency even more, the PM backed away from taking further initiative.

The third layer consisted of a small number of countries trying to rescue the CoP and still achieve a result. Bilateral and trilateral consultations among Parties did not lead to a coherent way forward and the PM was asked to take control again. This he did by bringing together the 30 or so countries that brokered the Accord.

Our attempts to create a basis for discussion that would advance agreement on 1/CoP15 and 1/CMO5 failed. The text was silent on the future of the Kyoto protocol and any reference to a future legally binding instrument. Through a disorganised and ill-directed sherpa process a document emerged that became the Accord. Frantic behind the scenes diplomacy by major countries let to its ultimate adoption in a small circle.

By then we had the Friday informal High Level Event behind us. A small group of countries, reflecting a much broader discontent with the process, made it clear that they would not accept a backroom deal brokered by the super powers. Not enough was done to sell the Accord, especially within the G77. When it reached the plenary, attempts to get regional groups to discuss it failed. Complete chaos resulted.

Here we reached the very edge of the abyss. Although here was by then almost universal support to adopt the Accord, hammering it through against consensus would have created mass protest. Attempts to overrule this would have destroyed the credibility of the process. Consensus may be difficult to achieve, but if it is what you have, it must be respected.

The Lumumba [Di-Aping, G77 spokesperson] effect then kicked-in. The outrageous statements [which he made] prompted many Parties to take the floor and say they were in fact willing to accept the Accord as an outcome. I think it took about five hours to get through the worst plenary I can remember and finally a decision was take to note the Accord.

Does this spell the end of the UNFCCC process? That is what many were saying. Parties that participate in the most un-transparent backroom dealing I have ever seen are certainly expression frustration at their failure to force a stronger result. Over time I hope they will see this failure as a blessing.

Democracy is time consuming and can be frustrating, but it builds a stronger future. We have an incredible architecture under the UNFCCC and attempts to reconstruct it among a smaller circle could take a decade. Investing in managing our process properly is a better way to go.

Inviting HoS seemed like a good idea, but it seriously backfired. Their early arrival as well as that of Ministers did not have the catalytic effect hoped-for. The process became paralysed. Rumour and intrigue took over.

What I have written is only the tip of the iceberg. Much more went on. As I said, we need to think this through more deeply and learn from it. But let's do that after a good rest!

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