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Two reports recommend the US government changes development and diplomacy policies. Photograph: Brendan Smialowski/Getty Images
Two reports recommend the US government changes development and diplomacy policies. Photograph: Brendan Smialowski/Getty Images

Diplomacy and development, working together in the US

This article is more than 13 years old
Two studies on the US government recommend different branches work in tandem along with other donor nations to make aid more effective and efficient

For the past 18 months, various sections of the US government have been engaged in two important studies that may have profound effects on how the country interacts with the world. Now that they have been released, we can assess what they mean for US diplomacy and for development programmes.

Many observers believe these studies set Washington on the right course. While I agree, I also believe more clarity is needed with regard to how the US partners with other donor nations to address development needs. This is especially important given that both reviews advocate that programmes be more focused and selective.

The subjects of the two studies cover different ground. The Presidential Study Directive (PSD-7), led by the National Security Council (NSC), focused on development and how to better manage the activities of more than two dozen government agencies. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), was led by the state department and USAid to look at how diplomacy and development can work together more effectively. It was leaked ahead of schedule last month.

The studies came about because of the recognition that US diplomacy and development strategies need to adjust to a world filled with new threats, new players and new ways of engaging with friends and foes alike. "Fitness for purpose" has been a popular term in London that has not yet caught on in Washington. One can make the argument that US agencies remain fit for the purpose of cold war dynamics, but have not adapted to current conditions. The QDDR does a fine job of identifying 21st century threats and trying to craft diplomatic and development responses. It falls down on the job of how to implement the rhetoric.

For example, with regard to development, the QDDR does not provide a clear sense of how the US will work with other donors in effective and efficient ways. The threats it identifies – terrorism, nuclear proliferation, economic disruptions, climate change, cyber security, international crime and disease pandemics – are certainly shared by everyone. And development is accepted as a way to ameliorate their effects. Working with other donors and with poor countries seems a smart way of doing business.

US policy-makers recognise this. The Obama administration's global development policy, a product of the NSC's study, references an international division of labour. At a time when global economic uncertainty is causing donors to re-evaluate their budgets, it seems that partnering is not just smart but essential.

Some European policy-makers have raised the subject of working with the US through a division of labour, modelled either within or among sectors, or on specific initiatives. The premise is that donors have specific strengths, or comparative advantages, that can be leveraged to support development advances. The QDDR does not provide much help in identifying Washington's comparative advantages, even though it boldly states what those advantages are – food security, global health, climate change, democracy and governance, sustainable economies and humanitarian assistance. The list strikes many as areas in which the US wants to engage, and may in fact overestimate those areas in which the US really leads. It does not match the rhetoric of being more focused on what we do and more selective about where we do it.

On the other hand, to be a reliable partner with developing countries and donor nations, the US must get its own house in order – and the QDDR takes us in that direction. The document articulates commitments to strengthen USAid and to sensitise diplomats to the important role of development. Much of this is through internal reforms with regard to hiring, training and technology. It also tackles how to improve co-ordination within the government. US ambassadors will now be in charge and accountable for an interagency process that produces country diplomacy and development strategies. 

But this should be taken one step further. Ambassadors should also be empowered to devise integrated, country-based, multi-donor strategies that reflect shared responsibilities. Such an approach would require a meeting of minds among governments as an idea worth pursuing. It would need an agreement by donor governments to push a division-of-labour model down to the field even while there is a scheme from above on the objectives, sectors or initiatives that would form such a partnership. 

If that were one of the outcomes of these two studies of development, the world would be well served.

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