Hard power, soft power: India should apply the latter vis-à-vis China

Adding more firepower to the US pivot to Asia, the American navy just commissioned its largest and most technologically advanced destroyer. The $4.4 billion USS Zumwalt is a stealth destroyer that is clearly designed to shock and awe. It’s extremely difficult to spot on radar, equipped with an advanced power plant and weapon system, has a large flight deck to enable operations with new F-35 fighters and MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, and boasts of the ability to accommodate weapons of the future such as electronic rail guns and laser.

In short, the USS Zumwalt is a mean machine. And guess where it will be deployed – the Pacific theatre. In fact, this was confirmed by US defence secretary Ashton Carter way back in April when he had asserted that all three of the planned Zumwalt class of stealth destroyers would be assigned to the Pacific as part of the rebalance of US forces to the region to promote stability and counter China.

Taken together with the deployment of America’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system in South Korea, the Zumwalt will add considerable muscle to US strategic operations in East Asia. Given this scenario, is it really irrational on the part of China to feel it is being cornered by the US? I am not making a moral judgment here. I am merely pointing out that the US has taken a set of initiatives to significantly enhance its presence and power projection in East Asia. This includes the deployment of state-of-the-art military hardware, securing access to five military bases in the Philippines, boosting freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, and enhancing military coordination with Japan and South Korea.

Against this backdrop, is it not rational for China to respond appropriately with its own set of strategic initiatives? After all, every country will look out for its own strategic interests. Which brings me to my next point about the strategic equation between India and China. Understandably, New Delhi has been frustrated by Beijing’s refusal to support its stand on Pakistan-based terrorism. But trying to publicly pressure Beijing over this will achieve little in the given scenario. This is because we can’t expect to browbeat an economy that is five times bigger than us. Secondly, at a time when China feels certain countries are trying to constrain it, Beijing will be less inclined to “give in” to Indian demands which can be construed as loss of face.

In this scenario, India has to gradually induce China into accepting the fact that not taking action against Pakistan-based terrorism is detrimental for everyone in the neighbourhood. And this can be achieved through greater dialogue and boosting bilateral economic cooperation to an extent that will dwarf the China-Pakistan economic relationship. In fact, China is open to this as indicated by it during the recent BRICS summit in Goa where it agreed that the bilateral trade deficit can be rectified through greater Chinese investments in India.

Lastly, we must realise that China has bigger issues to deal with than us. It is trying to effect a very tricky economic transition in the face of rising labour wages and a growing Chinese middle class speaking out against domestic anomalies. Simultaneously, it is trying to wade off the pressure being exerted by the US and its allies in East Asia. In such circumstances, and based on our own strategic depth, it makes far more sense for New Delhi to seduce Beijing to its point of view. We shouldn’t try to apply hard pressure of our own – this simply won’t be effective – as the US is already doing that vis-à-vis China. Instead, we should take advantage of the situation and enhance our dealings with China to get it to see things our way on Pakistan.