What Changed When Everything Changed

9/11 AND THE MAKING OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

Yale UNIVERSITY PRESS

Contents

Excerpt

CHAPTER 1

"What the United States of AmericaIs All About at Our Core"

I

A CAMPAIGN THAT SEEMED ENDLESS WAS at last coming to a close. On October11, 2000, Texas Governor George W. Bush and Vice President Al Goretook their seats at a table on the stage of Wait Chapel at Wake Forest Universityin Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for their second presidential debate.The event was billed as a conversation, with Jim Lehrer, the polishedpublic television anchor, as the moderator. He took the candidates throughan eclectic assortment of national issues, from gay marriage to educationreform. On foreign policy, Lehrer asked how the rest of the world shouldview the United States. "It really depends," Bush said, "upon how our nationconducts itself in foreign policy. If we're an arrogant nation, they'llresent us. If we're a humble nation, but strong, they'll welcome us." Goreagreed. The "idea of humility is an important one," he said, but humilitywas not enough. America had to have "a sense of mission in the world." Itsstatus as the world's only superpower created an obligation to "project thepower for good that America can represent."

Midway through the event, Lehrer asked the candidates whether theywould support a federal law banning racial profiling at all levels of government."Yes, I would," Gore answered. "I think that racial profiling is a seriousproblem.... Imagine what it—what it is like for someone to be singledout unfairly, unjustly, and feel the unfair force of law simply because of raceor ethnicity. Now, that runs counter to what the United States of Americais all about at our core." Gore promised that as president, he would make alaw banning racial profiling "the first Civil Rights Act of the 21st century."Bush agreed. "I can't imagine what it would be like to be singled out becauseof race and stopped and harassed. That's just flat wrong, and that'snot what America is all about. And so we ought to do everything we canto end racial profiling." But he went farther. The problem, he said, wasnot just in law enforcement. "It's an issue throughout our society. Andas we become a diverse society, we're going to have to deal with it moreand more. Arab-Americans," he said, "are racially profiled in what is calledsecret evidence"—a reference to the use of secret evidence in immigrationproceedings. "My friend Senator Spencer Abraham of Michigan is pushinga law to make sure that Arab-Americans are treated with respect." Bushplaced his confidence in the decency of the American people. "I believe, assure as I'm sitting here, that most Americans really care. They're tolerantpeople. They're good, tolerant people. It's the very few that create most ofthe crises, and we just have to find them and deal with them."

Bush's remarks were part of a calculated strategy. Longtime Republicanactivist Grover Norquist, who was advising the campaign, understood thatmany American Arabs and Muslims were social and fiscal conservativeswho were uncomfortable with the Democratic platform on issues like abortion,gay rights, and tax policy. He also knew that the Democratic ticket wasstaunchly pro-Israel. When Lehrer asked a question about the Middle East,Gore's first words were, "Well, we stand with Israel." Bush, by contrast,said that any lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians must "begood for both sides." He pledged to work with moderate Arab states likeEgypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait; Gore never mentioned an Arabnation except to demand that Syria release three recently captured Israelisoldiers. Norquist also knew that Muslims were the fastest-growing religiousgroup in America. Though reliable numbers are hard to come by,some estimates put their number at six million, concentrated in such keybattleground states as Michigan, Illinois, and Florida.

The Bush campaign's strategy to woo Muslim and Arab-American votersfixed on two issues: racial profiling and the use of secret evidence inimmigration proceedings. The latter was the subject of a bill introducedby Senator Spencer Abraham, a cofounder of the conservative legal groupthe Federalist Society. In 2000, as the only Arab-American in the Senate,Abraham had introduced the Repeal Secret Evidence Act, which wouldhave barred the Immigration and Naturalization Service from deportinga person based on undisclosed evidence. Many in the Arab-American andMuslim communities believed the INS used such evidence to discriminateagainst Muslim and Arab immigrants. Parallel legislation had been introducedin the House by David Bonior (D-MI). By the time of the presidentialdebate, Bonior's bill had one hundred cosponsors from both sides ofthe aisle. The ACLU had warmly supported both the Abraham and Boniorbills. Three days after the debate, Gore added his support.

The bipartisan political sentiment mirrored the consensus within society.Americans were overwhelmingly opposed to racial profiling. A 1999Gallup poll, for instance, showed that eight in ten whites and nearly ninein ten African-Americans were opposed to the practice. Mindful of thisconsensus, the Republican camp correctly judged that Bush could appealto conservative Muslims and Arab-Americans on an issue that mattereddeeply to them while also appealing to moderates and independents whowere worried that he might be too conservative. He worked hard to implementthis strategy during the campaign. He issued a statement entitled"Governor George W. Bush's Record of Inclusion." Regarding secret evidence,he said he was "troubled" that "new immigrants, often Arab or Muslimimmigrants, face deportation or even imprisonment based on evidencethey've never seen and never been able to dispute. That's not the Americanway." While Bush agreed that national security was "of course the foremostconsideration," he insisted that a legitimate concern about national security"doesn't justify a disregard for fairness, dignity, or civil rights."

Days before the debate, Bush had met with more than two dozen Arab-Americanand Muslim leaders in Dearborn, Michigan. Located on thebanks of the River Rouge southwest of Detroit, Dearborn is the center ofArab-American life in the United States. Nearly 30 percent of the city's100,000 residents are of Arab descent, by far the highest concentrationin any American city. In this meeting as well, Bush had pledged to endethnic profiling and the use of secret evidence. He named Khaled Saffuri,the deputy director of the American Muslim Council, to be the campaign'snational adviser on Arab and Muslim affairs. He sent his top national securityadviser, Condoleezza Rice, to meet with another delegation of Muslimand Arab-American leaders. At the Republican National Conventionin Philadelphia, Talat Othman, a third-generation Muslim-American andbusinessman from Chicago, closed one session by offering the duaa, aMuslim prayer of benediction. It was the first Muslim benediction ever offeredat a major party's national convention.

These efforts paid off. Barely two weeks before the election, the politicalaction committee of the American Muslim Political Coordination Council—anumbrella organization made up of the four largest Muslim organizationsin the country—formally endorsed Bush for president. Dr. AghaSaeed, head of the council, praised Bush for taking "the initiative to meetwith local and national representatives of the Muslim community. He alsopromised to address Muslim concerns on domestic and foreign policy issues."Dr. Yayha Basha, president of the American Muslim Council, saidBush had shown an "elevated level of concern in regards to secret evidenceand airport profiling and bringing it to the national political debate." Onelection day, Muslims sided with the GOP in record numbers, by some accountsfavoring Bush over Gore by a ratio of 8:1. In Florida, a state Bushcarried by only 537 votes, some polling data showed that 80 to 90 percent ofthe roughly 55,000 Muslim voters cast their lot with Bush. In an article inthe American Spectator, Norquist boasted that "George W. Bush was electedPresident of the United States of America because of the Muslim vote."

Muslim and Arab-American groups celebrated Bush's victory and lookedforward to movement on racial profiling and secret evidence as well asgreater presidential access. Their hopes were buoyed as Bush filled outhis cabinet. Senator Abraham, who had lost his reelection campaign, wasnamed secretary of energy. Khaled Saffuri landed a position in the WhiteHouse. The day after Bush was sworn into office, a group of prominent Republicans,including Newt Gingrich, John Sununu, and Grover Norquist,met with representatives of the Muslim community to discuss secret evidencelegislation, the role of the Muslim community in the election, andbringing Muslims into the Bush White House. Signs remained positive asthe administration settled in. In an address to a joint session of Congresson February 27, President Bush said that "too many of our citizens havecause to doubt our Nation's justice when the law points a finger of suspicionat groups instead of individuals. All our citizens are created equal andmust be treated equally." Bush said he had charged Attorney General JohnAshcroft with developing "specific recommendations to end racial profiling.It's wrong, and we will end it in America." Days later, Ashcroft said hewas "very eager" to answer the president's call.

In June, Democrats in both houses of Congress introduced the EndRacial Profiling Act. In July, in videotaped remarks to the NAACP, PresidentBush repeated that "racial profiling is wrong, and it must be ended inAmerica." In August the Senate held hearings on the pending legislation.Even opponents of the bill spoke in favor of ending racial profiling. SenatorOrrin Hatch (R-UT) said, "Racial profiling is an issue that has generatedwidespread public concern. Fortunately, unlike many of the issues weconfront here in Washington, there has emerged a consensus concerningthe fundamental point of the debate. Racial profiling, also known as bias-basedpolicing, is wrong, it is unconstitutional, and it must not be practicedor tolerated." In addition, Muslim leaders were eager to meet with thenew president. They wanted to remind him of their support and hold himto his campaign promises. Twice the meeting was scheduled, and twiceput off. Finally, it was set for a Tuesday afternoon in the second week ofSeptember. The president would be flying up from Florida and would meetwith the group at 3:30. But the September 11 meeting never took place, andwhen it was finally rescheduled, the president's priorities, like those of thenation, had changed.

II

We are often told that September 11 "changed everything." But this isa sentiment more repeated than explained. The so-called war on terrorhas now entered its second decade. It has lasted more than twice as longas either the Civil War or the Second World War, and more than five timesas long as our involvement in the First World War. Yet aside from the occasionaldramatic event—the killing of Osama bin Laden, for instance—terrorno longer dominates the news. By the time Barack Obama waselected, only 2 percent of the population ranked terrorism as the most importantproblem facing the country, and by late 2011, the fraction had fallento fewer than one in a hundred. Americans do not much fear another attack(though that would no doubt change if one were to occur), and it is no longernecessary for people to form judgments about a post-9/11 world in anemotional state (though some still do). Enough time has passed for peopleto have taken the long second look.

Having taken that look, we may ask how September 11 has changed "whatthe United States is all about at our core," as Vice President Gore put it inthe 2000 debate at Wake Forest. How have these attacks altered the meaningand content of our shared national values? How have they changed thestories we tell that give these values their shape and substance—storiesabout immigrants and diversity; about membership and belonging; abouttolerance and dignity? In the hundreds of books written about September11, these questions have largely escaped attention.

Answering them requires that we take a very different look at post-9/11debates. Many writers have studied what politicians and other cultural leadershave said. Vice President Cheney's infamous line that September 11would carry us to "the dark side" has been endlessly reprised and providedthe title of a best-selling book. But few writers have examined how thesedebates have been linked to different visions of "what America is all about,"as Governor Bush said in the 2000 debate. To do this, we must have a veryclear understanding of how national identity comes into being.

Many people seem to believe that American national identity is a fixedcondition, timeless and unchanging since the Founding. That is certainlyhow it is described by our political leaders. "We believe in and fight for ourprinciples," Jimmy Carter said in 1980, "and they'll never change." Carterwas certainly right that Americans "fight for" their principles, but they alsofight over what those principles mean and entail. National identity takesshape as these contests resolve themselves in the public square and wesettle, if only for a time, on how our shared values and traditions will beexpressed. National identity, in other words, is dynamic. It depends vitallyon which arguments and constructions about American life acquire theexalted status of common sense.

Consider, for example, the idea of America as a Judeo-Christian nation,with its unmistakable implication that national identity is more closelyconnected to certain religious traditions than others. Today this idea is sodeeply embedded in the national consciousness that if we think about itat all, we might imagine that leaders in the United States have always describedthe country in these terms. Yet until the middle of the twentiethcentury, the expression would have struck most Americans as bizarre andmany as blasphemous. As a term used to describe the values and beliefsshared by Jews and Christians, it originated in the 1930s and did not appearin presidential remarks until late 1952, when President-Elect Eisenhowerfamously pronounced that "our form of government has no sense unless itis founded in a deeply felt religious faith, and I don't care what it is. With usof course it is the Judeo-Christian concept but it must be a religion that allmen are created equal." Thus the many people who bristled at the insistenceby President Bush and other cultural leaders right after September 11that Islam is a third partner in our national religious heritage were clingingnot to a timeless reality of American life but to a recent creation.

This example helps illuminate something important. Because it is impossibleto understand after without a keen understanding of before, ourtask requires that we give considerable thought to national identity as ithad taken shape by the end of the twentieth century. Yet with notable exceptions,this too has been overlooked in the vast literature on September 11.Instead, the attacks have led to a great many studies of American behaviorduring periods of armed conflict. We became much more familiar with thesentiment that led to the internment of Japanese-Americans during theSecond World War and the suppression of dissent during and immediatelyafter the First World War. The thought was that we are most apt to overreactimmediately after a crisis begins, and that this impulse could perhaps berestrained by careful attention to past crises. Writers turned their worriedgaze to these moments in the hope that inquiry into the past could preventmisery in the present.

But scholars also studied these periods out of a sincere belief that momentsof real or perceived threat (even those separated by decades or centuries)have more in common with one another than with periods of relativecalm (even when calm and chaos are separated only by the time it takes for aplane to crash into a building). And it is certainly true that, at least on occasion,post-9/11 rhetoric seemed to echo the language of earlier times, skippingacross the years like a rock skipping across a pond. Only the propernouns were new. Yet there is something intuitively unsatisfying about thisapproach to history. It imagines that the American response to threat issomehow free-floating, cast loose from time and place and uninfluencedby existing beliefs and social arrangements. It supposes, for example, thatwe can learn more about Congress's decision to suspend the writ of habeascorpus in 2006 by examining the suspensions during the Civil War—madeunder the leadership of a very different president during a very differentwar at a very different moment in our history—than we can by studying"peacetime" events during the second half of the twentieth century, whichcollectively shaped the worldview of the actors who suspended the writ in2006.

This approach to history is dangerously incomplete. The response to realor imagined crisis in the United States has always been shaped by a numberof factors that vary substantially over the years. For one thing, Americanpolicy makers always believe they are acting in conformity with the nation'svalues; but as I will stress throughout, the meaning and content of thosevalues has never been etched in stone. National identity is forever a workin progress. The response to crisis will be governed in very large part bywhat those ideals mean at the time of the response. The internment of theJapanese during the Second World War, for instance, was made substantiallyeasier by the fact that "equality" meant something very different in1941 than it does today. A nation at home with Jim Crow while at peace,with its rigorously enforced insistence on second-class status for African-Americans,was not likely to be particularly troubled by legally enforceddiscrimination against Japanese-Americans while at war.
(Continues...)Excerpted from What Changed When Everything Changed by JOSEPH MARGULIES. Copyright © 2013 by Joseph Margulies. Excerpted by permission of Yale UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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