A Resource Guide to Public Diplomacy Evaluation

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INTRODUCTION

When it comes to public diplomacy (PD), the experts can’t seem to agree on much. Forty-six years after Edmund Gullion, U.S. Ambassador and Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, coined the term, there is still no widely accepted definition of PD. Some writers conflate the terms “strategic communication” and “public diplomacy.” Others argue that there is a “conceptual convergence” of Public Relations (PR) and PD. Increasingly, experts talk about “PD 2.0,” or even a “new” public diplomacy, but like the old PD, they can’t seem to agree on what it is. There is, however, one aspect of PD about which everyone agrees—evaluating it is difficult, but important.

The events of September 11, 2001, crystallized attention on public diplomacy as a key element of diplomatic statecraft. With this came a greater focus on the issue of how to measure its success. In the decade since 9/11, governments have struggled to put in place a “professional” (i.e., comprehensive, systematic, and independent) evaluation regime. These efforts, halting at first, have gathered steam in recent years. So too has the literature on PD evaluation. More has probably been written on this topic in the last ten years than in all the years since Ed Gullion’s lexical inspiration. This guide reviews the scope and status of the field of PD evaluation and offers a list of resources for those who wish to know more about the subject. The author hopes that the guide will stimulate additional research by academics and practitioners alike on this key area of PD studies.
The bibliography is divided into 11 sections, with the number of bibliographic entries shown for each section. **Section One** offers the reader a framework for discussion of the challenges and importance of PD evaluation. The fourteen entries in this section also introduce some of the key tools, terms, methods and priorities inherent in consideration of the topic. **Section Two** looks at the UK government’s approach to PD measurement. The writings here trace the evolution of the British Government’s thinking about public diplomacy generally and its evaluation efforts specifically. **Section Three** presents over forty works on how the U.S. government, in particular the Department of State (DOS), has tackled the issue of PD evaluation since passage in 1993 of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). The predominance of materials on USG evaluation efforts reflects the number and availability of English-language texts on the subject, the influence and importance of American debate on the issue, as well as the author’s familiarity with USG programs and practices.

**Sections 4-8** examine the individual programmatic elements of PD and the evaluation strategies and methodologies used to measure success in each. The section on **Exchange Programs** has the most entries, suggesting the longstanding and key role exchanges have played in government public diplomacy efforts. Two of the articles here, for instance, were published in 1955, when the post-war surge in government-sponsored exchanges, especially those involving the U.S., spurred questions about their effectiveness in advancing national interests. The section on **Cultural Programs**, on the other hand, has the fewest entries, perhaps not surprising given its reputation as one of the more difficult PD components to measure. Included here are pieces noting the sporadic support cultural programs have enjoyed over the years, particularly in the U.S., as well as two major evaluations of such programs undertaken by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA). **Section Six** contains articles on Information
Outreach and Media Agenda Setting, long a staple component of government PD, as well as works on private sector PR efforts and the metrics used for measuring their impact. Section Seven examines developments in gauging the impact of New Media, an area that seems certain to grow in coming years as more and more organizations, including governments, seek to use such media to engage with new audiences and as more sophisticated measurement technologies come on line. Section Eight focuses largely on U.S. and UK efforts to assess the effectiveness of their respective radio and TV International Broadcasting units, with a special emphasis on broadcasting to South Asia and the Middle East.

Section Nine features articles on the similarities and differences between PR and PD, the evaluative tools and methods they share in common, and on the oft-heard contention that the private sector can serve as a model for government in the area of performance measurement. The topic of Section Ten is the nexus of PD, Public Opinion, the Media, and Foreign Policy. The materials included here cannot do justice to this very broad subject area, but they can serve as an introduction to some of the themes and concepts that animate current discussion on the interplay among these actors. The bibliography concludes with a list of Websites relevant to the theory and practice of evaluation.

PD evaluation is a complex topic that reaches across several disciplinary boundaries and is susceptible to numerous different approaches, tools, and methods. Just as one size does not fit all in implementing a PD regime, there is no single right answer as to how that regime should be evaluated. That said, it is possible to draw from the accumulated wisdom in these readings some general conclusions about four key elements of PD evaluation: The Challenges and Benefits of PD Evaluation; The Administration of Evaluation; The Evaluation Process; and Issues that Warrant Further Research.
PART 1: THE CHALLENGES AND BENEFITS OF PD EVALUATION

Challenges—The Dirty Dozen

As noted earlier, there is little disagreement among experts about the difficulties inherent in measuring success in public diplomacy. The list of reasons why is a long one. Following are twelve of the most commonly heard laments—the “dirty dozen”:

1. **Impact can often be seen only over the long term.**

   This is certainly true in the case of exchanges, perhaps especially so with youth exchanges, but it is also an issue in other areas of public diplomacy programming. PD efforts by Government X may have played an important role, for example, in convincing a host government to pass legislation that supports its law enforcement policy priorities, but it may be several years before the real impact of that legislation becomes known.

2. **PD evaluation measures concepts that are intangible.**

   Documenting verifiable changes in awareness, perceptions, and attitudes requires a commitment of considerable time, effort, and skill. Doing so over a long period of time amplifies the challenge considerably.

3. **Results may not be directly attributable to PD intervention.**

   It is often difficult to draw a straight line of causation between a PD program and its desired result. Time, external events, and
other actors can intervene to complicate the cause-effect equation. What we are left with is trying to measure contribution, rather than attribution, a fuller discussion of which can be found in Part 3.

4. **Tracking elites is often not sustainable over time.**

   It’s axiomatic that the host-nation leaders the PD practitioner most wants to interact with are also the busiest. Getting them to agree to an interview, fill out a survey, or participate in a focus group is difficult. Getting them to do it over the course of several years or more for the purposes of a longitudinal study is truly daunting. Moreover, one has to be sensitive to the possibility that pursuing repeated evaluative follow-ups might lead key contacts to think they are mere specimens in some behavioral study rather than valued interlocutors and colleagues.

5. **Evaluation is time, labor, and cost intensive.**

   Comprehensive, independent evaluations of USG PD programs take an average of between 1-2 years to complete and cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. Reports suggest that contractor fees for such evaluations have risen dramatically since 2005. This raises the question of whether we will soon confront an evaluation-divide, where only the wealthier PD players can afford to carry out professional evaluations. Even those with resources may find themselves forced to cut back.

6. **Because professional PD evaluation is relatively new, baseline data often does not exist.**

   As governments have increasingly embraced the need to evaluate the success of their investment in PD, and as they have chosen the performance measures they will use to gauge that success, they have discovered that there is often no usable baseline data against which to assess progress toward their stated objectives. Gathering that data can be time-consuming and expensive.
7. **Changes in political leadership at home and in PD staff in the field can affect the continuity of evaluation regimes.**

New political leadership brings with it new programs and policies, as well as new approaches to performance measurement. What constituted a priority for one administration may be discarded in the next. Departments and agencies retain their “enduring missions,” but the individual initiatives they launch in support of that mission inevitably undergo change over time, as new leadership seeks to put its own stamp on programmatic activity. This phenomenon is repeated at the field level as heads of PD sections at diplomatic missions abroad rotate in and out at 2-3 year intervals, bringing with them new ideas and programs.

8. **The growing emphasis on multilateral, interagency, coalition and public-private partnership approaches to addressing global issues can complicate evaluation strategies.**

Getting everyone in one’s own office moving in the same direction is hard; getting people in other offices, agencies, sectors, or even countries on the same page is exponentially more difficult. Organizational cultures, missions, objectives, even jargon, are different and must be harmonized. As problems become more globalized, however, joint solutions will be required to resolve them. Measuring success in such an environment will likely demand new evaluative approaches.

9. **The proliferation of new media technologies requires new approaches to evaluation.**

Media changes today with lightning speed. Social media may pose a particular challenge in this regard. As one evaluation specialist said recently, “How do you measure something that didn’t exist 4 years ago and may not exist 4 years from now?” Also potentially vexing is integrating the work of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) and technologists.
10. **Institutions, government included, prefer success stories.**

   No organization likes to admit that one or more of its programs are ineffective. Prestige, funding, even jobs, are on the line. Fear of such consequences can lead to inaction, fudging, or even burying the results of a less than stellar evaluation.

11. **There is often confusion about the difference between outputs and outcomes.**

   Experts offer a number of different definitions of what constitutes an output and what separates an output from an outcome. The dividing line seems to hinge on the issue of control. This is discussed in more detail in Part 3 on The Evaluation Process.

12. **PD Evaluation has attracted limited academic attention**

   Such research is essential to providing a theoretical foundation for and devising new approaches to measuring PD performance. Governments should perhaps consider establishing academic advisory groups or funding academic research in order to accelerate the study and practice of PD evaluation. There is room, too, for establishing regular informal consultations with like-minded governments who are confronting the same issues related to PD evaluation.

**Benefits**

Despite the widely perceived difficulty of evaluating public diplomacy, there is little disagreement among PD analysts and practitioners about its importance. A strong evaluation regime can bring a number of clear benefits, including the following:
1. **Evaluation can lead to a better allocation of resources.**

   Governments can use evaluation to help establish funding priorities. Directing resources to programs that work and withholding them from those that don’t is important in normal budgetary times, and crucial in times of budget crisis.

2. **It can help organizations justify budget requests.**

   PD, at least in the U.S., has always seemed to suffer from cycles of budgetary boom or bust. Many analysts attribute this phenomenon to the fact that PD has not been able to establish a clear evidentiary record of success. A professional evaluation regime is key to producing such a record and to convincing governments and citizens alike that public funds are being well spent.

3. **Evaluation can reveal PD best practices.**

   Determining through evaluation which PD initiatives work and which don’t, and more importantly, why, can lead to the development of best practices. Once identified, governments must then devise ways to ensure that such practices are shared as widely as possible. These can include intranet message boards, cables to the field, and presentations at practitioner conferences. Tracking other posts’ adoption of a best practice to determine whether it has broader applicability would be a useful next step.

4. **It can motivate staff to improve performance.**

   Evaluation is often viewed by program staff as a control mechanism, or as a threat. If done as part of a professional evaluation regime, however, with every system, function, and program receiving scrutiny at regular intervals, and with incentives built into the process, it can serve to boost morale and the performance of both permanent staff and contractors.
5. **Evaluation can moderate inflated expectations of what PD can reasonably be expected to achieve.**

PD is not a magic bullet. It is often only as effective as the leaders and policies it supports. Expecting it to quickly reverse widely held negative attitudes is probably asking too much, especially given the limited resources PD practitioners often command. Evaluation, however, can help identify those audiences, areas, and circumstances where well-researched, well-funded, and innovative PD can reasonably be expected to produce positive results.

6. **If PD can be shown to produce concrete results, it can provide an alternative to the use of hard power.**

The history of PD, at least in the U.S., suggests it is valued more in times of war and crisis than it is in times of peace. It has often been, for example, one of the first casualties in the search for a “peace dividend,” one of the factors no doubt contributing to the boom or bust resource cycle mentioned above. If, however, PD can be shown to produce substantive results, it can stake a claim to not only more consistent funding but also a more significant role in foreign policy deliberations.

7. **Performance measurement can help build a domestic constituency for PD.**

Regrettably, a majority of the world’s citizens likely have but the vaguest idea of how an Embassy functions and what its staff of diplomats do every day; nor do they have much sense of what public diplomacy is. Perhaps this is to be expected. After all, most diplomatic activity occurs overseas and in secret. One consequence, however, is that diplomacy generally, and public diplomacy in particular, has no natural domestic constituency (another contributing factor to the budgetary boom or bust phenomenon). Demonstrating
effectiveness through evaluation, and then publicizing the results as often and widely as possible, can work toward building a public (and hopefully legislative) base of support.

8. Demonstrating effectiveness through evaluation can give PD a seat at the policymakers’ table.

Traditional definitions of PD focus on its role of building support for national policies among foreign audiences. PD, however, works best when it is involved not just in implementing and supporting policy, but also in its formulation. Demonstrating results through evaluation is PD’s ticket to the show.

9. Evaluation forces the PD practitioner to confront assumptions and to answer the “So What” question.

When asked the question, “Do exchanges enhance mutual understanding and build support for national policies?” the usual response is, “Of course they do.” The reality, however, revealed largely through evaluation, is much more complex and shaded, as a number of the entries in the section of this bibliography on exchanges amply demonstrates. Evaluation is also key to answering the “So what?” question. In today’s culture of measurement, it’s no longer enough to simply say that 400 people attended a fabulous outdoor jazz concert. PD practitioners must now try to find ways to capture the impact the event had on those lucky attendees.
PART 2: THE ADMINISTRATION OF PD EVALUATION

As noted earlier, professional PD evaluation is a relatively new field. The State Department commissioned a number of evaluations as a result of the growth of U.S.-sponsored exchanges, both academic and cultural, following World War II. Two reports on these post-war evaluative efforts, both written in 1955, are included in this bibliography. These early efforts at evaluation, however, did not lead to the development of a more systematic approach to performance measurement. Evaluation remained under-resourced and sporadic for the next nearly half century, with the anecdote reigning supreme as the primary method of recording program success.

Movement toward establishing a more systematic and professional PD evaluation regime began to gather steam in the U.S. only after September 2001. In the UK, it was the release of the Phillis Commission report on government communications in 2004 that led eventually to the Lord Carter Coles Report and a re-assessment of British PD and how to measure its performance. In both the U.S. and UK, progress toward setting up such a system has recently gained more traction, with each country taking significant, albeit different, approaches toward the creation of a “culture of measurement.”

Regardless of which approach an individual government selects, PD researchers and practitioners agree that there are key common factors that adhere to setting up and administering a successful evaluation regime. They are as follows:
Leadership Buy-In: Leaders must make clear at every opportunity that they value accountability through performance measurement. If the rank and file doesn’t believe that the leadership is serious about evaluation, the result will likely be a series of meaningless box-checking or CYA exercises that waste valuable time and money and benefit no one.

A Systematic Approach: Evaluation should be built into the organizational framework, not added on. This means that it is an integral part of PD program planning, design, and implementation, that employees at all levels of the organization understand their roles and responsibilities in the performance measurement process, and that evaluation results are shared broadly and acted upon.

A Strategic Plan for Evaluation: Just as many government agencies today have devised strategic plans to address their long-term objectives, so too should they consider adopting such plans solely for evaluation. A strategic evaluation plan can help add a measure of predictability to the evaluation cycle, prioritize limited resources, compel staff to look beyond the program horizon, and perhaps act as a hedge against shifting political winds.

Independent Evaluations: Hiring outside contractors to do evaluations is a time-consuming and, as noted earlier, increasingly costly venture. It requires drafting a detailed “Request for Proposal,” establishing an appropriate set of protocols for selecting the winning bid, and working with the firm hired to ensure that its staff fully understands the PD program’s purposes, processes, and goals. The principal benefit of an independent evaluation is that it helps insulate the contracting agency from the charge that the evaluative process somehow lacks fairness or objectivity. Today, almost all DOS PD program evaluations are carried out by independent contractors.
Clear, Measurable Objectives Connected to the Organizational Mission: While a seemingly obvious requirement, devising such objectives can be very difficult. Before the current era of professional evaluation especially, such objectives tended to be generic, high-minded, and vague statements of intent: e.g., “We will be a beacon of hope to the world’s poor.” Government PD evaluators today recognize the need for objectives that reflect their institution’s core mission and are both practical and measurable.

Training: Given the near-universal view among experts that PD evaluation is a challenge, we shouldn’t expect generalist field officers, or their local staff, to be up-to-date on the latest trends in the social and behavioral sciences, to know what a logic model is, or how to devise and implement an opinion survey. Often, field staff won’t even recognize a “result” they themselves have engineered. Training is the best way to ensure that employees know their role in the organization’s evaluative process, what data they are expected to gather, and the proper way to report it. To be effective, such training needs to be focused, intensive, and thorough and not, as one evaluator recently put it, offered for just an hour on a Friday afternoon as part of some other course.

Actionable Data: The data that is gathered as part of an evaluation should be used—whether to defend a budget, prioritize spending, spin a compelling narrative of success, or to improve program performance. To quote from the evaluator’s handbook, “If you don’t plan to use the data, don’t bother gathering it.”

Stakeholder Involvement: The data that is gathered should be end-user oriented and shared broadly with stakeholders, to include the organization’s senior leadership, program funders, staff charged with program implementation, external communications personnel, and interested outside parties, among others. One government PD department invites program stakeholders to a post-evaluation
workshop where they decide how to interpret the results and make the best use of them going forward. In this way, they get stakeholder buy-in for next-stage changes to the program.

**Adequate Resource Allocation:** Evaluation experts say that between 8-10% of the budget of any program should be invested in evaluation. Few organizations, inside or outside of government, meet this goal. Most programmers would prefer to spend that 10%, not on evaluation, but on another 2–3 youth exchange grantees or a second journalist training workshop. A recent survey of American NGOs involved in carrying out exchange programs, designed and implemented by a USC graduate student, found that 8% of respondents spent between 6–9% on evaluation, 44% spent between 1–3%, and another 44% had no idea how much they spent. The Gates Foundation is on the other end of the spectrum, spending a reported 15% on performance measurement. With the cost of independent contract evaluations spiraling in the U.S., we may begin to see more in-house evaluations, and/or a move away from qualitative to more quantitative instruments in an effort to cut costs.

**Audience Research:** The end game in PD is finding and reaching the desired audience, regardless of whether one is trying to inform, advocate, listen, or connect. This has become more important as the spread of democracy has given more people a voice in government, as new non-state actors gain influence, and as developments in communications technologies offer increased access to information and more avenues for direct, non-mediated communication. Of course, such positive developments bring in their wake obstacles for the PD practitioner—increasingly fractured audiences; a vast cyber clutter that requires innovation and pizzazz to penetrate, qualities governments aren’t particularly noted for; the growing potential for viral mis- and dis-information; the potential loss of message control; and a news cycle that churns out policy challenges 24–7. Some scholars argue that audience research should be used at every step
of program implementation, but few institutions, public or private, have the staff or financing to implement such practices, especially on a global scale. Nonetheless, PD programming without some effort to identify and research the target audience is akin to throwing darts in the dark.

**Talking the Walk:** Many organizations, government PD shops included, talk the talk on evaluation, but few walk the walk. Even those that do need to take one additional step: they need to “talk the walk.” In short, PD evaluation units need to do their own public diplomacy. They should distribute evaluation results widely, both internally and externally; engage in constant dialogue with leadership, funders and stakeholders; and insist that every public address or congressional testimony by a senior official include some gem culled from a recent evaluation.

**Declassification:** Talking the walk for a government agency requires an additional measure of transparency, which can best be accomplished through declassification of evaluation results. If that can’t be done, for whatever reason, unclassified versions should be made public. No PD agency can expect to be rewarded with more resources or to build a strong domestic constituency if it hides its success behind a wall of official secrecy.

**Embedding:** PD organizations seeking to set up a professional evaluation regime often find that in-house performance measurement expertise is in short supply. One way to overcome this deficit is to embed staff on the contract evaluation team. This can serve as an effective way to transfer skills and build staff capacity for the long term.

**Evaluating the Evaluators:** Regular evaluations of the evaluation unit are essential, not only to ensure fairness but also efficiency and effectiveness. It’s important for program offices to know that the
evaluators themselves embrace performance measurement and are competent and professional.

**Incentives:** Embassies are typically very busy places. PD field offices are no different. Officers juggle the management of exchange, speaker, or cultural programs while serving the public communications needs of the Ambassador as well as all the other sections of the Mission. Their daily schedule is hostage to breaking news and any journalist with a cell phone. Results reporting in such an unstable, at times, chaotic environment is often seen as a time-consuming and thus unwelcome chore, to be consigned to local staff, put off, or ignored entirely. Leadership can help overcome this situation by implementing a system of incentives designed to encourage more and better data collection and program feedback. Such incentives might include awards or even additional program funds for top-reporting individuals and/or posts.
PART 3: THE EVALUATION PROCESS

What should we Evaluate?

A country’s PD evaluation regime should reflect its public diplomacy objectives. If country A’s public diplomacy is designed largely as a nation branding exercise, its evaluation regime will differ from that of country B whose primary focus is on using PD to support its foreign policy objectives, or country C which sees PD, not as a means, but as an end in itself (mutual understanding). Some countries’ PD programs embrace one, two, or all three of these approaches. The U.S., for example, uses PD in support of foreign policy goals (generally defined), as an image enhancing exercise, and as a tool to strengthen mutual understanding. As a result, its performance measures include such items as editorial support for U.S. policies as well as increased understanding of and favorability toward U.S. society, values, and culture. Strengthening mutual understanding is a legislatively mandated objective of all U.S. exchange programs. The British government abandoned branding several years ago in favor of using PD as a means to support foreign policy priorities (although recent reports suggest branding may be making a comeback in the UK), with the nominally independent British Council responsible for enhancing mutual understanding through cultural and educational programming. For a government seeking to establish a PD program, and its attendant evaluation regime, settling on its objectives is an important first step.

Regardless of the objective adopted by any given country, the focus of most measurement effort has traditionally been on the PD “program,” considered by many the primary unit of public diplomacy
activity. We focus on the program, one PD scholar remarked only half in jest, because we don’t know how to measure anything else. True or not, there are certainly benefits to focusing on “programs” as the central element in PD performance measurement. First, there is a long history of doing so, and many government-run PD programs have been around for decades. There may be, as a consequence, a fairly extensive, extant body of research—reports, surveys, program histories, and possibly even prior evaluations, not to mention usable baseline data—that can help provide background and context for new efforts to measure program success. Second, programs are seen by many organizations as discrete entities and thus easier and less expensive to evaluate. A third factor highlighting the program as the focus of PD evaluation relates to how programs are funded. Often, funds are allocated to specific programs, i.e., are earmarked by the funder. In such cases, the recipient is obliged to demonstrate that the program funds were well spent.

Focusing on the program as the central element in PD evaluation may, however, have its drawbacks. For one, there could be a tendency for program evaluations, like programs themselves, to be stovepiped. When a veteran evaluator, for example, was asked recently for an assessment of the three most important factors in the success of any exchange program, the response was surprising: “We do not make those kinds of judgments; each program is evaluated on its own merits, not comparatively.” The downside of this approach—looking at each program in isolation—is that it may result in lost opportunities to see connections between programs, reach broader conclusions, and to provide more useful guidance to field practitioners. Integrated and/or crosscutting evaluations, while perhaps more time consuming, can also serve to increase contact among program offices, stimulate the sharing of ideas and best practices, and permit deeper insight into how to combine programs to best effect, with more efficient use of staff and financial resources. It may lead as well to consideration of other approaches to evaluation.
Instead of looking only at programs, for instance, perhaps it might be fruitful to assess program clusters. Organizationally, it might be worthwhile to divide the evaluation unit into two sections, with one focusing on assessing individual programs, while the other takes a more global view of such evaluations with an eye to finding broader trends, linkages, and applications.

There are other approaches to PD evaluation that don’t feature the individual program in a central role. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), for example, as part of President Bush’s Management Agenda, developed an evaluation process called the Program Assessment Rating Tool or PART. Despite its name, it did not evaluate discrete State Department PD programs. Rather, the OMB considered the entirety of State’s PD efforts as a “program” and took a systems approach to its evaluation. OMB examiners reviewed four components of the system in the PART process: “Purpose and Design”; “Strategic Planning”; “Program Management”; and “Results.” They assessed each component and then assigned the program an overall score ranging from “Effective,” to “Moderately Effective,” to “Adequate,” to “Ineffective.” A rating of “Results not Demonstrated” meant that the OMB could not determine program success because there was no usable baseline data or the performance measures in use were inadequate. The OMB “PARTed” nearly 1,000 USG programs from 2004-2008 and the results, including those for PD, were posted on its www.expectmore.gov website. The PART process was discontinued by the Obama Administration, but its influence in shaping how USG agencies view evaluation should not be underestimated.

Another approach to PD evaluation that is not program-centric is the Advancing Public Diplomacy Impact (APDI) initiative, which was launched in 2007 by the State Department’s Evaluation and Measurement Unit (EMU). APDI seeks to measure the aggregate impact of public diplomacy on foreign publics. It does so by
surveying the differences in attitudes between foreign elites who have participated in USG PD programs over the course of the previous five years and a control group of elites from the same demographic categories who have not participated in such programming. In 2007, EMU surveyed 1800 elites in eight locations from such sectors as journalism, the arts, NGOs, academia, and politics; in 2009, the sample size was expanded to 6,500. The performance measures focused on understanding of U.S. society, values and policies; favorability toward the U.S.; attitude toward U.S. policies and influence globally; PD program satisfaction; and receptivity to future engagement. APDI findings suggested that repeated PD engagement over time can have a positive impact on participants’ overall views of the U.S. The areas where PD engagement seemed to produce the weakest results were in support for U.S. foreign policy and views toward U.S. global influence. These results mirror the findings from numerous past evaluations of exchange programs, where positive changes in attitude toward U.S. foreign policy stood out as the hardest objective to achieve. That said, the results in these two areas among PD program participants still surpassed those for non-participants. One of the challenging issues with APDI, as with exchange evaluations, is trying to determine the degree to which participants come to the PD program pre-disposed to sympathize with its objectives and/or its sponsors.

Other approaches to PD and its evaluation that do not focus specifically on the program include framing and network analysis. For additional information on the former, see the Egner piece *Between Slogans and Solutions: A Frame-Based Assessment Methodology for Public Diplomacy* in Section One of the bibliography. Ali Fisher’s article in Section Seven provides an overview of how network analysis can work to make PD more effective in both online and offline environments.
How Should We Evaluate?

As with the question of what we should evaluate, the question of how to go about it is open to a variety of different approaches, methods, and tools. Following are some of the issues that organizations can face when deciding how to conduct an evaluation, posed as a series of competing choices.

**Process vs. Impact:** A process evaluation reveals how well a particular program is working. An impact evaluation demonstrates what results the program is getting. Most organizations still rely almost exclusively on the former for feedback. These kinds of evaluations, given out during the concluding part of a program, typically ask questions about whether the program participant found the conference, speaker or exchange useful, whether the materials/meetings were appropriate, and what should be changed about the program in order to improve it. It is designed simply to assess whether the program worked as planned and the participants were satisfied with the experience. An impact evaluation, on the other hand, tries to get at the “why” of the program. Why did we conduct it in the first place? What were we trying to accomplish, and did we succeed? It asks questions designed to determine whether the PD program had produced the desired impact, usually defined as a positive change in awareness, attitude, or behavior. Impact evaluations are more difficult and time-consuming to design and conduct, may require pre-during-and post-program assessments, and demand a significantly higher level of analysis.

**Quantitative vs. Qualitative:** Momentum today seems to be on the side of the numbers. In the U.S., the trend toward quantitative data accelerated under the Bush Administration. There is no denying that numbers have a certain evidentiary power. They can define the framework of a program, indicate trends, and encapsulate success or failure. They can be read and absorbed at a glance, a decided
advantage when submitting evaluation results to busy stakeholders and/or funders. And increasingly important, quantitative data tends to be less costly and time consuming to obtain than qualitative data. Evaluative tools such as focus groups, face-to-face interviews, storytelling, and observation all require a considerable investment of staff, time, and money. This may lead to such instruments being sidelined in favor of on-line, telephone, and snap polls. Evaluators seem uniformly to believe that a mixed-method approach, incorporating the collection of both quantitative and qualitative data, produces the truest and best evaluations. A good example of how qualitative and quantitative data can work together well can be found in the British Council’s annual report, where quantitative data produces a “scorecard,” and qualitative data a “storyboard,” which adds color and context to the numbers.

**Outputs vs. Outcomes:** As noted earlier, there is often confusion about the difference between an output and an outcome. For the purposes of this discussion, outputs are defined as activities designed to generate desired outcomes. Twenty judges trained is an output; the successful implementation of a trial-by-jury system is an outcome. A useful way to think about the difference between outputs and outcomes centers on the issue of control. Government X can identify a problem and select the most appropriate PD intervention, but once it is implemented, the outcome is no longer within its control; it is at the mercy of external factors and the receptivity of the target audience. As the Bagavad Vita says, “Man has control over his actions, never the fruits of action.” This is where evaluation can provide insight into the effectiveness of the output in producing the desired outcome.

**Intermediate vs. Long-Term Outcomes:** Not all PD outcomes are created equal. There is, in fact, a hierarchy of outcomes, related to the issues of time (sustainability) and scale (of change). If a PD office in country X, for example, has as one of its goals to help combat
the trafficking of women and girls, it might begin by raising public awareness of the issue through intensive media outreach (short-term result). Once the agenda is set, it might follow up by helping support the passage of a law federalizing the crime of human trafficking using such PD tools as grants, professional exchanges, materials support, and speaker programs (intermediate result). While these constitute very good outcomes that create momentum toward the desired change, we may need to wait several more years before we begin to see the desired (longer-term) results. Such results might include an uptick in data sharing among local law enforcement agencies; a decline in the level of government corruption; more prosecutions and convictions for trafficking; and ultimately, a reduction in the number of people trafficked. The scale of change produced by the PD intervention may be best described as a continuum running from stasis, to partial, to absolute. The PD office in the example discussed above knows that an absolute change—the elimination of human trafficking in country X—is impossible and so must decide what degree of change is acceptable and then deploy the means necessary to achieve it.

While long-term, substantive change is the gold-standard among PD outcomes, it is also the most difficult to achieve and to measure. There are a number of reasons for this. First, there is pressure from funders for quick results. Telling last year’s million-dollar donor to wait ten years to see results will likely ensure that additional funds will not be forthcoming. This pressure to see a quick return on investment can compel agencies to put more resources toward measuring short rather than long-term Impact.

Second, as discussed above, governments are not particularly good at maintaining staff, program, and resource continuity over time. This is true in a home capital such as Washington DC, but especially so at field posts, where personnel turnover and budget instability are constants. Under these circumstances, tracking
programs or program alumni over the long term becomes very difficult. Consider the example of the human trafficking law above. The desired long-term outcome of a significant diminution in the number of women and girls trafficked may take years to become manifest, if ever. Government record keeping, especially in the developing world, is spotty, so there may be no baseline data to start with, and little capacity to track cases over time. Moreover, most of the staff that was around at the start of the PD effort may well have moved on in the time between launch and outcome, taking with them all corporate memory of the initiative. For those left behind, or new on the job, there is little incentive to pay attention to a now-ten-year old project they had nothing to do with. And lastly, the more time passes between PD program and desired outcome, the less certain we can be of PD causation. This issue is discussed in more detail in the following segment.

The difficulty of measuring long-term impact puts a premium on intermediate results, which can be used to indicate that the PD intervention is on the right track. Some analysts refer to intermediate results as “signals,” or “proxies,” which offer a “plausible correlation” between mid-term results and achievement of the end goal. In the case of the trafficking law, it might take a decade to see demonstrable evidence of a sustained reduction in trafficking. The intervening results, however—increased law enforcement cooperation and data sharing, more convictions, less local corruption—may be enough to indicate substantial progress toward the goal of a significant reduction in the number of women and girls trafficked.

**Contribution vs. Attribution:** As mentioned earlier, connecting the cause-effect dots between PD program and desired result can be difficult. Take again the example of the effort to combat the crime of trafficking in persons. The Embassy’s PD section no doubt deployed all the tools in the PD toolbox and devoted significant time and resources to this effort. To what extent, however, can we ascribe
the passage of the law solely to its work? After all, the Ambassador raised it in every meeting with relevant host-country officials; other sections of the Embassy were active in advocating progress on the issue; the EU Mission weighed in with its support; and local organizations and individuals also pressed the matter. In this case, as in many others, contribution is clear, attribution less so. For the PD section to claim sole credit would not sit well with other parts of the Mission; for the U.S. Embassy to claim sole credit would not sit well with its partners or even the host country. Some PD observers say that attribution is over-valued; it’s the results that count. In the larger picture, this view has a certain appeal, but it may in the near term leave PD incapable of demonstrating effectiveness to its stakeholders, and thus in a weaker position to demand needed resources. To address the challenging dichotomy between contribution and attribution, a new set of innovative measurement devices may be needed.

**To Poll or not to Poll:** Use of poll data as a public diplomacy performance indicator has long been a bugbear for U.S. PD field officers. Pressed to come up with performance indicators as part of the post’s annual strategic planning process, generalist PD officers clung to poll data as a lifeline: “We will improve the public’s image of the U.S. in Country X by 7% in 2012,” or “We will increase public support for democracy by 10% in 2013.” With the introduction of professional evaluation in recent years, this lifeline gradually disappeared. Generic polling designed to track progress in such broad topic areas, the evaluators said, cannot be used to measure PD success because too many external factors are in play that cloud the cause-effect relationship between PD programming and desired outcomes. Generalized polling is useful in identifying problems and tracking trends over time, but is unreliable as a performance indicator.

This is not to say that all polling can’t be helpful in assessing PD performance. In fact, it can and probably should be used more than
it is, but its effectiveness as an assessment tool seems to be directly proportional to the specificity of its programmatic and audience focus and its use in combination with other (usually qualitative) instruments, e.g., focus groups or personal interviews. The principal challenge with this approach, of course, is its expense. Using the so-called “campaign-style” method, with research conducted at every stage of a program, is ideal, but few governments have the time, staff or money to implement it.

It is ironic that, as generalized polling has faded as a performance indicator used by practitioners to measure the success of their PD efforts, it has become the metric of choice for many stakeholders, with often unfortunate consequences for PD. In the U.S., poll data tracing the decline in the U.S. image abroad from 2004–2007 were so dramatic that they captured headlines everywhere, prompting the commonly heard lament, “Why do they hate us?” They also seem to have firmly established a reversal of those poll numbers as the sole standard by which to judge PD’s success, or failure. As the numbers remained flat year after year, the effectiveness of PD came under increasing, often critical, scrutiny. When asked what to do about the foreign image problem, the official response was telling: “We have to do a better job of getting our message across,” i.e., the problem lay with PD, not with policy. But as noted earlier, PD is only as effective as the policies and leaders it supports. Expecting PD to flip global public opinion in such a circumstance was unrealistic, especially given the level of resources at its command. This issue goes to the heart of the question about whether PD can “move the needle” and whether polling is the most appropriate tool to answer that question.

What Is PD’s Target Audience?

There is no simple answer to this question. Nor perhaps should there be. The traditional response usually focuses on the broad and dichotomous categories of mass and elite. Some include the media
as a separate audience category. Part of the answer to this question goes to the issue of whether PD can best produce the desired results working from the ground up (mass) or the top down (elite). The evidence seems to suggest that it can work both ways, with the decision on which to choose dependent on, among other factors, resources, the particular issue at hand, and the cultural context of the target country. It would be interesting to do a comparative case study that looks at instances where PD efforts on the same issue in separate countries produced the desired result, but with one taking a mass and the other an elite approach. Of course, this is largely a question of emphasis as most PD efforts invariably encompass both approaches.

Regardless of which approach is emphasized, the media is usually involved in the equation. PD practitioners recognize that the media is both filter and amplifier and work hard to ensure it functions mostly as the latter by establishing positive, productive relations with news outlets and journalists. The media’s key role in message amplification, agenda setting, and shaping public opinion ensures that editorial support for U.S. policies figures prominently among the USG’s long-term PD outcome measures.

Increasingly, PD’s target audience is described in more segmented terms, perhaps a reflection of a broader audience fragmentation partly occasioned by the unprecedented access to information provided by the Internet and the interactivity offered by social media. The World Bank, for instance, includes a gender-based component in evaluating all of its programs, regardless of whether the program is targeted at women.

Another important audience segment for PD is youth, variously defined. Focusing on youth seems like a logical approach, given their status as the “successor generation” and the fact that their attitudes may be more open to change, but a decision to do so should be context
and issue-based. If the objective is policy change, for example, youth, and youth from marginalized or disadvantaged communities in particular, may not be the priority audience. If the objective is to counter violent extremism, youth from such communities may be the proper focus, but perhaps not in every country. Even within the youth audience category, there is segmentation. One evaluator has described youth with access to computers as “secondary elites.” This audience segment is perhaps the most apt target for social media outreach.

Selecting youth as a primary target audience for PD, however, is something of a gamble. If one sends a mid-career professional, say, the deputy editor of a local newspaper, on an exchange program, there is a reasonable expectation that this person will someday be the editor of that paper, i.e., in a good position to use the knowledge gained from the exchange in a way conducive to national interests. Sending a 15 year-old student on an exchange program offers much less certainty that the return on investment will justify the expense. This explains why, in the USG, when PD budgets were cut significantly in the mid-to late 90s, the focus shifted away from youth and toward elites, considered a much better bet for a positive return. Whichever audience is selected as a priority for PD programming, the program portfolio should reflect that emphasis. In short, if the priority is youth, the bulk of the program dollars should be devoted to youth programming.

The issue of the most effective audience for PD programming is a fit topic for further academic research, and perhaps even a joint effort by academia and government. Such research could make PD more effective and increase its impact.

**How do we Evaluate PD at the Field Level?**

Most of the large-scale, independent evaluations conducted by the USG focus on centrally conceived and funded programs that are
intended to be carried out by diplomatic posts worldwide. To borrow an academic reference, these are like core courses. Left unaccounted for are the “electives,” the country-specific programs that are devised, funded, and implemented by individual PD field offices. These programs encompass a full range of PD activities, among them exchanges, the performing arts, press outreach, seminars and conferences, and grants to local organizations. Each post has its own budget, prepares a strategic plan, which identifies PD objectives, indicators, and targets, and post-devised programs are designed to help achieve those objectives. Posts are instructed to feed data on these programs into a central database, called the Mission Activity Tracker (MAT). The data includes a description of the program activity, with information on audience, theme, objective, cost, and result (usually rendered anecdotally). The information collected in MAT is designed to support broader evaluation efforts by providing searchable, quantifiable output data (how many people attended the seminar or read the op-ed), but it is more of a reporting mechanism than an evaluative system. As noted earlier, the APDI project seeks to record the aggregate impact on participants, randomly selected, who were engaged in any one of several of post’s PD programs, but not any one in particular. Hence, the individual post-launched initiative has remained mostly unexamined, unless the post decides to undertake its own evaluation. Few can do so, however, because of a lack of time and resources.

One possible solution to this omission is the establishment of regional evaluation offices, staffed by evaluation experts, who can act as resources for posts by providing training, consulting on strategic and PD evaluative plans, overseeing audience research efforts, and taking a global view of posts’ MAT submissions with an eye toward identifying best practices, opportunities for resource sharing, and possible impacts, both country-specific and regional. The Department of State currently has among its specialist corps regional Information Resource Officers and English Language
Officers. Given the importance of evaluation in today’s culture of measurement, a regional evaluation corps could provide a useful value added.
PART 4: ISSUES THAT WARRANT FURTHER RESEARCH

What is PD’s Sphere of Influence?

The terrorist attacks of September 11 and the decline in the U.S. image abroad that occurred after the invasion of Iraq precipitated not only greater focus on public diplomacy (witness the flood of reports on how to improve it that appeared during that time) but also increased funding (the USG spent an estimated $10 billion on PD between 2001–2008). Despite these positive developments, U.S. approval ratings abroad between 2004–2008 continued mostly flat, and in some places hit historic lows. Even more worrisome was that the list of countries where negative sentiment was greatest included a number of long-time U.S. allies. In some places, anti-Americanism now had potentially fatal consequences. This bleak picture was changed almost overnight in many countries by the election of Barack Obama as President in November of 2008. According to the Pew Polls, in Germany, those who viewed the U.S. positively climbed from 37% in 2007 to 64% in 2009. In France, the turnaround was even more dramatic, going from 39% to 75 during the same timeframe. *

The “Obama effect” raises some interesting questions that invite further investigation. Was it a historic one-off? Did Obama and, by extension, the U.S., prosper in the court of global public opinion because he was elected as the tide of war in Iraq seemed to be turning, and because the contrast in policy and style between him and his predecessor seemed so stark? Had any other U.S. presidential election resulted in such a public opinion reversal? Could such a
turnaround in global poll numbers only have occurred in relation to the U.S., a superpower the election of whose leader has a direct impact on the course of world events? Did public opinion towards the UK change dramatically when Margaret Thatcher or Tony Blair was elected, or towards Russia when Gorbachev took power? Have there been other, non-political, events that have had such a catalyzing effect on world opinion—the 1969 moon landing, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the first Gulf War—or even on opinion in a single country—e.g., tsunami or earthquake relief?

The answers to such questions may help us to better understand PD’s sphere of influence. The contrast in impact on the U.S. image overseas between 8 years and $10 billion in PD spending and the election of Obama would seem to suggest that, on a macro level at least, a dramatic change in public opinion toward the U.S. requires an equally dramatic and significant causative event. This is certainly not to say that U.S. PD failed during those years, that field officers weren’t doing good, innovative work, or that in some localized cases their public diplomacy efforts bore fruit. Nor is it to deny the serious PD challenge posed by an unpopular war and a series of ugly (Abu Ghraib) or controversial (Guantanamo) events.

What it may say, however, is that a global PD effort, dispersed over nearly 200 countries and cultures, with field posts headed by different leaders with different interests and talents, and all of it funded at approximately $1.5 billion per year, cannot hope to have the same impact as that produced by such an outsized event as the Obama election.

The idea that PD may not be able to “move the needle” significantly at the macro level, i.e., that PD’s influence may grow larger as its focus grows smaller, would seem to be supported by the initial findings of the APDI initiative mentioned earlier. As discussed, they showed that long-time PD participants were more likely than non-participants
to say they have a better overall understanding of and favorability towards the U.S. The non-participant elites were certainly exposed to broader PD programs and messaging through the media, but these seemed not to have had the same effect as that experienced by those who were active participants in public diplomacy programs. PD’s sphere of influence might then be compared to the ripples created by a pebble tossed into a pond. The ripple is greatest at the point of impact and becomes attenuated the farther away it moves. If the individual is the PD point of contact, the effect is greatest there, with declining impact as the PD ripples move beyond the individual to the institution, the community, the nation, and beyond.

If this idea has merit, it has serious implications for the conduct of public diplomacy. It suggests, for example, that personal contact and interaction, what Edward R. Murrow was referring to when he talked about the importance of “the last three feet,” is of great importance in conducting a successful public diplomacy. This idea is supported by communications experts who argue that communication is most effective when customized and targeted, and the fact that most firmly held attitudes are formed and/or changed through personal interaction and/or experience. The irony of this conclusion about the value of personal interaction in attitude formation and, by extension, behavior change, is that virtually every development in modern diplomacy seems to be pushing us in exactly the opposite direction. The daily flood of e-mail keeps the field officer chained to the computer; increased security demands close officials off to the public; libraries shutter because so much information is available online; press conferences and meetings are conducted by video conference; and as PD budgets get tighter, staff is cut and social media outreach becomes a substitute for personal interaction. In short, we may be seeing a distancing of PD practitioners from their audience, with potentially deleterious impact on PD’s effectiveness.
The phenomenon of the vanishing or increasingly virtual American diplomat overseas may have echoes in business and journalism. In the corporate world, the days of American country directors of major multinationals abroad appear to be over, a victim of globalization, U.S. tax policy, and budget cutbacks. Major U.S. news outlets with bureaus overseas and/or foreign-based correspondents are also on the wane, as new media puts traditional media under financial threat. One can find almost any information about the U.S. courtesy of the Internet, but exchanging views on policy or current events with an actual American professional overseas is becoming increasingly difficult.

**Does PD have an Economic Impact? If so, can we Measure it?**

For the PD practitioner, setting an agenda is great; so is building a network, or attracting an eye-popping number of friends on the Embassy’s Facebook page. But one outcome that what would thrill most funders and stakeholders alike, not to mention contribute to PD’s stature in the foreign policy community, is demonstrating that public diplomacy has an economic impact. The ways in which PD may provide an economic boost are manifold. In the case of the U.S., for example, they include working to increase the number of tourists who visit for pleasure and the number of students and professors who come to study, receive training, or do research. They include support for state and local trade missions and American businesses overseas. The latter can involve advocacy for U.S. companies bidding on contracts, highlighting and supporting their in-country CSR activities, working with local American chambers of commerce to push policies favorable to U.S. economic interests (e.g., IPR, money laundering), and conducting crisis management when a U.S. company experiences problems. They can also include PD support for free trade, open skies, or environmental agreements and, on the opposite end of the spectrum, opposition to foreign government policies that discriminate against U.S. firms. And lastly they include
the economic spin-off of professional and citizen exchange programs or content-based training programs for economic journalists (e.g., “How to Cover the Energy Sector.”).

While there are multiple ways in which PD can have an economic impact, providing convincing evidence of it through evaluation remains elusive. In fact, there has been very little research done in this area. In 1999, the National Council for International Visitors (NCIV) commissioned a study by Alverno College in the U.S. to examine the domestic social and economic impact of the State Department’s International Visitor Program (an entry on this study is included in the Exchanges Section of the bibliography). Findings suggest that the program had a substantive social impact in communities with local NCIV Councils, with volunteers and host families benefiting from an expanded range of local contacts and broadened political and cultural perspectives. Economic results, however, were less clear. It appears that, on occasion, a visitor’s stay in the U.S. stimulated a business contact or opportunity but the outcome of these was largely inconclusive or unknown. More recently, the Swedish government has commissioned a study on the issue but has not yet released its findings.

Despite the lack of prior research and the challenges inherent in such an effort, devising a set of metrics that can capture PD’s contribution to the national economy is certainly worthy of further academic attention. Such research could bring new focus to PD as an important tool in the foreign policy toolbox.

How do we Measure Success in Social Media?

The siren song of social media has been heard by governments all around the world. The prospect of engaging vast new, hitherto unreachable, audiences in productive dialogue is perhaps particularly tantalizing to PD practitioners, whose business it is to connect
and communicate. Many have jumped in with both feet, at times leaving home office policy guidance on its use playing catch-up to field practice, while others have been more cautious. Regardless of whether they are on a fast track or still in the experimental stage, all governments must eventually come to grips with two key questions: what is our objective in using social media, and how can we measure its return on investment.

Government objectives for social media embrace, with varying degrees of emphasis, the full range of traditional PD functions. Some, for example, see it primarily as a device for stimulating interactive dialogue (engagement). A number of diplomatic missions have thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of Facebook friends with whom they carry on a regular conversation. Others view it largely as a way to push out information, promote policy, correct erroneous press reports, or manage crises (informing). Still others argue that new media is best suited to listening (understanding). Software exists, for example, that permits users to track the global conversation on blogs and social networks, and even to determine the prevailing sentiment of that conversation vis-à-vis key events, trends and people. Such software will only grow more sophisticated over time, permitting us far greater insight into public opinion at both a global and country-specific level. Clearly, the potential offered by social media for expanding understanding, connectivity, and dialogue is enormous.

While we can listen to and track the global conversation on social media, no one has yet figured out an effective way to impact that conversation (influencing). Efforts to address this challenge, however, are under way on several fronts. Various USG agencies, for example, have offices staffed by language-capable personnel who participate in dialogue on key blogs around the world, but the results of those efforts are unclear (see Lina Khatib’s study of the DOS’ Digital Outreach Team in Section 8 of the bibliography). Other scholars have done very promising work on network analysis,
trying to track connections and determine nodes of influence in the blogosphere. The State Department’s Evaluation and Measurement Unit (EMU) last year launched a multi-phased study of social media designed to give PD practitioners the tools they need to use it effectively. The first phase, now completed, conducted market research and audience analysis. Subsequent phases will explore issues associated with tracking and influencing the global dialogue on key issues. The ultimate goal of the study is to determine how social media can be used in support of national interests and to devise appropriate metrics for measuring success.

Just as the opportunities presented by social media are great, so too are the challenges, especially for governments, which walk a tightrope between living up to a higher standard of accuracy and accountability in information dissemination and complying with the demands of a ravenous 24-hour news cycle. These challenges include the necessity of adequately staffing the management of new technology platforms; devising quick and flexible clearance procedures; reassessing acceptable levels of risk; ceding more control over the dialogue; incentivizing interactivity; and finding the right balance in content between the “social” and the “political.” Another major concern is that by the time we come to some conclusion about how best to use social media, the technology will have evolved and something new and unexpected will have rendered them anachronistic. This goes directly to the question of the level of investment we want to make in these new applications.

As with any new, potentially transformative technology, there will a period of trial and error, of experimentation and research, as governments try to determine the right way forward. We are still in that phase now, but one thing is clear: the social media landscape is changing so rapidly that governments will have no choice but to reach out to the private sector to keep pace. Social media, and perhaps especially its analytics, is, therefore, one area where government-
academic cooperation and other forms of public private partnership hold particular promise.

*Does Program Branding Impact Effectiveness?*

Branding comes in all sizes today. There is nation branding, region branding, city branding, and product branding, each with its own growing body of research. One area, however, that has escaped much attention in research on PD is program branding. All centrally administered and funded DOS PD programs come with a name. Most of these names, however, are used for internal identification and administrative reasons. Only a handful have resonance outside the organization, i.e., have been successfully branded. The Fulbright Program is perhaps the best example. But what about programs conceived, funded, and implemented at the individual post level? Would an effort to brand the most important of these programs have a positive impact on their effectiveness? A good example of how this might work in practice is the Youth Ambassador Program. Founded by the U.S. Embassy in Brazil in 2002, it sends public school students with good English-language skills to the U.S. for three weeks of meetings and interaction with officials (including the Secretary of State), peers, and teachers, in both Washington DC and other locations across the country. The students also have a home-stay experience and attend school while in the U.S. The post publicizes each annual program with a flurry of press activity, both before and after the U.S. visit. The participants talk with their local media upon return home and contribute to an alumni association website they created and maintain detailing their experiences. Any time a ranking U.S. official travels to Brazil, a high-profile visit with the Youth Ambassadors is included on the itinerary. The post also created an after-program component in which intensive support is given to returnees who wish to apply for study in the U.S. A number of Youth Ambassadors have now been accepted into U.S. universities and/or summer study programs, some with scholarships,
and all of which has been widely publicized. The program, which in some places now includes a U.S. Youth Ambassador component (American youth going to Brazil), quickly spread to other posts in Latin America and has now been adopted by ECA as part of its youth exchange portfolio.

That the Youth Ambassador program in Brazil has now achieved brand status there seems clear. Keys to this effort were program consistency, continuity of funding, active press outreach, leadership buy-in, and positive results. What is not entirely clear is the extent to which this brand status has impacted program effectiveness, and how that impact might be measured. Metrics might include press coverage, volume and quality of student applications, continuing post-program contact with American hosts, number of students admitted to U.S. summer programs or universities, amount of private-sector and host-government support, and contributions to the student website. In any case, a more intensive effort to determine the benefits of program branding would be helpful to posts as they consider launching a major new initiative or breathing life into a pre-existing program.

**How Are PD and PD Evaluation Different in a Counter-Insurgency (Coin) or Post-Conflict Environment?**

Recent events in the Middle East and Afghanistan have focused attention on the need for stronger civilian involvement in COIN or post-conflict situations. This extends not just to security and development, but also to engagement with host-country publics, i.e., public diplomacy. Much of the work that has been done on the issue of PD in such environments, some of it very good, has come from the military under the heading of “strategic communications” (see the article in Part 3 entitled *Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Strategic Communication Best Practices 2007–2008* for an excellent summary of the U.S. military’s stratcom assessment activities
in Iraq). It would be useful to see complementary academic research not just on the issue of how conducting PD in a COIN or post-conflict environment differs from doing so in peacetime, but whether the metrics for such an effort might also be different. Certainly, some of the evaluative components would remain the same—tracking media play, conducting public opinion surveys—but would there be room for other measures? Some analysts have pointed, for example, to opponent’s “counter-measures” as a sign of PD effectiveness. Jamming of radio broadcasts or cutting off access to the Internet might fall into this category. Others point to the extent to which opponents try to replicate one’s PD efforts. One Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) leader in Iraq has described using “line-of-sight” measures such as the ripeness of fruit in the marketplace, the volume of new cars on the road, and the presence of ATM machines as good indicators that regional security had improved (see the blog post in Part 3 by a U.S. Foreign Service Officer on his methods for assessing progress in Iraq’s Western Anbar Province in 2008). What other measures might be dictated by a situation in which there is still active, albeit low-intensity, conflict, or the infrastructure and social order have been damaged?

Irrespective of the measures selected, it seems apparent that COIN or post-conflict environments where lives and national reputations are on the line warrant priority evaluative attention. Such attention might take the form of special interagency evaluation teams, comprised of seasoned evaluators and subject matter experts (SMEs) that could be dispatched to the country in question to work with local civilian and military leadership to evaluate the effectiveness of the public diplomacy effort. Resources for such teams should be prioritized, given their work’s importance to strategic national interests, even if that means drawing them from other countries/projects. Experience gained in such an initiative should be well documented and made available throughout the interagency community so that a body of knowledge and expertise can be called upon in a future crisis.
Can we Test-Drive Programs based on Short-Term Evaluation?

It’s axiomatic among PD practitioners that if you ask 50 of them about the best approach to problem X, or how best to conduct program Y, you’ll get 50 different answers. This speaks to individual experience in different cultures, the creative impulse that is the motor of all effective PD, and the varying levels of resources available to field posts at different times and in different places. Such diversity of experience and opinion certainly suffuses central program staff as well as field officers and might be profitably carried over into evaluation. While potentially too costly to implement broadly, for key program initiatives, it may be useful to establish competing teams of programmers and assign them to devise an initiative designed to address a particular global or regional issue. Once ready, the programs could be field-tested in countries with similar environments, or in the same country at different times, and then subjected to short-term evaluation designed to show which program produced the best results, or at least showed the most promise. As noted, introducing competition may in the short run be costly, but it may produce long-term benefits in efficiency and effectiveness. Moreover, it signals to all involved in program preparation and implementation that only the best ideas will be rewarded.

Should we Promote Evaluation as a Foreign Policy Objective?

As mentioned earlier, government record keeping and statistical analysis in the developing world is modest at best, a victim of, among other problems, internal conflict or natural disasters, inadequate resources, lack of full control over sovereign territory, a disconnect between state and local governments, or an insufficient commitment to transparency. Even governments in the developed world are regularly criticized for uneven performance when it comes to data collection and management. The absence of reliable baseline data in many countries makes evaluating the effectiveness of PD
efforts problematic. The situation is even worse, however, for the host-country itself. Not only does it not have usable data, but it does not have the means to collect it or, once collected, to evaluate it. This dilemma is exacerbated by the spiraling costs of professional evaluation. If a country has no idea of the extent of a problem within its borders, it will have little chance of adequately addressing it. Looking at evaluation as a governance issue may lead governments that have performance measurement expertise to consider promoting evaluation as a foreign policy objective. Evaluation, after all, is a key component in fashioning democratic institutions that function well and, in so doing, building confidence among the public that tax monies are being well spent. Insofar as PD in particular is concerned, all countries seek to project a positive identity globally. This is perhaps especially relevant for those states emerging from war or internal conflict or transitioning from autocracy to democracy. Lending needed expertise in PD and PD evaluation to such countries may be an innovative but low-cost investment in the future of such countries as they strive to explain who they are and define their policies and values to the world.

Conclusion

The surge of interest in public diplomacy in the last decade has been accompanied by an attendant growth of interest in PD evaluation, perhaps surprisingly, more on the part of governments than academia. A few governments have evaluation offices staffed by professional evaluators; some have begun to study the issue or commissioned research; nearly all now “talk the talk” at the very least. It is fair to say, however, that while trending in the right direction, the study and practice of assessing performance in public diplomacy is still in its formative stages. What is needed to move the discipline forward is greater attention by academia and more collaboration between practitioners and scholars. The author hopes that this resource guide, written by a practitioner from a practitioner’s
perspective, makes a useful contribution only to the field but also to stimulating more such collaboration.


This article by a former U.S. Foreign Service Officer reviews efforts by the State Department to evaluate its public diplomacy (PD) programs, while examining the challenges posed to that effort by a rapidly changing technological and communications environment. The author argues that evaluation is key to a successful PD regime but notes that a clear definition of what constitutes success has eluded even practitioners. Johnson also discusses different approaches to measurement in the various constituent parts of United States Government (USG) public diplomacy, in particular in the field of international broadcasting.


In his 2007 presentation to a Wilton Park Conference, Steven provides an overview of how research and evaluation can benefit the “new public diplomacy,” which he says is marked by an increase in the influence of non-state actors, with a concomitant decrease in the power of states, a growing focus on multilateral problems
requiring global and/or regional solutions, and asymmetric security challenges which tend to diminish the effectiveness of hard power. In this new PD environment, Steven argues the need to develop a “theory of influence” for PD, i.e., how PD can shape public opinion; investigate the interplay between elite, mass, and media audiences; and marshal an effective response across organizational or interagency boundaries. Doing so, he argues, will provide a better understanding of what we can reasonably expect PD to achieve. The article includes a discussion of the value of logic models, the importance of a systematic approach to performance management, and the range of evaluative instruments available to PD practitioners.

Pahlavi, Pierre C. “Evaluating Public Diplomacy Programmes,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2007): 255–81. Pahlavi’s article provides a good overview of the relevant issues in PD evaluation. He notes that while developments in international politics and communications have raised public diplomacy’s profile as a foreign policy tool, the absence of an evaluative framework to measure its effectiveness has kept PD from playing a more important role in the international affairs arena. He reviews the challenges to measuring success in public diplomacy, which include the lack of clear goals, widespread confusion between outputs and outcomes, limited resources, flawed or insufficient audience information and analysis, and over-reliance on and/or misuse of polling data. On the key issue of whether public diplomacy (in Pahlavi’s words “soft power diplomacy”) can have hard effects, i.e., can contribute to achieving foreign policy goals, he says the jury is still out. No one has yet come up with a methodology to determine the strategic (i.e., long-term impact) of PD, but he argues that research in the area of public relations evaluation might prove fruitful, given the similarities between the two disciplines. He also argues for the importance of focusing on short-term and intermediate goals as promising indicators of end results. Pahlavi concludes by reviewing
the reasons why a strong evaluative regime is important and offers his assessment that, while nascent, momentum is building within foreign ministries for a more professional approach to PD measurement.


This report recaps the main points of a 2006 Wilton Park Conference on Public Diplomacy. It includes a brief section on evaluation, which asserts that the “merits of measurement” are still a subject of “debate and uncertainty.”


This article is a read-out of an international seminar on PD held in 2005 in Holland, co-sponsored by the Dutch MFA and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Much of the article is taken up with informed commentary on the practice of PD, with only a small section addressing the issue of its evaluation. In this section, the authors assert that there is still no accepted standard for measuring success in PD. They cite as possible reasons the difficulty of devising valid performance indicators and obtaining reliable data. The lack of valid indicators, they conclude, has led to an increased reliance on polling as a measurement device.


Perl’s essay looks at the issue of using public diplomacy to mitigate extremism and how to measure success in that endeavor. He offers as possible performance measures a “skills and resources inventory,” which would track the language fluency of U.S. diplomats charged with waging the war of ideas and the resources (staff and funding) allocated to them. Another measure would be how well the U.S. recruits, trains, and deploys talented personnel. Perl also discusses the importance of targeted evaluation and selection in setting up an effective evaluation regime in what promises to be a long struggle in a time of diminished resources.

Fitzpatrick, Kathy R., The Future of U.S. Public Diplomacy: An Uncertain Fate, Leiden, Koninklijke Brill NV, 2010. This comprehensive study of American public diplomacy contains a chapter on evaluation, in which the author examines three main issues: the neglect of evaluation in the period before 9/11; the question of what constitutes success in public diplomacy; and the development of a new approach to evaluation that embraces the idea of PD as a tool, first and foremost, for building relationships.


In this article, McDowell reviews the current status of public diplomacy, including how it should be defined (he adheres to PD having an element of government involvement), how globalization has impacted the practice of PD, and the different challenges and opportunities faced by small, medium and large states in doing PD. McDowell also addresses the difficulties of quantifying success in
PD in such areas as relationship building (networking) and cultural programming, given the often long-term and diffuse effects of these activities. In this regard, he cautions against governments focusing too much on short-term quantitative results, arguing that this may crowd out consideration of programs and activities that show results over the long run.

Egner, Michael. Between Slogans and Solutions: A Frame-Based Assessment Methodology for Public Diplomacy. Diss. The Pardee RAND Graduate School, 2009. (Accessed 28 Jan. 2010). http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2010/RAND_RGSD255.pdf. Egner’s dissertation argues that improvements in the design and diagnostics, and ultimately the effectiveness, of PD campaigns can be realized by implementing a frame-based approach rather than relying on the program as the primary unit of PD activity and analysis. Using frames, which Egner identifies as cues or arguments that emphasize individual aspects of any particular policy, policymakers can better target and adjust key messages. Framing works best, he argues, when it is done on a country-specific basis and when it relies on local advocates rather than when it is centrally devised and propagated globally by U.S. officials. The author uses U.S. PD efforts in support of the Iraq war to illustrate his points vis a-vis framing. The dissertation also includes a useful discussion of the relationship between the media and public opinion, the importance of audience research in setting and adjusting frames, and the strong influence that local elites, especially national leaders, have in media agenda setting.

In an article on the taxonomy of public diplomacy, Cull notes the challenges associated with evaluation, in particular with the long-term nature of some results of PD activities.


Brown here offers his reflections on the discussion of public diplomacy evaluation that took place at the March 2011 meeting of the International Studies Association in Montreal. He points out that the discourse on measurement focused on both the program level (e.g. surveys of exchange participants) and the national level (e.g. Anholt’s Nation Brand Index), but notes that the gap between the two often makes it difficult to connect the impact of program activities to macro-level perceptions. To improve the conceptualization of PD evaluation, Brown recommends drawing on the approach of the international development community and implementing a “theory of change” for programmatic activities that describes the intended effects. Such a process lets planners evaluate their own assumptions and highlights measurement and evaluation points throughout the process.


This dissertation, published in book form by Stockholm University, looks at how three foreign ministries, the UK, Sweden, and the U.S., and affiliated cultural organizations (the Swedish Institute and the British Council), have tried to adapt their “old” PD regimes to the “new” demands of a globalized world, with a specific focus on the methods each uses to evaluate success. The author begins by reviewing the history of public diplomacy, the differences between the old and new PD, and three approaches to PD measurement (logic models, network analysis, and perceptions analysis). He then
moves to a comparative analysis of PD as practiced by the U.S., UK, and Sweden, using a major PD campaign undertaken by each government to illustrate their prevailing policies and practices as well as the degree to which they have embraced new PD strategies in the face of national or institutional constraints.


This report is the product of a working session between evaluators, advocates, and grantees convened by the California Endowment to discuss the development of a framework to consider the role of advocacy work in policy change and the creation of measurable and meaningful indicators and benchmarks to assess progress. The report emphasizes the importance of setting goals and priorities from the outset and the use of multiple methods to achieve evaluation objectives. Further discussion focuses on strategies and recommendations for developing a theory of change to explain how a group’s activities are expected to contribute to achieving its long-term outcomes. Other recommendations address the development of benchmarks, indicators, and approaches to data collection. Finally, the report considers how results might be better utilized to improve the overall process. See also Part 1 of this report: http://www.calendow.org/uploadedFiles/Publications/Evaluation/challenge_assessing_policy_advocacy.pdf.


The Cold War ended in victory for the West at least partly because of its effective public diplomacy. Kelley here examines this claim in
an effort to determine whether it is possible to devise an effective PD strategy and whether the lessons learned during the Cold War can be applied to the issues confronting the world today. He notes that evaluation has long been a problem in U.S. PD. Today, it’s a matter of resources and commitment; during the Cold War, it was getting access to good data from closed societies. He also addresses the problem of attribution, noting that while news and information from radio and publications certainly penetrated the Iron Curtain, it’s not easy to assess the impact or influence of that information flow. One indicator that suggests a degree of impact can be found in the extent of Soviet efforts to keep Western information out. Kelley concludes that the claim that Cold War PD was a success is difficult to prove or disprove conclusively given the tendency of proponents to rely on anecdotal evidence and the lack of reliable, quantifiable data.

2. The UK Government’s Approach to PD Measurement [9 entries]

Phillis, Bob (Chair). “An Independent Review of Government Communications,” Presented for the Minister of the Cabinet Office, January 2004. (Accessed 1 Feb. 2010) http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100807034701/http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/gcreview/News/FinalReport.pdf. This review of UK government communications asserts that the perceived rise in public alienation from government and the political process is the result, at least in part, of a communications style that seeks to manage, i.e., “spin” news, that does not factor communications into the policy formulation stage, and lacks a “strategic and measurable” approach. The Phillis study calls for greater transparency, greater coordination between agencies, and enhanced dialogue with the public among other measures. It also recommends the creation of a new position—Permanent Secretary for Government Communications—as well as a new support body, Government Communications Network, to promote best practices.

The 2005 Lord Carter Coles review of UK public diplomacy is a follow-on to the 2002 Wilton review of PD and the 2004 Phillis Commission Report on government communications. The Carter review examines all aspects of UK public diplomacy, including a useful delineation of the differing roles of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the British Council, and the BBC World Service and, while citing improvements in PD since 2002, notes that more needs to be done, specifically in the areas of strategic planning and coordination, performance measurement, and the development of new PD tools. Among its recommendations, the review calls for the adoption of a Public Diplomacy Board, a PD Laboratory, and a new definition of public diplomacy itself.


This report is a read-out of the main conclusions reached at a 2007 Wilton Park Conference on public diplomacy. It reviews post-Carter Report changes in British PD and also offers a look at the American perspective, including efforts by the U.S. business community to support USG public diplomacy efforts. The challenge of evaluating the effectiveness of public diplomacy is treated substantively. The report asserts that measuring PD needs to be approached on a systems basis and that PD strategies need to be structured in such a way that they lend themselves to effective measurement. It examines the UK’s use of logic models to frame PD initiatives and clarify their objectives, as well as some of the key instruments of data gathering that best identify progress toward the achievement of intermediate goals. The report also looks at the impact of new media on public diplomacy and the role of the military in PD.

In this speech, David Triesman, former Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office with responsibility for public diplomacy, outlines the rationale for a new British approach to PD that eschews the “unmeasurable” task of image building in favor of engaging new audiences in dialogue on key issues.


A portion of this GAO Report reviews recent changes in the British approach to strategic communication in the areas of planning, research and measurement and suggests that these changes offer a potentially useful guide to U.S. PD efforts. Such changes include the integration of strategic planning and research across agencies; using PD to support specific foreign policy objectives instead of nation branding; evaluation of PD on the basis of behavior rather than attitude change; and the importance of research and measurement in gauging progress toward objectives. The GAO takes special note of the UK’s creation of two new PD structures: the Public Diplomacy Board, which coordinates strategic communication planning, resource allocation and measurement across relevant agencies, and the Public Diplomacy Laboratory which draws on outside experts to develop innovative approaches.

This piece describes the FCO and British Council’s two-year effort, launched in 2007, to craft and test a pilot framework for evaluating the effectiveness of their public diplomacy programs. It begins by noting the challenges inherent in assessing PD: the long-term nature of some desired impacts; the problem of measuring intangibles; and the issue of attribution, i.e., finding a direct cause-effect relationship between PD initiative and desired outcome. To overcome these difficulties, the FCO and the British Council worked together to better coordinate their strategies and desired outcomes. This joint effort was aided by the development of a logic model that offered a common and consistent frame of reference for action and measurement. The article includes a useful description of the UK’s three “tracking tools” used to measure intermediate PD impacts: a media tracker; an influence tracker; and a concrete-changes tracker. It also describes in some detail the relationship between the logic model and the evaluation framework, with side-by-side visual representations of each to illustrate how public diplomacy activities can be viewed as a “journey” from input to the achievement of a policy goal, with sequenced measurement determining progress along the way.

**Annual Report 2009-2010: Working for the UK Where It Matters.**

The British Council’s Annual Report for 2009-2010 outlines how the UK’s international cultural and educational organization measures its effectiveness.

In this paper, Wilding outlines the logic model the UK introduced in 2007 to help plan and measure its public diplomacy activities and discusses its implications for the BBC World Service. He reviews the BBC’s objective of being the most respected international news service and its “arms-length relationship” with the government, noting that these features make it largely incompatible with an approach that views PD as a tool to support foreign policy aims. Being the most respected global broadcaster may, as a useful byproduct, bring additional benefits to the UK, including support for Britain’s foreign policy aims, but it is an end in itself. The UK makes no effort to determine what those benefits might be, nor does it measure any impact on users other than how they feel about the BBC. In the U.S., on the other hand, the BBG’s mission is directed more toward accomplishing PD objectives, in spite of a mandate requiring its news to be “accurate, objective, and comprehensive.” In either case, it’s important to distinguish the role “their activities are meant to play in PD and to set performance targets accordingly.”


This is a report by the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee on planned FCO PD efforts relating to the 2012 London Olympics and Paralympics. The report identifies the Foreign Office’s key PD strategies and objectives for the Games but does not systematically address the issue of how its efforts will be evaluated. Individual program case studies in Annex E, however, do offer an analysis of “impact and evaluation.”
3. PD Metrics in the U.S. Government [49 entries]

GPRA Legislation and the PART Process [17 entries]
[The Clinton Administration]


[The George W. Bush Administration]

“FY 2004 Budget Chapter Introducing the PART: Rating The Performance Of Federal Programs” Office of Management and
This OMB piece introduces the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), a device designed to measure the performance of U.S. federal government programs. It begins with a review of previous USG efforts to achieve more accountability in program management, identifying the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 as the most significant step to date. The GPRA legislation mandated that agencies identify their goals and performance measures on an annual basis. The PART program attempts to build on the process started by GPRA and to address its perceived weaknesses. Using a questionnaire, it examines four areas of program assessment: purpose and design, strategic planning, management, and results and accountability. Each element is graded based on a numeric scale and then given a rating ranging from Effective, to Moderately Effective, to Adequate, to Ineffective. A score of “Results not Demonstrated” means that the program managers were unable to generate usable performance measures or adequate data. The article concludes with an assessment of PART’s early results—fully 50% of the programs evaluated through 2003 were unable to demonstrate results—and changes that are required to make this measurement tool more effective in the future.


This site contains a useful archive of documents relating to the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) process, including annual OMB guidance and training documents issued to agencies in preparation for the review.

“Measuring and Managing the Performance of Public Diplomacy Programs: A Project Report for the Office of the Under Secretary of

Commissioned by the U.S. Department of State, this report outlines the Performance Institute’s review of State’s efforts to measure its public diplomacy programs. The Institute describes the review process, its goals, and its two deliverables – a much reduced list of performance measures and a logic model for PD. Also included are a set of recommendations for strengthening the Department’s evaluative capacity going forward.


Kniker is the former chief of the evaluation unit in the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA). He also served as a senior advisor on evaluation and the PART process to the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. In this 2006 speech to the American Evaluation Association, he reviews the history of PART as it relates to State’s PD efforts and offers a critical assessment of PART’s strengths and weaknesses. Regarding the former, he notes that PART stimulated a culture change in the Department that saw greater focus placed on planning, performance assessment, and identifying achievable results. With respect to PART’s weaknesses, he says that it did not take into account leadership, an essential ingredient in building an effective performance measurement system, and it tended to rely too heavily on quantitative data at the expense of qualitative data. He concludes by recommending the creation of a mechanism that can assess the effectiveness of PD across bureaus in the Department and across agencies in the government as a whole.
Launched in February 2006, this is the USG website that identifies which federal programs are performing or not performing, based on the PART assessment process.


[The Obama Administration]

Zients, Jeffrey. “Statement of Jeffrey D. Zients Chief Performance Officer and Deputy Director for Management, Office of Management and Budget, before the Budget Committee, United States Senate.” 29 October 2009. (Accessed 8 Feb. 2010) http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/testimony/Zients_102909.pdf. Zients’ testimony references past USG approaches to measurement (GPRA and PART) and indicates that the Obama administration
plans to move away from the PART process and implement a different system to pursue its performance measurement priorities.


This document includes a description of the High Priority Performance Goals (Priority Goals) initially listed in the FY2011 Budget that federal agency heads were instructed to identify as part of the new performance measurement strategy implemented by the Obama administration. Agencies were asked to choose goals that did not require additional resources or legislative action to achieve within an 18 to 24-month time frame, but rather hinged on strong execution. For a more detailed description of the Priority Goals identified by the Department of State, see Chapter 7 of the FY2011 Analytical Perspectives Budget: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/performance/chapter7-2011.pdf.


This memo from Zients to the USG Senior Executive Service outlines how the Obama administration’s approach to performance management has been implemented, describes the strategies used, and provides an update on the progress achieved thus far.


This is the first major update to the original GRPA legislation since its passage in 1993. The new legislation requires agencies to
designate senior officials to serve as chief operating and performance improvement officers and to post quarterly performance updates on a single government website instead of submitting them to Congress annually. The following entries are comments on the revised legislation by two government analysts.


Brodsky’s article outlines the major components of the revised GPRA legislation, describes the level of support it received in Congress, and mentions some criticisms leveled against the legislation, including that the bill did not directly identify ways to eliminate or consolidate government programs.


Kamensky’s piece provides background on the previous GPRA legislation and provides an overview of the major provisions required by the new law. The article points out that the increased consultation between agencies and Congress that the legislation requires will also demand that Congress coordinate internally among its many committees.


This GAO report looks at how three USG cabinet departments (Education, Health and Human Services, and Housing and Urban
Development) plan evaluations and suggests that their approach could be a model for other agencies to follow. The report asserts that the four general criteria these departments use to plan evaluations are remarkably similar: a) strategic priorities for major programmatic or policy-area concerns or new initiatives; b) programmatic difficulties or opportunities; c) critical areas in which there are questions or a lack of actionable information; and d) the feasibility of launching a valid evaluation.

This is the Obama administration successor to the Bush administration’s expectmore.gov site. It reviews government efforts to cut waste and improve efficiency in eight areas: acquisition; financial management; human resources; technology; performance improvement; open government; sustainability; and customer service. It also includes mission statements, plans, and reports from each of the 24 federal government departments and agencies, including the Department of State.

GAO Reports on Public Diplomacy [8 entries]

Since 2003, the Government Accountability Office has produced a series of reports on the state of U.S. government public diplomacy efforts, including several that explicitly deal with the issue of evaluation. A list of these follows:

In its first in-depth assessment of U.S. public diplomacy strategy post 9/11, the GAO points out significant shortcomings despite expanded DOS efforts since the 2001 terrorist attacks. The report criticizes the
lack of an integrated strategy for joining diverse PD activities and the absence of an interagency PD strategy. Failure to systematically measure progress toward PD goals is also emphasized, as is the absence of a definition of the “problem” public diplomacy is intended to address. The report highlights the lack of systematic program evaluation at the mission level by PAOs, largely due to staff and funding shortages, and the limited availability of polling data to help measure progress. In its response to this report, the State Department expresses its willingness to comply with the GAO’s recommendations related to measurement and to place increased emphasis on research and analysis.


This report reviews U.S. government efforts to date to coordinate U.S. public diplomacy efforts between agencies and the extent to which the private sector was involved in these efforts. Finding current efforts to coordinate public diplomacy insufficient, the report specifically calls for the White House to facilitate the development of a national communications strategy to guide and coordinate the PD efforts of the State Department, USAID, the BBG, and DOD. The GAO also recommends that the Director of the White House Office of Global Communications work to assess USG methods and strategies used to communicate with foreign audiences and coordinate the delivery of messages so that they reflect U.S. strategic communication priorities. Finally, the report recommends that the Secretary of State develop a strategy to guide department efforts to engage the private sector in pursuit of common public diplomacy objectives.

Government Accountability Office, *State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges*. GAO-06-535, 3 May 2006. (Accessed 25 October 2010) http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06535.pdf. This report echoes many of the recommendations made in previous GAO reports on U.S. public diplomacy, with particular attention to outreach efforts to Muslim audiences. A review of mission performance plans and field work in Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt found that posts’ public diplomacy programming lacked important elements of strategic communication and planning, including a clear theme or message and identification of specific target audiences. Research and evaluation efforts were also limited by budgetary constraints and a lack of field expertise in commissioning and conducting these types of studies. The report recommends that the Secretary of State develop written guidance describing how the department plans to implement U.S. strategic communication priority goals and tactics in the Muslim world and create a sample country-level communication plan as a guide for posts. GAO also recommends creating a way to share best practices to address long-standing program challenges that have been especially relevant in the Muslim world.

This GAO report examines USG efforts to “brand” its foreign assistance activities. It stems from Congressional concern that the U.S. does not do enough to make foreign recipients aware of the origins of the assistance they receive. The report finds that, while those agencies involved in foreign aid have established some regulations for marking and publicizing their activities, there is no overall strategy for surveying the impact of their efforts on foreign audience awareness and attitudes toward USG assistance. Nor is there any U.S. government-wide guidance or policy on branding practices. The report recommends that surveys and/or focus groups be undertaken to assess the impact of USG branding efforts and that interagency agreements be reached to implement a common approach to marking and publicizing USG aid activities abroad.


This 2007 GAO report examines the use of research by those USG agencies whose portfolios include strategic communication with foreign audiences. It finds that the Department of State, the lead U.S. agency for overseas strategic communication efforts, had not, as of 2007, implemented a research-focused approach to its thematic communication outreach. The report also asserts that USG agencies have no institutional mechanisms to evaluate end-user needs or to coordinate and/or share the research that they do undertake. The recommendation to adopt a “campaign-style” approach to public diplomacy, first included in 2003, is reiterated here, and the need for PD staff training on how to use research is emphasized. The GAO includes for comparative purposes a case study of the British government’s revamped approach to public diplomacy and audience research.

This report offers the GAO’s assessment of the 2007 “U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication” developed under the leadership of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes and the Policy Coordination Committee. The GAO, which called for such a plan in both its 2003 and 2005 reports, notes that the strategy provides guidance on objectives, target audiences, public diplomacy priorities, and interagency coordination, but lacks a clear definition of the problem, the desired results the strategy would achieve, and identification of agency roles and responsibilities. The report also observes that the requested supporting strategic plans for various agencies and specific countries had not been developed. Although the national strategy identifies some goals and objectives, it lacks subordinate objectives or indicators to measure progress. The report also expresses concern that agencies (e.g. BBG, USAID, and DOD) had developed measurement systems for their efforts that failed to link back to national priorities for public diplomacy and strategic communication.


This GAO report reviews the State Department’s use of various public diplomacy outreach platforms to engage with international audiences. Among the platforms under review are American Presence Posts, American Centers, Binational Centers, American Corners, Virtual Presence Posts, and social media efforts such as Facebook. The report notes that the Department’s 2010 Strategic Framework for Public Diplomacy calls for the expansion of these
outreach platforms but argues that the failure to properly evaluate them (with the exception of American Corners) has inhibited an accurate assessment of their effectiveness and the resources needed to support them.

U.S. National Communication Strategies and Evaluation [4 entries]

This is a bill introduced by Congressman Mac Thornberry in April 2005 to establish a Center for Strategic Communication. The Center would present information on foreign public opinion to policy makers, coordinate interagency stratcom efforts, devise new PD programs and initiatives, and develop appropriate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

Long recommended by GAO, this national plan for PD and Strategic Communication was issued by the State Department’s Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes in 2007. The document identifies strategic PD objectives and audiences and stresses the importance of additional resources and interagency cooperation. It also offers a detailed recipe for how to achieve U.S. PD objectives through a series of “attachments.” The strategy concludes with a section on evaluation and accountability. It states that the Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) for PD should devise an evaluation strategy designed to foster a “culture of measurement,” create common interagency performance indicators, and establish mechanisms for gathering data. It provides few details,
however, on how the PCC should go about accomplishing these objectives.


The Strategic Framework for Public Diplomacy, released by Under Secretary Of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Judith McHale in 2010, is an updated version of the national PD strategy issued by her predecessor U/S Karen Hughes in 2007. Intended as the initial phase of a process leading to a more detailed operational PD plan, the framework contains a PD mission statement, a description of the global environment, and a list of five strategic objectives, each accompanied by a proposed tactical plan for how to achieve them. The fourth objective, “Better Inform Policy-Makers,” contains a provision to create a new staff within the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) to strengthen market research capabilities in an effort to sharpen policy planning and decision making, as well as tailor new PD initiatives to target audiences. Objective number five, “Deploying Resources in Line with Current Resources,” recommends stronger alignment of budget with policy priorities, strengthened planning at the post level, and greater focus on using evaluation tools to maximize program impact.


Mandated by section 1055 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act of 2009, this is the Obama Administration’s national interagency stratcom plan. It argues broadly for greater synchronization of words and deeds, including factoring listening and communications into the policy making process, and increased
interagency coordination of “deliberate communication and engagement.” The document features a section on evaluation and recommends enhanced coordination and access to research and audience analysis across the inter-agency community. It dismisses the need for an independent, non-profit body tasked with providing strategic assessment and guidance. The plan provides a useful read-out of the roles and responsibilities of the various players and bodies within the USG stratcom universe.

DOS PD Evaluation in Practice [8 entries]


The State Department’s monthly magazine highlights the work of the Office of Policy, Planning and Resources (R/PPR), and more specifically, its Evaluation and Measurement Unit (EMU). The EMU is charged with creating and implementing instruments designed to measure the success of the Department’s public diplomacy programs. The article describes the history of the unit, its goals, the challenges of evaluating PD, the strategy and mechanisms the EMU has developed to gather and analyze data, and plans for future initiatives.


This is the page on the State Department’s website that describes the activities of the “R” Bureau’s Evaluation and Measurement Unit for public diplomacy and public affairs.

Armstrong’s blog post notes the trimming in 2008 of the Department of State’s approved public diplomacy performance measures from 900 to 15 and its adoption of Business Intelligence software to help gather data for measuring PD outcomes. It also comments on how the American obsession with “Return on Investment” (ROI) extends even to PD, which must constantly prove its worth because it lacks a domestic constituency.


Weier’s piece reports on the State Department’s use of business intelligence software to better track the relationship between its public diplomacy programming overseas and its expenditures. This software was used in the Public Diplomacy Impact (PDI) project that sought to measure the impact of PD programming on participants. A new effort seeks to gather detailed funding information to better match resources to desired outcomes.


This transcript of a meeting of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy focuses on PD evaluation in the Department of State. It features remarks by those members of the Department responsible for evaluating the success of public diplomacy programs. The discussion ranges from the development of a measurement
culture in the DOS to current practices and likely future efforts to devise and implement an effective evaluation regime.


This transcript is of the September 2010 meeting of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, which focuses on the development of a PD evaluation model by faculty and students at the University of Texas, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs. The Commission asked the LBJ research team to develop the model, review current USG evaluation activities, and make recommendations on future efforts. The discussion focuses largely on an explication of the Public Diplomacy Model for the Assessment of Performance (PD-MAT), which is based on three desired PD outcomes—understanding, influence and favorability—and on steps the DOS might take to strengthen and better coordinate its evaluative efforts.


Commissioned by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, this report by a research team at the LBJ School of Public Affairs presents an “assessment tool for measuring the effectiveness of public diplomacy programs.” The report reviews current Department of State evaluation efforts, offers its own assessment tool, and suggests future evaluative approaches. Called PD-MAP (Public Diplomacy Model for the Assessment of Performance), the team’s quantifiable evaluation framework measures success against
three core outcomes of all PD programs—increasing understanding of and favorability towards the U.S. and strengthening America’s global influence—in five thematic areas: culture, foreign policy, security, economic policy, and climate change (environmental policy). The researchers divide the target audience for PD programs into three segments: foreign government officials, elite, and general (mass) and include weighting and risk assessment as variables in producing measurable results.


Strategic Communication and Evaluation in the Department of Defense and Other USG Agencies [12 entries]


This article by former USAID Director Andrew Natsios describes the rise of the “counter-bureaucracy,” the regulation, oversight, and evaluation entities within the USG that monitor U.S. foreign aid programs, and which, Natsios argues, have hindered, rather than helped, U.S. development practices. His key argument is that the emphasis on short-term quantitative results, usually involving some form of service delivery, in a field where the most important result—sustainable institution building—can only be judged over the long term, have led to a distortion of aid priorities and weakened field practice.


This article by a former NSC official in the Bush Administration argues that a coordinated and fully-resourced strategic communications effort is an essential component of U.S. national security. Toward this end, he calls for a national communications strategy and the establishment of a permanent institutional structure for coordinating and implementing a whole-of-government approach to stratcom. He also notes that this effort cannot succeed without organizational elements built into the effort directed specifically toward assessing progress toward objectives. He then concludes by offering some possible indicators that might be used at each level of approach—strategic, operational, and tactical.

This document contains the DOD’s 2007 strategic communications plan in support of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan. It comes complete with a matrix specifying target audiences, objectives, and performance measures to gauge effectiveness.

Baylor, Bradford H. *Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Strategic Communication Best Practices 2007–2008*, Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, Suffolk, Virginia, 10 March 2009: 1–17. Bradford describes best practices emerging from a 2007 Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) overhaul of its strategic communications efforts that led to significant improvements in capabilities and results. It begins with a description of the challenges posed by a complex counter-insurgency situation in Iraq and discusses measures implemented by MNF-I’s commander to change the communications team’s approach to stratcom. One of the best practices to emerge from these efforts was the establishment of a unit dedicated solely to analysis and assessment. This unit undertook quantitative and qualitative research on media themes, message alignment and resonance, Iraqi perceptions, and managing misinformation and disinformation. While acknowledging the difficulty of measuring the direct impact of MNF-I’s communications efforts on Iraqi attitudes and perceptions, the article argues that the assessment initiatives offered senior commanders unbiased information, better media situational awareness, and warrant “further study and evaluation.”

and how these impact U.S. capacity to conduct PD on an interagency basis.


This document describes Strategic Communication principles developed at the Department of Defense’s March 2008 Strategic Communication Education Summit, held in collaboration with the Department of State and civilian educators and practitioners. The purpose of the guide is to provide a tool to promote enhanced understanding of Strategic Communication, which the Pentagon terms an “emerging and extremely pertinent joint concept.” Prominent among the principles is the call for DOD stratcom to be “Results-Based,” featuring a continuous cycle of “research, analysis, planning, execution, and assessment.” The cover note to the document stipulates that the principles are to be reviewed every two years until they become part of formal doctrine.


This is a blog post by a former U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team leader in Western Anbar Province in Iraq in 2008. The author reviews the challenge of measuring success in his area of responsibility, concluding that it is more art than science and perhaps a more apt field of study for the military’s anthropologists than its pollsters. Especially interesting are his discussion of a “risk premium” and “banana index” as methods for assessing improvements in local security.

This article reviews the highlights of a panel discussion sponsored by the US Institute of Peace on evaluating the media’s role in managing and ameliorating conflict. The event coincided with the release of the “Caux Guiding Principles,” which were formulated at a December 2010 meeting by interested stakeholders such as NGOs, journalists, and donors among others. The Principles (see link below) present a general approach to improving the evaluation of the media’s impact on peacebuilding. The overall goal of these efforts, the author concludes, is to develop a community of practice in the field, build and share an archive of lessons learned, and increase efficiency at a time of budgetary shortfalls.


DeYoung and Pincus review the U.S. military’s information operations in Iraq, arguing that the Pentagon’s role in the “war of ideas” has significantly changed and expanded in recent years, with the conflict in Iraq emerging as a “proving ground” for the new approach. The outreach tools encompass media campaigns, billboards, PSAs, and other video products. The article notes the role of contractors in carrying out these initiatives, including a concerted effort to research Iraqi attitudes and perceptions through media content analysis, polls, and focus groups. The authors point out that the level of funding for DOD stratcom in Iraq dwarfs that allocated to the DOS for public diplomacy and notes Congress’
interest in seeing better coordination between the two agencies in their communication outreach efforts.


This article reports on Congressional concerns about the DOD’s strategic communications programs which, because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, have grown rapidly and, as of 2009, cost nearly 1 billion dollars annually. The funds, however, are spread so broadly across the Pentagon that Congress is having trouble exercising oversight. Pincus’ piece notes that the House Appropriations committee will require the DOD to report back on “target audiences, goals, and measures of effectiveness.”


Shanker’s article reports on plans to launch a new unit within the State Department designed to counter extremist propaganda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Funds would be used to bolster radio broadcasting, cell phone service, journalist training, and media outreach.

4. Measuring Exchanges [22 entries]

Historical Perspectives [9 entries]

This article, like that by Brewster (see below), was written in 1955, and deals largely with the U.S. experience with exchange programs. The authors state that the main goals of almost all U.S.-organized exchanges—both public and private—are to build capacity in developing countries and to strengthen mutual understanding. The objectives of the Department of State also focus closely on nurturing an improved understanding of and support for the U.S. and its policies, in particular strengthening democratic institutions. Evaluating an exchange, the authors argue, comes down to answering two questions: did the participant absorb the skills and values the program was designed to transmit and, upon return home, did the exchangee convey them to a larger audience? They note that, while there was plenty of anecdotal evidence to suggest that exchanges were achieving what their organizers intended, formal evaluations were a recent development. They conclude by reviewing several recent evaluations and discussing the lessons they offer the researcher.


Prompted by the growth of government-sponsored exchange programs after WWII, the author asks the question: Were these programs effective in achieving their objectives? To answer the question, he examines a series of extant evaluation studies, most of which consist of U.S.-organized programs, either Americans going abroad or exchange participants visiting the U.S. He notes early on that exchange program objectives vary from program to program and participant to participant, so determining objectives is key to measuring success. He also notes some of the challenges inherent in evaluating the success of such programs: the focus on process rather
than impact; obtaining good baseline data; the long-term nature of some results; and tracking the leap from impact on individuals to impact on organizations, communities or societies. The author concludes with a useful synthesis of “recurrent themes” about program impacts, as observed in the evaluations under review. These include the role age and length of visit play in altering attitudes; the importance of program content rather than administration or style; and the difference in impact on participants of views toward the U.S., (tending toward more favorable, but “highly differentiated,”) versus views toward U.S. policy (slight).


This article examines the assumption that travel to another country, i.e., cross-cultural exchange, impacts the attitudes of the traveler toward the visited country and toward one’s own. It looks at the experience of a group of 29 Germans who visited the U.S. for six months to a year during the period 1949-1951 on a program funded by the State Department. Data was collected through a series of three interviews, at the start of their program in the U.S., right before their departure, and 6 months after they returned home, plus questionnaires and direct observation. Findings indicated that attitude change is often conditioned by the visitors’ national frame of reference. In areas where there were shared values, the visitors were more open to exploring new ideas. In areas of value conflict, or where the visitors felt unequal or disparaged, opportunities for change were more limited. The article also includes an interesting discussion of the sequence of change that visitors may experience, which offers possible insights for evaluation researchers.

This book examines the experience of Japanese students and scholars who participated in exchange programs with the U.S. in the pre and post-WW2 periods in the context of Japanese modernization and cultural relations with America. It contains useful insights into the differences between the experience of male and female students; the importance of the home environment of the returning scholar (Was the U.S. in favor at the time? Did the scholar have the right sponsor?) in their making the most use of the exchange experience; and the cultural imperative of gaining knowledge and contributing to modernization while retaining traditional values and not being “contaminated” by exposure to the West. The authors conclude that the success of any exchange experience must be assessed on the basis of many factors, not just one, and that one of the most important is the historical context in which the exchange occurs.


*De Sola Pool here looks for answers to the question: What do we know about the impact of foreign travel? In reviewing several studies, including one that examines U.S. businessmen’s attitudes toward foreign economic issues, he draws five conclusions. Among them are that individual expectations condition effects, travel broadens significantly, and that the amount of travel makes a big difference in its impact on the traveler. He concludes by asserting that the accelerating pace of international travel will have a profound effect on American attitudes in the future.*

This work tests the hypothesis that foreign students in the U.S. who develop stronger social relationships with Americans are more likely to view the U.S. and its citizens more favorably. The researchers selected students from different sized universities and cities and looked at the opportunities for social interaction that each presented, with an eye towards determining whether a favorable situation, rather than simply a pre-disposition, encouraged contact. The findings suggest that the situation was relevant to contact, and that more contact enhanced favorability toward the U.S. and certain aspects of U.S. social life. Attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy were not affected. The study also showed that students from Europe, and students from other parts of the world who had previously lived or traveled abroad, or who had participated in a U.S. orientation program, were more likely to develop stronger social relationships.


This article looks at patterns of attitude change, and the conditions that occasion them, as a result of experience in a foreign culture, focusing specifically on Scandinavian students who spent a year in the U.S. in the late 1950s. The research encompassed the students’ self-image in the categories of nationality, profession, and personal relationships, but this paper focuses only on the first category, national image. The authors found that the participants’ motivation and expectations, as well as their interaction with and openness to the exchange experience generally and the host country specifically, contributed significantly to how views of their own country changed.

This article looks at the effects of international travel on the traveler and the hosts with whom he or she has direct contact. In this regard, the author discusses some of the multiple variables that can condition the effects of travel, among them its purpose and duration, the traveler’s expectations, language capability and relationship to the host society, and the ease or hardship of travel. De Sola Pool then offers an analysis of the six major forms of travel about which a body of evaluative literature exists. They are foreign study or training; technical assistance travel; tourism; business; military deployment; and immigration. The author notes that the major focus of most such past analyses has been on favorability—does the traveler’s image of the host country improve as a result of travel—and reviews the “contradictory findings” of the literature on this “limited” approach. He concludes by examining the ways travel changes the host’s view of the traveler and the traveler’s views of himself.


Writing in 1976, Flack welcomes the growing interest in evaluating the impact of study abroad programs. He notes, however, that conducting such assessments is a complex affair and points to two major mistakes of most extant studies: they place too much importance on the sojourn, rather than the make-up of the sojourner, in weighing impact; and they don’t adequately differentiate the results themselves. Despite these difficulties, the author proceeds to offer a useful review of existing analyses of the study abroad experience in an effort to cull established wisdom on their results. He looks at four areas of impact: on the individual; the host institution and society; the home society; and “intersocial and international relations.”
Contemporary Research [5 entries]

This paper looks at the personal and professional impact of the exchange experience on 280 American Fulbright scholars (not students) in Africa during the period 1968-1983. The authors examine in particular those factors that occasioned change, including the motivation of the participants themselves. Findings showed that most viewed the experience as a very positive one, personally and professionally. A majority also saw it as positive for their career goals (more than two-thirds in all age groups were promoted within three years of their return), even though nearly a third believed that their experience was undervalued by their home institution. Changes in the home or host institutions were more likely to be reported by full or associate professors than by lecturers or assistant professors, suggesting that rank made them more capable of effecting change.

This paper looks at changes in stereotypes by U.S. exchange students in Britain and Germany. The students were surveyed before, right after, and 9-months after the conclusion of the program. Variables examined included degree of contact with host country nationals and important personal experiences, both positive and negative, that contributed to the students’ views of the host country. For students in Germany, perceptions of the British served as the control and vice versa. Results showed that attitudes and stereotypes toward the host country changed significantly during the exchange but remained
stable upon return home. Group perceptions of the host country actually worsened during the students’ stay, possibly because of inflated early expectations, while those toward the control group remained unchanged. A strong determinant of positive change in attitudes and stereotypes was the degree of direct personal contact with host country members.


*Atkinson seeks to test the hypothesis that U.S.-hosted military and civilian exchange programs are a valuable tool in the war of ideas against extremism. Examining the human rights records of states that have sent military officers and students to the U.S. on educational exchanges, she concludes that such programs can diffuse liberal democratic values in authoritarian states, especially when three conditions are present: the exchangee has significant social interaction while on the program; the participant and the hosts “share a sense of community”; and the participant achieves a “politically influential position” upon return home.*


*This article argues that most exchange program evaluations only measure the impact on the participants themselves while ignoring the potential “ripple effects” on “indirect participants” such as escorts, host families and program staff. To remedy this shortfall, it recommends the implementation of a 360-degree approach to evaluation and offers a case study to illustrate how such an approach*
might work. The piece contains a good bibliography on the impact of study abroad programs.


This piece describes the effort now under way by Prof. Emily Metzgar to assess the ongoing impact of the Japan Exchange and Teaching Program (JET) on the educational and professional experiences of American participants and on their opinions of Japan. Metzgar’s study utilizes an online survey to collect data from the JET program alumni and to evaluate their continuing connection to Japan in the years following their participation in the program. The study will also examine ways to evaluate the JET program’s impact on aspects of American political, media, and public opinion environments.

USG Exchanges [8 entries]


In her dissertation, Mueller devises a “conceptual framework” for the evaluation of the International Visitor Program (IVP), a short-term exchange program for young leaders carried out by the Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA). She reviews the relevant principles of evaluation, the history of the program, and the 24 existing IVP evaluation studies, most of which she finds outdated and/or flawed, especially by the lack of quantitative data and the failure to address the impact of the program on host-country individuals. Mueller concludes by outlining her framework, including useful discussions of the relevance of characteristics individual participants bring to the exchange and
indicators or variables that condition the results of IVP projects and help facilitate comparative analysis.


This qualitative study, undertaken in 1998 by the Alverno College Applied Research Team at the request of the National Council for International Visitors (NCIV), looks at the domestic social and economic impacts of the U.S. Department of State’s International Visitor (IV) Program, (then administered by the now-defunct United States Information Agency). It is based on phone interviews with volunteer hosts from various local councils of the NCIV. The findings suggest that the IV Program has a significant impact on communities where the Councils are located by expanding the hosts’ networking opportunities, broadening their perspective on global issues, and by heightening awareness of and facilitating greater interaction with people from other countries.


A continuation of the 1998 NCIV analysis of the social and economic impacts of the IV Program, this update adds additional sites and then synthesizes the data from the two studies. It confirms the findings of the first study and adds a brief bibliography.

This website contains summaries of all program evaluations completed since 1997 by the evaluation division of the Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural affairs. Below are two representative samples of evaluations of ECA programs.

“Outcome Assessment of the Visiting Fulbright Student Program: Executive Summary.” Prepared for U.S. Department of State by SRI International, June 2005: 1–6. (Accessed 4 Apr. 2010) http://exchanges.state.gov/media/pdfs/ope/completed/execsummaries/fvsp.pdf. This evaluation of the Visiting Fulbright Student Program, conducted by a contract consultancy firm in 2004-2005, is designed to assess the impact of the program on the personal and professional lives of the participants, and to document the program’s success in promoting “mutual understanding.” The evaluation relied on both quantitative and qualitative evidence to measure success, using such indicators as participant satisfaction with the program, increases in learning, behavior change, professional enhancement, and the development of lasting relationships. The study’s findings strongly suggest the program is meeting its objectives.

“International Visitor Leadership Program Outcome Assessment: Executive Summary.” Apr. 2010) http://exchanges.state.gov/media/pdfs/ope/completed/execsummaries/ivlprogram.pdf. This IVLP assessment was also conducted by an outside contractor and had much the same objective—to assess the impact of the program on the participants and their affiliated organizations and to ascertain how well it met its legislative mandate of bolstering mutual understanding. The study examined participants from Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine during the years 1996–2001. It was conducted from November 2004 to March 2005, a period that coincided with the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange
Revolution in the Ukraine, a reminder, the authors state, of the need to take context into account in evaluation. The findings, derived from over 800 personal interviews and multiple focus groups, were based on four outcome levels—participant satisfaction, professional learning, behavior change, and follow-on linkages—and revealed the program to be successful at each level.


Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors. *Report of Inspection: Management Review of Youth Programs, Bureau of Educational & Cultural Affairs, Department of State*, ISP-I-10-16, October 2009. (Accessed 3 Dec. 2009) http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/131068.pdf. This report by the State Department’s Office of the Inspector General looks at the question of oversight of four secondary school exchange programs conducted by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA). The age group for participants in these programs is 15–18 years old. The report finds that ECA program staff, assuming that monitoring responsibility was transferred in the language of the grant, tended to focus more on monitoring the grant process rather than the exchange participants, resulting in a general
lack of oversight. The report recommends enhanced training for program officers, additional staff and funds for site visits, and the development of improved monitoring procedures.

5. Cultural Programming [12 entries]

U.S. Perspectives [10 entries]


This document outlines the activities of the Center for Arts and Culture in support of expanded U.S. efforts in the field of cultural diplomacy. It includes a series of recommendations, a public and cultural diplomacy timeline (starting from September 11, 2001), and executive summaries of five articles on the topic commissioned by the Center in 2003. Following are three of these articles.


Cummings’ article offers a useful overview of U.S. cultural diplomacy policy since the 1930s and concludes with a comment on the difficulty of measuring its results.


Sablosky reviews the U.S. Department of State’s approach to cultural diplomacy during the years 1993–2003. She begins by tracing the history of U.S. cultural programs abroad, noting that funding and political support have always been sporadic. The most recent wave of funding cuts reached its apogee in the late 90s, by which time
USIA’s budget had been cut by 33% and its staff by 29%. USIA itself was dissolved and its components rolled into the State Department in 1999. The author then examines funding and activity levels for key exchange and cultural programs. She concludes by asserting that cultural diplomacy has the potential to positively impact U.S. foreign relations, but that without a “clearly articulated rationale” for carrying out such programming, that potential may go unrealized.


Schneider argues here that cultural diplomacy is perhaps the best vehicle for America to convey its values to the world. To illustrate her point, she provides examples of creative uses of this vehicle by U.S. Embassy officials in a variety of countries. While asserting that the “returns” of cultural programs are “intangible,” Schneider says they form “an integral part of our relationship with other people and other countries.”


This 2005 report by the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy argues for the centrality of cultural diplomacy in U.S. public diplomacy specifically and foreign policy in general. The authors state that it is through cultural activities that a nation best expresses its ideals, but despite that, the U.S. has, since the end of the Cold War, consistently under-funded cultural programming. They also state flatly that cultural diplomacy suffers because “no metric or language exists by which to gauge the success of a cultural initiative.” Cultural diplomacy involves, as one writer puts it, a “certain degree of faith.” The authors conclude by issuing a set of recommendations,
one of which calls for more training of U.S. public diplomats in the areas of research, polling, and new media.

Undertaken by ECA contractors, this evaluation looks at the impact of the Jazz Ambassadors program from 1997-2004, during which more than one-hundred individuals and groups toured the world. It relied on site visits, on-line surveys, and telephone interviews to ascertain how well the program met its goals, including strengthening mutual understanding, broadening target audiences, and deepening awareness of U.S. culture and values. The results suggest that the program is an effective public diplomacy tool.

This evaluation, undertaken in 2005-2006, looks at the effectiveness of an ECA program designed to offer scholarships to 14-18 year-old non-elite students to study English and learn about American society and values. Although originally focused on Muslim youth, the program has since expanded to include non-Muslim students. Findings suggest that the program is effective in enhancing students’ English language skills, deepening their understanding of American culture and society, and improving their views of the U.S. and the American people. The evaluation incorporated both qualitative and quantitative methods such as individual interviews, surveys, focus groups, site visits, and classroom observation.

Slackman’s article examines the Access English language teaching program in Egypt, sponsored by the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. It offers an interesting analysis of the potential impact of the program on its participants, though largely through an anecdotal frame.


Kaiser asks whether traditional cultural diplomacy – sending American arts groups and artists abroad – is an effective strategy for improving the U.S. image. His answer is “no.” He argues that cultural diplomacy is marketing and that marketing is only effective when repeated, and the USG simply doesn’t have the resources to sustain such an effort. Kaiser posits instead that a more cost-effective and results-oriented approach would be for the USG to focus on sharing U.S. expertise in arts management in order to help struggling arts organizations abroad achieve sustainability over the long term.

“Arts and Culture,” American Evaluation Association. (Accessed 18 Jan. 2011) http://comm.eval.org/EVAL/eac/Home/Default.aspx. This is a topical interest group within the American Evaluation Association that focuses on the evaluation of arts and cultural programs. The site intends to respond to the needs of arts and culture evaluators by providing a venue for the discussion of best practices and the development of customized evaluation tools.
International Views [2 entries]


Simon begins by noting that cultural diplomacy has been neglected by scholars because it is considered a lesser tool of diplomacy and is given low priority by diplomatic practitioners because it is time-consuming, expensive, and lacks quantifiable impact. He argues that there has been no widespread agreement on the objectives of cultural diplomacy, nor is there even agreement on what is meant by the term “cultural.” Despite these drawbacks, Simon argues that cultural diplomacy, which he defines as “the deployment of a state’s culture in support of its foreign policy goals or diplomacy,” can offer powerful benefits to a country in such areas as nation branding and network building.


In this article, Memis argues that, while cultural relations as practiced by the British Council is viewed as a long-term investment, the demand from stakeholders and funders for more “immediate” results has required the development of an evaluation system that includes short and medium-term performance indicators and that uses both quantitative as well as qualitative approaches. Memis provides a brief historical overview of the Council’s evaluation efforts, an explanation of the current status of evaluation (a general Corporate Scorecard and project-specific performance measures),
and a description of the Council’s three target audiences, priority themes, project development, and quality control. She concludes with a case study of the quantitative and qualitative approaches taken by the Council in measuring outcomes for a project in East Asia that linked designers with people with a physical disability in an effort to produce a concept for a product useful to both the disabled and non-disabled communities.

6. Information Campaigns and Media Agenda Setting [14 entries]

Information Campaigns [8 entries]

This article examines factors that can impede the success of information outreach campaigns. The authors argue that exposure to and processing of public information is largely determined by the psychological characteristics of the audience itself. Among their findings: up to 30% of the people have little to no interest in any given event; interested people acquire more information, i.e., motivation in seeking the information is key; people tend to pursue information that fits their existing preconceptions; exposure to new information does not necessarily mean the that it has been uniformly processed and retained, nor does it necessarily lead to changes in attitude; and interest in foreign affairs tends to be “generalized,” i.e., large groups at either end of the scale tend to be interested in most issues or in none at all.

Mendelsohn argues that the failure of some information campaigns, often attributed to public apathy (as articulated most notably in Hyman and Sheatsley’s use of the phrase “know nothings” to describe a segment of the audience for any given event), should more properly be attributed to the failure of communications practitioners to involve evaluation experts in program design and implementation. The author says that past research shows that information campaigns can succeed if they take audience apathy into account and they establish clear objectives and specific audience targets. He concludes by reviewing three case studies that show how social science research can aid the communications practitioner in creating effective information campaigns.


According to Macleod, with over $20 billion dollars spent every year on PR worldwide, managers are demanding measurable results. The focus is on media evaluation in particular since media publicity is the most frequently used PR tool. This article looks at ways to measure success in media outreach. She reviews guidelines enumerated by the Association of Media Evaluations Companies (AMEC), notes the four levels of measurement: input; output; outtake; and outcome, and lists the key questions that should be asked before the launch of any media campaign.


Michaelson and Griffin argue that the traditional methods of doing media content analysis, among them article clipping, circulation and readership analysis, tonality and prominence studies, don’t provide the PR professional with the most important information necessary.
to gauge media outreach success—a systematic assessment of message accuracy and a strong link between campaign objectives and content analysis.

Wang, Jian. “Managing National Reputation And International Relations In The Global Era: Public Diplomacy Revisited,” Public Relations Review, Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 2006): 91–96. Wang argues here that national reputation is an “instrument of national power,” given its ability to create an enabling environment for policy. The tool that nations use to manage that reputation is public diplomacy. In an increasingly globalized world, Wang says, the traditional ways of conducting PD, state-conducted policy and advocacy rather than relationship driven and reliant on the mass media, may no longer be adequate in the face new forms of communication and the growing sway of non-state actors. He concludes by listing three areas for further research: the diverse new audiences created by a globalized and linked world and innovative survey instruments that measure how audiences generally relate to nation states on an emotional level; the desirability of a continued predominance of governments in conducting PD; and the impact of new communication technologies on PD practice.

the results of information campaigns. The last of these articles, authored by Klingemann and Rommele, offers a checklist of when and how survey research can be used in devising and implementing communication campaigns.

Barrett, Diana and Sheila Leddy. “Assessing Creative Media’s Social Impact.” The Fledgling Fund. December 2008. (Accessed 1 Feb. 2011) http://www.thefledglingfund.org/media/pdf/ImpactPaper.pdf. This article examines documentary films as agents of change and explores the kinds of metrics the Fledgling Fund uses to inform its grant-making activity. The authors acknowledge the difficulty of establishing a direct link between the “power of a film or other media and social change.” They argue, however, that assessing impact is essential and offer several “key lessons” in how to assess results, among them using a “range of data,” setting realistic goals and expectations, and working collaboratively with stakeholders. They conclude by presenting an evaluation framework that features the “dimensions of impact” that the Fund uses to assess the projects it supports.

O’Loughlin, Ben. “Media Diplomacy: Measuring Impact in the Global Influence Business,” (Royal Holloway, University of London, 2007), Presented at Media@LSE Fifth Anniversary Conference, London School of Economics, 22–23 September 2008. O’Laughlin’s article looks at whether new interactive technologies employed by transnational media will effect a transformation in public diplomacy by permitting media consumers and publics to exercise influence horizontally, i.e., independent of government. He says that there are signs that the USG has moved away from the Cold War model of advocacy and message penetration toward a public diplomacy that emphasizes listening, mutuality, and dialogue. The looming question is how to measure the impact of this dialogue. O’Loughlin argues that evaluating the role of any media depends on communications models that point to the best ways to reach
audiences. He discusses the pros and cons of two such models: transmission and ritual.

Media Agenda Setting [6 entries]

Wanta, Wayne, Guy Golan, and Cheolhan Lee. “Agenda Setting and International News: Media Influence on Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations,” *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, Vol. 81, No. 2 (Summer 2004): 364–377. (Accessed 12 Apr. 2010) http://blog.roodo.com/trac_mak/a6dc7e59.pdf. This article examines the role news coverage plays in determining how important the public thinks a foreign nation is to the U.S. and whether positive or negative coverage impacts the public’s attitudes toward those nations. They conclude that more news coverage generally translates into a greater sense among the public of the relative importance of a nation to U.S. national interests. They also determine that while more negative coverage seems to deepen negative public attitudes, the same does not hold true for more positive coverage.

Lee, Suman. “International Public Relations as a Predictor of Prominence of US News Coverage,” *Public Relations Review*, Vol. 33, (2007): 158–165. This article explores whether foreign countries’ PR efforts in the U.S. are effective in raising their profile in the American media. Analyzing the media coverage of 97 countries in major newspapers and broadcast outlets against the number and dollar amount of their PR contracts, he concludes that investment in PR is a significant predictor of prominence in American media coverage.

Manheim and Albritton explore the impact of foreign government use of American PR firms to boost their national image in the U.S. Specifically, they examine how such efforts affected news coverage in The New York Times. The authors argue that media manipulation by PR firms is likely to succeed for two principal reasons: the public, having little knowledge of most foreign countries or of foreign affairs generally, takes its cues from the media and, because the U.S. media does not cover international news widely, it is more susceptible to PR inputs. They analyze coverage of six countries over a two-year period and find that in case after case positive shifts in media coverage took place. The authors do not conclude that this improvement in coverage led to corresponding policy benefits, but leave open the door to that possibility. This article introduces a U-shaped “conceptual framework” that can be used by foreign nations to develop a successful PR campaign in the U.S. based on their image and visibility, and which is used as a foundation for later work analyzing how media coverage can affect national images.

Manheim, Jarol B. *Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Manheim’s 1994 volume expands on the discussion about governments’ use of public relations to influence national image that he began in his 1984 article. The book provides an in-depth look at how foreign governments use strategic public relations to manipulate their national image, explores several case studies where these techniques have been used, and finally provides a more detailed analysis of the conceptual model used in evaluating and understanding these strategic communication efforts.

This 2003 Master’s thesis by an MIT student in Political Science outlines an analytical model designed to predict the success of public diplomacy campaigns, using the concepts of “strategic directionality,” which focuses on a country’s image and visibility, and “elite-oriented messaging” as the two most important predictive factors. The model draws from the work of Jarol B. Manheim, who in 1984 introduced the U-shaped conceptual model for PR campaigns based on a nation’s image and visibility, later elaborated on in his 1994 book (see entries above). Mitigating elements include the target audience’s predisposition to acceptance of the PD campaign’s messages and the degree to which the campaign is concealed from the intended audience. The thesis presents as test cases Britain’s attempts to cultivate U.S. public support in the period leading up to America’s entry into WW2, and Kuwait’s efforts to engender U.S. backing following the Iraqi invasion of that country in 1990. The paper concludes by using the model to predict the success (unlikely, he says) of the U.S. post-9/11 anti-terrorism public diplomacy campaign in the Middle East, and by offering policy prescriptions for dealing with the negative fallout from the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Kiousis, Spiro and Xu Wu. “International Agenda-Building and Agenda-Setting: Exploring the Influence of Public Relations Counsel on News Media and Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations,” International Communication Gazette, Vol. 70, No. 1 (2008): 58–75. This article examines whether the PR counsel provided to foreign nations impacts the U.S. media and public opinion. Their findings suggest that PR counsel can mainly benefit foreign nations by helping to reduce negative coverage in the media, thus contributing to a more positive public perception.
7. New Media [21 entries]

New Media and the USG [7 entries]

Fung’s piece asserts that, in the face of foreign policy challenges and rising anti-Americanism, the State Department has turned increasingly to “digital diplomacy,” and that social media analytics tools like Klout can help to measure success in that effort. The vast trove of data that can be collected through such tools can help digital diplomats customize messages and engage target audiences more effectively.

This chapter of the Department of State’s Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) outlines the Department’s policy toward employees’ use of social media. It describes the limits on the archiving of personally identifiable information of those accessing DOS social media sites and provides guidelines for record keeping of content amassed using Department-owned and third party social media platforms (Sections 794 and 795).

The article reports on the Obama administration’s efforts to engage with global audiences using tools such as Facebook and Twitter. Some data (such as the hundreds of thousands of text messages received and fans attracted to the eJournal USA Facebook page) are mentioned as indicators of successful outreach. The authors discuss some of the potential pitfalls of engagement through social media, such as raising tensions with foreign governments and traditional media journalists.

Ferenstein, Greg. “How the U.S. Engages the World with Social Media,” Mashable.com. 17 May 2010. (Accessed 9 Dec. 2010). http://mashable.com/2010/05/17/state-department-social-media/. Ferenstein’s article provides a brief overview of different ways the State Department is using social media platforms to engage with various global audiences. The article focuses on quantitative evidence of the State Department’s interactions with international populations using Twitter, Facebook, blogs, and other online resources that suggests they have made progress in establishing dialogue and moving away from one-way communication.

This is an analysis of the work of the Department of State’s Digital Outreach Team, which seeks to engage bloggers in Arabic, Persian, and Urdu on foreign policy topics involving the U.S., with an eye toward providing the American point of view and countering mis- and dis-information. They use President Obama’s Cairo speech as a case study.

Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Review of the Use of Social Media
This is the DOS Inspector General’s evaluation of social media use at American Embassies overseas. It tracks compliance with guidance provided in the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) and issues recommendations for improving the posts’ management of new media.

This is an analysis of the OIG report on U.S. Embassies’ use of social media. It concludes by posing a number of questions raised by but not addressed in the OIG report.

The Private Sector Perspective [4 entries]

Sterne’s volume provides a how-to guide for measuring success in the use of social media and for developing ways to produce meaningful analysis of social media metrics. He highlights the importance of defining goals from the outset, determining objectives, and finding ways to measure outcomes that go beyond counts or impressions to incorporate reach, influence, sentiment, and the ability to inspire action. Although Sterne writes about measuring return on investment in social media from a business perspective, his approach sheds light on many of the questions associated with measuring outputs and outcomes from social media engagement that relate to public diplomacy.

This presentation provides step-by-step recommendations for measuring brand presence with social media tools, with an emphasis on closely linking desired goals and performance metrics. Paine and Wallace emphasize the importance of defining objectives, establishing benchmarks, and choosing the appropriate tools in order to assess return on investment in social media engagement. A case study of the various dimensions of Georgia Tech’s use of social media platforms illustrates some of the principles of the presentation.


In this article, McCann describes how, through effective use of evaluation, social media can increase productivity. He identifies three areas where productivity gains might be realized: networking, which can begin with a single tweet, reach thousands, and save valuable time and money; actionable data gathered though the use of analytics tools that filter and systemize “information discovery”; and more effective collaboration with others. Social media, McCann concludes, is often a “double-edged sword” when it comes to productivity, but its usefulness in work-related activities can be maximized through careful review and analysis.

This paper offers recommendations on measuring engagement with the blogosphere from a PR perspective. Paine asserts that even though the environment for marketing messages has changed and become more difficult to control, the three essential components for PR measurement remain the same (outputs, outtakes, and outcomes). She notes that it is important to consider both what a firm is saying via its blog, as well as what is being said about the firm in the larger blogosphere. Paine also emphasizes the importance of drawing actionable conclusions from data-driven insights, while focusing on trends over time.

The International Outlook [6 entries]


Fisher here advocates for greater understanding of networks in order to increase the chances of success in public diplomacy. Given the emphasis on digital engagement and “PD 2.0,” Fisher sees evaluation potential for network analysis, such as whether an initiative has helped to generate desired links between individual bloggers. Although Fisher suggests network analysis may be easiest in the online environment, he also sees an opportunity for its use both with offline PD initiatives and those that cross between offline and online spaces. Fisher includes several detailed case studies of the use of network analysis in evaluation, including an assessment of the British Council’s effort to establish whether a network had developed after individuals participated in one of its program initiatives. Fisher also covers Twitter-related network analysis, both in the discussion created through the use of “hashtags” and through the Twitter network of a PD organization.


The ICT Development Index provides a wealth of data for researchers interested in information and communication technologies (ICTs) in more than 150 countries and compares progress made between 2002 and 2007. This report was called for in the outcome documents of the World Summits on the Information Society and mandated by the International Telecommunications Union in order to establish common indicators and benchmarks for closing the digital divide.

van Noort, Carolijn. *Social Media Strategy: Bringing Public Diplomacy 2.0 to the next level*. Consulate General of the Netherlands, San Francisco, 11 November 2010. This piece, undertaken at the request of the government of the Netherlands, examines research on “PD 2.0” with an eye toward devising a strategy for social media use by the Dutch Embassy and Consulates in the U.S. In particular, the article looks at challenges to the foreign service and PD tradecraft posed by the explosion of new media. It concludes with a call for evaluation to be included in any social media strategy.

Non-profits and NGOs [2 entries]

Holland, Arielle, Karen Matheson, Marc Ruben, and Andrea Wood. *2010 Nonprofit Social Media Benchmarks Study: An Analysis of Growth and Social Engagement Metrics for Nonprofit Organizations*. Washington: M+R Strategic Services, 2010. (Accessed 12 Apr. 2010) http://e-benchmarksstudy.com/socialmedia/. This paper was written with the intent to help organizations develop “meaningful metrics” for their social media outreach. The study offers guidelines for measuring social media engagement activities for non-profit organizations, including growth rates and content interaction via tools like Facebook and Twitter.

Krape’s short review of the “Public Media Camp” on strengthening local and public broadcasting focuses on efforts to measure impact, which for public media (and public diplomacy) relates to informing audiences and behavior change. Krape describes one five-stage model for measuring social impact (created by the Fledgling Fund) which he believes is also applicable to measuring public diplomacy media efforts.

Websites [2 entries]


Kaushik’s piece offers suggestions for government websites to measure success based on the desired outcomes and objectives of their sites. His recommendations focus on questions government websites could ask in order to generate useful data from existing web analytics tools.


Welchman’s brief article provides context for a discussion of how the U.S. and U.K. governments approach sharing information online. She argues that the U.K. government’s approach to consolidation of government online resources and websites has been more successful.
than that of the USG. U.S. government web managers’ efforts toward “transparency” focus on interactivity at the expense of improving access to necessary information. She recommends the sharing of best practices between the U.S. and U.K. governments as well as greater accountability for U.S. leaders to promote effective “government-wide Web Governance.”

8. International Broadcasting [17 entries]

U.S.: BBG and VOA [9 entries]


This GAO report outlines challenges facing the U.S. State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors in their outreach efforts towards majority-Muslim countries and describes progress made in the implementation of GAO recommendations to address these issues. The GAO had criticized the BBG’s 2001 strategic plan for lacking strategic goals and objectives to assess increasing audience size and measurable objectives to assess changing audience views toward the U.S. The GAO also concluded that, like the State Department, the BBG faced resource issues and organizational and media market challenges that hindered its ability to reach its objectives. The GAO recommended the BBG revise its strategic plan to include measurement objectives, implementation strategies, resource requirements, and timeframes as well as a plan to reduce overlap in its scope of operations. In response, the BBG modified its strategic plan to create a single goal to maximize impact in priority areas of interest and added broadcast credibility and audience awareness to its performance measures. However, the GAO concluded the BBG had yet to include implementation strategies, resource requirements,
and project time frames for the various initiatives in its strategic plan.

This presentation provides an overview of the entities that make-up U.S. international broadcasting, its mission, budget, recent trends and developments, and future challenges. The presentation also outlines the audience research component of U.S. international broadcasting, including its three performance measures of reach, reliability, and understanding.

This document outlines the mission, challenges, goals, and implementation strategies for U.S. international broadcasting. The strategy identifies “one overarching, measurable goal” for the BBG — to “deliver accurate news and information to significant audiences in support of U.S. interests.” Ten different implementation strategies to achieve this goal are outlined, although specific benchmarks or criteria to determine their success are not described in this document.

The impact model utilized by the BBG has five dimensions: reach, engagement, influence, understanding, and reliability. Each dimension has several sub-components that are used in audience research to evaluate the effectiveness of BBG broadcasts.

Commissioned by Senator Richard Lugar, this report is the most recent comprehensive overview of the activities of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. The report addresses both the Board’s long-standing staffing difficulties, as well as key issues and countries of concern for the next Board. The report specifically focuses on challenges facing BBG activities in the Middle East, China, Russia, and Iran, as well as Radio Free Asia and Arabic-language Radio Sawa. Each section of the report features data describing the potential audience for the BBG entity under discussion, with particular attention to online activities. The report underscores that consistent leadership and effective allocation of resources for BBG entities will be critical factors in their ability to fulfill their mission within the context of U.S. public diplomacy. Significant attention is dedicated to understanding the audience for Al Hurra TV and Radio Sawa in comparison to other media competitors and addressing negative perceptions about Al Hurra programming (with the exception of Iraq). Restrictions on press freedom in a number of countries pose other challenges for U.S. international broadcasting. The report also encourages Congress to revisit the Smith-Mundt legislation restricting U.S. public access to BBG programming. Appendices to the report list which countries and languages are covered by various BBG entities.


This GAO report reviews the extent to which the Middle East Broadcast Networks (MBN) utilize strategic planning, the MBN’s progress on developing financial and administrative controls to ensure the efficient operation of the organization, the procedures the MBN has developed to ensure compliance with journalistic standards, and the extent to which the BBG has developed performance indicators for MBN efforts and met its performance targets. The
GAO recommends that MBN develop a strategic plan to help it meet challenges in a competitive marketplace. The report acknowledges procedures MBN has put in place to help ensure its programming meets journalistic standards, but also recommends that additional quality control measures, such as listener/viewer feedback, be used to improve program quality. GAO also recommends that MBN implement a standardized annual program review for its entities, as called for in the BBG guidelines. The report notes that weaknesses in MBN’s methodology and documentation have made it difficult to determine whether BBG targets for audience size and program credibility are being met. The GAO recommends that MBN establish regular program reviews and increase transparency in its audience research.

This piece critiques Clinton’s March 2011 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on U.S. international broadcasting. Brown focuses on Clinton’s efforts to secure greater support for international broadcasting, but warns that the potential impact of government-sponsored international broadcasting and the internet may be minimal when compared to domestic media channels that often have much broader audiences. Brown suggests that a more realistic assessment of specific audiences and the overall media environment will be necessary for the U.S. to develop more effective approaches to its international broadcasting.

This OIG report examines the VOA Service to Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim country. According to the report, the Service has evolved over the years from one primarily devoted to radio to a multi-platform effort focused on TV. The Service operates through 230 affiliates countrywide, and places its programming on 9 of the 11 stations with national reach. The report notes the use of audience research, including focus groups, and anecdotal evidence to guide new directions in broadcast policy and programming, including greater focus on the Internet and mobile phones, as well as programs designed to target women and Muslims. The report adds that Indonesia has the second largest number of Facebook users in the world, with the VOA Service alone boasting 320,000 fans.


This OIG report includes a detailed discussion of the challenges Radio Free Asia faces in conducting audience analysis and measuring effectiveness in a repressive environment. Difficulties include measuring listenership for the Tibetan, Korean, and Uyghur services, limited data on Lao and Vietnamese listenership, an inability to measure audiences during crises (when interest is often at its highest), accurately determining internet traffic from those using proxy servers or other “anonymizing” systems, and survey respondents’ fears about revealing their listening or viewing habits. In addition to its audience research, RFA uses a number of other approaches to gathering data: anecdotal information, including listener comments online, remarks by call-in participants, emails, and phone calls, as well as tracking the spread of RFA stories by word of mouth when they appear on blogs and other reputable media outlets.
International Broadcasters [2 entries]


This working paper examines the role of government-funded international broadcasters in supporting their nations’ public diplomacy efforts. The report provides context for evaluation of broadcasting and considers its contribution to PD, with an emphasis on the importance of setting goals. It also features a review of international broadcasters from multiple countries, including the BBC, VOA, Radio Netherlands Worldwide, France 24/Radio France International, Deutsche Welle, Al Jazeera, CCTV, NHK, KBS, and CBC. The paper is the result of research commissioned by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and is intended to stimulate a broader debate about Australia’s international broadcasters and their role in furthering the country’s public diplomacy and supporting its foreign policy goals.


This annual report includes a section on measuring performance for the BBC World Service which describes the primary objectives for the BBCWS. Six major target areas are outlined, included reach and awareness for BBCWS in priority areas, and performance data is provided to show whether target objectives have been met.

Middle East [2 entries]

USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School for Communication & Journalism. *An Evaluation of Alhurra Television*

This assessment of Alhurra television programming uses content analysis to assess the challenges the network faces in carrying out its mandate. Expert discussion groups conducted in Beirut, Cairo, and Dubai with Arab media professionals and academics also contributed to the report. Its main findings were that Alhurra programming was not tailored to the interests of the Arab audience, demonstrated a substandard quality of journalism, had a perceived bias toward the U.S. government, and was often seen as propaganda. The report is the result of a 2007 request from the Broadcasting Board of Governors to assess whether Alhurra TV news and current affairs broadcasts conform to the standards and principles set forth in the U.S. International Broadcasting Act.


Nisbet and Myers’ article studies the potential effects of transnational Arab TV on the rise of transnational Muslim and Arab identity in the Middle East by analyzing public opinion data from a series of cross-national surveys completed between 2004 and 2008. The article considers past research on the growing implications of transnational media in the Middle East and asserts that it is the first study to utilize quantitative data to link exposure to these transnational networks to the salience of Muslim or Arab political identity among individuals. The study focuses on using quantitative data to test whether viewing transnational Arab TV news has a significant influence on political identification. It concludes that exposure to these transnational networks increases the probability of Muslim or Arab political identification at the expense of national-level political
identity, although there were variations among levels of education. The authors also suggest that the resulting growth of transnational Muslim political identity will require a greater “regional” focus in U.S. foreign policy toward the region.

U.S. Broadcasting in and to Afghanistan [4 entries]

Carew’s article describes lessons learned from USAID’s experience in sponsoring the popular TV series “On the Road” in Afghanistan. One of these lessons is that the program management team needs to invest sufficient resources in “high-quality monitoring and evaluation.” In this case, Carew advises that USAID set aside 25% of the program’s first-year budget for a comprehensive, independent viewership survey. He adds that, if at all possible, surveys should also be conducted prior to the program’s launch to get baseline data on attitudes the show is designed to influence.

In this article, Marks reviews efforts by the U.S. Embassy in Kabul to support the broadcast of several TV shows, including the hit cop drama Eagle Four. The author asserts that while these shows are popular, there is as yet no evidence that they are producing the desired policy outcomes. To address this issue, the Embassy recently hired an outside consulting firm to assess the shows’ impact. The evaluation will include surveys that track viewer attitudes over time. Following are two OIG reports on USG broadcasting to Afghanistan, one from 2006 and the other 2010. They outline the objectives of the BBG in that country and discuss the need for better metrics to gauge success in reaching those goals.


9. PD and PR: The Private Sector as a Model for PD Practitioners [19 entries]

PD and International Public Relations [8 entries]

This article looks at earlier U.S. efforts to advocate for itself on the world stage. The authors find that, while numerous government agencies and private sector entities are actively disseminating information about the U.S., it is neither coordinated nor is its effectiveness properly evaluated. USG efforts, in particular, suffer from lack of clear objectives, insufficient resources, stovepiping, and the absence of strong leadership.

This article argues that while PR and PD share similar objectives—influencing foreign audiences on behalf of their client or organization—and use similar tools, the ways in which each discipline can draw from the other have yet to be delineated. The authors urge more research by PR scholars to explore areas of conceptual convergence.


This book chapter takes up the theme of a conceptual convergence between PD and PR. The authors assert that the prevailing view on the purpose of PR is that it focuses on strengthening “communication and relationships between organizations and publics.” PD, on the other hand, is a separate but similar function marked by “international or intercultural communication between nations and foreign publics.” They argue that these two concepts have been integrated into a larger strategic communications framework that is blurring the boundaries between them and leading towards a conceptual convergence. They warn that this convergence has been taking shape absent a firm theoretical underpinning, which could lead to “mismanagement of information power” and credibility issues for both disciplines. They urge additional research on the topic.


Grunig here discusses the role of PR as a management function and the growth of international PR and its similarity to public diplomacy. He outlines his four models of public relations—press agentry and public information (which are one-way and asymmetrical), two-way asymmetrical (which uses audience research to develop communication strategies), and the two-way symmetrical model
(which is based on research but implies that change may occur in both the audience and the sponsoring organization as a result of the communication activity). Grunig concludes by reviewing the ethical considerations involved in employing each of these PR models, using historical case studies to support his points, and asserts that the two-way symmetrical model is most likely to enhance international dialogue and cooperation and build relationships.

This article examines the similarities and differences between two relatively new communications disciplines: intercultural communications and international public relations. It contains a useful discussion of PD as a form of international PR and takes an interesting look at the debate between scholars over the question of whether a quantitative or qualitative methodology is more appropriate for analyzing intercultural phenomena.

Yun says that, despite Signizter and Coombs’ 1992 call for scholars to test which PR theories are most applicable to the study and practice of PD, not much has been done. The lack of such research, he says, is responsible for the “regrettable” belief that PR and PD are substantially different. His study looks at “underdeveloped” areas of PD as well as areas where PD excels, examines them against the “Excellence Study” (L.A. Grunig et al, 2002) of best practices in PR and organizational communications, and then compares two of the Study’s PR models against the advocacy practices carried out by 113 foreign embassies in Washington DC. Testing the “fit” of two PR measurement models to PD, the author finds that the PR framework
is useful in measuring and conceptualizing PD behavior and best practices.


This paper posits the theory that PR and PD share similarities in that each is concerned with managing relations between organizations and publics and that a PR framework—specifically organizational-public relationship measures (OPR)—can be used to evaluate PD practices and predict PD outcomes. The authors’ test case is the relationship between the U.S. Embassy in Seoul and Korean university students. The authors suggest that the quality of the relationship between the Embassy and specifically its PD personnel and target foreign publics can be important in determining broader attitudes and behavioral intentions.


Fitzpatrick’s article explores how adopting the public relations theory of “relationship management” to contemporary conceptualizations of public diplomacy might advance understanding of both its theory and practice. She argues that PD does not need to function exactly like PR, but posits that multidisciplinary perspectives can enrich thinking about public diplomacy and thus help to make it more effective.
PR and Measuring Effectiveness [11 entries]


*The Institute for Public Relations* website has an excellent section devoted to articles on PR measurement and evaluation. Many of these articles are on topics relevant to the PD professional. Among them are best practices in PR research, how to measure social media, and new models for media content analysis. Following are two of the PR Institute’s “Gold Standard” papers considered to have significantly advanced the study and practice of PR evaluation.


*As the title suggests, this is a dictionary of terms used in PR evaluation and measurement.*


*This primer on the measurement of short-term PR programs was followed by a second volume that looks at measuring the more long-term effort to build relationships between organizations and their constituents: “Guidelines for Measuring Relationships in Public Relations.” (www.instituteforpr.com)*

Lindenmann, Walter K. *Putting PR Measurement and Evaluation into Historical Perspective*. Institute for Public Relations, February
Lindenmann’s paper is a helpful overview of the array of literature produced over the years on improving PR measurement and evaluation. He traces the long history of works dealing with evaluation in the PR field dating back more than 60 years.

This article attempts to draw a distinction between PR and PD, asserting that too often the two are inappropriately conflated. The authors argue that PR deals with “private” goods individually consumed, and PD deals with “public” goods (democracy, rule of law), whose benefits can only be enjoyed if adopted collectively. Given these differences in attributes, private and public goods cannot be “marketed” or assessed in the same way. The authors present a “constituency/adversary” model for marketing public goods and examine the civil rights and anti-apartheid campaigns of Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela respectively as test cases for how this model might be used in U.S. PD efforts in the Middle East. They conclude by recommending that “major elements” of PD be outsourced to other, non-government players and that more focus be placed on dialogue than monologue.

This 2003 GAO report is the first in a series of post-9/11 reports on U.S. public diplomacy. In it, the GAO reviews USG PD efforts in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks, with a specific focus on outreach to the Muslim world. The report finds that State lacks a) a
comprehensive PD strategy that integrates its various programmatic components; b) a strategy for coordinating interagency PD efforts; and c) a systematic approach to performance measurement. It recommends that the agency look to private sector PR campaigns for best practices in order to strengthen its strategic communication efforts.

Wang, Jay. “Public Diplomacy and Global Business,” The Journal of Business Strategy, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 (2006): 41–48. This article looks at the feasibility and desirability of business involvement in public diplomacy and the ways in which this might be most profitably accomplished. Wang outlines the main challenges facing PD today and argues that business can bring specific talents to the table to help overcome those challenges, in particular a global perspective and managerial and technological capacity. Other areas in which business might deploy its strengths are cultural promotion and building relationships.

Business for Diplomatic Action, America’s Role in the World: A Business Perspective on Public Diplomacy. White Paper Prepared by Business for Diplomatic Action. October 2007: 1–18. (Accessed 25 Jan. 2010) http://www.businessfordiplomaticaction.org/learn/articles/bdawhitepaper_oct07final.pdf. This white paper argues that the global decline in America’s reputation has such potentially dire consequences for the U.S. economy that the business community must be a vital partner in the work of public diplomacy. The paper reviews the causes of the decline in America’s image, the possible economic consequences resulting therefrom, the skills business can bring to the table (strong audience research techniques, cultural adaptability, and creative use of new communication technologies), and makes several recommendations for restructuring U.S. public diplomacy. Among these are removing PD from the State Department and housing it in an independent, semi-governmental organization; creating a new council run by the
executive branch that would coordinate PD across USG agencies; enhancing the use of business approaches to strategic planning and research; and significantly increasing resources.

Lord, Kristin and Richard Fontaine. Managing 21st-Century Diplomacy: Lessons from Global Corporations. Center for a New American Security, December 2010: 1–33. (Accessed 30 Dec. 2010). http://www.cnas.org/node/5436. This report looks at the management practices of four U.S. multinational companies—Fedex, IBM, McDonald’s and GE—with an eye toward extracting lessons for State Department reform. While acknowledging important strategic and operational differences between public and private sector organizations, it is the latest in a long series of reports (see the GAO studies on PD) suggesting that the Department has much it can learn from the corporate world. It urges the DOS to rebalance its global vision with local initiative; to strengthen the link between planning, execution, and evaluation; and to reformulate its hiring and retention practices to create a 21st century workforce.

Xavier, Robina J. and Patel, Amisha M. and Johnston, Kim A. “Are we really making a difference? The gap between outcomes and evaluation research in public relations campaigns,” ANZCA Annual Conference: Making a Difference. 7–9 July 2004, University of Sydney, Sydney. (Accessed 5 Jan. 2011). http://eprints.qut.edu.au/21014/. This study reviews the literature on PR evaluation in Australia in order to examine trends and determine the role evaluation plays in demonstrating campaign performance. The authors identify performance measurement methodologies and review numerous campaign case studies in order to assess the extent to which evaluations matched up with “set outcomes.” As with other such studies, they find that there is often a tendency to substitute outputs for outcomes in evaluating program performance. The study
concludes with a set of recommendations designed to improve PR accountability.


This document outlines the new declaration of standards and practices to guide measurement and evaluation of PR as adopted by the delegates attending AMEC and the Institute for Public Relations’ 2nd European Summit on Measurement. Seven principles were adopted that describe the basic philosophy behind the establishment of standard practices, including the importance of goal setting, the value of measuring media quantity and quality, the importance of measuring social media, and the preference for assessing outcomes over media results.

10. PD, Polling, and Audience Research [5 entries]


This 2007 GAO report examines the use of research by those USG agencies whose portfolios include strategic communication with foreign audiences. It finds that the Department of State, the lead U.S. agency for overseas strategic communication efforts, had not, as of 2007, implemented a research-focused approach to its thematic communication outreach. The report also asserts that USG agencies have no institutional mechanisms to evaluate end-user needs or to coordinate and/or share the research that they do undertake. The GAO includes for comparative purposes a case study of the British government’s revamped approach to public diplomacy and audience research.
Satloff, Robert. “Survey Says: Polls and the Muslim World,” *New Republic Online*, 30 September 2005. (Accessed 18 Jan. 2010) http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=873. Satloff here questions the accuracy of polls measuring Arab attitudes towards the U.S., as well as how those poll results are reported in polling company press advisories and in the media. He also discusses “structural factors” in the polls themselves that may affect their validity, such as language, sampling size, and the say-do divide (i.e., what is said in polls is not mirrored more broadly in actions, which is especially pronounced at the state level). He concludes by arguing that the task of U.S. public diplomacy to engage Muslim and Arab audiences in a productive discussion on extremism is no doubt challenging, but certainly not impossible, as some polls would suggest.

Fouts, Joshua, Ed. *Public Diplomacy Practitioners, Policy Makers, and Public Opinion: A Report of the Public Diplomacy and World Public Opinion Forum, April 9–11, 2006, Washington, D.C.* Los Angeles: USC Center on Public Diplomacy, 2006. This conference report examines the interplay between public diplomacy, the media, and public opinion and addresses some of the key questions in that relationship, such as how PD practitioners can most effectively employ polling in their campaigns; whether polling should be used to bolster approval ratings or advance specific foreign policy goals; what drivers actually influence public opinion; and whether elite or grassroots opinion is more important in shaping foreign policy. In addition to a read-out of the Forum, this booklet includes three articles by conference participants on the relationship between public opinion and public diplomacy.

This article examines the factors that affect global public opinion about U.S. foreign policy. Research on this issue was conducted in the period following U.S. military action in Afghanistan in 2001. The authors look at three factors affecting views of the U.S.: interests (state-level interests, usually defined as economic or security-related; socialization (political culture and historical experience); and influence (active efforts to affect foreign public opinion). The reported results are mixed but suggest that the U.S. or other dominant powers can, under certain conditions, positively impact foreign publics.


This article looks at the effects of U.S. high-level visits to foreign countries on public opinion in those countries. Using the period surrounding the start of the Iraq War as the focal point of their research, the authors conclude that high-level visits can have a positive impact when the visiting leader is “credible,” but that in the absence of that conditioning factor, a visit can actually produce a backlash effect. They do not address the question of how long the positive public opinion impact of a high-level visit can be expected to last.

11. PD, Public Opinion, the Media, and Foreign Policy [9 entries]

This article studies poll data between 1935 and 1979 with an eye toward gauging the correlation between shifts in U.S. public opinion and changes in policy. The research findings suggest that policy shifts tend to follow changes in public opinion, especially on major issues, and when the opinion shifts are substantial. The congruence between changes in opinion and policy, however, is not absolute and does not mean that, at times, policy cannot move opinion, the subject of a second article by the same duo entitled “What Moves Public Opinion” in which they argue this case.

Oskamp, Stuart and P. Wesley Schultz. Attitudes and Opinions. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004: 161–206, 345–375. This comprehensive textbook addresses the study of attitudes and opinions and includes useful material on the impact of the mass media on public opinion and the formation of international attitudes.

Rosati, Jerel and James Scott. The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy. 4th Ed. Australia: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2006: 350–411 (Ch. 12, The Public and Its Beliefs). In this chapter of their textbook, Rosati and Scott discuss public opinion as a critical factor in the foreign policy making process. It reviews the development of scholarship on this issue, which has moved over the years from a belief that policymakers lead public opinion to the more complex contemporary view that policy is generally responsive to public opinion on salient issues and that public opinion can often serve to circumscribe the policymaker’s range of actions. The chapter also includes a discussion of the differences between elite and mass opinion and the changing nature of American views of the world and U.S. foreign policy in the post-WWII era.

A former U.S. Foreign Service Officer, Fisher argues that the behavioral sciences—in particular psychology, anthropology, and sociology—can make an important contribution to the understanding and conduct of international relations and that foreign policy professionals should, therefore, receive more and better training in these disciplines. The “revolution in communications” technology and the resultant growth in public participation in foreign affairs has changed the reality of foreign policy, which is no longer found in the traditional, formal dimension but rather in an informal even “irrational” dimension ruled by public opinion, beliefs, and attitudes. In such a dimension, public diplomacy plays a key role, as it insists that the “whole complex of psychological and philosophical factors be included in any analysis of the international behavior of nations.” In this context, Fisher includes a discussion of the importance of understanding how language, national character, and the interplay between culture and personality impact patterns of perception, and ultimately, the dynamics of foreign affairs.


In this article, the authors examine the research on public opinion and foreign policy in an attempt to “clarify” the relationship among the elite (leaders), the public, and the media in determining foreign policy outcomes. They suggest that the relationship among these three “independent, strategic actors” is akin to a marketplace where information is the key commodity. They assert that information usually favors the elite (who can use it to frame an issue) but that circumstances can bring the public into a more balanced position. Important in this regard is the difference between public interest in foreign affairs generally, which tends to be low, and interest when there is a crisis, when interest tends to rise. The public’s impact on
foreign policy is weakest when the information deficit is strongest and gathers force as the deficit narrows, which is usually the product of a prolonged conflict or crisis. As for the media, the authors argue that it is the central link between the leaders and the public and thus play a critical role in the policy marketplace, as it acts as an information trader and responds to supply and demand pressures. They conclude by discussing the possibility that increasing media fragmentation will encourage consumers to engage only with media that support pre-existing attitudes, with significant implications for bipartisan consensus and slowing down the “narrowing of the information gap” between elites and the public during a foreign policy crisis.


Haefele’s essay explores USIA’s early efforts to measure global public opinion on the U.S. and major international issues, as well as the influence of these surveys on the formation of Kennedy’s foreign policy. The author outlines the evolution of public opinion polling in USIA and its predecessor agencies and investigates how Kennedy’s belief in the importance of world public opinion, especially in the context of the Cold War, led to an expansion of these efforts. While Kennedy sometimes chose to make foreign policy decisions that went against the preferences suggested by USIA’s polls, his administration relied on this data to manage global reaction to U.S. policy choices, such as the resumption of underground nuclear testing.

Gilboa’s article examines four concepts that he believes explain the global media’s impact on the foreign policy making and implementation process. He argues that the global media can be seen as a “controlling actor” (the CNN effect, replacing policymakers), as a “constraining actor” (the media as one of the influential factors in policymaking), as an “intervening actor” (where prominent journalists become mediators in conflicts themselves), and as an “instrumental actor,” (where leaders use the media to advance international negotiations or agreements, resulting in “media diplomacy”). The extent to which global media influences the policy process depends on the context in which it operates, with the media becoming more powerful when prominent journalists become international political brokers and when leadership vacuums occur. In many cases diplomats and other government officials have lost many of their traditional roles to journalists. Gilboa recommends that additional training and attention to planning and implementation will be necessary to help leaders manage the challenges created by global communication and the media.


In this piece, Gilboa analyzes the ongoing debate among policymakers, journalists, and scholars about the influence of the “CNN effect” on the foreign policy-making process. Gilboa points out that two areas of consensus exist: 1) Global television news coverage has accelerated the foreign policy-making process; and 2) it can influence the conduct of policy (rather than establish it) through the broadcast of graphic images that often undermine elite and public support for specific policies (although context still heavily determines the impact of this effect). Gilboa also highlights the distinction between the media’s ability to “control” policy
makers, as opposed to its ability to “pressure” them and argues that most studies can only provide evidence that the media can pressure policy makers rather than forcing them to act. Media also have the potential to replace leaders on significant issues if they lack a clear policy. Gilboa notes that Robert Entman’s “cascading activation model” is the best example of a theory that attempts to explain the relationship among government, the media and public opinion.

Seib, Philip. The Al Jazeera Effect: How the New Global Media Are Reshaping World Politics. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2008. This book addresses how new media sources—including satellite television and the Internet—are playing a significant role in reshaping global politics, with a special emphasis on Al Jazeera and the Middle East. The author notes that these sources can be a tool for both good and ill in an increasingly borderless world.

12. Websites of Interest [24 entries]

Resources and Guides [6 entries]


“Free Resources for Program Evaluation and Social Research Methods,” from The International Consortium for the Advancement of Academic Publication. (Accessed 18 Jan. 2011) http://gsociology.icaap.org/methods/. This page includes a free listing of resources for program evaluation and social research methods, including organizational resources and “how-to” evaluation sources.

This library, supported by the National Science Foundation, was developed for professionals seeking to design, conduct, document, or review project evaluations. OERL’s resources include instruments, plans, and reports from evaluations that have proven to be sound and representative of current evaluation practices.


This is a listing of academic articles published between 1984 and 2009 that address the issue of cultural diplomacy. Links to the publications are often included.


This list of the California Endowment’s publications provides examples of different approaches that can be used for programmatic evaluation. Of particular note is the article on the use of storytelling as an evaluative tool.


This organization covers a broad range of topics related to research on different issues, including cultural competency. Their report on “The Impact of Culture and Context on Program Evaluation: The Model Institutions for Excellence Program” may be of particular interest: http://www.air.org/focus-area/education/index.cfm?fa=viewContent&content_id=627.
Training [4 entries]


The mission of Claremont’s IOPER is to provide consultative services and to conduct research designed to improve the effectiveness of a wide range of programs and organizations. Its site includes a description of the research, evaluation, and organizational consulting services it provides, a list of faculty books and publications, and examples of current research being undertaken at the Institute.


The website for the Kirkpatrick Partners’ training and evaluation model provides a list of upcoming training sessions and events. It also offers a Resources page (requires free registration) with articles, white papers, diagrams, podcasts and webinars relating to their approach to evaluation. The “Kirkpatrick Scale” played a role in earlier USIA efforts to measure the performance of its PD programs.


This organization focuses on providing training in performance measurement for government evaluators. It offers training through its centers for excellence and has frequently worked with OMB and other USG entities to refine measurement and evaluation practices.


This George Washington University-affiliated organization frequently provides training for evaluators.
Trends in New Media and Its Evaluation [3 entries]

“Occam’s Razor” by Avinash Kaushik
http://www.kaushik.net/avinash/.
Kaushik’s blog offers an in-depth look at current issues and trends in web analytics from the perspective of the Analytics Evangelist for Google and the Chief Education Officer at Market Motive Inc. Kaushik provides commentary and analysis on challenges facing web analytics in both the private and public sectors.

This site from KDPaine & Partners provides frequent updates on trends and developments related to measurement in the field of PR, with an emphasis on measurement of social media use.

This survey of Americans investigates how consumer habits for acquiring news are shifting with the growing influence of online news sources. A full dataset as well as a full report and questionnaire are available.

Approaches to Evaluation in the Field of Development [6 entries]

This chapter from the USAID Automated Directives System (ADS) describes the practices and standards used to determine how well Agency Assistance Objectives are achieving their intended results, including the collection of qualitative and quantitative performance
data, using performance monitoring to strengthen future results, and facilitating the sharing of best practices with other USG agencies.

This site provides an overview of the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development’s evaluation priorities and the elements of its evaluation program, including its Independent Advisory Committee on Development Impact that advises DFID on its evaluation work.

This organization intends to “advance and extend the practice of development evaluation” in order to serve the international development community. It offers conferences and other events as well as a range of tools and resources for international development evaluation.

The International Development Research Centre serves as the development evaluation entity for the Canadian government. They offer publications, a database of projects, and other resources related to a wide range of development topics.

This page provides an overview of the monitoring and evaluation process utilized by the Millennium Challenge Corporation and
gives links to performance reports by country and sector as well as information on impact evaluation.


This World Bank portal offers access to its studies and resources on the impact of Governance and Institutional Reforms, including its ongoing projects, select publications on the design and methodologies used in impact evaluation, and materials from previous learning events.

Associations and Networks [5 entries]


This association for American evaluators provides resources and services for its members on a wide range of topics in the field of evaluation. It also offers conferences and training events, a listserv and other community discussion forums for its members, and a newsletter. It offers a searchable database of evaluators and other career development resources.


This is the Canadian equivalent of the American Evaluation Association, which provides professional resources for Canadian evaluators and access to recent publications on evaluation.


This site, hosted by an informal association of federal government evaluators from the legislative and executive branches of the USG, contains resources and information about federal evaluation
activities, including lists of useful reports, periodicals, and internet collections.


EPA’s Program Evaluation Network. (Accessed 15 Apr. 2011) http://www.epa.gov/evaluate/pen.htm. This Environmental Protection Agency site provides a look at how one USG agency is trying to share evaluation expertise and best practices internally.
Author Biography

**Dr. Robert Banks** joined the Foreign Service with USIA in 1983. During his 28-year career as a Public Diplomacy practitioner, he served as Assistant Executive Officer in Bonn, West Germany; Deputy Public Affairs Officer (PAO) in Nicosia, Cyprus; Deputy Press Attaché in Seoul, Korea; East Asia Policy Officer in USIA’s Worldnet Film and Television service; Press Attaché in Managua, Nicaragua; Cultural Affairs Officer in Seoul; Examiner for the Foreign Service oral entrance exam in the Bureau of Human Resources; Planning and Coordination Officer in the Office of Public Diplomacy in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs; PAO in Buenos Aires, Argentina; and State Department Chair on the faculty of the Marine Corps War College in Quantico, Va., where he taught regional studies. His most recent (2009–2011) and final State Department assignment was as the Public Diplomat in Residence at the University of Southern California’s Center on Public Diplomacy. He retired from the Foreign Service in September of 2011 and now serves as an Adjunct Professor of Public Diplomacy at USC.

Banks joined the Foreign Service following the completion of his doctorate in Interdisciplinary (American) Studies at Oklahoma State University. Originally from Boston, he received his BA and MA, in English and American Studies respectively, from Boston College. He currently resides in Pasadena, CA, with his wife Liz.
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