Intersections Between Public Diplomacy & International Development:
Case Studies in Converging Fields

By James Pamment, Editor
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INTRODUCTION

This volume originated out of a discussion with the British Council a few years ago. In light of changes to their grant-in-aid in 2010, nearly two thirds of their governmental funding is now comprised of Official Development Assistance (oda). I asked what difference there was between the work that was conducted as cultural relations and the work that was budgeted as aid. The answer was that the same programs were being conducted around the world, but that they were charged to the aid budget in oda-eligible countries. In other words, conceptually and practically there was little difference. As I spoke with more practitioners in the region, it became clear that this was a pattern in 21st century public diplomacy that deserved further investigation. However, it was also clear that academic and practitioner discourses around public diplomacy and aid were so distinct that any attempts to make sense of their similarities would require significant groundwork.

The common trajectory is unmistakable, and is the result of very clear trends in both fields. While the Millennium Development Goals and aid effectiveness debates of the past 20 years have pushed international development actors to think in terms of “partnerships” and “participation,” PD has also shifted its debates toward “dialogue,” “engagement,” and “collaboration.” Meanwhile, the efforts of many countries to reach the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) suggested oda target of 0.7% GNI have conflicted with the global economic crisis and austerity movements. The resulting pressures have seen aid drawn back into political and diplomatic toolsets (for example in Canada), with public diplomacy an obvious area where oda funding may be employed to support diplomatic goals. This picture is further complicated by the emergence of the BRICS and MINTS as non-traditional soft
power and aid actors, who are using public diplomacy and targeted international development funding to support their political and economic objectives (Pamment & Wilkins 2015).

In a recent article published in *Communication Theory*, I argue that public diplomacy and international development emerged from a shared geopolitical and conceptual context, and that they have continued to evolve their techniques and debates in parallel to, yet separately from, one another (Pamment 2015). It is my firm belief that researchers of public diplomacy should better understand the relationship between PD and aid if we are to fully appreciate the pressures upon our field today; likewise, scholars of international development should more rigorously consider the role of PD within different aspects of aid. We can learn so much from one another. With the exception of a very recent think piece by Silvio Waisbord (2014) exploring the relationship between strategic communication and development communication, this remains largely uncharted territory.

Subsequently, the USC Center on Public Diplomacy has made International Development a priority area in their work, and has supported research into this phenomenon under their Non-Residential Fellowship Program. Together with leading development communication scholar Professor Karin Wilkins, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, and CPD, we arranged a one and a half day symposium in February 2015, bringing together thirty scholars from around the world whose work could help exemplify key aspects of the practical and theoretical relationship between PD and aid (see Appendix 1). This collection of essays features some examples of that scholarship, and in all likelihood represents the first published volume on this topic. Our hope is that these first steps can help to raise the profile of this important issue, and provide inspiration and direction to those interested in further exploring this crucial intersection between fields.
Conceptualizing the intersection

There is little consensus among scholars regarding the relationship between the two fields. When outlining his forthcoming comparative PD project at the International Studies Association’s 2013 conference, Eytan Gilboa stated that he considered foreign aid to fit under PD’s umbrella. Likewise, Fisher & Bröckerhoff (2008, pp. 48ff) include aid within their discussion of PD. However, previous iterations of Nicholas Cull’s components of PD do not explicitly consider aid (Cull 2008), and many of the edited volumes central to the field do not cover it in any detail (e.g. Cowan & Cull 2008; Snow & Taylor 2009; Melissen 2005). Similarly, international development scholarship has paid little attention to the public diplomacy field. Lancaster (2007, p. 13), for example, observes that foreign aid may be conducted to support diplomatic and commercial goals, but doesn’t pay any specific attention to public diplomacy. For a detailed discussion of the parallels between the fields’ major debates, see Pamment (2015).

Taking the discussion forward, I wish to propose three distinct levels through which we can conceptualize the intersections between PD and international development. This framework aims to capture three important ways in which we can better understand the sites and contexts where the two fields appear to converge. This approach is inspired by the work of Shah and Wilkins (2004), who propose a simple but elegant distinction between communication for development (i.e. communication as an act that contributes to development) and communication about development (i.e. discourses within the institutions that conduct the work). My suggestion is to add an additional layer that represents the communication of development, which covers the marketing and stakeholder communication so intrinsic to contemporary development practice. These three levels help to isolate the areas where PD and international development intersect, and hence provide a point of departure for the further analysis of their parallels and possible interactions.

The first level is based on the assertion that the act of giving aid can in itself be considered a form of public diplomacy. From this
perspective, we might consider aid to be an extension of traditional diplomatic objectives towards the general public; underscore the advanced role of civil society in mediating between donors and recipients; and highlight the centrality of education, exchanges, and information in aid activities. The earliest Edmund Gullion-era definitions support the view that PD “encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy;” that it involves “the interaction of private groups in one country with those of another;” and that “central to public diplomacy is the transnational flow of information and ideas,” which could include topics such as health education (Murrow, 1965). Likewise, Bruce Gregory’s more recent comprehensive definition includes “some sub-state and non-state actors” and their efforts “to build and manage relationships; and to influence thoughts and mobilize actions” (Gregory, 2011, pp 351-372). In this first sense, there is a case to be made for including the communicative action of aid distribution within the remit of public diplomacy, most obviously in areas such as advocacy, education, and exchanges. Thus, we can identify an intersection between PD and aid as mutually supportive techniques for development.

A second level is to consider the communication of aid activities as public diplomacy. This issue was raised for example by the Djerejian Commission (2003), which highlighted the importance of USAID conducting PD campaigns to inform foreign citizens about its work. Djerejian refers to “two principal arms of public diplomacy, the State Department and [US]AID” (p. 43). It continues, “In a broad sense, a great deal of AID’s work is public diplomacy at its best. AID’s programs, in the words of one of its top officials, are ‘American values in action’” (p. 66). This confusion between PD as the act of giving aid and as the communication of aid is reflected throughout the report, with much of its discussion emphasizing the importance of the former, but its recommendations only going so far as to promote the latter. This conceptual slide is represented in the following statement: “‘We are the message’, one AID official said to us, ‘but we get people saying, Why don’t you publicize what you do?’” (p. 67). By including aid communication within PD’s remit, Djerejian goes some way to legitimizing the practical relationship
between the two fields. Thus, it is possible to identify a clear intersection in the role of PD as the communication of development, such as in the branding, marketing, and promotion of aid activities to foreign citizens and domestic stakeholders in a manner that supports an actor’s reputation and image.

The third level of analysis should focus on how these issues are discussed and understood within institutions and among the experts that produce aid and public diplomacy. In other words, it is not enough to consider intersections solely in terms of the communicative act of distributing aid, or in terms of the broader marketing of those acts. Within aid and PD institutions are ongoing discussions, distinctions and discourses that also represent an important intersection between fields. Shah and Wilkins (2004) focus their distinction between communication for development and communication about development so as to emphasize issues not just in developing communities but also within the development community itself; for example, in the discourses surrounding the role of women in social development. Discourses that reveal subtle similarities, distinctions, contradictions, and synergies between fields are clearly of importance. Thus, it is possible to identify a key level of institutional discourse within practitioner communities about development and public diplomacy, their techniques, participants, forms of knowledge, and relationship, which can teach a great deal about how the fields intersect in practice.

The three levels may therefore be summarized as i) PD and aid for development, in terms of its formal practices; ii) the discourses of PD and aid that comprise the marketing and broader communication of those activities; and iii) discourses within institutions that shape the knowledge about PD and aid that informs practice (Table 1). All three dimensions may be considered sites of intersection between the two fields where there are identifiable similarities, overlaps, or tensions.
Table 1. Three levels of analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PD and aid for development</th>
<th>PD and international development activities in the field</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communication of PD and aid</td>
<td>Branding, marketing and stakeholder communication of aid and PD activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discourses about PD and aid</td>
<td>Institutional discourse and knowledge about PD and aid activities</td>
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Overview of chapters

The following seven chapters represent research on the intersections between PD and aid from a variety of perspectives and disciplines. The case studies represent different geographical regions and techniques, exploring different variations upon how the two fields may be said to intersect. Collectively, they demonstrate that public diplomacy and international development intersect in a variety of complex ways, such that it is no longer possible to interpret the practices and theories of one without also considering the other. In the longer term, I believe this to be advantageous to both fields, as they will mutually strengthen one another and bring fresh perspectives and ideas.

The first chapter, by Hyunjin Seo and Stuart Thorson, focuses upon academic exchanges with scientists, primarily from the U.S. and North Korea. The chapter conceives of these PD activities in terms of their contribution for development, particularly in the sense of improving mutual understanding and empathy. They demonstrate that PD in the form of scientific exchanges can play a central role in supporting human development and skills in marginalized countries like North Korea; but, also, and perhaps more importantly, that the mutual understanding gleaned from these meetings can contribute to new knowledge and discourses about the participant countries and
their appreciation of one another. This can potentially lead to shifts in policy decisions. PD and international development are thus shown to work in tandem, with potentially significant results for both fields.

Chapter 2, by Senem Çevik, explores the role of humanitarian aid and citizen diplomacy in relation to Turkey’s increased diplomatic and business presence in Africa. In mapping out the networks of official state actors, NGOs, and religious organizations supporting Turkey’s regional influence, the chapter considers the intersection of aid and PD for development. It goes on to discuss the relationship between these activities and Turkey’s broader brand and reputation, thus linking development and PD initiatives to discourses of Turkey as a humanitarian superpower, while also revealing intersections between political, diplomatic, social, and economic layers of Turkey’s foreign aid strategy. As such, the chapter unpacks the ideologies about PD and aid within Turkey’s expansive new foreign policy, in ways that distinctly demonstrate the advantages of analyzing these public diplomacy and international development activities in tandem.

In Chapter 3, Larisa Smirnova focuses on China’s burgeoning academic sector and its attractiveness to Russophone students. Traditionally, education exchanges are one of the main areas where definitions of public diplomacy and aid intersect, on the grounds that the education of foreign students from developing countries can directly contribute to long-term collaborative and reputational goals, as well as sharing in knowledge that can contribute to economic development. The chapter argues that in providing educational scholarships for development, China needs to be more proactive in enabling the ever-growing pool of foreign students with connections to China to play a role in its public diplomacy. If foreign students are to spread their experiences of and about Chinese society in ways conducive to Chinese influence, Smirnova argues, state scholarship programs need to develop a fuller appreciation of why students want to go to China, and of their subsequent career choices.
The fourth chapter, by Valerie Cooper, focuses on the area of international broadcasting, which is both a component of public diplomacy and part of the field of development communication. The chapter examines discourses about development in media development strategies aimed at South Sudan, covering the literature of and for journalism training programs held in the country by several of the largest Western media organizations. Through an analysis of the key themes, value-based terms, and buzzwords in the training materials, Cooper argues that many of these organizations remain fixed in a “modernization” paradigm, by which they seek to export exogenous values upon Sudanese society. This raises practical, strategic, and ethical questions about the nature of media interventions in foreign societies that are central to debates both in PD and international development studies.

In Chapter 5, Mohammad Ibahrine considers the important role of sports in the economic and reputational development of the Gulf States. Concentrating on the relationship between sports events and nation brands, the chapter investigates the social and developmental benefits of positive global media coverage for Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar. Ibahrine argues that the promotional and sponsorship activities of public diplomacy provide a vehicle for domestic economic diversification that ultimately benefits the region as a whole. Thus, economic development is as much an outcome related to the global marketing of these nations as it is of the infrastructural investments for development connected to the arranging and hosting of sporting mega events. This points to interesting tensions over images of unequal social conditions, evolving patterns of international recognition, and regional competition in the face of global attention.

Chapter 6, by Kazumi Noguchi, investigates the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), with a focus on public-private partnerships in the financing and delivery of global health diplomacy. In charting the diverse network of actors involved in PEPFAR, Noguchi demonstrates the importance of shaping common discourses about development among organizations with complementary expertise and capabilities. The effective delivery of
such projects, she contends, directly leads to improved perceptions of the U.S. and hence reveals a strong public diplomacy dimension through the communication of aid. Thus, PEPFAR may be considered an aid initiative that also creates soft power advantages in those countries where its deployment has been successful.

In the final chapter, I explore the relationship between public diplomacy, soft power, and development communication through the case of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). As a project supported by a major conglomerate of states, NGOs and multilateral institutions, IATI provides a single registry for the reporting of information about aid and development funding in a manner intended to improve aid effectiveness. In this sense, IATI may be simultaneously considered communication for development, a tool for the public communication of development, and a form of institutional discourse about development. However, the chapter demonstrates that complex forms of institutional behavior change implied by IATI’s approach to big data go beyond improving aid and cross over into the realm of soft power. As such, international development and PD appear to coalesce within a socializing role that ultimately advocates for change within the working cultures of aid institutions.

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I wish to express my profound thanks to Jay Wang for supporting, hosting, and financing the symposium. At CPD, I also wish to thank Stacy Ingber for her impeccable organizational skills, the interns who volunteered to help run the symposium, and Lauren Lee White, Sohuela Amiri, and Jillian Hegedus who worked with the copy editing on this publication. I am most grateful to Katherine Brown (U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy) for financial support for some conference participants, and co-organizer Karin Wilkins (University of Texas at Austin) for her invaluable advice. Thanks also to our keynote speakers Nick Cull (USC), Gary Rawnsley (Aberystwyth University) and Joe Straubhaar (University of Texas at Austin), and to the conference participants, who came from all over the world with their fascinating contributions to this topic. Finally, I
wish to acknowledge the Swedish Research Council (dnr 350-2012-343), who financed my own participation in this project.

Works Cited


**Endnotes**

1. Note that Professor Cull gave a keynote at the aforementioned CPD symposium on the relationship between his components and aid.
Empathy in Public Diplomacy: Strategic Academic Engagement with North Korea

Hyunjin Seo, Ph.D. (Corresponding Author) & Stuart Thorson, Ph.D.

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Introduction

The governments of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK/North Korea) and those of the United States (U.S.) and South Korea (ROK) have been at loggerheads since the division of the Korean Peninsula following the Second World War. There have been military skirmishes, tests of nuclear devices by the North, joint military exercises by the South and U.S., threats and counter-threats, economic sanctions, periods of cooperation, and occasional diplomatic discussions. A consequence has been an ongoing demonization of the ROK and U.S. by the DPRK along with similar demonization of the North by both the U.S. and South Korea. While there has continued to be limited economic trade between the two Koreas and humanitarian assistance to the North from U.S.-based NGOs and UN agencies including the World Food Program, the lack of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and DPRK have made non-governmental public diplomacy engagements quite challenging.

The often cartoon-like characterization of North Korea renders it difficult for U.S. officials and ordinary citizens to imagine what the world looks like from the perspective of North Koreans. This sense of being able to see the world as another sees it, that is an ability to have empathy for another’s position, has long been argued to be an important skill in negotiation and conflict resolution (Batson and Ahmad 2009). In this chapter, we distinguish two variants of
empathy and then illustrate the role public diplomacy, in the form of strategic academic science engagement, played in developing empathy during a three-week workshop led by the U.S.-DPRK Scientific Engagement Consortium. The workshop brought together 20 North Koreans (a mix of academic scientists, English teachers, and Foreign Ministry officials), two South Korean nationals, eight U.S. citizens, and three Chinese nationals and was held in Dalian, China during July 2014.

**Empathy and Diplomacy**

The practice of international diplomacy involves using language to reach robust agreements in the presence of ideological, linguistic, epistemological, and even ontological divides. Public diplomacy engagement efforts, which are structured to enhance the likelihood of developing empathy, offer a mechanism for reducing the frequency and intensity of these unintended misunderstandings. We use the concept of empathy to denote imagining the state of consciousness of another. There are at least two distinct senses in which this might be done. First, one might imagine oneself in a state of consciousness as if one were in the conditions one believes the other to be. In this first case, one would use one’s own reasoning to determine what the other should do. A simplified example would be a U.S. policy maker arguing, “If I were North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, I would use money for economic development, not for nuclear weapons.” Second, and far trickier, one might imagine the state of consciousness of a person of the sort one believes the other to be in the conditions the other understands him or her to be in. That is, one tries to imagine the thinking process of another person and understand the situation that person feels herself to be in. An example here would be that same U.S. official suggesting that, “While I disagree with North Korea’s nuclear program, I understand why Kim Jong Un might believe that North Korea is threatened by South Korea and the U.S.” Empathy understood in this way need not imply agreement. One can be empathetic with a person with whose views they find anathema. Moreover, these two senses of empathy can have dramatic behavioral consequences, different constituent affective components, and, importantly, may suggest distinct
approaches to negotiation and conflict resolution. Pinkston and Saunders (2003) offer extended examples of how empathy might be helpful in formulating U.S. policy toward North Korea.

We argue that strategic, sincere, and sustained public diplomacy efforts as afforded by the sequence of engagements leading up to the Dalian Workshop case, can contribute to developing the second form of empathy; being able to credibly imagine someone else in the situation that person perceives herself to be in. Concrete examples are provided to illustrate how focused technical activities of this sort can lead to broad shared understandings and empathy, though not necessarily agreements, that go well beyond narrow technical issues. Finally, we provide specific suggestions of ways that this can be a useful and scalable tool for overcoming demonization.

Context

Syracuse University on its own, and now with the U.S.-DPRK Scientific Engagement Consortium (Campbell 2012; Thorson 2012), has been working with counterpart academic institutions in the DPRK since 2002. To date, there have been 16 science engagement meetings involving Syracuse University with the DPRK. These have been held in Pyongyang, Beijing, Syracuse, Atlanta, and, most recently, Dalian, China. In line with our strategic engagement objective, each of these events has focused on academic science, has involved a slowly rotating group of core participants from both the U.S. and the DPRK, and has been designed to earn shared trust among the gradually expanding group of participants.

Involved U.S. and DPRK institutions have contributed the time of their academics and administrators. Syracuse University and the Consortium have used external grant money to cover direct costs of DPRK participants’ travel as well as lodging and meals when participating in joint meetings away from Pyongyang. The DPRK has shared in hosting costs while delegations were in Pyongyang.

Most recently, our academic science counterpart has been the North’s Korea Science Corporation (KSC). KSC was established
to serve as the intermediary between DPRK’s State Academy of Sciences (SAOS), a government organization, and the U.S.-DPRK Scientific Engagement Consortium, a U.S.-based NGO. KSC describes itself as an NGO acting on behalf of SAOS to promote science and technology cooperation with foreign NGOs. SAOS (a governmental entity) created KSC (nominally an NGO) in order to work with our Consortium (also an NGO).

Thus KSC provides a formally nongovernmental connection between the SAOS and the Consortium. SAOS, established in 1952, runs both a number of research institutes and the University of Sciences. While SAOS is a part of the government, its high status provides it a degree of independence not always enjoyed by more conventional DPRK academic institutions. SAOS recruits top middle school students from around the country to its University of the Sciences by sending its senior scientists to provincial schools as talent scouts. SAOS operates some 40 research institutes, has several hundred research centers, and administers a publishing facility that produces scientific journals and books. SAOS has an active external program to provide its scientists with opportunities to work in selected countries in Asia and Europe.

Members of the first delegation to visit SAOS from the Consortium were told they were the first U.S. citizens to be invited to the SAOS campus. In part, the invitation was extended due to earlier work with Kim Chaek University of Technology in Pyongyang, but it also represented a recognition by SAOS leadership (and probably the DPRK’s political leadership as well) that the U.S. is a world science leader and that the Consortium might be able to help SAOS upgrade its facilities and create training and research opportunities for its up-and-coming young scientists.
From the very beginning, in all of our discussions with SAOS/KSC, they acknowledged the importance of building capabilities of their academic scientists to interact with the global science community. To this end, they sought our collaboration in developing their understanding of the ways in which academic science is organized in the U.S., as well as on enhancing their communication skills in English to enable them to become more active and productive participants in international science meetings. Accordingly, SAOS seemed prepared to make needed adjustments in their operations, or even to adopt new approaches, for the sake of achieving greater integration with the global scientific community.

As a consequence of our extended experience with the DPRK, we have earned the trust of both the DPRK academic community and officials in the foreign ministry. We also continue to have a good working relationship with the “New York Channel” at the DPRK’s UN Mission in New York City. In short, we benefit from hard-earned experience in everything from hosting DPRK academics in the U.S. and China, appropriate coordination with relevant U.S. and ROK government and civil society agencies, procedures for needed visas,
issues of sanctions and, importantly for U.S. institutions, export control.

**Dalian Workshop**

The focus of the Dalian Workshop, developed in collaboration between U.S. and DPRK participants, was specialized English language training intended to facilitate participation by North Korean academic scientists in international science meetings. One of the authors of this paper co-directed the workshop and the other was responsible for the digital media components of the workshop training. Each was present throughout the workshop. The Dalian Workshop was our first experience with all participants staying in the same hotel and was also the first to use recent college graduates (all U.S. citizens) as teaching assistants (TAs). All workshop participants, with the exception of the two English instructors and the three Chinese attendees, stayed together in the same hotel for the entire period.

The 2014 Dalian program began with an opening dinner on July 13 and ended with a closing dinner on August 1. During the three-week program, North Korean participants attended English language sessions from 9 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. from Monday to Friday with a lunch break of an hour and a half. Only morning sessions were held on Saturdays, and two Sundays were devoted to field trips as described later in this section.

DPRK participants were divided into two classes with separate instructors. The first class was made up of 10 SAOS male scientists. The primary course objectives were to help them better communicate their scientific research in English and to interact with international academic scientists. The main instructor for the course, a male native English speaker teaching in the English Department at Syracuse University, had considerable experience offering English courses for non-native speakers, including those from South Korea. The class covered English writing, reading, listening, speaking, vocabulary, and grammar with a particular emphasis on scientific communication aspects. Toward the end of the program, each scientist in this class
did a poster presentation on his research area to the entire group of participants. Each SAOS scientist prepared his own poster in English with the guidance of the instructor and TAs. The topics of poster presentations include cellular networks, computer-aided design, colloidal coal suspension, and mushroom viruses.

*Poster Session Planning*

The second class consisted of five SAOS English teachers and five people from a mix of the DPRK’s Foreign Ministry, DPRK Korea America Private Exchange Society and their recently established U.S.A. Institute. This class was aimed at helping participants acquire and improve knowledge and skills in teaching English to scientists. This group included three North Korean women. This class was led by a female linguistics professor from Syracuse University specializing in language instruction and pedagogy. The course objectives were: (i) to describe the historical development of language teaching methodologies; (ii) to identify and apply principles of the Communicative Language Teaching approach to individual activities, lessons, and curricula; (iii) to distinguish English for Specific Purposes (ESP) from General English in historical development, learning goals, and course design; and (iv)
to develop lessons in and a curriculum outline for an ESP-Science course. As part of the course, two SAOS English teachers were paired to actually teach the scientist group an English session in English. In addition, each was required to develop their portfolio including all the materials produced during the three-week program.

**Capstone Poster Session**

For each class, TAs assisted the instructor and helped the North Korean participants complete assignments. The DPRK participants reported that their formal and informal interactions with the TAs helped not only improve their English skills but also understand perspectives of young Americans.

Both groups attended two digital media workshops led by one of the authors. These workshops combined theoretical and hands-on approaches to learning effective ways for academic scientists to gather relevant information using open-source programs, supporting connections with international scientists, and sharing research results with other scientists. Participants discussed implications of digital networks for scientific communications including challenges and opportunities posed by developments in information technology and networks. In addition, the workshops covered several digital
platforms and tools for searching information and sharing digital media content.

To enhance participants’ experiences with digital communication methods, we created individual email accounts for each participant’s use during the workshop period. We utilized our own email server for this purpose. For email account user IDs, we assigned the names of Nobel Prize laureates in science. We observed a great variance in terms of their level of experiences with email functions. Some participants were well versed with email, though most said they had never used it outside of the DPRK. In comparison, several participants seemed to have little experience with email itself.

In addition to the regular class meetings, we arranged two field trips to provide opportunities to experience cultural and historical aspects of China and explore the city of Dalian. Dalian is a seaport in the south of China’s Liaoning Province, located to the west of the Korean Peninsula across the Yellow Sea. This close proximity meant that Dalian has enjoyed cultural and historical ties with Korea. We chose Dalian as the training venue in part because its location made it possible for the North Koreans to reach it by train.

On one Sunday, all the trainees and participants visited Lushun Prison Museum, which is about a 45-minute drive from Dalian. This museum includes a memorial site for Ahn Jung-geun, a Korean independence activist who fought against Japan’s annexation of Korea. He was imprisoned in Lushun Prison in 1909 after assassinating then Japanese Prime Minister Hirobumi Ito, and was later executed in 1910. Ahn is revered both in North and South Korea, and this memorial site is popular among Koreans. Indeed, participants from both Koreas took pictures together in front of Ahn’s statue in the museum’s memorial hall.

One field trip was more for entertainment. The group visited Dalian Shengya Ocean World and dolphinarium, one of China’s most popular aquariums. This was a tourist spot that the North Koreans wanted to visit. Perhaps one reason for the interest was to compare it to the dolphinarium at Pyongyang’s recently opened Runga
Theme Park. In addition, we organized a couple of bus trips to main shopping centers in Dalian for the North Koreans to purchase items for themselves, their families, and their friends.

Informal interactions during field trips, dinners, and conversations at the hotel were important opportunities for all the parties involved in the program to get to know more about one another on a personal level, build rapport, and learn about cultures different than their own. Based on the authors’ experiences and accounts from the other participants, these interactions were friendly, open, and sometimes personal. For example, one SAOS scientist told one of the authors about his daughter, who he said excels in music, sports and science. He asked what advice he should give his daughter to help her find her passion. This is in line with both authors’ experiences of interacting with North Koreans at other occasions in North Korea, South Korea, the U.S., and some European countries in the past. These informal interactions in Dalian made us better understand the importance of programs like the Dalian workshop. Below, we summarize several important observations during the Dalian program.
First, North Korean participants frequently talked about a strong need for scientists and English teachers in North Korea to have a greater level of exposure to native English speakers, particularly Americans. One SAOS scientist said it is difficult to learn American English in North Korea because they do not have opportunities to practice English with native speakers. He pointed out that English teachers in DPRK “have little or no direct experiences with Americans,” and expressed his dissatisfaction with DPRK English instruction. This is in line with comments an SAOS English teacher made in Dalian that English teachers in DPRK find it increasingly challenging to teach American English, since their experiences with native speakers are very limited.

Another interesting observation was their eagerness to utilize the Internet and digital media applications not only to gather information, but also to connect with other people. While inconsistent Internet connectivity in our hotel and frequent blocking of domains such as Google in China prevented us from using it full-scale, it was apparent, for example, that the experience of using email with people outside of DPRK was significant for many of the DPRK participants. One wrote in an email in English, “it’s very amusing to connect with you by e-mail.” Several indicated they had never used email before, while some others seemed to be more experienced.

They showed a great interest in other digital media applications as well. For example, our Skype session with Hall Healy (Chicago) of the Anbyon Crane Restoration Project made a strong impression on participants. We believe it helped them understand how they can engage with academics in other countries at very low cost. When asked whether they had any prior experience with Skype, only one person said yes. After the Skype session, several SAOS scientists asked whether they can use it in DPRK and if so, how. In their English language class following the Skype session, the instructor asked what some new English terms were that they learned during the Skype session. While we expected them to mention English terms related to the Crane Restoration Project in their country, the first term they mentioned was Skype.
Discussion

Beyond the specific scientific objectives of the workshop, a long-term goal of our engagement efforts has been to build empathy-based trust among U.S. and DPRK academic scientists. Over the years we came to see that trust building often involves much more than simply ‘keeping one’s word.’ In part, this is because sometimes events occur which make ‘word keeping’ impossible; nuclear devices are tested or strict sanctions are imposed with implications outside the control of participants. More commonly, parties to engagement end up with subtly different understandings of what commitments have been made, which leads to misunderstanding and a sense of trust having been violated. High politics examples of this involving the U.S. and North Korea are catalogued in Carlin and Lewis (2008). These negative outcomes are particularly likely in U.S.-DPRK engagement efforts where significant language and cultural differences, together with the history of demonization and slow and unreliable communications channels, can combine in perfect storms of misunderstandings.

In this chapter, we discuss the importance of academic science engagement in nurturing empathy between scholars from countries
that have had historically difficult political and diplomatic relations. Specifically, we argue that intensive sustained public diplomacy engagements as afforded by the Dalian Workshop case can contribute to developing a particular type of empathy that is often hard to achieve: being able to credibly imagine someone else in the situation that person perceives himself or herself to be in. This type of empathy requires an ability to imagine the framing and cognition of another and thus understanding the situation the other understands herself to be in. Another type of empathy we discuss in this paper, which is easier to achieve, involves putting oneself into a situation that one thinks the other side is in, and using one’s own reasoning to determine what the other side should do.

There are several reasons why the Dalian Workshop has contributed to developing the type of empathy considered harder to achieve. First, the three-week exchange program for North Korean academic scientists and English teachers allowed for informal interactions between participants from North Korea and the U.S., especially as most participants stayed in the same hotel during the entire program period. Having meals together several times and making field trips provided a congenial and productive environment for meaningful conversations and, most importantly, the nurturing of empathy. This in turn helped us to resolve the sorts of issues that could otherwise become intractable. For example, North Korean delegations dealing with the U.S. generally want one person to deal with reimbursements for such things as airfares. In the case of U.S. NGOs, that is typically a Korea America Private Exchange (KAPES) representative. We have always preferred that those reimbursements go directly to each delegation member. For us this was largely an accounting issue. Once we had an opportunity to talk with KAPES representatives about this, we discovered that each of us had similar concerns about accountability but different approaches to achieving it. We then easily worked together to develop a procedure that met both our needs. While this may seem a trivial example, this sort of thing was repeated many times during the three-week program. Empathy builds on itself, creating positive feedback and resulting in a shared sense of sincerity and trust. This helps both sides better
understand what matters to the other in terms of building and maintaining relationships (Seo, 2013). We believe that empathy, sincerity, and trust are critical, yet all too often missing, components of relations between the U.S. and North Korea.

Second, the topic of the workshop, academic science, helped both sides leverage similarities between them. One of the features that distinguishes science from other approaches to knowledge is a broadly shared commitment to an empiricist epistemology (Thorson & Seo, 2014). This is not to suggest that science is never politicized. Rather, several interrelated features of modern science, such as being empirical rather than ideological and being increasingly non-national, can be used to counter challenges facing countries with difficult diplomatic relations. Indeed, there are historical examples that show science can be an attractive avenue for trust-building and cooperative engagement between countries where formal political or diplomatic relations are strained or non-existent. Examples include Cold War science exchanges between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, European cooperation in creating and administering the European Organization for Nuclear Research, and cooperation in the Middle East around their synchrotron center.

Empathy can lead to broad shared understandings, though not necessarily agreements, that go well beyond narrow technical issues. We believe that public diplomacy efforts of the sort described here can help to develop that empathy even in the face of a history of mutual demonization. We must remember that a fundamental purpose of public diplomacy is to ensure that John Kerry’s observation endures as an accurate description of the U.S. experience: “One of America’s most incredible realities continues to be that we’re a country without any permanent enemies.”
References


Endnotes

1. While not focusing on diplomacy, a fascinating discussion of how these differences may result in people seeing the “same” thing quite differently can be found in (Nisbett 2010).
2. In Thorson and Seo (2014) we provide an extended discussion of properties of global academic science which make it an especially fruitful domain for DPRK-U.S. engagement.
3. The Korea America Private Exchange Society or KAPES is an offshoot of the DPRK Foreign Ministry whose purpose is to deal with non-governmental groups in the U.S. The DPRK Head of Delegation was a KAPES member.
Turkey’s Humanitarian and Development Aid: An Ecosystem of Conservative Grassroots

B. Senem Çevik

Introduction

Turkey has begun to enjoy greater global visibility resulting from its economic, political and social strides, which have manifested themselves in an active foreign policy formation. This newly crafted foreign policy is aimed at advocating for change in the international relations system through various tools of engagement including state and non-state actors. Of particular importance has been Turkey’s growing humanitarian aid program, which according to the 2014 Global Humanitarian Index, makes Turkey the third largest humanitarian donor. This is largely owed to its efforts in Syrian relief, which have exceeded $2 billion USD (Global Humanitarian Index, 2014). Turkey’s foreign and humanitarian aid demonstrates a functional ecosystem of multiple actors, stakeholders and benefactors that have successfully positioned Turkey in its current donor state position. State institutions such as AFAD (Disaster and Emergency Management Authority), TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), Türk Kızılayı (Turkish Red Crescent) and Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs) are key actors in the aid-giving apparatus. This chapter investigates the ways in which religious and historical identities are used to support a values-based foreign policy discourse. It will map the Turkish aid ecosystem, and further explore some of the political, economic and social consequences of Turkey’s faith-based public diplomacy and international development framework.
Values-Based Discourse: Aid Giving as ‘Manifest Destiny’

Turkey’s humanitarian and development aid is based on its values-based foreign policy rhetoric, which positions Turkey as a humanitarian, morally driven state formulating its foreign policy on values that resonate globally. Values-driven policy has been at the forefront of the thirteen-year Justice and Development Party (JDP) rule, which defines itself as a conservative democrat political party. The key factors manifest in this political rhetoric are influenced by ideas of Islam enmeshed with Turkey’s historical, cultural and geographical ties with multiple local and global regions, and has been formally asserted in the so-called “strategic depth doctrine” put forth by prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (Davutoğlu, 2011; 2012:3). Strategic depth is a concept coined by Turkey’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs and current Prime Minister, which envisions Turkey as a pivotal state that employs historical, geographical and cultural assets in engaging with its regional neighbors. This proximity is seen as Turkey’s natural “hinterland.” This doctrine particularly encourages recognition of the Ottoman heritage and Turkey’s engagement with former Ottoman territories through empowering these assets with aid. Within this trajectory, the conservative political elite perceives humanitarian aid as Turkey’s manifest destiny (Kardaş, 2012: 3).

The Ottoman Empire in the 16th century stretched to the far-flung regions in Africa, preventing European colonialism and becoming an economic superpower due to its control of various trade routes. The selective interpretation and utilization of Ottoman history has served primarily as leverage in gaining domestic approval for foreign policy. In this way, development aid to Somalia, Yemen and Tanzania is framed and narrated as a historical duty passed on from the Ottoman forefathers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015a). As such, former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu stated in relation to aid to Somalia that, “This is our historical duty, besides this is our humanitarian duty and this is an integral part of our active diplomacy in Africa” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015b). Thus, historically infused rhetoric about aid giving mobilizes and consolidates the domestic electorate, while facilitating the projection of power in
these regions. The historical narratives provide the ideological basis for a functional aid system consisting of a humanitarian and development network that mobilizes Turkey’s social capital.

Turkey’s projection of moral leadership in the region may be illustrated in its values-based policies that are an extension of its perceived historical responsibility (Davutoğlu, 2012; Yeşiltaş and Balcı, 2013). As a result, Turkey has symbolically positioned itself as a representative of the aggrieved, underprivileged and victim nations (Lepeska, 2014). For example, Turkey’s extensive support of the Palestinian cause projects this political positioning to likeminded groups in the region, while simultaneously consolidating domestic support for the JDP. Turkey’s current interest in Islamic issues is thus fundamentally connected to domestic conservative grassroots movements, some of which have become its frontline actors in international development and public diplomacy spheres.

**Economic Outreach and Religious Diplomacy**

 Turkey’s current donor-state status overlaps with some important socio-economic developments that have taken place over the last thirty years in the country. For decades, faith-inspired political parties, such as the National Outlook movement and its successors, and their grassroots organizations and constituencies were underrepresented in Turkey’s social and political sphere due to the dominant laicist\(^2\) structure (Merriam Webster, 2015). In response to the political system, Islamic political organizations reorganized their structure. Islamic-oriented faith-based NGOs, business organizations and women’s chapters directed their efforts in spreading across rural Anatolia and into underprivileged neighborhoods in urban cities. The roots of prominent contemporary Turkish aid NGOs such as the IHH (İnsani Hak ve Hürriyetleri İnsanı Yardım Vakfı/IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation) date back to the early 1990s where they found great interest within the Islamic factions of society (TIKA Report, 2015). Turkey’s key public diplomacy actors with international recognition have arisen from these political conditions. These Islamist grassroots movements have acted as a catalyst for
the new conservative bourgeoisie following the normalization of Islamic values in political and foreign policy spheres.

This movement gained momentum with the landslide victory of the conservative democrat JDP in 2002 (Dalay, 2014). Since 2002, these groups have become active stakeholders in Turkey’s foreign policy framework. Conservative business organizations such as TÜSKON (Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists) and most significantly MÜSİAD (Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association) have facilitated the rise of what are frequently referred to as the “Anatolian Tigers,” which is a symbolic name for the rising economic power of the conservative new bourgeoisie. MÜSİAD and TÜSKON are established and supported by a wide range of Anatolian entrepreneurs from mid-size companies to small businesses that have substantially benefited from the rise of JDP. These businesses today in many ways define the JDP voter base and have been key actors in restructuring the Turkish economy. Turkey’s overall economic progress has directly, and in some ways indirectly, empowered the aid ecosystem through donations and political support.

Conservative businesses and their social power are inherently connected to the faith-based NGOs through donations and opaque networks between the private and public sector. Faith-based aid NGOs such as IHH, Cansuyu, Yeryüzü Doktorları (Doctors Worldwide), Deniz Feneri (Lighthouse Association), Kimse Yok Mu, Beşir Derneği (Basher Association) and Hüdayi Vakfı/Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi Vakfı (Hüdayi Foundation) have traditionally appealed to the conservative Muslim bases. They employ religious duty during Muslim days of observance such as Ramadan and Eid-Al Adha/Eid Al Fitr, or times of crises in the region (i.e. operations against Gaza). Aid drives in support of Muslims in Somalia, Syria and Myanmar have received significant attention in recent years, together with abundant media coverage (Orakçı, 2014).

Faith-based NGOs also set the tone for Turkey’s economic involvement in various regions. In numerous places, aid NGOs
have been the forerunner organizations representing Turkey, which are quickly followed by business organizations. For example, the Gülenist movement, a cult-like organization based on the Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen’s teachings, moved into parts of Central Africa long before Turkey could establish any formal trade presence there. The movement assumed the role of mediator between Turkey and foreign local communities through their political alliance with the JDP government until 2013. The Gülen network set a precedent for the way that state organizations and businesses work together to project Turkish interests. The donor base of faith-based NGOs is derived from the same circles as business networks such as MÜSİAD, TUSKON and political grassroots affiliated with Islamic groups, and thus provides a natural platform for business interests to follow these values-based nongovernmental actors (White, 2002; Atlı, 2011).

NGO activities admit to a certain degree of connection with the government, though frequently these connections are obscured. Turkish humanitarian and development aid is organized in a way that incorporates NGOs with government agencies. The support base of patrons linked with MÜSİAD and TUSKON indicate a connection between conservative businesses, the pious masses and humanitarian assistance. Beyond this cooperation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also facilitates the work of these collaborative efforts when necessary. The traditionally pro-establishment diplomatic cadres have demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with these NGOs because they support the foreign policy goal of expanding to new markets (Orakçı, 2014). Hence, efficient and effective delivery of aid is often either overseen by diplomatic representation or has its implicit support. More importantly, the interaction between diplomatic circles and NGOs ensures the exchange of experience and information, in turn supporting the functionality of the aid ecosystem.

This is a mutually beneficial structure. NGOs benefit from the credibility of the Turkish brand at points and at other times help to establish credibility for Turkey through the humanitarian/development
work they do. As a result, aid giving by state and non-state actors is a mutually beneficial and functional collaboration that serves as a blueprint for what is understood in the region as the “Turkish model.” Other actors besides the diplomatic, nongovernmental and business sectors also play important functions. The media, largely controlled by the ruling government either directly or indirectly, is supportive of the aid ecosystem through framing Turkey’s aid drives in a positive light. Opinion leaders including academic and well-known public intellectuals serve as channels of communication, while grassroots volunteer organizations are strongly influenced by ideas propagated by these opinion leaders and foreign policy discourses. Thus, over the course of the last decade, faith-based business and relief NGOs have become convenient tools of policymaking. As a result, religious and historical affinities are exploited and act as catalysts in generating valuable foreign aid, public diplomacy and business networks.

**Social Power: A Turkish Model?**

This new doctrine fits very well into the established best practice of public diplomacy theory. People-to-people interaction is the most recognized approach in the “new” public diplomacy, as a series of citizen diplomacy interactions that builds bridges between communities (Snow, 2009; Zaharna, 2009). The citizen diplomats who play a fundamental role in building these person-to-person relationships come from a wide and varied candidate pool that includes students, NGOs, businesses and cultural organizations (Citizen Diplomacy, 2015). Citizen diplomats essentially represent their nation brand and also assist in establishing that nation brand. In this regard, sincere communication between citizen diplomats of two nations has the potential to build long-term bonds between nations and cultures.

Peter van Ham describes social power as “the ability to set standards and create norms and values that are deemed legitimate and desirable, without resorting to coercion and payment” (Van Ham, 2013: 19). Social power in this respect is key in relationship-building approaches. In a similar vein, Zaharna contends that relationship building can be carried out through development projects as an
expression of the ties between two entities. This engagement model can be established and enriched by the long-term humanitarian investment of business and aid NGOs as well as local ODA offices (Zaharna, 2009).

In the Turkish case, business associations and businessmen have taken on the role of citizen diplomats in contributing to the improvement of bilateral economic, commercial and social ties (Atlı, 2011). Volunteers involved in humanitarian and development aid have extensive leverage in listening and communicating with local audiences. They become part of the local community and enmesh with the local values of the recipient society (Köylü, 2013). These representatives are not only acquainted with the culture, language and traditions of the recipient country, but because of these qualifications they can also act as the cultural bridge between two communities. Volunteers represent Turkey and at the same time maintain the flow of information between countries and cultures, as well as interpreting the needs and demands of these communities. Accordingly, volunteers are the eyes and ears of a Turkish state that facilitates the flow of information to and from the community leaders and grassroots organizations. Overall, the role of each actor is important in understanding the domestic appeal of Turkey’s aid mechanism.

The key actors in Turkey’s humanitarian and development aid are empowered by cultural, religious and economic contingencies, and in many respects they constitute Turkey’s social power. Turkey’s foreign aid apparatus showcases the important role of individuals, social capital and an active public diplomacy audience. The people-to-people interaction between aid workers, ODA offices and recipients serve as communication pathways to establish genuine relations across multiple levels of society. The social power of Turkey’s NGO field officers and volunteers make Turkey’s aid framework exceptional; however, it should be noted that this values-based social power is focused upon Muslim communities and ideologies, which can undermine Turkey’s capacity to reach out to non-Muslim aid recipients.
Implications of the Turkish Ecosystem

Humanitarian assistance is a goodwill effort, yet it still offers benefit for the benefactor. This dual advantage begs a discussion on whether these examples of humanitarian assistance can be truly categorized as an altruistic effort. In this sense, humanitarian assistance is beyond genuinely civic initiatives and benefits the donor country, donor institutions, and stakeholders as much as it benefits the recipient. There are noteworthy economic, political (domestic and international) and cultural benefits stemming from Turkey’s aid ecosystem. Although the ecosystem clearly benefits the recipient societies through providing jobs, income and infrastructure, for the purposes of this chapter only the implications for Turkey will be assessed.

The existence of Turkey’s state and non-state actors in regions where it is expanding its influence has enabled the increase of Turkish exports to these regions. For example, Turkey’s exports to North Africa and Middle East have increased from $5.2 million to $48 million in the last ten years (SAM Report, 2014).

A significant portion of Turkey’s exports has been in the construction industry. Turkey’s state and non-state presence in Africa, for instance, has facilitated an increase in the number of building projects Turkey is involved in. With Turkey indicating official interest in Africa following the “Africa Opening” (Turkey-Africa Relations MFA, 2015) that was proclaimed in 2005, state and non-state entities became interconnected on a more systematic level. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was the first non-African high-level official to visit conflict-stricken Mogadishu in 20 years. His 2011 visit was symbolic in the sense that it fostered a fresh approach to managing the Somalia crisis from Mogadishu instead of the neighboring city of Nairobi, Kenya (Kızılay, 2013). Soon after, Turkish humanitarian and development aid to Somalia and Somaliland greatly increased due to celebrity diplomacy and media exposure (Akpınar, 2011). After the visit, the Turkish Red Crescent stationed personnel in Mogadishu, which was quickly followed by a Turkish Embassy and TIKA office (Tank, 2013; ICG Policy Briefing, 2012). In a
similar fashion, corporations that have had close ties with the JDP government assisted in rebuilding Somalia through constructing the Mogadishu Airport, Somali Port, and highways. Numerous infrastructure developments are being assisted by TIKA (Özkan, 2014).

Pakistan, which is another destination for Turkish foreign aid and business ventures, has increasingly gained prominence in these matters due to its infrastructure needs. For instance, in 2013 a Turkish construction company won the contract to construct parts of the metro-bus line in Lahore, as well as the contract to operate the line for eight years (Hürriyet Daily News, 2013). As a byproduct of Turkey’s need to expand to new markets, Turkish Airlines—the national airline and a key actor in Turkey’s public diplomacy—inaugurated new routes to Africa and Latin America (Selçuk, 2013). Through these new routes, diplomacy and trade have become far easier to conduct.

Business and NGO lobbying in Africa has often been credited for Turkey’s rotating membership status in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2009-2010. Aside from the diplomatic expansion, the Turkish presence in Africa and Southeast Asia has rendered significant results in Turkey’s role in peace-making initiatives. The NGO presence in remote conflict regions has further facilitated Turkey’s role as a mediator and humanitarian diplomacy actor, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. Together with long-term trust building and philanthropic efforts, Turkey’s NGOs have been able to partake in the facilitation of negotiations between groups in conflict. In line with this, Turkey hosted the First Istanbul Somalia Conference in 2010—organized within the UN framework—and the following conference in 2012. The Istanbul II Conference, unlike the previous London Conference on Somalia, took an inclusive approach to civil society and NGOs. The conference included both civil society representatives and politicians as well as inviting 135 clan elders, thus allowing for a “homegrown solution” to come out of the event (Tank, 2013). In addition, Turkey will host the United Nations First Humanitarian Peace summit in 2016 (World Humanitarian Summit,
2015). As a result, the aid ecosystem has galvanized Turkey’s claims as a major power in conflict resolution and mediation. Through the complex interconnectedness within an ecosystem of religious NGOs, grassroots organizations, traditional diplomacy, business diplomacy, and citizen diplomacy, Turkey is aiming to consolidate its position in peace building.

Another political outcome of the faith-based ecosystem has been the large number of new embassies and consulates in regions where Turkish businesses have flourished. According to the most recent report by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), embassies in Africa almost tripled, from 12 to 35 in the last decade. TIKA is actively involved in 37 African countries with 7 offices on the continent (Sorumluluk ve Vizyon, 2013: 13-15). The official presence in these regions where Turkey is expanding its outreach is essential for strengthening diplomatic ties and facilitating the transfer of foreign aid. A similar trend is apparent in Turkey’s Latin America opening, which has seen the expansion of NGOs, TIKA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diyanet in the region (Levaggi, 2013; Özkan, 2014).

**Graphic 1**

Conclusion

Turkey has gone through an impressive change over the course of a decade, seeing massive domestic social, political and economic development. As a rising power, Turkish public diplomacy and aid have been entwined in seeking innovative ways to share Turkey’s story, exert power and create new partnerships. A key component of that story is Turkey’s soft power. Humanitarian and development aid have become significant ways of wielding Turkey’s soft power through values-based movements motivated “from below” at the citizen level. Humanitarian aid has been a major tool in Turkey’s foreign policy framework due to its capacity to establish long-term grassroots relationships with recipient states. The Islamic faith is a dominant catalyst in mobilizing the NGO grassroots and the donor base, while also serving as a cultural bridge between the donor and the recipient states. Currently, as the world’s 18th largest economy, Turkey is the third largest humanitarian donor state globally and is a key humanitarian actor in providing aid to over two million Syrian refugees (World Bank, 2015; MFA, 2015).

As a result, Turkey’s eagerness to introduce new modes of global governance also introduces new approaches to humanitarian aid through non-governmental initiatives. The Turkish ecosystem offers a foreign policy model that combines an ethical and religious discourse with the pragmatic goal of maximizing power, which has its own prospects and limitations. Given Turkey’s geopolitical positioning between the Islamic region and the European Union, its capacity to promote new modes of engagement with publics based on religious and cultural dynamics makes it an attractive intercultural mediator. On the other hand, Turkey’s public diplomacy lacks a grand strategy, which may hinder the long-term institutionalization of the faith-based ecosystem. Political uncertainty within Turkey threatens both the stability of the country and the durability of the aid ecosystem. Thus, the success of this model will ultimately depend on whether it can be sustained regardless of the governing political party.
Bibliography


Endnotes

1. This doctrine particularly encourages recognition of the Ottoman heritage and Turkey’s engagement with former Ottoman territories through empowering these assets with aid.

2. Laicism is a political system characterized by the exclusion of ecclesiastical control and influence. In the Turkish case laicism refers to the formal exclusion of Islam from the political system.

3. TUSKON was very active in Africa until the rift between the Gülen movement, which dominates TUSKON, and the JDP government. After the fallout of this political alliance, MÜSİAD, which has closer ties to the JDP government, has dominated the business network.

4. For instance, the Port of Mogadishu was constructed by Albayrak İnşaat and the Mogadishu Airport by Cengiz İnşaat. Kolin İnşaat has offices in Uganda overseeing development projects in Rwanda, Ethiopia and Mozambique. These conservative businesses also have crucial domestic contracts and some of these corporations own newspapers.
Eurasian Students in China: A New Angle in Understanding China’s Public Diplomacy

Larisa Smirnova

Today China is turning its eyes towards Eurasia, the region that includes Russia and Central Asia, as part of its global “One Belt, One Road” strategy. In the absence of an established Chinese diaspora in the region to act as go-betweens, and given an insufficient understanding of China by regional decision-makers, attracting support from people in the region might turn out to be a challenging task. This chapter looks at the experiences of Eurasian students who study in Chinese universities and suggests that they could become instrumental for China’s public diplomacy in the region. Building on theoretical research by top scholars of public diplomacy and education, as well on my own empirical research on the Chinese campuses, I make several arguments. First, China should be more open about the active role that foreigners play in its public diplomacy. Second, the focus should shift from the quantity to the quality of foreign students in Chinese universities. Finally, China should increase its emphasis on foreign students’ long-term career options rather than focusing simply on their acquisition of Chinese language proficiency and exposure to Chinese culture.

Introduction

On March 28, 2015, China officially unveiled the blueprint of the “One Belt, One Road” strategy, an ambitious plan to connect the Asian, European, and African continents more tightly, with an emphasis on infrastructure development along several continental and maritime lines (Xinhua News Agency, March 28, 2015). Two of the three announced continental sub-lines that together constitute the so-called the Silk Road Economic Belt explicitly involve Eurasia,
the region that includes Russia and Central Asia (Government of China, 2015).

China argues that the Silk Road Economic Belt will promote economic development in all of the countries and regions involved. In order to implement this far-reaching project, however, China will need to win the support of decision-makers in the Eurasian region. Moreover, this improvement of China’s image in the region will need to be long-lasting, as China intends to rely on the Silk Road to help achieve its crucial domestic economic goals, such as the transition to innovation-driven growth (Xi, 2014) and balanced development of the Eastern coastal and Western inland regions of the country (Feng, 2015).

However, attracting support from people in the region might prove more challenging than expected. At present, no established Chinese diaspora in Russia or Central Asian countries exists to play the role of go-between, a role that the Chinese diaspora played when the country began to realize its policy of “opening up” to the West in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Vogel, 2011). Therefore, several factors might affect China’s plans, such as relatively low levels of cultural awareness about China among decision-makers across the Eurasian region (Gabuev, 2015), potential rivalries with Russia (Smirnova, 2014), religious sensitivities in Central Asia, and persisting, though diminishing, mistrust and perceptions of China as a “long-term threat” (Nixey, 2012).

Foreign graduates of Chinese universities could play a strategic role in credibly conveying China’s message in their native regions. In 2013, according to government statistics, 33,947 foreign students in China hailed from China’s fellow member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional multilateral body that also comprises Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan (China Ministry of Education, Statistics Yearbook). During the ten-year period from 2004-2013, Chinese statistics recorded a total of 174,494 students from these Eurasian countries (China Ministry of Education, Statistics Yearbook).
Efforts are ongoing to further increase the number of exchange students between China and the Eurasian countries (Xinhua News Agency, October 13, 2014).

China’s public diplomacy is known for its predominantly Chinese and governmental face (Nye, 2013), while the role of foreigners is passive, mostly as admirers of Chinese culture. As Jian Wang notes, the most widely known actors in China’s public diplomacy are China Central Television’s English-language network (CCTV News), government news conferences and spokespersons, and the Confucius Institute (Wang, 2011). The images of foreigners broadcast by Chinese media for foreign audiences are routinely similar to those aimed at the domestic Chinese audience. These images depict the amiable interaction of mutually exotic cultures and show foreigners writing calligraphy, performing kung fu, or wearing traditional Chinese clothing. Very few foreign visitors to China, except perhaps for Henry Kissinger, avoid this kind of depiction in the Chinese media. For example, Michelle Obama received this sort of coverage during her most recent visit (China Daily USA, March 21, 2014). China treats its admirers generously, but it has remained a closed society for so long that it requires a culture change before foreigners can play an active role in the promotion of the Chinese enterprise.

Contrary to assumptions sometimes held in the West, China does not insist that its public diplomacy should necessarily be conducted by the government. The potential of public diplomacy in general, and of educational exchanges in particular, is currently receiving increased emphasis and being reconceived, with Chinese scholars extensively citing Western views on the subject (Zhang, 2013). This paradigm shift in China makes empirical research on the opportunities and challenges of China’s “people-to-people diplomacy” in the Eurasian region particularly meaningful.

**Theory and methodology**

The links between public diplomacy and development communications constitute an emerging field of research and are
not fully established (Pamment, 2015). This paper builds on the argument that student exchange programs are more effective if they bring long-term professional or personal opportunities to their participants. For example, S.H. Yun criticizes traditional student exchanges for the “overly focused construct of understanding and learning of the host country,” arguing persuasively that “acquiring knowledge through direct experience is too self-evident to merit scrutiny, and little is known about how this knowledge translates into positive or negative valence” (Yun, 2015). G. Scott-Smith points out that “…an exchange will have the greatest impact…if it offers openings and opportunities that the participant can utilize for their own personal and / or professional benefit afterwards” (Scott-Smith, 2008).

A body of research from the economics of education also calls on policy-makers to increase their focus on the career prospects of graduates. D. Throsby showed that “one clear area for further research…is the valuation of the wide range of benefits to all stakeholders arising from foreign study, in particular the longer-term career benefits to students from internationalization of higher education” (Throsby, 1999). D. Obst and J. Forster also found that “enhancing career opportunities and gaining experience for future employment, whether at home or internationally, are major contributing factors in a student’s decision to study abroad” (Obst & Forster). In contrast to the traditional assumption that international students should return to their home countries, J. Bergerhoff et al. recently demonstrated empirically that “a country benefits if it attracts many foreign students who stay in the country. A policy to open up universities for foreign students is therefore complementary to a policy to make the labor market attractive for these foreign students” (Bergerhoff, Borghans, Seegers, & van Venn, 2013).

For those conducting empirical research about international students in China, inadequate statistics pose a challenge. Even obtaining a breakdown of students by country of origin is difficult. The most authoritative source is the Concise Statistics on Foreign Students in China, issued annually since 1999 by the Department of
International Cooperation and Exchanges of the Ministry of Education of China (China Ministry of Education, Statistics Yearbook). This publication is only available in China and in Chinese.

Another difficulty lies in ascertaining the share of students receiving scholarships, which is meaningful when evaluating China’s investments in attracting foreign students. At present, three main types of scholarships are available in China: (1) the Chinese government scholarship, administered by the China Scholarship Council (CSC); (2) Confucius Institute Scholarships, administered by Hanban (Confucius Institute, or CI); and (3) various grant schemes managed by provinces, cities, and individual universities. The CSC is the largest grant-managing institution in China. For example, in 2013, it granted a total of 33,322 scholarships to foreign students (China Ministry of Education, Statistics Yearbook), whereas Hanban (CI) granted 6,929 in the same year (Hanban, 2013). Statistics on the CSC scholarship and its distribution by country are included in the Concise Statistics on Foreign Students in China. However, the distribution by country of Hanban (CI) scholarships is not published, and data on other scholarships would be difficult to gather because they come from a wide variety of sources. Fortunately, the International Department of a major Chinese university, which requested to remain anonymous, kindly responded to my request to provide data regarding international students from the SCO countries. These data make it possible to estimate the overall share of students receiving scholarships.

In order to evaluate students’ individual experiences, I conducted detailed interviews with Eurasian students in China. In order to protect the privacy of respondents and allow them to express their views freely, I have omitted their names in the text of this chapter. The distribution of interview respondents by country roughly corresponds to each country’s share in the total number of students from SCO member countries. Of the 23 total respondents, twelve are from Russia and eleven are from the four Central Asian countries. The average number of years they spent studying and living in China is 4.15. Seventeen still live in mainland China, and six live outside
of China. Eighteen are students in degree programs (nine are PhD candidates, two are Master’s graduates, four are Master’s candidates, two are Bachelor’s students, and one is a Bachelor’s graduate), and five attended long-term (at least one year) non-degree Chinese language training in China. The interviews focused on three main topics: motivation for coming to China, comparative advantages and disadvantages of the Chinese education system, and career plans and options.

**Key findings**

1. **Chinese higher education is increasingly attractive in the Eurasian region, with interest strongest in Kazakhstan.**

Statistics suggest that most Eurasian students in China come from Russia and Kazakhstan. In 2013, among the 33,947 students from SCO member countries in China, almost half (47%) came from Russia. The second largest share came from Kazakhstan (33%). The share of three other SCO countries (Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) was 20% in total (see Table 1 / Figure 1).

Over the past ten years, interest in receiving an education in China consistently grew faster, on average, among Eurasian students than among international students, with the biggest growth occurring in Kazakhstan. Between 2004 and 2013, the number of Eurasian students in China increased by at least 7.9 times. (The number of Kazakh students increased by more than 14 times). Over the same period, the total number of international students in China increased by 3.2 times. The average annual increase was 46% for students from Kazakhstan and 25% for students from Russia, while it was 14% for all international students. However, after peaking in the mid-2000s, these growth rates stabilized after 2010 and are now close to the average for international students. If weighted by population, interest is strongest in Kazakhstan, with 66 out of every 100,000 people from that country now studying in China. Interest is actually quite low in Russia, where the ratio is just 11 out of 100,000. Interest is lowest in Uzbekistan (6/100,000) (Figure 2).
### Table 1

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Source: author’s compilation based on China Ministry of Education statistics

### Figure 1

![Graph showing foreign students from SCO member countries in China, 2004-2013](image)

Source: author’s compilation based on China Ministry of Education statistics
2. Eurasian students, especially from wealthier countries, are often prepared to pay for their studies in China, which they consider to be an investment that will grow in value throughout their future career.

The majority of Eurasian students in China are either paying for their own education or have obtained scholarships from their home countries. The average percentage of Eurasian students receiving the China Scholarship Council (CSC) scholarship has remained stable at around 10% over the past three years (Figure 3). Higher percentages of students from poorer countries, especially Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, tend to receive scholarships.

The total percentage of Eurasian students who obtain a scholarship from Chinese sources, all kinds of grants included, can be estimated at approximately 20%-30%. In order to verify this estimate, I obtained data from the International Department of an anonymous top-tier Chinese university. Since 2000, 483 Eurasian
students have attended this university. Among these, 361 (75%) are listed as self-reliant, including 80% of students from Russia and 75% of students from Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic. A large majority of students from Uzbekistan (74%) and 100% of students from Tajikistan benefited from Chinese scholarships.

Figure 3

![Graph showing share of Chinese government scholarship beneficiaries, 2009-2013](image)

Source: author’s illustration based on China Ministry of Education statistics

Eurasian students generally consider tuition in China to be affordable, though it is usually more expensive than in the countries of origin. Financial motivations for coming to China, such as receiving a grant, are certainly high, but not always at the top of the list. Although most of my interview respondents benefited from a Chinese scholarship at some point during their studies, most were self-supporting for at least part of the program. Some explained that obtaining a scholarship was “more of a matter of prestige than a decisive factor in coming to China.” All interviewees agreed that “obtaining a scholarship in China is very feasible, it just takes some administrative hustle.” In some cases, because the fees are affordable, they “preferred to pay and not to bother [obtaining a scholarship].”
The students consider studying in China to be an investment in their future that will grow in value. This view is based on the widespread perception that because China is developing so spectacularly, becoming an expert on China would be helpful in landing a good job. “Right now, it is still not that hard for foreigners to get into Chinese universities, even the top ones. But in ten years it will become very hard to get into Peking University or Tsinghua University. Then, when I will tell people that I graduated from Tsinghua, they will be very impressed.” Optimism about education in China is often matched by pessimism about education in the students’ home countries. “I believe that a Chinese education is a better investment in the future than a Russian education because Chinese education is growing in value and Russian education is declining,” one respondent told me.

3. The main motivation of the Eurasian students is adding “Chinese language” or “China-specific expertise” to their original degree.

Studies in China are unlikely to be the only university studies that a student pursues: Eurasian students usually have a university degree from their home country and view education in China as an extra asset. Among 483 students in an anonymous Chinese university, only 58 (12%) were enrolled in bachelor’s degree programs; 59 (another 12%) were enrolled in graduate level degree programs (Masters and PhDs); 366 (76%) came for non-degree studies or exchanges. All except 2 of the 23 interviewees had obtained at least a bachelor’s degree in their home country.

The preferred major is clearly Chinese language. It is impossible to determine the majors chosen by students from specific countries or regions based on official Ministry of Education statistics. According to the data on 483 students that was provided by the anonymous Chinese university, the overwhelming majority of students (398, or 82%) were enrolled in Chinese language programs at different levels (Figure 4).
Interest in China-related social sciences, taught in Chinese or in English, is growing. According to the above-cited data from a Chinese university, various economics-related majors were popular, such as business, finance, and management. Other majors chosen by students included, in order of decreasing popularity, politics, international relations, communications, law, Chinese philosophy, education, and art.

The students assume that China is “special” and that learning about it will be beneficial either to their country and/or to their own professional development. One interviewee, a Master’s graduate in International Relations, mentioned “being slightly disappointed by her program because it was too focused on the Western theory of International Relations and not enough attention was paid to China’s specifics.” Another respondent, an economics major from Russia, is writing her thesis about China’s stimulus package during the 2008
global financial crisis. She called China’s policies “very advanced” and “likely transposable to Russia’s conditions.”

Interest in studying the natural sciences in China is virtually nonexistent. In this regard, Eurasian students are similar to their Western counterparts (Belyavina, 2013) but different from African students who often come to China to learn technical skills (Gillespie, 2001; 2013). In the Chinese university that I examined, only 11 out of 483 Eurasian students (2.2%) studied science-based majors. The most popular among them were software and information technologies, followed by architecture, chemistry, biology, and traditional Chinese medicine. Thus, students from the Eurasian region do not yet regard China as a technological power, and are much likelier to study natural and technical sciences in Russia (Arefiev & Sheregi, 2014) than in China.

4. Eurasian students find China’s university system more open than those at home, and are beginning to see it as a platform towards more advanced training in Western institutions.

Perhaps surprisingly, most of my Eurasian interviewees, regardless of which country they came from, found the Chinese university education system “more open” than those in their home countries. The openness of the Chinese education system is apparent in several respects:

• The number of Western books, journals and research databases available at the university library is higher than in home countries.
• The number of Western guest professors is higher than in home countries.
• English-taught courses tailored toward foreigners are more available than they would be at a university back home, where language proficiency is a major concern for foreign students.

Regardless of whether they attended English-taught or Chinese-taught programs in China, most of the respondents pointed out that
their English improved while in China and that they met and learned to interact with classmates from different cultural backgrounds. One student pointed out that “most educated Chinese people speak good English, and it’s easier and faster to learn English than to learn Chinese.” Those interviewees who attended Chinese language courses or English-taught programs stressed, in particular, that “my group was very international,” that “my classmates came from over 40 countries,” or that “China was my first experience of living abroad, and it is where I learnt to communicate with people from different countries.” They generally spoke with appreciation of this exposure to diversity.

Eurasian students tend to believe that the Chinese educational system is more compatible with Western standards than the education systems of their home countries. First, the Chinese university system is organized in a standard international three-stage model of “Bachelor (4 years) + Master (3 years) + PhD (3-4 years),” whereas many Eurasian universities still maintain the Soviet model of “Specialist (5 years) + Candidate of Science (3 years) + Doctor of Science (undetermined).” Second, Chinese universities have begun to achieve higher rankings internationally. Mainland China has at least two institutions that are fully competitive internationally: Tsinghua University and Peking University (QS, 2015) (Times Higher Education, 2015) (Webometrics, 2015) and has set up a generously funded university internationalization scheme (the so-called “Project 985”) that aims to bring 39 more Chinese universities to the international level. Third, as unprecedented numbers of Chinese students head to the West for advanced training (UNESCO, 2013), Chinese campuses provide ready access to facilities that help to prepare them for Western admission examinations.

As a result, more Eurasian students are starting to look at China as a bridge to pursuing further education in the West. Especially among the Russian interviewees, many said that they would like to continue their education in the West. “After my studies in China,” one Russian interviewee told me, “I wanted to go to a Western country. But my husband doesn’t speak foreign languages, and I have
a little daughter. That prevents me from going right now, but I am still considering the opportunities.” “I have a German boyfriend,” another one told me, “and would like to move to Germany with him when I graduate. Otherwise, I dream about studying at Columbia University, too.” One other student said that after she graduated from her program in China, she moved to France, obtained her MBA, and now lives in Provence.

The Central Asian students, however, seem less willing to go to the West than the Russians. Chinese universities are in competition with those in Russia, rather than with Western universities, as a pole of attraction for the Central Asian students (Figure 5). The Central Asians are usually more traditional, have more family ties in their home countries, and tend to be better integrated in Chinese society. As one student from Kazakhstan explained, “I am not attracted by the West. I prefer Asia. It’s such a colorful region. I don’t look or feel different from the Chinese. They generally take me for a Kazakh from Xinjiang, and are surprised when I say I am actually from Kazakhstan.” The most popular option for the Central Asian respondents was to return to their home country. One of the Central Asian interviewees said he was “considering moving to Russia in a few years.”

Figure 5

Source: author’s illustration based on statistics by China Ministry of Education, UNESCO (UNESCO, 2013), and the IIE (Institute of International Education, 2012-2013)
5. Study experience in China is usually positive, but career options are not as abundant as initially perceived.

The Eurasian students tend to like China and to stay there for long periods. No statistical data is available on the average length of stay by international students in China, because once they graduate or switch to another study program, they are statistically viewed as a new entrant to China. The average number of years that my interviewees spent in China is 4.15. Among them, the longest-staying person has lived in China for 9 years, two students stayed for 8 years, and one for 7 years.

With several exceptions, the respondents usually stated that they found China more similar to their home countries than they had expected. “I can compare between the Chinese, the Russian, and the French education systems,” one respondent told me. “The Chinese education system is more similar to the Russian one. It accentuates theory over practice.” Another one said, “I don’t feel too homesick in China because most of my friends and colleagues are in China.” One student from Kazakhstan told me, “My sister and I came to China seven years ago, initially by accident, because Xinjiang was close to where we lived. But we liked it. Then our mother also came, and she is now pursuing her doctorate degree in Beijing. We are all very used to the Chinese way of life.”

Eurasian students tend not to view the lack of political or religious freedoms in China as serious constraints. Judging by various regional blog and social media comments written by current or former students of Chinese universities, their overall opinions of China are positive (Magazeta.com, realchina.ru). Comparisons between China and home countries are often favorable to China. “Unlike back home, there is no corruption in the Chinese education system,” a Central Asian student said. Central Asian students might find some Chinese habits, such as rushing into the elevator without letting people out first, to be funny or annoying, but overall they believe that communicating with Chinese people is not difficult.
Students who managed to achieve a strong command of the Chinese language tend to be more positive about their prospects. One inspiring success story is that of 29-year-old Russian Alexander Gabuev, a former exchange student at Zhejiang University who is now a respected China affairs commentator working at the Moscow Carnegie Center. Another remarkable Russian, Yulia Dreyzis, a former exchange student at Central China Normal University and now an associate professor at Moscow State University, is known for her translations of Yu Hua novels. However, they both mentioned that they also had degrees in fields other than Chinese language (History and Finance for Gabuev and Literature for Dreyzis). Still, even for those respondents with less spectacular careers, a typical answer was, “I am not worried about my job prospects. Speaking Russian, English, Chinese (and a Central Asian language), I will always be able to find a job.”

However, the students who attempted to find jobs in China expressed frustration, for several reasons. First, they face stiff competition from English and Russian speaking Chinese students who graduated from foreign universities, who “speak better Chinese and understand China better.” Second, the Eurasian students feel disadvantaged vis-à-vis native English-speakers. “The Chinese might well have a ‘love and hate’ relationship with the United States,” one recent graduate told me, “but even those who dislike certain U.S. policies still admire the U.S. goods and the U.S. ways of living and doing things.” Therefore, this student concluded, “the Chinese companies usually prefer candidates from the U.S., or, if not, native English speakers, for all kinds of positions.” Third, many respondents perceive China’s system of granting work permits as overly restrictive, so it is challenging to get legal jobs. As one student explained, “if you are employed by a big international company, they can get you a work permit. However, most Chinese companies are not even authorized to hire foreigners at all.”

Regardless of their career expectations, most respondents were bitter about the fact that “students are not allowed to hold part-time jobs legally in China, which makes it extremely difficult to get
experience and identify potential employers.” One graduate, who now lives in France, said that “in France, students are allowed to work for 20 hours a week. That is immensely helpful, and also good for the country, as the international students can be more self-reliant and need less stipend money from the government.”

Conclusions and policy recommendations

China’s “One Belt, One Road” strategy is one of the most ambitious development initiatives outside of the West. In order to succeed, Eurasian economic cooperation needs to build trust between people. However, most citizens across the Eurasian region have so far had few opportunities to nurture the personal friendships necessary to engage in business together, and still know little about each other’s cultures. Therefore, it follows that public diplomacy is key to the success of China’s international development strategy.

Amidst the negativity surrounding Russia’s economic recession, the many challenges China’s development strategy faces, and growing civil unrest in Central Asian countries, promoting prosperity and people-to-people diplomacy through education exchanges would seem to provide a positive and mutually beneficial platform for tackling the region’s many dilemmas.

Based on the findings of this study, at least tens of thousands of natives of the Eurasian region have graduated from or studied at Chinese universities. This represents a new generation of Chinese-trained professionals, which is much larger than in years past, when opportunities to learn Chinese were limited to narrow circles of graduates of a handful of Soviet universities. The Eurasian students who have studied in China tend to be China-friendly, have a first-hand knowledge of China, and usually have at least some knowledge of Chinese.

These professionals have three main options: return to their home country, remain to work in China, or move to the West, where they would likely need more advanced learning before they can join the labor market. In any of these three cases, they could play important roles in China’s public diplomacy and in the expansion of China’s
influence. If they return home, they will gradually start to play a growing role in China-related decision-making in their countries. In the absence of the lobbying power of a Chinese diaspora in the region, the positive image of China that these professionals hold could be crucial for the success of projects such as the “One Belt, One Road” strategy. If they find opportunities to stay in China, they can help strengthen China’s ties with their home countries, playing a role in public diplomacy similar to that of ethnic Chinese people in Western countries. The last option, in which students move to the West, may at first glance seem to be less beneficial for China. However, increased admission into Western universities of not only Chinese nationals, but also foreign graduates of Chinese universities, will increase the prestige of China’s universities and eventually help attract more quality foreign students to China.

Taking into account the priority of the Eurasian region for China’s foreign policy, China could take a few further steps to maintain ties with graduates and establish contact with future students, to improve foreign students’ career perspectives, and to empower them as people-to-people diplomacy actors:

1. Keep in touch with the graduates of Chinese universities by promoting alumni associations. The creation of such associations has already begun (Institute of the Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2014)). Chinese institutions can establish contacts with them.

2. Offer facilitated procedures for visas to foreign graduates of Chinese universities. Consider creating fast track visa applications or, if this is not possible, granting long-term multiple entry visas to facilitate their return for various projects. China could study the U.S. B1/B2 visas, which are issued for 3, 5, or 10 years and allow an unlimited number of stays for limited periods, in order to see if it could be adapted to these ends.

3. Consider lowering the requirements for granting work permits to foreigners in China. Foreign students could be allowed to legally hold part-time jobs, the number of the Chinese companies allowed to sponsor foreigners for work permits could be enlarged,
and requirements for the recently-introduced R-visas for foreign high-skilled professionals could be lowered.

4. The trend in program design should not be to focus explicitly on Chinese language training, but to attract students who have broader areas of expertise to various Chinese-taught and English-taught programs.

5. Considering that many students complained about facing less promising career prospects than they had anticipated, China’s focus in the near future should not be on increasing the number of students from the Eurasian region. Rather, China should shift its focus to raising the quality of the Eurasian students who enrolled in programs of study in China.

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Endnotes
1. The actual number of students was perhaps smaller. As the statistics are compiled annually, it is possible that some students, who stayed in China for several years, were accounted for each year.
2. For those countries that are not included in the Statistical Yearbook, the maximum number of students would be 499 (the Statistical Yearbook says explicitly that it includes countries from which at least 500 students originate). Therefore, the maximum total number of students from Central Asia was $499 \times 4 = 1996$. The maximum total number of SCO member countries would be $1996$ (Central Asia) $+ 2288$ (Russia) $= 4284$. Therefore, $33947/4284 \approx 7.9$.

Acknowledgements
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I. Introduction

In 2014, UNESCO investigated the potential inclusion of media into the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). The report “Why free, independent and pluralistic media deserve to be at the heart of a post-2015 development agenda,” summarizes arguments for including media in the SDGs—namely the empirical evidence of the correlation between free media and sustainable development, and the recognition of quality media as an integral part of good governance. Media development funding currently represents only a tiny percentage of international development spending—only 0.5 percent, or $645 million, in 2010 (Internews 2012).

But media is not a value-neutral industry, and this has become more obvious as more development agencies and countries engage in media development. In particular, China’s involvement in the past 10 years has caused alarm and accusations from the West of the Beijing government attempting ‘soft power’ politics (Banda 2009a). Yet little attention has been paid to the ideology driving the West’s media interventions in developing countries. This research aims to better understand the diverse motivations, objectives and values of some of those Western-based media interventions by quantifying and rhetorically analyzing literature from programs conducted in South Sudan since the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

II. Media Development Definitions and Justifications

Media development remains a largely subjective term loosely ascribed to a variety of programs, both as means to an end as
well as means in themselves, which support media organizations in developing countries (Berger 2010). UNESCO, which has championed media development since the inclusion of Article 19 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, has largely avoided adhering to a single definition, instead focusing on tools to assess and measure impact of media development programs (UNESCO 2008).

For western-based media development organizations, the basis for such interventions lies in media’s perceived role in democracy and development (Clingendael Institute 2003). Hanitzsch (2011) describes this Western approach to media as the ‘detached watchdog,’ which strives for accurate and objective reporting in order to inform the citizenry and keep the government in check. A report by the Clingendael Institute (2003) states that “the significance of the media is obvious: a reliable news media enables well-informed citizen decision-making that, when freely exercised, in turn contributes to democratization.”

However, academic research casts doubts on this assumption about media’s impact on democracy. Anam (2002) claims that democracy and media have a symbiotic relationship—media can help develop nascent democracies by keeping them transparent and informed, but media is also dependent on the government to allow its own independence; there are few things media can accomplish when under threat of censorship or punishment from the government.

Beyond democracy is the question of media’s contribution to development. Berger (2010: 559) argues that media “do not necessarily deliver ‘development’, just as they do not intrinsically promote democracy.” If media is understood to be merely a tool of communication, it must be assumed that tool can be used to achieve both positive and negative goals. Despite this, the findings from the following research show that assumptions about media’s positive impacts on governments and peoples are both perpetuated in the development industry and used to justify and promote media development programs.
III. Public Diplomacy and the Modernization Paradigm

Aside from being a development tool, media interventions are also tools of public diplomacy. As described by Joseph Nye (2008: 95), media development can be understood as “an instrument that governments use to mobilize…resources to communicate with and attract the publics of other countries.” He outlines three dimensions of public diplomacy, the last of which is “the development of lasting relationships with key individuals…through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences, and access to media channels” which practitioners hope can contribute to soft power influence (2008: 102).

The unique situation of the media means that media development has impacts beyond public diplomacy as well, because the information and values that are taught in these trainings and exchanges then have the potential to be broadcast to the population as a whole. While the population of recipient countries might distrust direct broadcasts from foreign players, such as Voice of America or the BBC, local media outlets, often assisted by foreign NGOs, enjoy a greater amount of trust (Nye 2008; Internews 2012).

Furthermore, such training approaches can serve to mold a recipient country’s media into the donor’s ideal media system in what can be seen as a re-embodiment of the modernization paradigm. Scott (2014: 33) explains the modernization paradigm as the idea that “‘undeveloped’ societies should aim to replicate the political, economic, social and cultural characteristics of ‘modern’, ‘developed,’ Western societies”—and in this case, replicate media systems as well. As this research aims to show, donor organizations, understandably, are most likely to promote a media approach in recipient countries that resembles the system from their own countries.

While such development approaches are common practice and not inherently worrisome, this research highlights two problems with this form of public diplomacy and modernization in the context of media: first is the assumption that media values are normative
at the expense of established media and cultural values in recipient countries; second is the acknowledgement that numerous countries are involved in media development, and their media systems and media development approaches are all unique and, occasionally, contradictory.

A. Media Development in an African Context

In the case of South Sudan, scholars often refer to its situation within African media (Internews 2011); however, one must acknowledge that the continent is comprised of 54 sovereign countries with diverse governments and unique cultures within their borders. In her research on non-Western media systems, Voltmer (2011) lists characteristics that set apart many African media systems, including greater state intervention, more divided and weaker media markets, and the integration of local values into journalistic standards. Yet international development organizations often seem to be less concerned with understanding the intricacies and unique values of media in the context of recipient countries and more focused on meeting their pre-established goals for media development projects.

A telling characteristic of the modernization paradigm present in media development is that interventions are often conducted with little to no research or situation analysis prior to interventions. An analysis of media projects since the 1990s by the Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA) stressed the constant need for monitoring and evaluation of projects, yet only in passing touched on the fact that many programs lack baseline data in the first place (Mosher 2009). This failure to understand the media environment and culture of recipient countries by media assistance organizations has led to the coining of the phrase (and subsequent fatigue of) “briefcase trainings,” in which international trainers fly in, produce a brief weekend workshop and fly out (Fojo 2012: 4). These one-size-fits-all approaches are efficient in that they can be repeated in any country without having to invest more time and energy into research, modification of the program or monitoring and evaluation. As can be anticipated, research such as that by the World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers (WAN-IFRA 2011: 7) has found a
“consistent mismatch between the needs…and the type of assistance they receive” in terms of media assistance in developing countries. In brief, the failure of organizations to research and develop projects suitable to a country’s specific media context has resulted in differing and often even conflicting goals and poor results of media development programs.

B. Diverse Ideas of a ‘Developed’ Media

Yet using the term ‘Western’ to describe media values is in itself an oversimplification that glosses over another criticism of foreign media involvement—the fact that each donor country has its own unique media system that it chooses to promote. Kasoma (1999: 17) summarized it best with his critique that “the French would see state-ownership and control as a basic approach to the press servicing a democratic political set-up…the British would support…one owned by a public corporation similar to the British Broadcasting Corporation…while the Americans would support only a privately owned press.” This is seen in practice by comparing the diverse support offered through media organizations, such as U.S.-based Internews’ support for privately-owned commercial radio in Afghanistan (Berger 2010: 555) versus UNESCO’s use of public service broadcasting as an indicator of media development, which Berger argues can only be satisfied with a Canadian Broadcasting style of media. These examples, it’s worth noting, are all of western democratic nations; it becomes a much more complicated picture when you add non-democratic governments from around the world and especially with the entry of China into the African media landscape.

IV. Methodology

The basis of this research is a rhetorical analysis of literature concerning journalism training programs conducted by international development organizations in South Sudan since the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in order to determine the values and priorities of these organizations and understand how they view the role of media and how this impacts their approach to training. A rhetorical analysis is based on the idea of rhetoric being
“writing and language with intent” (McCloskey 1994)—in this case, the intent being to persuade donors, taxpayers, even participants that the trainings are necessary and beneficial to the recipient country’s wellbeing.

A. Focus on South Sudan

After 50 years of intermittent civil war, the northern and southern regions of Sudan agreed to a CPA in 2005, which subsequently freed the south from the media suppression of the Khartoum government (Infoasaid 2012). In July of 2011, South Sudan became the world’s newest country. This transition from a government with state-controlled media to a democracy with theoretically free media meant there were few existing resources or trained journalists. Starting in 2005, this media transition created a unique situation for studying the work of international media organizations. The number of similar projects running at the same time makes an ideal set of researchable projects to compare.

B. Information Gathering

Initial online research utilized search engines in order to find international organizations that conducted media development work in South Sudan. This process was aided by a list compiled by BBC Media Action and included in their country report. Once a list was created, programs were selected based on the following criteria:

1. The project must have taken place in the Republic of South Sudan, or in the area currently recognized as South Sudan, since the signing of the CPA in 2005.
2. The project must have been conducted by a ‘Western’ development organization. In this instance, ‘Western’ is used not necessarily geographically, but in terms of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries, which are primarily based in the Western hemisphere (OECD); as such, this includes development involvement from Japan.
3. The project must be focused on capacity building of South Sudanese journalists of any medium.
The seven selected projects were conducted by BBC Media Action, Fondation Hirondelle, Internews, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Media Diversity Institute, and two from UNESCO. Details of these projects can be found in the appendix. Once these projects were selected, the researcher utilized web searches and email correspondence to collect documents such as press releases, project reports, training curriculum, project outlines, and transcripts of speeches related to projects and originating from the organizations themselves to a larger audience.

Following close readings, these documents were entered into NVIVO10 software and analyzed, using the Word Frequency Query to create a list of repeated words, which were then narrowed down to only words that dealt with media values and media development outcomes, as seen in Table 2; then using Text Search Query in order to determine how these words were used in context. This then allowed a rhetorical analysis of the use and understanding of these words in the texts, as well as a problematizing of which words were most utilized by individual organizations, and which words were surprisingly absent.

V. Analysis

Several recurring themes became immediately obvious when analyzing the texts. Perhaps the most interesting finding is the questionable division between media development—development of the media presumably for the media’s sake and media for development—development of the media to achieve other development goals. The highest occurrence of a media development value word (47 times for free) is still significantly less than the lowest occurrence of a media for development value word (57 times for democracy), revealing that on average, more emphasis is put on media for development goals than media development goals. Another finding is frequent use of certain buzzwords in the text without any discourse on what those words actually mean or how they relate to the projects. As such, this research also found discrepancies in how those words are interpreted by different organizations.
A. Media Development

1. Journalist Capacity Building

Fondation Hirondelle, UNESCO and Internews had the greatest presence of journalistic skill goals in their literature, including story development, editorial/technical content creation, reporting, production, management and understanding the role of community journalists. However, this was not the case for all programs. The training by Media Diversity Institute, for instance, only mentions one training topic that could be considered a hard journalistic skill—using visuals in stories—in their literature, choosing instead to focus on ethical and developmental topics. Even if journalistic capacity building did form a larger part of the projects themselves, its absence in the literature across the programs implies that it is a secondary priority to the larger ideals and values desired by the media development organizations.

2. Journalist Values

Journalist values in the West, as described by Hanitzsch (2011) include an emphasis on journalists as detached gatekeepers and watchdogs, objectively reporting accurate and balanced information to the public. Such a mentality was prevalent throughout the literature analyzed here. However, many of these words, while frequently repeated, were usually missing any sort of explanation of their inclusion in the curriculum, how they were to be taught in the training and how to measure trainees’ understanding or attainment of them—in short, they seemed to serve merely as ‘buzzwords,’ meant to sound desirable to the audience without any deeper elaboration.

One such buzzword is ‘accuracy.’ In journalistic terms, accuracy simply refers to correctly and precisely stating known information. Variations on the word accuracy appeared 15 times across all organizations, and related words such as reliable, credible and variations on trustworthy appeared a combined 31 times. Another value present in the ‘detached watchdog’ style of journalism is the idea of balanced reporting, meaning that all sides of a story are told in order to avoid favoring just one view. All of the documents mentioned this idea, with balance being the most frequent at 8
appearances and impartial appearing in the all program documents except UNESCO’s.

Appearing more than any other journalism value word, free was mentioned in relation to media 47 times in the texts, trailed only by independent, with 30 appearances. The majority of these appearances were to reinforce the importance of free and independent media rather than to explain it. Fondation Hirondelle declares that “the role of independent media is crucial,” (2011a), while UNESCO states that “the development of a free, diverse and professional media…are critical to promoting good governance and democracy…” (UNESCO 2013: 16). This emphasis on the value of free and independent media and the assumption that there is one universal and ubiquitously understood definition of it was repeated by all organizations except Media Diversity Institute.

Though these words appear in almost every organization’s texts, none attempt to provide explanations of what precisely constitutes a free or independent media, or how that might be realized in the context of South Sudan. The one exception is perhaps Fondation Hirondelle’s staunch assertion that “radio and television stations, which in these cases are nearly always instruments of the state, are not legitimate” due to their being “known to be controlled by the government” (Fondation Hirondelle 2011a). A similar mentality is seen in questionnaires from Internews journalism trainees, one of which stated that “an independent media is free from interference of government interest…” (Internews 2011: 81). The perspectives of Fondation Hirondelle and Internews appear to create a dichotomy with free and independent media on one end, and government-involved media on the other.

This is in sharp contrast to JICA’s approach, which worked directly with the South Sudanese Ministry of Information and Broadcasting to support their transition to a public service broadcaster. Without specifying how this process will take place and how much power the Ministry will have, JICA nevertheless declares that “the important role Public Broadcasting to play [sic] in this young democracy cannot
be overemphasized,” as it is “the provider of accurate information in time at the most needed moment [sic]” (Akamatsu 2012). Public Service Broadcasting is mentioned three times in JICA texts and once in BBC texts. Despite the dichotomy suggested by Fondation Hirondelle and Internews, JICA also uses *independent* in their text, as a JICA representative pledges support to South Sudanese television in order to help it “become an independent media house that will contribute in the growth of this society” (Wudu 2012).

Predictably, the two organizations that mention and lend support to a public broadcasting system are those that come from countries with public broadcasting services in place. BBC Media Action is a branch of the public service British Broadcasting Corporation, which is paid by licensing fees in the United Kingdom (although BBC Media Action itself is funded by grants and contributions, primarily from the Department for International Development). Japan also has one of the world’s largest public broadcasting services, NHK (McKinsey and Company 2004); Fondation Hirondelle is based out of Switzerland, which also uses licensing fees to fund the Swiss Broadcasting Corporation. Though the foundation spoke out against government involvement in media, there was no mention of what sort of media system would avoid this or mention of the transition to public service broadcasting.

Any discussion on the concepts of *free* and *independent* media would still skirt the obvious contradiction that comes of having these trainings and projects funded by foreign international aid organizations, which—as seen below—are promoting their own development agendas within the country. It’s curious that Fondation Hirondelle would harp on the illegitimacy of media run by the government, when that was precisely their relationship with Radio Miraya.

Much can also be learned from which words do not appear. In Internews’ research on media perceptions in South Sudan, the research highlighted that the countries’ radio stations were “highly valued by their communities as important sources of news, information, culture
and *entertainment*” (emphasis added) (Internews 2011: 11). This is supported by the results of the questionnaires, which found that 70.4 per cent of respondents said that entertainment was “very important” to them (Internews 2011: 40).

Yet outside of this single report by Internews, the word entertainment doesn’t appear in any of the texts, even though Fondation Hirondelle, BBC Media Action and JICA all have projects involving radio stations, which have the potential to entertain as well as educate. It raises the question of whether these NGO-supported radio programs provide entertainment-focused programs, and if they do, why they choose not to highlight this aspect in their literature. Perhaps these organizations would rather focus exclusively on the developmental aspects of their work, assuming their audience—existing and potential donors—would disapprove of funds being spent on entertainment purposes.

**B. Media for Development**

Every organization listed a contribution to democracy as a desired outcome of their media development project, with Internews’ 29 mentions being the most frequent of the organizations. JICA cites their project’s ability to “provide the people with accurate information in a rapid manner, upon which the proper function of democracy is dependent” (emphasis added). Similarly, BBC stresses the “democratic role of the media in helping people follow the political issues” (emphasis added) (BBC World Service Trust 2011). Another function is the *watchdog* function of journalism. The BBC describes the media as a “means to check government decisions and spending” (BBC 2012a: 14), as well as having a section in its report focusing on South Sudan’s media struggles with their “fourth estate role.” Finally, the *giving voice/empowering* function of journalism is described by BBC Media Action, Internews, and JICA. Internews explains that their radio station project “gives voice to rural people, minorities, women, the marginalized, and the poor and thus potentially represents a democratizing force” (Internews 2011: 8).
This approach not only assumes that the reader is already familiar and agrees with media’s positive contribution to democracy, but more importantly assumes that there is a proven contribution to democracy, which research has shown is not the case. For short press releases, this oversight can be excused on the basis of not having the space for a full discussion; but longer reports, such as those by Internews, BBC Media Action and UNESCO, have space for such a discussion or at least a brief explanation. Following the idea that these reports serve largely as public relations or marketing texts for donors, however, it would be in the interest of the organization to have the reader believe that the project is guaranteed to positively contribute to democracy.

2. Peacebuilding

Given South Sudan’s long and violent road to independence and the domestic challenges it has faced since achieving independence, it’s unsurprising that another development buzzword for media is peace. Variations on the word peace appeared in all organizations’ literature except JICA and MDI, for a total of 68 times. Radio Miraya even uses the title “peacekeeping radio station,” though the title is self-assigned with no further explanation. Similarly, BBC Media Action (2012a: 3) asks the reader to “consider the role of communication in peacebuilding: media and communication have huge potential to support a peaceful transition to self-governance,” a redundancy which seems only to assure the reader that BBC Media Action has not really considered the role in much depth themselves.

Peacekeeping attributes in the literature focus on raising awareness and promoting dialogue and understanding between different peoples both between Sudan and South Sudan as well as within South Sudan. Though JICA does not directly use the word peace, its literature discusses media’s ability to “boost the mutual cooperation between the two countries” as well as having “a great role in post-conflict countries like South Sudan in restoring its stability and dignity” (Wudu 2012). Like with democracy, the promotion of media as peacebuilding makes clear the media for development agenda used by these organizations—they view the media as a tool which can be used to encourage their goals for the nation.
VI. Conclusion

In summation, the following themes were revealed in the analysis of the selected journalism training programs:

- The most frequently promoted journalism value words were *free* and *independent*, which are associated with Western ideas of media and its role in a democracy; however, these words were rarely dissected in text and appeared to have contradictory definitions and implications for different organizations, as seen through Fondation Hirondelle’s stated mistrust of media with ties to the government and JICA’s explicit promotion of government-supported public service broadcasting.

- Other journalism value words include *accuracy* and *balance*, yet, similar to *free* and *independent*, these words were rarely defined and seemed to function more as positive buzzwords to garner donor support; entertain, despite Internews’ report on it being a popular reason to listen to radio, was not mentioned by any other organization, presumably in lieu of more ‘development’-associated values.

- Though all of these journalism training programs were marketed as ‘media development,’ the literature concerning them tended to focus less on journalists’ capabilities and more on their media for development outcomes—in particular, the assumed (though not empirically supported) contributions to democracy, development and peacebuilding.

The implications of this and similar research go beyond what can be addressed through quick fixes. One could argue that, on a practical level, individual media development organizations can prioritize understanding the media environment and journalism trainees’ needs prior to trainings to avoid accusations of a modernization paradigm and soft power attempts. Such information would allow these organizations to tailor their media development approaches and analyze their own stated objectives—for instance, prioritizing *entertainment* content that can potentially develop a stronger audience base, rather than focusing exclusively on *development* content. Donors could also demand more accurate and explanatory
literature concerning these programs, rather than accepting promising buzzwords without specific, practical plans and supporting research.

But this approach fails to address the larger, ideological issues highlighted by this research. At the core of the issue is a question of the ethics of promoting one’s own media system—however altruistic the intent—in a foreign environment where it might not be suitable, in lieu of a different system that may not completely align with the intervening organizations’ ideology.

Addressing the issues raised in this research would require that the international media development community ask itself some crucial questions concerning their roles and their priorities—namely, if they exist exclusively as a development tool, per media for development and the modernization paradigm; or if their priority is to support and enable media in developing countries first. In the case of the former, the media development sector seems on track, but should adjust their objectives to reflect this; in the case of the latter, these organizations would need to shift their priorities to better understand and work within the established media system, and support the existing media needs without prioritizing Western development objectives above things like basic skills training. This question of foreign ideology will also need to be looked at with the increasing involvement of China and other non-Western donors in African media development.

The ethical questions facing media development are not very different from those faced by the larger international development sector as a whole. Though media development superficially appears to be more value-neutral than other sectors, in reality it is just as steeped in the modernization paradigm and promotion of one culture’s values over another’s. The issues of values and priorities in trainings presented here can only be addressed by a deeper discussion within the media development community of precisely what entails ethical development and how best to achieve it while valuing the populations they aim to support.
### VII. Appendix

#### I. Table 1: Selected Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization (Originating Country)</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Media Focus</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Funders/Partners</th>
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<tr>
<td>BBC Media Action (UK)</td>
<td>Voice and Participation</td>
<td>community radio</td>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td>Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>Fondation Hirondelle (Switzerland)</td>
<td>Radio Miraya</td>
<td>radio</td>
<td>2006-2014</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)</td>
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<td>Internews (USA)</td>
<td>Radio for Peace, Democracy and Development</td>
<td>community radio</td>
<td>2006-2011</td>
<td>USAID; Mercy Corps’ Localizing Institutional Capacity in Sudan (LINCS)</td>
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<td>Capacity Building of the UJOSS</td>
<td>multi-platform</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>UJOSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO (United Nations)</td>
<td>Joint Media Elections Trainings</td>
<td>multi-platform</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>International Media Support (IMS); UNIFEM (now UN Women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JICA (Japan)</td>
<td>Project for Institutional Capacity Development of South Sudan TV and Radio</td>
<td>TV/radio</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>JICA; South Sudan Ministry of Information and Broadcasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Diversity Institute (UK)</td>
<td>The People’s Voice</td>
<td>newspaper</td>
<td>24 Nov - 3 Dec 2010</td>
<td>UJOSS; Integrity; European Commission Delegation Khartoum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. **BBC Media Action**

BBC Media Action is the charity branch of the British Broadcasting Corporation with the mission to “inform, connect and empower people around the world.” (BBC Media Action 2014). The analysis of their work here focuses on their capacity building program Voice and Participation, which trained more than 200 journalists from rural radio stations in 2010 to 2011 utilizing classroom-based learning and on-the-job training and mentoring, funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2. **Fondation Hirondelle**

The Swiss-based Fondation Hirondelle and the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) created Radio Miraya in southern Sudan in 2006 and oversaw its operation until 2014. The foundation provided in-house training for around 100 journalists, technicians and managers in various aspects of journalism, the most heavily documented of which was the training in preparation for the January, 2011 independence referendum. Fondation Hirondelle states that one of its distinguishing features is its journalists’ roots and subsequent prioritization of journalism development above all else.

3. **Internews**

Internews’ South Sudanese community radio project, funded by USAID and a sub-grant from the Mercy Corps’ Localizing Institutional Capacity in Sudan (LINCS), created, funds and supports five local language radio stations in rural areas, capable of reaching an estimated 1.7 million listeners. The stations “promote democratic culture, champion inclusion and cultural diversity and have advocated for the rights of women and girls” (Internews 2011: 6). Community members were trained as radio journalists on topics such as story development, program design, editorial and technical content, management, and the role of community journalists.

4. **UNESCO**

UNESCO has been involved in two of the main journalism training projects in South Sudan: the Joint Media Elections Training in 2009 with International Media Support and UNIFEM (now UN
Women), and the Capacity Building of the Union of Journalists of South Sudan (CBUJOSS) in 2012. The Joint Media Elections Training (JMET) involved two weeks of classroom training and three weeks of mentoring exercises on election coverage for twelve journalists across Sudan and South Sudan prior to independence (UNESCO 2013: 29); CBUJOSS focused on journalism skills and involved the Training of Trainers in 10 states, who would then train their colleagues in private, public and community media for an anticipated reach of 200 total South Sudanese journalists.

5. JICA
The Project for Institutional Capacity Development of South Sudan TV and Radio, led by the Japan International Cooperation Agency, is a $6 million USD, multi-faceted approach to supporting TV and radio in South Sudan, of which just one aspect is technical capacity building and training of journalists. The project, initiated in 2012, is in partnership with the South Sudan Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and focuses on improving the state media system.

6. Media Diversity Institute
As the name implies, Media Diversity Institute focuses on using media to “help foster tolerance and understanding between different groups and cultures” (Media Diversity Institute 2013). MDI partnered with the Union of Journalists of South Sudan for a 10-day training of 16 journalists from around South Sudan on topics such as ethics, censorship, story gathering, working with excluded groups, using visuals in stories and safety and security. Their journalism training was part of a larger 18-month project, The People’s Voice, which created 15 monthly supplements that appeared in South Sudanese newspapers.
II. Tables

Table 2: ‘Media Development’ Word Frequency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>BBC Media Action</th>
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The table shows the word frequency for different organisations and media development value words.
Table 3: ‘Media for Development’ Word Frequency

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<th>Organisation</th>
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References


sites/infoasaid.org/files/Sudan%20media%20and%20telecoms%20landscape%20guide%2023.02.11%20edit.pdf


**Endnotes**

1. This research was conducted under the supervision of Dr. Martin Scott at the University of East Anglia.
Nation branding through sport has become an important technique for smaller countries to project themselves on the world stage. As “sports diplomacy” continues to gain significance, efforts to maximize the potential of sporting events and particularly sport media coverage will likely be at the center of many smaller countries’ nation branding strategies (Pigman and Rofé 2014; Szondi, 2008). Many small Gulf countries in particular have been racing to host and associate their countries’ names with globally prestigious sports events. The import of these goals means that the politics of presence or absence, as played out in the realm of sports sponsorship, have wider implications. Globally mass mediated sport is a site where nation-branding efforts are both constructed and negotiated. These efforts act as important factors in associating sport, tourism and diplomacy.

Prestigious sporting events such as the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup are regarded as branding platforms with high demand and with high symbolic value (Nauright, 2013: 23). Hosting prestigious global and regional sporting events will undoubtedly be decisive in branding small Gulf governments and making them visible on the world map. And while some experts and analysts regard organizing mega-sporting events as a loss of substantial financial resources, this chapter argues that investing in sports contributes to the enhancement of global position and visibility. This is potentially useful for offering a more nuanced image of these countries and for diversifying the economy. This helps to answer the question of why these countries would financially guarantee the capital investment
to host these mega-sporting events without securing a return of investment.

National governments in the Gulf have been integrating branding programs and strategies in their governmental and semi-governmental bodies. Their ambitious efforts are to make branding not an integrated marketing communication campaign, but rather a component of national and governmental policies for economic development (Anholt, 2008: 23). Some countries, for example the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain, have considered sports as a development issue. These policy commitments are in line with the political leaders’ visions and agendas for developing their countries. They are also motivated by the urgency of diversifying the resources of sustainable post-oil economies. The focus of their long-term investments is to develop a competitive advantage, including sustainable economic growth and societal high-impact development, for which sports events provide valuable showcasing opportunities (Koren, and Tenreyro, 2010).

Some Gulf States have been investing multi-billion dollar budgets to build an image of affluence and elitism connected to elite sports events (Higham and Hinch, 2009: 255). They have also come up with big ideas in branding their places, as shall be discussed on a case-by-case basis below (The Economist, 2008). Gulf countries are joining the “branding bandwagon” and using sports sponsorships to appeal to youthful audiences around the world. UAE and Qatar, for example, are beginning to develop a state-of-the art infrastructure to facilitate sports-based branding efforts.

Gulf countries have also been exploring new ways to refine branding strategies and tactics in line with their own needs. Political leaders and policymakers have risked billions of dollars in investments in order to position their countries for the global exposure that sports sponsorships can bring. Sports sponsorship, such as in Fly Emirates advertising on Arsenal football club’s kit, is used as a communication strategy to achieve branding objectives, to create awareness through exposure, and to generate goodwill vis-à-vis the nation. Nations use
sports sponsorship to improve their reputations among international organizations like Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA) by investing in the long-term growth of the sports. Research has shown that such sponsorship creates brand association in the minds of the target audiences by linking the brand to the sponsored activity (Meenaghan, 1991).

High-profile sponsorships have offered the Gulf countries a global media presence. The burgeoning conventional wisdom is that sponsoring prestigious sports events, clubs and athletes is not a luxury option for Gulf countries, but a strategic branding decision. These branding efforts are supported by the highest ranks of the political leadership, and global sports sponsorship is a key component of national development strategies because it provides a global platform to communicate with audiences worldwide (Barez, 2007: Santomier, 2008: Nauright, 2013).

This chapter aims to provide an understanding of the use of sports in nation branding in the Gulf region. It argues that these investments are long-term oriented and aim to both showcase the country and diversify the economy. Hence, they seek to combine nation branding with national development through sports diplomacy. The chapter includes case studies of Bahrain, UAE and Qatar, before concluding with a discussion of some of the lessons from these examples.

Nation Branding in Three Small Gulf States

Bahrain

More than a decade ago, the Bahrain Government acknowledged the value of sports in nation branding and made it a cornerstone of its branding strategies (Higham and Hinch, 2009: 255). Since 2004, Bahrain has initiated a number of ambitious sporting events to elevate the country’s status. It hosted the inaugural Gulf Air Grand Prix 2004, which resulted in the FIA giving the host country the “Best Organised Grand Prix” award for the inaugural race (AMEinfo.com 2005b). In 2005, the Bahrain Grand Prix followed. Bahrain also hosted the opening Grand Prix of 2006 (AMEinfo.com 2005a). The
Bahrain Grand Prix was historically significant because it was the first Formula One Grand Prix to be held in the Arab world.

Television coverage is a major component of the strategy to exploit high-profile sports events. Martin Whitaker, chief executive officer of the Bahrain International Circuit, which host the Bahrain Grand Prix, believes that “broadcasting the most watched sports on television is a massive opportunity to promote Bahrain” for tourists and investors. This has also benefitted Bahrain TV, who became the official broadcaster of the FIA Formula One World Championship in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The 2009 FIA Formula One World Championship was broadcast live on Bahrain Television’s Satellite TV Sports Channel 1 in Arabic and Sports Channel 2 in English. Through the prestige of hosting a single round of the Formula One season, Bahrain has also associated itself with motorsport in general by become supporting its television channels to become a dominant broadcaster in the MENA region.

Over the last four years, some human rights activists have campaigned for boycotting the Formula One in Bahrain as part of the Arab Spring. In March 2011, Bahrain was to host the season-opener, when Bahraini authorities and the FIA decided to postpone and reschedule the race to later in the year, because of violent demonstrations (The Guardian, 2011). Despite more attempts by protesters, the Grand Prix returned to Bahrain in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015. This means that even international human rights organizations, which urged Formula One teams to consider boycotting the Bahrain Grand Prix, did not achieve their objectives. Top officials at F1 believed that the Grand Prix should not become a platform for political agitation.

**UAE**

To build its global profile, the UAE has started a comprehensive, long-term sport-based branding strategy. The mission of the Department of Tourism and Commerce Marketing (DTCM) is to “position Dubai as the leading tourism destination and commercial hub of the world.” The Dubai Convention Bureau is dedicated to
hosting national and international events to promote the Emirate as a business tourism destination (DTCM website). One of the long-term objectives of the DTCM’s strategy is to attract sport-related events, congresses, tournaments and exhibitions. Hamad Bin Mejren, DTCM’s Executive Director of Business Tourism, said that sporting events have a direct impact on the local economy.

The UAE has hosted globally-recognized sporting events, including the Red Bull Air Race, Formula 1 Etihad Airways and Abu Dhabi Grand Prix. In 1993, the Dubai Duty Free Tennis Championships was launched to build international awareness of the destination. The country also hosted the Abu Dhabi World Tennis Championship, the Abu Dhabi Golf Championship, the Al Ain Aerobatic Show, Abu Dhabi International Triathlon, Dubai Desert Classic, Rugby Sevens and the Dubai World Cup horse race.

To coordinate and integrate these sporting events and efforts, the Abu Dhabi Sports Council (ADSC) was established in 2006 (Abu Dhabi Gov, 2011). It arranged the 2007 Abu Dhabi F1 Festival, during which an unprecedented free Formula One event took place. It then negotiated the contract for an annual Abu Dhabi Grand Prix. The first race took place in 2009 at the Yas Marina Circuit, a state-of-the-art motor racing venue built between 2007 and 2009. These world-class events are essential in guaranteeing high visibility and building awareness because of the large viewership; for example, the Abu Dhabi Golf Championship has a combined viewership of more than 400 million (Travelweekly, 2011).

The continuous global resonance of the UAE through sports coverage has translated into world-class status as a tourist destination. At the World Travel Awards 2010 Grand Final, Abu Dhabi’s Tourism Authority (ADTA) was recognized as the “World’s Leading Tourist Board,” its airline Etihad Airways won the “World’s Leading Airline,” and its Emirates Palace was selected as the “World’s Leading Meetings and Conference Hotel.” The nation branding strategy that was run under the logo “Destination of Distinction”
successfully integrated sports diplomacy with tourism, and has made the UAE a rising star in the tourism sector (Travelweekly, 2011).

Such industry recognition shows why sports events can be a fundamental component of a national policy of economic diversification. Several other components are worth noting. The first is the Dubai Sports Channel, which launched in 1998. Its mission is to be a leading sports media brand in the Arab world and to help brand Dubai as the capital of sport in the region. The channel covers a number of major sporting events with global interest such as Dubai World Cup in horseracing, Dubai Open Tennis Championship and the World Powerboat Championship (Website of Dubai Sports, 2011). In the same vein, Abu Dhabi Al Riadhia (Sports) is an Arabic television station owned by Abu Dhabi Media Company. In 2008, the channel launched its digital presence under a new brand identity and programs. It had the right to broadcast Formula 1 until 2012.

In 1985, the government of Dubai founded Emirates, the national airline of Dubai. Emirates started as a small company and quickly entered onto the regional travel scene. Now, Emirates has grown in scale and stature to compete with a number of international carriers (Official website of Emirates). Emirates has become a significant actor in football sponsorship. Emirates was an official FIFA Partner from 2007 to 2014, and has signed sponsorship deals with a number of European clubs, including Paris St Germain in France, Hamburg in Germany, Arsenal in England and AC Milan in Italy. The most recent sponsorship agreement will grant Emirates unique branding opportunities by becoming a partner and official airline to Spanish club Real Madrid (Gulfnews.com, 2011).

Senior officials at Emirates consider sponsorship as an essential component of the company’s marketing strategy. For them, it is a convenient platform to connect with customers and build a strong and lasting relationship (Emirates.com, 2015). This strategic sponsorship has placed Emirates in the spotlight at every FIFA sport event. The presence of the Emirates’ crew at the FIFA World Cup
finals medal ceremonies has associated the company with winners and champions.

Sponsorship programs are not limited to Football, but include Rugby Union, Yacht Racing, Power Boat Racing, Golf, Cricket, Horse Racing and Tennis (Emirates Sponsorship, 2011). According to the Chairman of Emirates, Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al-Maktoum, sports sponsorship is a vital component in the company’s integrated marketing communication strategy. For him, sport sponsorships represent one of the smartest and best approaches to connect with prospective consumers and clients (Emirates Sponsorship, 2011).

Another national carrier, Etihad, has followed suit. Etihad claims that the company’s vision and mission is to “associate with a large number of events and causes that reflect” its position as “a catalyst for change” (Etihad website, 2011). Etihad “supports the promotion of local culture in the UAE and worldwide” by sponsoring “sporting events that are consistent with” mission, vision and values (Etihad website, 2011). In 2009, Etihad sponsored the Melbourne Stadium to be renamed Etihad (Etihad website, 2011). The same sponsorship policy that yielded success in Australia was adopted and applied in England. Etihad signed a sponsorship agreement of 10 years with Manchester City to rename the City of Manchester Stadium to Etihad Stadium (BBC.com, 2011). These examples demonstrate that major corporations can use their brands to support national goals and strategies.

Qatar

Gulf countries initiate nation-branding programs for a variety of reasons. In the case of Qatar, senior officials there regard sports as one of the most important components of its nation branding strategy (Peterson, 2006: 747). Qatar has placed nation branding high on the political agenda, projecting its posture to the rest of the world in an effort to attract investment, business, tourism and qualified talent. It has been keen to host a number of large-scale regional and global sports events. As a part of this approach, Qatar had already initiated its modern sporting reputation by hosting the 15th Asian Games.
(Asiad) in 2006, an Olympic-style event (Rhys, 2010). Another opportunity to brand the country was the Qatar Masters, an official part of the European and Asian Professional Golfers’ Association (PGA) circuits since 1998.

The world’s attention has recently focused on Qatar’s successful bid to host the FIFA World Cup in 2022. Qatar is the smallest nation ever to host the World Cup and won out over Australia, South Korea and Japan; it also defeated the United States in the final round of voting. Hosting the World Cup guarantees widespread media coverage and has helped place Qatar on the map as a world-class sporting venue with major events, sport sponsorships and state-of-the-art stadiums (Kamrava, 2013). These landmark events also spur Qatar’s modernization processes, as many infrastructural reforms are necessary in preparation for World Cup.

With Qatar hosting the World Cup in 2022, its sports diplomacy seems to have reached its apex. Qatar is planning to brand itself by impressing football fans worldwide in the way the World Cup is staged. Qatar has a generous budget of about $100 billion for the construction of new infrastructure such as an airport, seaport, road and rail links (Morisonmenon.com 2011; Futurebrand, 2009). Qatar will spend four billion U.S. dollars to build nine new stadiums and renovate three others. The stadiums will be air-conditioned for the players and spectators.

Qatar’s rising profile has undoubtedly been helped by its Al Jazeera satellite TV network. Al Jazeera Sports is a popular Arabic-language sports channel launched in November 2003 and was the first sports channel originating from Qatar. It has broadcast events held in Qatar such as the 2006 Asian Games. In 2009, Al Jazeera Sports acquired ART sports channels, including all sports rights held by the channel.

In 2008, Al Jazeera Sports won the rights for the UEFA Champions League for three seasons starting from 2009-10. The Spanish football league, one of the most popular sporting leagues globally, can be
seen worldwide, and features big clubs such as Barcelona and Real Madrid. In 2013, Al Jazeera Sports was rebranded as beIN Sports. According to Nasser Al-Khelaifi, the director of Al Jazeera Sports, the name “symbolises the mind of two channels aiming at bringing live and exclusive broadcasting of the biggest events” (Al Arabiya Network, 2011).

As with Bahrain and the UAE, sponsorship has become an increasingly important part of the sports industry. Sponsorship is heavy in football and brands are looking for popular sports and famous clubs. The Qatar Foundation has opted to sponsor the most famous club in the world, sealing a five-year shirt sponsorship deal with Barcelona, which receives 40 million U.S. dollars per season from 2011-12 (Arabian Business.com, 2011). In 2011, Qatar Sports Investments (QSI) acquired 70 percent stake in the French club Paris St Germain (PSG) (Al Arabiya Network, 2011).

According to The Economist, Qatar has firmly put its foot on the map of international diplomacy through such sponsorships efforts (The Economist, 2008). Mohamed bin Hammam, the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) President, noted: “Qatar desires to become a major sporting center” (AMEinfo, 2009). Qatar has managed to transform itself from a small peripheral Gulf country to an advocate for peace in the region and supporter for a democratic agenda in the Arab world. Qatar was, for example, a leading advocate of the Arab Spring (Coates, 2011). The Qatari approach to nation branding seems to be comprehensive, because it is conducted on political, economic, cultural and sporting fronts (Peterson, 2006: 748). Even security issues are part of this integrated approach. In 2011, Qatar organized the first international conference of sports security (Al-Jazeera, 2011).

As an essential part of its marketing strategy, Qatar Airways supports global initiatives to expand its visibility. Anthony Ryman observed that the Qatari government’s branding nation initiatives have been effective at delivering a unique positioning and differentiation that is credible (Ryman. 2007). In his study on
coverage and perceptions of Qatar in major world newspapers, John King concluded “Qatar’s effort to make its mark on the world’s radar screen has had some success” (King, 2008). One of the long-term goals of the branding is the subtle accumulation of soft assets that can be wielded in Middle Eastern politics (Kotler and Gertner, 2002).

**Conclusion**

When it comes to nation branding, the three Gulf countries studied here have achieved remarkable success in a short space of time. The hosting of sports events has enhanced the profile of many Gulf cities. Mega-sporting events have made contributions to the economic and urban development of the countries, and the three countries in question have shown themselves to be competent in arranging, hosting, sponsoring and broadcasting these events. But while the nation branding strategies would appear to yield positive outcomes, it remains a challenge to measure the return on investment on a global scale. The sponsors have certainly achieved higher awareness ratings. For example, according to a recent study, Emirates’ sponsorship of Arsenal FC is the most recognized amongst sports fans in the UK (Repucom, 2013). But this does not guarantee national development for Gulf countries, and may in fact represent money that could have been invested more wisely leave the country.

However, UAE and Qatar have managed to position themselves as forward-looking countries with a bright future through their brands. The favorability, strength, and uniqueness of their brand image permits cities such as Dubai and Doha to be strategically differentiated and positioned in the individual and collective minds of global audiences. According to recent research, Dubai is now the primary tourist destination in the Arab region. Dubai has become the fifth most highly-ranked destination city in the world and is ranked third globally in terms of growth in visitor spending (Hedrick-Wong and Choong, 2014). Nation branding has in this sense transformed certain aspects of these countries. The significance of these events in attracting global tourism and business is considerable, yet organizing these mega sporting events as the backbone of rapid economic
development involves a wide range of complexities (Nauright, 2014).

There have been challenges. European media covered, for example, the harsh working conditions of the migrant workers involved in the construction of Qatari stadia for the FIFA World Cup. This extensive media coverage negatively affected Qatar’s image. In response to worldwide criticism, Qatari officials improved the salaries of migrant workers and their social conditions. Qatar’s determination to host the World Cup was so strong that it was willing to change its labor legislation, which points to the transformative and development potential of sports diplomacy as a branding strategy.

To achieve higher brand awareness worldwide, Emirates, Etihad and Qatar adopted sports sponsorships as corporate communication instruments. As a national development strategy, nation branding can be understood as an ideology of economic modernization. In that regard, nation branding is conceived as a mechanism to assert an aspirational project throughout the Gulf region. Nation branding is synchronized with the UAE Vision 2021, Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030 and Qatar National Vision 2030 that emphasize sustainable regional economic development. The three countries have integrated strategic branding efforts into their national economic visions.

The current leadership appears fully aware that national prosperity in the twenty-first century is not just created by a country’s natural resources. Competition amongst the Gulf countries has led to an increase in the funding of mega sport events as a means asserting a differentiated brand. According to the World Economic Forum 2013, the economies of Qatar and UAE are now amongst the top 20 most competitive in the world (The Global Competitiveness Index, 2015: 12). Sports branding is not a guarantee of success, but there are signs that it is achieving positive results for these three small Gulf countries.
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**Endnotes**

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Public and Private Partnerships in U.S. Global Health Diplomacy Policy

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Introduction

The 2015 deadline for attaining the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is quickly approaching. Among the MDGs, public health issues are given high priority and three of the eight MDGs are directly related to public health, including HIV/AIDS prevention, maternal health, and infant mortality. Based on the progress chart prepared by the UN in 2013, while some of the eight goals had been achieved or were close to being achieved, there was still a need for improvement to reach most of the goals, and in some cases the conditions had even deteriorated (United Nations 2013). At the same time, the UN is working with a reduced budget despite the increasing costs of the global challenges it is expected to address (United Nations 2015).

Fortunately, there has been a rise in private-sector philanthropy over the past decade to counterbalance the decline in UN resources. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, for example, reported that its financial contributions for global health and development in 2012 totaled nearly US$2.5 billion—just under half of the UN’s total annual budget for all global health programs (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 2013).
In fact, although official development assistance from government to government is often the focus of development discussions, the growing involvement of private organizations in providing development assistance has become an indispensable part of the efforts toward meeting the MDGs. The impact of the private sector in promoting development worldwide and on developing countries themselves has been remarkable.

U.S. private philanthropy and private capital flows represent the vast majority of U.S. economic engagement with developing countries in recent years, making private funds a key factor in the country’s development efforts (Hudson Institute 2014). In fact, private capital flows from the United States, including philanthropic financial contributions, constituted 89 percent of U.S. total net economic engagement with developing countries in 2013 (Hudson Institute 2014). To leverage those resources, the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have implemented public-private partnerships (PPPs) to help tackle global development issues such as HIV/AIDS prevention. This chapter will focus on PPPs, and specifically on the roles played by non-state actors in the context of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), including a literature review on PPPs.

**Literature Review on Global Health and Public Diplomacy**

In the field of global governance for international cooperation, Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff note that partnership between the private and public sectors brings various benefits by creating synergy and utilizing the comparative advantages of the various actors involved in tackling national and international issues (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011). Salamon (2006), reflecting on governance and civil society, argues that collaboration among nonprofit organizations (NPOs), businesses, and governments is indispensable for tackling global issues. As far as implementation of social policies is concerned, Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff assert that reciprocal and vertical networks among various actors, including government and civil society, are very effective (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2001). Similarly, Rondinelli and Cheema (1983) have
noted that decentralization and inter-organizational relationships are indispensable for implementing policies. Indeed, Noguchi and Koike (2006), in their study of Japanese governance reform, concluded that collaboration between the government and nongovernmental/nonprofit organizations (NGOs/NPOs), such as philanthropic organizations, is crucial for implementing public policies. Benedicte Bull and Desmond McNeil (2007), however, found that the outcome of PPPs will differ depending on the international development issues that a given PPP seeks to address.

In practical terms, public-private collaboration is not a recent phenomenon in implementing international development policy. Even Japan, in the prewar period and the Occupation era, was the recipient of international assistance from various private philanthropic organizations, especially the Rockefeller Foundation, which collaborated with the Japanese government and Occupation forces to promote public health development (Noguchi and Koike 2006). In addition to influencing public health development in recipient countries, philanthropic organizations such as the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations have influenced U.S. foreign policymaking (Coombs 1964). Based on a study of the foundations’ international activities, Roelofs concludes that these institutions exert a major influence on policy in an invisible and inconspicuous manner, and do not try to show their ideology overtly in their activities (Roelofs 1983). Berman also asserts that the interests of the United States have developed where foundation programs and interests have been active, and that foundations were actively operating as a part of the ruling class, using their programs from 1945 to 1960 to achieve such U.S.-promoted goals as the spread of capitalist culture (Berman 1983). However, he does not mention that states and foundations were collaborators in tackling international problems. In their governance study, Hooghe and Marks (2012) note that there are two types of “multi-level governance”: (1) general-purpose jurisdiction and (2) task-specific jurisdiction. Although PPPs can be found in the former type of governance, they are more common in the latter type of governance, particularly in the international arena (Hooghe and Markers 2012).
There is a consensus that private organizations are among the actors involved in public diplomacy (Nye 2004). Indeed, Parmar (2012) claims that during the Cold War, as the U.S. government implemented its foreign policy for containing communism, networks were formed among the three major philanthropic foundations—Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller—and that even now these foundations, joined by a newcomer, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, are carrying out programs similar to those of the American government. Currently, public health development assistance serves as the basis for health diplomacy, in which a donor country collaborates with the private sector—including philanthropy—to deliver primary healthcare, such as activities to eradicate HIV/AIDS and malaria among citizens in developing countries. Kickbusch (2009), one of the scholars who has studied this type of health diplomacy, points to the importance of the intergovernmental process of the World Health Organization (WHO), as well as global health diplomacy. He supports a governance framework that stimulates PPPs in health diplomacy policy, much in the way that the Gates Foundation has done, working with the United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and establishing public-private agreements with USAID and UNITAID (PEPFAR 2012).

Youde (2012) points out three dimensions of the role played by private actors. First, private actors are able to provide recipient countries choices in terms of the types of programs they would like to implement. Secondly, private actors can focus on neglected diseases in global health and on pharmaceutical needs that are not being met by the companies in that industry. Third, and perhaps most important, is private actors’ ability to innovate in a way that other actors cannot. Private actors have been creating partnerships with government to fill gaps that other sectors are unable to fill. Youde (2012) concludes that these roles of private actors do not imply the privatization of international health, but rather that these private actors play an “additive” role in international health.
Davies (2010) elucidates the roles played by the private actors, donor countries, and aid recipient countries, stressing that although the roles of private actors are expanding in global health programs, donor states remain extremely influential in implementing global health policy. She uses the example of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), for which the Gates Foundation and donor states are the main funding sources (Davies 2010). Similarly, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria receives funds from governments, civil society, corporations, and private philanthropic organizations (Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 2015). These global alliances are good examples of public-private partnerships through which the donor governments are able to play a major role in global health policy.

There is also a consensus that private organizations are important actors in carrying out global health diplomacy beyond just their financial role. Following the Second World War, the Rockefeller Foundation collaborated with the Japanese government and Occupation forces to promote public health development (Noguchi 2014). Recently, donor country collaboration with major private foundations to eradicate HIV/AIDS and malaria has reached many citizens in developing countries (Moran 2014). The World Health Organization (WHO) (2015) has stated the importance of engaging non-state actors in international health diplomacy and global health governance, and it is in the process of establishing a framework and boundaries for involving private sector and philanthropic entities in its policymaking process.

Global health diplomacy has been utilized both for health promotion and as forms of soft power and smart power (McNinnes and Lee 2012). Players in this new public diplomacy include both state and non-state actors such as private philanthropic organizations, civil society, and NGOs (Cull 2009). On the U.S. government side, USAID and the Defense Department have been using health as a policy tool to appeal to the local people in developing countries (Bonventure, Hicks and Okutani 2009). Private actors, however, are increasingly visible in global health diplomacy as well. The
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has been devoting substantial funding to the eradication of malaria as well as other communicable diseases, and private actors have been very active in public-private partnerships implemented by PEPFAR.

The author’s current research focuses on the depth of involvement of private foundations in U.S. global health diplomacy policymaking. Although Ingenkamp and Low-Beer (2012) argue that it is an overstatement to say that the major U.S. private foundations are involved in any more than a financial capacity, the author argues that U.S. private foundations, including those established by former presidents, have been substantively involved in U.S. health diplomacy policymaking. The author will focus on the roles played by NGOs, using PEPFAR and other international health programs as a case study.

President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief

In 2003, the Bush administration launched PEPFAR, which initially targeted 15 countries mainly located in Sub-Saharan African, where HIV/AIDS, maternal health, and infant mortality issues are of grave concern: Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guyana, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. These countries were selected based on data on GDP and the prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS. Zimbabwe was not an original focus country, although it had been experiencing a high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate, but it was added in 2006. The target countries have continued to expand and as of FY2014, there are 41 countries that have received support from PEPFAR (Kaiser Permanente 2015). One key element of PEPFAR is that it reinforces the importance of PPPs.

In 2009, the Obama administration launched its own Global Health Initiative (GHI), but it maintained PEPFAR as a core component of that program. PEPFAR now operates not only in African countries, but in countries in Asia and other regions as well, and it has facilitated nearly 300 PPPs since 2006. These efforts were reinforced when the Department of State established an
Office of Global Health Diplomacy in 2012 to promote interagency coordination. The office’s stated strategic goals include protecting America’s health through global health action, assisting in technical expertise and innovation for the improvement of global health, and advancing U.S. diplomatic interests by assisting in global health (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services). That was also the year in which Secretary of State Hillary Clinton unveiled a new PEPFAR Blueprint that laid out how the government intended to help eradicate AIDS. One specific action step included in the blueprint was to “increase private sector mobilization toward an AIDS-free generation” through private sector engagement and PPPs. “The ultimate goal of each PPP,” it noted, “is to allow more people to benefit due to the additional resources—whether monetary or technical—brought to the partnership by the private sector organization. Doing so can increase efficiency, increase effectiveness and harness the comparative advantages of all partners. It can also be a tool to build capacity of local country partners” (US Department of State).

The main programs of PEPFAR are (1) Pink Ribbon Red Ribbon, founded by the George W. Bush Institute, Susan G. Komen, PEPFAR, and UNAIDS; and (2) the DREAMS project, founded by the Melinda & Bill Gates Foundation and the Nike Foundation. Pink Ribbon Red Ribbon focuses on the prevention of cervical cancer, since HIV-positive women are four to five times more likely to contract cervical cancer than are HIV-negative women. According to the former director of the Bush Institute, PEPFAR was founded not only to assist in humanitarian efforts for HIV/AIDS prevention, but also to promote diplomatic objectives in Sub-Saharan countries (interview with James Glassman, March 11, 2015). In other words, health was seen as not only bringing benefits such as the prevention of cervical cancer to people in the focus countries, but also encouraging support for U.S. foreign policy.

Pink Ribbon Red Ribbon has been implemented in Botswana, Ethiopia, Namibia, Tanzania, and Zambia since it began in 2008 (George W. Bush Presidential Center). A program officer at the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, which is a member foundation
of the program, mentioned during an interview that although the foundation usually supports the fight against communicable diseases rather than noncommunicable diseases, they decided to support the Pink Ribbon Red Ribbon project because women infected with HIV/AIDS are susceptible to cervical cancer (Interview with Tom Walsh, February 3, 2015).

The DREAMS project was launched on World AIDS Day in 2014, and the purpose of the project is to reduce the number of HIV infections among adolescent girls and young women in up to 10 high-HIV-prevalence countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Through public-private partnerships, PEPFAR, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and the Nike Foundation have been collaborating to keep girls AIDS free. Financially, PEPFAR provides $180 million for the program, the Gates Foundation gives $25 million, and the Nike Foundation has committed $5 million (“Working Together for an AIDS-Free Future for Girls”). In an interview, the program officer of the Gates Foundation noted that the U.S. government approached the organization for technical support and program assessment for the DREAMS project (Author interview with Tom Walsh).

These PEPFAR programs show the importance of PPPs and that the U.S. utilizes health as a diplomatic tool to influence Sub-Saharan countries, which are vulnerable in the area of health. To better understand how the PEPFAR-related PPPs function on an operational level, the author has examined a program for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) in Zimbabwe.

**PPPs on HIV/AIDS Prevention in Practice**

According to data compiled by Funders Concerned about AIDS on global philanthropic support to address HIV/AIDS, there were 24 U.S. philanthropic organizations that contributed more than US$300,000 each to HIV/AIDS programs overseas in 2008. The 2012 data shows that a number of new private organizations contributed 100 percent of their total HIV/AIDS disbursements to international HIV/AIDS programs. Among them, the Conrad N. Hilton Foundation, Keep a Child Alive, the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), and Zanta
International Foundation have contributed over US$1 million each (Funders Concerned About AIDS).

One key organization is the Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation (EGPAF), which contributed US$1,749,654 to overseas HIV/AIDS programs in 2010, making it the 17th largest U.S. philanthropic funder in the field that year (Funders Concerned About AIDS). Working with PEPFAR, EGPAF has been implementing a program for PMTCT in Zimbabwe since 2001, and USAID established a partnership with EGPAF under the PEPFAR Zimbabwe Family AIDS Initiative in from 2007 to 2012 (Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation). Through this project, EGPAF established partnerships with Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Health and Child Welfare at the local level. This case shows that there are two layers of partnership, namely partnerships with national entities and those with local entities. EGFAF also worked with USAID through the global Call to Action project, implemented from 2002 to 2010 under PEPFAR in African countries. The objectives of this project were to improve access to high-quality PMTCT services, to enhance technical leadership, and to document successful program models. As a result of this project, EGPAF provided nearly 4 million women with access to PMTCT (Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation). This case represents a best practice of PPPs in the area of PMTCT.

On Mother’s Day in 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton launched a new PPP initiative, the Mobile Alliance for Maternal Action (MAMA). This organization’s maternal healthcare programs use mobile phones to provide new and expectant mothers with health-related information. The initiative entails two layers of governance, global and local. MAMA has been implemented in South Africa under PEPFAR and works closely with USAID. Its global partners include USAID, Johnson & Johnson, mHealth Alliance, UN Foundation, and BabyCenter. Local partners include Cell-Life, the Wits Reproductive Health and HIV Institute, Vodacom, and the Praekelt Foundation. As explained by a MAMA program coordinator, the South African Department of Health has implemented its own
program, MumConnect, which it developed in collaboration with MAMA and the Praekelt Foundation (Media Club South Africa). MAMA, as a nonstate actor, provides policy recommendations and has been sharing information about the project among global and local partners. MAMA has also expanded its operations to implement its program in Bangladesh and India. In reply to a question regarding how MAMA selects partner countries, the authors were told that there are three selection criteria: (1) a high incidence of maternal mortality, (2) a substantial mobile phone dissemination rate, and (3) strong political will on the part of the recipient country. In these three countries, local actors have been involved in the MAMA project not only in operational roles, but in policymaking roles as well. In other words, although there are two layers of global and local governance, the various actors at both levels have been integrally involved in both the operational and policymaking roles. These two layers are not mutually exclusive, and in some instances, the global and local partnerships are blended vertically.

**Impact of Global Health Diplomacy**

The case studies above showed the effectiveness of the public-private partnerships in global health programs. In African nations, the public health priorities are the following: building and improving hospitals, preventing and treating HIV/AIDS, providing access to drinking water, providing access to prenatal care, fighting hunger, preventing and treating infectious diseases, and increasing child immunization (Pew Research Center). Among these seven issues, preventing and treating HIV/AIDS is a top priority, and countries such as Ghana have made HIV/AIDS prevention a top priority among the other issues on the government’s agenda (Pew Research Center). Most of the seven countries believe that HIV/AIDS should be the top public health issue, and Nigeria and South Africa, which were among the original 15 PEPFAR focus countries, have stated that HIV/AIDS is their top public health priority (Pew Research Center). In response to these needs, the U.S. government and private organizations have been implementing various HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programs, including PEPFAR.
The author of this paper believes that humanitarian efforts such as PEPFAR can have a direct effect on the people in recipient countries. Even in countries such as Zimbabwe, where the U.S.’s official diplomatic ties are strained, the HIV/AIDS assistance through PEPFAR can improve relations at a citizen-to-citizen level in ways that can be beneficial to national relations over the long term (U.S. Department of State 2015). HIV/AIDS prevention is an effective diplomatic tool to influence recipient countries since it shows the U.S.’s generous side. As a result of this generosity, lives are changed for the better.

Concluding Remarks
To date, this research has found that the organizations involved in recent PPPs in maternal health programs under PEPFAR, such as EGPAF, have been providing funding as well as program planning for the initiatives. In the case of MAMA, EGPAF developed the basic concept for the project. And while EGPAF and other non-state actors have been playing a tremendous financial role in global HIV/AIDS programs, their work goes well beyond the financial function as they are providing their partners with innovation for the programs. This research is ongoing, and the author will be conducting further interviews with private organizations and government agencies at the global and local levels involved in the maternal health programs of PEPFAR.

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THE INTERNATIONAL AID TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE: BETWEEN COMMUNICATION FOR DEVELOPMENT, SOFT POWER AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY?

James Pamment

The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) is an agreement establishing a common standard for the reporting of information about aid and development funding. Signatories include nations, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs) and private foundations, which together account for approximately 80 per cent of all international aid financing. IATI was initiated in 2008 under the framework of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for reducing global poverty by 2015, although it did not begin in earnest until the U.S. and several other major players joined in December, 2011.

IATI was designed to provide a common standard for publishing information, and to establish an on-line registry to hold the data. The common standard provides “universal project classifications and definitions” that record key data in a timely, comprehensive, forward-looking, structured, comparable, and open format (IATI 2011; http://iatistandard.org/201/introduction/). This includes standardized data on volumes of spending, when and where it will be paid, and how it will be used. Once published on the IATI registry, the theory is that data can be used by different actors to improve aid delivery and accountability. As of early 2015, over 300 donor organizations of different kinds have published some kind of compliant dataset (http://www.iatiregistry.org/publisher).
While the most actively publicized aspects of IATI have emphasized its benefits for development, there can be little doubt that IATI also seeks to achieve results that go beyond the availability of big data. I argue here that much of the advocacy driving the open data movement aims to develop shared behavioral norms that have only indirectly to do with developmental outcomes; rather, they are closer to the forms of influence associated with definitions of soft power and public diplomacy. As such, this chapter assumes the view that if IATI’s nuances are to be more fully appreciated, it should be understood both from a development communication perspective and a public diplomacy perspective. In this sense, IATI may be simultaneously considered communication for development, a tool for the public communication of development, and a form of collective institutional discourse about development.

**IATI as communication for, of & about development**

IATI’s mandate developed out of the MDG’s aid effectiveness and accountability debates held in successive High Level Fora in Rome 2003, Paris 2005, Accra 2008, and Busan 2011. A driving force for the initiative was the critique that developing countries lacked oversight of the funds that various countries, multilateral organizations, foundations and NGOs were investing into their economies. This disempowered developing countries in relation to their own development. IATI would provide a searchable registry of international development funding that could be updated in real-time, with information that would then be integrated into the planning of government ministries of recipient countries. However, while IATI’s explicit goals relate to the benefits of the transparent communication of aid expenditure to the development community, there are many implied goals that remain largely unstated.

The communication in support of IATI tells a simple story. IATI was established on the premise that “transparency of aid information promotes more effective partnerships, and accelerates development and poverty reduction by increasing accountability and ownership, reducing corruption, and improving service delivery” (IATI 2008). Transparent data may be anticipated to “lead to better governance,
more effective policy planning, programme implementation and accountability” (Kanani et al 2011). Therefore, IATI was premised on the belief that open data could act as a tool for development, by improving the communication of development activities to civil society, and communication about those activities among and between members of the development community.

McGee (2013, p. 113) summarizes aid transparency arguments as the “empowerment” case, which emphasizes inclusion, mutuality and partnership with recipients, and which was the primary motivation at Paris and Accra; the “democratic outcomes” case, which emphasizes the accountability of donors to domestic citizens, and has been a strong motivation for many national governments to publish their data; and the “developmental outcomes” case, which emphasizes potential improvements in the quality of aid allocation, delivery and results. It may be observed that each of the justifications proposed by the IATI Secretariat in 2011 fits within one or more of these categories. IATI’s users were positioned as:

- governments of recipient countries who need to know exactly how much aid is being spent in their country and when the money will be paid out, so that they can plan their budgets and activities accordingly [empowerment case]
- citizens who want to check whether governments are keeping their promises and hold them to account [democratic case]
- participating donors who will be able to meet their ‘access to information’ obligations and reduce their administrative costs because they will only need to publish their information once and will no longer need to respond to multiple information requests [democratic case]
- donors who want to co-ordinate their spending with that of other donors [developmental case]
- community-based organizations who want to know what resources are available and influence how they are used [democratic case]
anti-corruption activists who want to track recipient governments’ aid receipts and expenditure to find out whether money is being used properly [democratic case]

• journalists and researchers who want to investigate where aid is going and how effectively it is being spent [democratic case] (IATI 2011).

By empowering aid actors and recipients, democratizing the sector through open access to information, and providing data capable of improving decision-making, IATI represents a strong example of how the levels of communication surrounding development are mutually supportive and intertwined. Transparent data is fundamentally the production of information of aid activities, and hence represents a form of managed visibility designed to enhance democratic accountability (Thompson 2005). IATI is also justified as communication for development, on the basis that transparent communication can be a tool for development in its own right. This enables stronger partnerships, which should support more effective aid allocations. Lastly, it represents a new mode of communication between aid actors about their work, improving collective knowledge and supporting better cooperation, coordination and collective decisions. In this sense, it supports a stronger community through better communication.

However, it is perhaps in the intertwined nature of these levels that the full import of IATI’s impact is felt. Theories of accountability in aid organizations emphasize that reporting must be supplemented by organizational learning and better internal and external communication if efficiency is to improve (Ebrahim 2003, 2005). Likewise, an IATI viability study from 2009 observed, “The biggest challenges for IATI are not technical, but relate to changes in internal processes and culture” (Development Initiatives 2009). While any individual level taken on its own might simply refer to the adoption of a new working routine, IATI as a whole would appear to imply a deeper, more fundamental cultural shift within the aid community designed to leverage increased interdependence, the influence of civil society, and new technologies. As such, it fits within broader
geopolitical trends familiar to studies of diplomacy and international governance.

*IATI as soft power?*

Theorizing interdependence between different areas of international governance was integral to Nye’s earliest uses of the term “soft power.” In his seminal article from 1990, Nye outlines soft power as a means of transposing power between areas of international relations. He claims that “the fragmentation of world politics into many different spheres has made power resources less fungible, that is, less transferable from sphere to sphere.” Consequently, “other instruments such as communications, organizational and institutional skills, and manipulation of interdependence have become important … interdependence is often balanced differently in different spheres such as security, trade, and finance” (Nye 1990, pp. 156-158). This is significant, because the levels of interaction between communication for, of and about development in the case of IATI would appear to foreground Nye’s “communications, organizational and institutional skills” in the interests of influencing the interdependence of aid actors.

During the 1990s, Nye’s soft power thesis acted as an influential meditation on how the U.S. could maintain global leadership in a post-Cold War international system through its superior range of “power resources—military, economic, scientific, cultural, and ideological” (1990, p. 155). An international environment of “unevenly balanced mutual dependence” means that actors should seek “to set the agenda and structure the situations in world politics” through “co-optive power” (Nye 1990, pp. 158 & 166-167). In this sense, IATI may be seen as a co-opted standard whose attractiveness derives from a range of norms, pressures and interests. Explicit to Nye’s theory is the notion of steering flows of knowledge—such as the knowledge available about aid allocations—in order to shape experiences of international engagement. The architectural or structural advantages accrued from developing these shared norms are then utilized to reproduce preferred ideologies:
Co-optive power is the ability of a country to structure a situation so that other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with its own. This power tends to arise from such resources as cultural and ideological attraction as well as rules and institutions of international regimes (Nye 1990, p. 168).

Peter van Ham (2010, p. 47), developing upon the soft power thesis two decades later, argued that contemporary power should be considered in terms of the “capacity to produce, shape, and influence the motives, attitudes, roles, and interests of actors in international politics.” Social power, as he terms his more sociological (and less functionalist/realist) variation upon soft power, draws on “non-material power resources, ranging from expertise, knowledge and information, credibility, respect and authenticity, to framing, representation, and discursive power” (2010, p. 9). This sees actors attempting to influence the very structure, language and norms of the environment in which foreign affairs is supposed to take place. Hence, changing norms within the aid community may be contextualized within an expanded concept of influence that sees a shift from “command power” to forms of attraction, structural influence, and coordinated efforts to leverage relative advantages between sectors of societies (Nye 1990, p. 166).

My contention in this chapter is that IATI should be considered as a form of soft power. IATI may be considered a multi-layered effort to influence “communications, organizational and institutional skills” via common values, norms and patterns of behavior (Nye 1990, p. 158). As Alnoor Ebrahim (2003) has argued, a shared standard like the IATI acts as a “minimum common behavioral standard” that inspires rule-following behavior. A closely associated aspect of new external standards is the expectation that organizations improve their internal processes. Thus, it is not enough to simply ‘produce’ and ‘consume’ IATI data; organizations are also expected to learn and improve from the shared standard. This would appear to represent a form a socialisation across the aid community fundamentally
altering discourses about aid, and intended to turn a shared norm—that of open aid—into shared behavior via a common standard.

**Common norms & common standards**

Standards are voluntary agreements that classify things, define the conduct of processes and procedures, or define structural expectations. They influence actors’ choices by demonstrating efficient or coordinated forms of behavior that may be voluntarily adhered to. Norms, on the other hand, are internalized rules that belong to shared cultures. They are also voluntary, but their unconscious nature suggests that they do not represent a choice so much as un-reflected and learned patterns of behavior. They are typically developed through long-term processes of socialization and training, for example by belonging to a specific group with characteristic cultural values. Norms differ from standards insofar are standards are both explicit and have a recognized source. However, there is often overlap between the two terms (Brunsson & Jacobsson 2000, pp. 4-13; Brunsson 2000, pp. 21-30).

A driving force behind the aid transparency movement has been the norm of openness. As Senior Advisor for Innovation to former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton Alec J. Ross argued, “Dominant binary for political conflict in 20th century was left vs. right. In 21st century it is open vs. closed.” This refers to the normative ideal of readily available information about government activities, rather than to any explicit method of standardizing which information should be included. In essence, IATI’s challenge has been to turn a widely shared norm into an agreed and adhered-to standard. While there are strong national accountability pressures creating domestic markets for transparent aid data, the practical differences between them remain significant.

For example, the U.S. (Development Data, Foreign Assistance Dashboard, ForeignAssistance.gov and AidData), Sweden (Openaid), Norway (Aid Statistics), and the UK (Development tracker and Aid Transparency Guarantee) each developed their own systems for publishing transparent aid data in parallel with the IATI
agreements. Thus, their systems evolved in tandem with the general normative pressures that motivated IATI. But the shift from adopting national standards to an agreed multilateral standard was not as straightforward as the many pledges of political support suggested. Multilateral responsibilities have traditionally been served through the OECD-DAC’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which is generally considered the most accurate repository of aid donations since OECD staff verify the data for consistency. The creation of a new standard must therefore engage with national, and pre-existing multilateral, norms and standards.

A major hurdle facing many of the most advanced countries in terms of aid transparency is the distinction between the accepted norm, and the accepted standard. As these countries adapted their domestic democratic norms into searchable databases or registries, they based their publication standards either on the existing CRS standard, into which they already have an obligation to publish, or from existing information management systems. For example, DfID’s early advantage accrued from the benefits of consistent political will between Labour and Coalition governments, hosting the IATI Secretariat until 2013, having a number of leading British experts in influential positions shaping the common standard, taking the opportunity to create a new information management system during the period of IATI’s inception, and engraining the common standard into British NGOs at a relatively early stage. Thus, British aid transparency became an organisational and cultural norm for which the agreement of an international common standard was a governmental objective, and for which the range of governmental and nongovernmental expertise based in the UK was able to shape the evolution of the common standard at the multilateral level.

By way of comparison, Norwegian aid organization NORAD built its own aid transparency web portal in 2010, which was based around CRS data but filtered and simplified for the domestic public (data.norge.no). The back-end for this interface had been built up over many years to suit publishing to the CRS, and hence the public portal was relatively straightforward to implement. The Norwegian
government was an original supporter of IATI in 2008, and has clearly been committed to the norm of transparency. However, adapting its systems to the common standard created technical incompatibilities unique to their existing database, which have taken so long to resolve that some partners believed Norway was considering pulling out of its IATI commitments as late as 2014. Unlike DfID, NORAD declined to join IATI’s Technical Advisory Group or contribute to the development of the common standard, and thus privileged its national standard over efforts to shape multilateral debates. To date (summer 2015), NORAD still hasn’t overcome its technical hurdles and published in the IATI registry.

This co-optive power has not been limited to Western donor countries and NGOs. Parallel pressures sought to integrate the budgetary planning of partner countries within the common standard. For example, the DRC’s Ministry of Finance piloted the common standard in its domestic budgeting in order to better integrate aid planning with governmental planning. While this was justified on the grounds that such integration can help IATI meet its customers’ needs, these activities introduce an element of structural influence within aid partnerships which is unequal in nature, and that implies a transfer of norms and standards from donor to recipient countries through “communications, organizational and institutional skills” (Nye 1990, p. 158). In other words, it would appear that on a structural level, IATI seeks to change the behavior of donors, NGOs and recipients in ways that clearly meet the admittedly loose definitions of soft power.

Regardless of the explicit motivations for adopting the IATI standard, its implicit themes may be related to theories of soft power, and particularly the role of ideational and structural influence. The tension between norms and standards is merely the tip of an iceberg that delves deeply into the organizational cultures of aid donor and recipient institutions. The challenge for IATI adopters is to change their behavior: their internal routines, budgeting activities, their use of data in decision-making and external engagement, as well as their quality of integration with other donors, implementing organizations
and recipients. In this sense, any communication for development and external communication of development is predicated on the kinds of institutional reforms that fundamentally alter patterns of behavior and communication about development.

*Communication for development and/ or public diplomacy?*

I suggested in the introduction that these issues compel us to consider IATI both in terms of development communication and public diplomacy. The key point is that, as many of the chapters in this book have in their own way confirmed, the two fields overlap significantly. IATI demands open data-steered decision-making; greater integration across boundaries and organizations; and active participation in a global civil society defined both by common norms and standards. As such, it is similar to the interpretation of public diplomacy defined by Castells (2008, p. 91), who argues that the purpose of PD “is not to assert power or to negotiate a rearrangement of power relationships. It is to induce a communication space in which a new, common language could emerge as a precondition for diplomacy.” In this sense, IATI may be considered to lay the technological infrastructure and language for the common communication of aid in a manner that may eventually help to improve the quality of aid delivery.

In Castells’ sense, it is telling that many of the reasons for adopting IATI are centered on the democratic case: its utility for recipient countries, citizens, community-based organizations, anti-corruption activists, journalists and researchers in terms of access to information (IATI 2011). Yet to suggest that power is not at play in this kind of ‘communication space’ would appear misleading, particularly if we consider the notion of soft power as influence over structures and rules. On the contrary, public diplomacy theories are well-placed to elucidate the layers of political influence that permeate adoption of IATI; to reveal the strategic diplomatic objectives that inform models of communication within international development initiatives. While recipient countries can benefit from the new knowledge that IATI affords them, integration into the aid community also places socializing demands upon all participating institutions. As such, the
production of this common language for aid may be characterised by soft power, co-optive and public diplomacy techniques.

**Works Cited**


**Endnotes**

1. Twitter, May 9 2013.
PD and International Aid Conference
Friday, February 27, 2015
ASCJ, Room 204 and 2nd Floor Lobby

DAY 1
Revision#3: 2-5-15

8:15am   Continental Breakfast
Breakfast will be set-up by 8:00am. Guest and speakers should plan to enter the Annenberg School at the East Wing and walk across the 2nd floor patio to reach the conference location.

8:45am   Welcome Remarks
Jay Wang, USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School, University of Southern California
James Pamment, Karlstad University & University of Texas at Austin, CPD Research Fellow

9:00-10:15   Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy & Development
Kazumi Noguchi, Woodrow Wilson International Center
Craig Hayden, American University
Cesar Corona, National Autonomous University of Mexico/USAID Mexico
Efe Sevin & Banu Hawks, Kadir Has University
MODERATOR: Karin Wilkins, University of Texas Austin

10:20-11:35   Education, Scholarships & Exchanges
Andreas Åkerlund, Uppsala University
Hyunjin Seo & Stuart Thorson, University of Kansas & Syracuse University
Larisa Smirnova, Xiamen University
Vladimir Diaz, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona
MODERATOR: Robert Banks

11:30   Lunch set-up
Boxed lunches will be available for attendees in the 2nd Floor Lobby and return to ASC 204 for the Keynote Lunch Panel
11:45am-1:00pm    Lunch and Keynote Panel
(20 min each and 15 for discussion)
Nicholas J. Cull, University of Southern California
Joe Straubhaar, University of Texas at Austin
Gary Rawnsley, Aberystwyth University
MODERATOR: James Pamment, Karlstad University & University of Texas at Austin

1:10pm-2:30pm    Alternative Approaches to Development
Tara Ornstein, The Union
Anna Velikaya, The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Foundation
B. Senem Çevik, Ankara University
Katherine Reilly, Simon Fraser University
MODERATOR: Shabnam Shalizi (Doctoral Candidate, USC Annenberg School for Communication)

2:30pm-2:45pm    Break
Coffee and beverage service will be available for conference participants in the 2nd Floor Lobby.

2:45pm-4:15pm    Media in Development
Valerie Cooper, Hong Kong Baptist University
Ming-Yeh Rawnsley, University of London & University of Nottingham
Ece Algan, California State University at San Bernardino
Shearon Roberts, Xavier University of Louisiana
Fran Hassencahl, Old Dominion University
MODERATOR: Jie-Ae Sohn, former president of South Korea International Broadcasting Foundation and Visiting Scholar, USC School of Social Work

4:15pm-5:30pm    Nation Brands & Economic Development
Nadia Kaneva, University of Denver
Juyan Zhang, University of Texas at San Antonio
Kyung Sun (Karen) Lee, University of Texas at Austin
Yan Wu & Yakun Yu, Swansea University
MODERATOR: Gary Rawnsley, Aberystwyth University
6:00pm-7:30pm  Private Reception at the USC University Club Patio
Passed appetizers and cocktail receptions for conference speakers, moderators, and VIP guests.

** End of Day 1 **

PD and International Aid Conference
Saturday, February 28, 2015
ASCJ, Room 207 and 2nd Floor Lobby

DAY 2
Revision#2: 2-5-15

8:30am  Continental Breakfast
Breakfast will be set-up by 8:00am. Guest and speakers should plan to enter the Annenberg School at the East Wing and walk across the 2nd floor patio to reach the 2nd Floor Lobby and Annenberg Room 207.

9:00am-12:00pm  Saturday Workshop Session
Informal session outlining the book projects and providing the opportunity for further discussion about day one’s talks and possible directions for us to continue this collaboration.
James Pamment, Karlstad University & University of Texas at Austin
Karin Wilkins, University of Texas Austin

Panel 1: Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy & Development

Kazumi Noguchi
Woodrow Wilson International Center, Kazumi.Noguchi@wilsoncenter.org

Following the example of PEPFAR, the Japanese government launched the Strategy on Global Health Diplomacy in 2013, through which Universal
Health Coverage was identified as a crucial element of Japan’s post-2015 development agenda. That strategy explicitly lists “global public private partnerships” as one action item. These facts confirm that cooperation with private entities has assumed an increasingly critical role in global health diplomacy. The intended contribution of this study will be to enhance the understanding of the roles of philanthropic organizations and of philanthropic collaboration with the government in international health diplomacy by examining the practice of PPPs. This study is highly significant for the following reasons: (1) it will help clarify the effectiveness of health diplomacy as soft power and shed light on the type of relationships between the donors’ governments and the donors themselves that are most effective for improving health issues as well as advancing the donors’ foreign policy; (2) it will clarify the influence of private entities on global health diplomacy policymaking; and (3) given the emphasis the Japanese government has placed on global health as a key priority in foreign policy, it may have significant implications for Japan’s PPPs in global health diplomacy.

Craig Hayden
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US public diplomacy has a historical relationship with the practice of development that is rooted in the modernization paradigm that privileged the role of communication interventions in changing political, cultural, and social structures during the Cold War. These institutions of statecraft have diverged considerably over the latter part of the 20th century, though more recent programs and policies sponsored by the United States illustrate a strategic shift in public diplomacy practice that reflects much of the participatory logic that frames US development policies and discourse. This paper explores public arguments and discourse about three US initiatives that may be organizationally identified as aspects of public diplomacy, but reflect fundamental assumptions about the role of communication as a tool of development. The implications of these arguments suggest
that the imperative of influence that underwrites public diplomacy is encoded into practices that carry expectations about the provision of communication resources. Influence, in this sense, is symbolically derived from how public diplomacy facilitates particular social and cultural behaviors, and is less directly tied to concerns over image and opinion about the United States.

Cesar Corona
National Autonomous University of Mexico/USAID Mexico, cesarcorona@me.com

Public Diplomacies & International Development Assistance

The objective of this paper is to provide conceptual clarity on different interpretations of public diplomacy and to explain how each interpretation leads to different conclusions of whether international development assistance is a form of public diplomacy. I argue that, using communication theory variables and international law indicators, these interpretations can be grouped into a small set of categories that provide a clear framework to explain the intersections between public diplomacy and fields like international development assistance.

Efe Sevin & Banu Hawks
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Development and Promotion: Development Assistance as a Public Diplomacy Instrument in Turkey

This study attempts to explain the interaction between public diplomacy and official development assistance (ODA) activities by analyzing the Turkish practice and official discourse. Turkey is relatively new to the fields of public diplomacy and international development. The concept of public diplomacy was not seen in the policy discourses until 2004. The first institution bearing the name ‘public diplomacy’ was established in 2010. Yet, the country acts to establish itself as an active public diplomacy actor and a generous donor to development and humanitarian assistance projects. Turkey takes pride in and promotes itself through being a donor country and drastically increasing both its official humanitarian and development assistance contributions. Given
these changes, Turkey stands out as a crucial case to understand the interaction between development aid and public diplomacy, as well as the impacts of both activities on the perception of the country.

**Panel 2: Education, Scholarships & Exchanges**

**Andreas Åkerlund**  
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*Scholarship programs as development assistance and public diplomacy*

Higher education is generally a very small part of ODA-activities. Compared to the sums spent on technical assistance and even compared to the money spent on local training or basic teaching. Higher Education, knowledge transfer and ODA is however interesting in its very particular relation to public diplomacy. The aim of my paper is to discuss the mutual benefit and possible conflicts of interest between ODA and PD within the realm of higher education, more exactly within the scholarship programs for academic exchange run by the Swedish Institute.

**Hyunjin Seo & Stuart Thorson**  
University of Kansas & Syracuse University, hseo@ku.edu; thorson@syr.edu  
*Empathy in Public Diplomacy: US Academic Science Engagement with North Korea*

The government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK/North Korea) has been at loggerheads with the governments of the United States (US) and South Korea (ROK) since the division of the Korean Peninsula following the second World War. There have been military skirmishes, threats and counter-threats, economic sanctions, and occasional diplomatic discussions. A consequence has been an ongoing demonization of the ROK and US by the DPRK along with similar demonization of the North by both the US and South Korea. While there has continued to be limited economic trade between the two Koreas and humanitarian assistance to the
North from US-based NGOs and UN agencies including the World Food Program, the lack of diplomatic relations between the US and DPRK have made non-governmental public diplomacy engagements difficult.

**Larisa Smirnova**  
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*Understanding the Eurasian Dimension of China’s Public Diplomacy*

The proposed paper evaluates the human capital derived from the exchange programs between China and Russia/former USSR Central Asian countries from the perspective of their role in increasing the Chinese economic influence on the Post-Soviet Eurasian Space and in transforming the Chinese economic development model from low-cost manufacturing to high-technology exports. This paper contributes to the body of research on assessing China’s increasing public diplomacy and soft power efforts. So far, most studies focused on various exchanges between China and the West, the typical pattern of education programs being that of a Chinese student coming to the West to receive education. The only significant case of China as a recipient of foreign students was that of African countries. Our findings, based on a survey of Russian and Central Asian students in three top Chinese Universities (Peking University, Tsinghua University, Xiamen University), suggest that China’s Universities are becoming an important pole of attraction for the students from Russia and post-Soviet countries, a considerable number of whom will soon become available as actors of China’s public diplomacy and economic influence in their region of origin.

**Vladimir Diaz**  
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*Developing Agricultural Leaders in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Case of the IICA-CONACYT Scholarship Program in Mexico*
Mexico’s public opinion around the world centers on the fight against “drug trafficking and organized crime” and foreign policy leaders recommend the use of public diplomacy to improve Mexico’s brand image. President Enrique Peña Nieto calls for Mexico to achieve its full potential through peace, inclusivity, quality education, prosperity, and global responsibility. “We can be a positive and proactive force in the world, a nation serving the best causes of humanity.” One example, which is the focus of this case study, is an educational exchange program created by Mexico’s Council on Science and Technology in partnership with the OAS’s Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture. The IICA-CONACYT Scholarship Program provides agricultural professionals from Latin America and the Caribbean with post-graduate education at Mexico’s leading research universities and applied research opportunities in their home countries.

Panel 3: Alternative Approaches to Development

Tara Ornstein
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Public Diplomacy and TB Control in Brazil: A Case Study

Tuberculosis (TB) killed more than a million people worldwide in 2013 and is a serious public health problem in Brazil, which is one of 22 countries with a high TB burden. World Health Organization data places Brazil in the 16th position for absolute number of cases and the 22nd position for the number of new cases reported in the country. According to the Brazilian Ministry of Health, TB is directly related to poverty through unhealthy living conditions, malnutrition, and access to health services. One of the biggest barriers to effective TB control, however, is the prevalence of stigma which prevents patients from receiving the care they need. Although TB control remains a priority for the Ministry of Health, TB infection rates have fallen in recent years. Since 2005, Brazil has successfully used the tools of public diplomacy in several initiatives including the Kick TB Campaign which was launched ahead of the 2014 World Cup.
in Brazil and the Thiaguinho public awareness initiative in which a popular singer spoke about his experience as a TB survivor.

In addition to providing an overview of the public diplomacy campaigns undertaken in Brazil, this case study will highlight which activities were perceived to particularly helpful in improving TB control by both community activists and public health experts. The case study will also identify which activities may have the potential to be replicated outside Brazil. This research will draw on published evaluations of these campaigns, media reports, and interviews with global health and communication professionals based in Brazil and at international institutions such as the Global Fund, World Health Organization, and Treatment Action Group among others.

Anna Velikaya
The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Foundation, velikaya@gorchakovfund.ru

Military sport cooperation as an underestimated public diplomacy tool

Public diplomacy has various forms, methods and aspects. Military sport cooperation can also be attributed to this sphere of international relations. The system of collaboration based on this process contributes not only to constructing positive image of some state and regions, but it also contributes towards development of the less privileged states and even to the post-conflict settlement. First steps of the cooperation in this sphere trace back to 1945, to the Allied Powers sport championships. After the fall of the Iron Curtain military sport was subordinated to two organisations representing different camps: the Sports Committee of Friendly Armies (of the Warsaw Pact countries) and International Military Sports Council (of the Western countries; officially—French abbreviation CISM—Conseil International du Sport Militaire). These two structures were regularly hosting various championships, winter and summer world games. But in 1990-s all member countries were united in the solid system-CISM. Nowadays this organisation consists of 134 member nations. The governing body is the General Assembly, meeting once
a year. CISM conducts 2 types of events: institutional and sport. The most interesting competitions are summer and winter world games. But mostly spectacular are Cadet games, unifying officers of tomorrow from various countries (the last Cadet games took place recently in Ecuador).

B. Senem Çevik
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*Turkey’s Faith-Based NGOs: A Framework of Grassroots Networking*

Turkey has been increasingly visible in the global political scene in recent years as an emerging middle power. Turkey’s presence has manifested itself in an active foreign policy formulation aimed not only at exerting influence, but also at proposing a change in the international relations system through numerous tools of engagement. NGOs play a key role in projecting Turkey’s policies as well as positing Turkey as a major donor state. Turkey intends to establish itself as a purveyor of humanitarian assistance and a mediator in regional conflicts via its NGOs—by building long-term people-to-people relationships grounded in mutual trust. This paper will discuss the intricate relationship between Turkish domestic politics and civic initiatives by proposing a faith-based communication network of aid NGOs. The proposed framework will capture the role of faith-based NGO networks in connecting with conservative grassroots/donors by way of ideology, foreign policy and economic derivatives. It will further discuss the role of on-site volunteers in building long-term relations with host communities, which facilitates the establishment of these NGOs as brokers in peace building. The framework will also offer a recap of the implications rising from the self-selectivity of faith-based NGOs.

Katherine Reilly
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*Canada’s Shifting Development Partnerships Model: From Global Norm Formation to Public Diplomacy*
The Canadian government’s development assistance apparatus has long relied on official partnerships with local Canadian development organizations to both legitimate and amplify its contributions to ODA. Until recently, this mechanism has referenced a liberal global citizenship model (John Gaventa) of public engagement both at home and abroad. However, the current Canadian government has been radically reshaping our development assistance model over the past several years. It has closed the doors of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), removed funding from several prominent think-tanks, such as the North South Institute (NSI), and reorganized its relationship with its national ‘public of record.’ These changes are a direct response to Canada’s transition into an energy production and natural resource extraction economy, which can in turn be explained by global power shifts within the international state system. The result has been a new approach to federal partnerships with Canadian development organizations, oriented much more towards justifying and mitigating the impacts of Canadian industry working in emerging markets or marginalized communities. This is pushing Canadian NGOs to grapple with new public engagement pressures that are much better explained in terms of global resource geopolitics and public diplomacy efforts both at home and abroad.

Panel 4: Media in Development

Valerie Cooper
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Toward a ‘Developed’ Media: The Priorities of Media Dev in S. Sudan

This research aimed to better understand the motivations, priorities and values of some of those western-based media interventions, from organisations such as the UK-based BBC Media Action, the US-based Internews and UNESCO, among others. With the goal of problematizing the Western-initiated cultural diplomacy, or ‘soft power’ present in such media interventions, the research rhetorically analysed literature from these organisations’ programmes
conducted in South Sudan, which has undergone the transition to independence, democracy and a more open press since signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. As such, the principal question this research asked was, What are the journalism systems, values and priorities that are being propagated in South Sudan through the use of media development trainings from Western-based international organisations, based on analysis of these organisations’ own texts? The basis of this research is a rhetorical analysis of literature concerning journalism training programmes conducted by international development organisations in South Sudan. The nine projects that met the criteria represent the work of seven organisations from Europe, North America and Asia. The literature produced in association with these projects was coded and analysed in order to find frequently recurring words related to values or goals of the projects.

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Science Communication in Taiwan: Rethinking the Local and Global

This paper analyses and compares two television documentaries produced in Taiwan that aim to attract both domestic and international viewers: Bird without Borders (Fanjia baqian li: heimian pilu, Public Television System, 2008) and Tomb Raptor (Huishian jiu chuanqi, National Geographic and Government Information Office, 2009). This comparative approach helps us to understand (i) Taiwan’s position in the international science television markets, (ii) how Taiwan participates in global production networks and (iii) why the Taiwan case study can enrich the study of science communication. The discussion proceeds along two dimensions: First, it explores the historical context of these productions by providing a brief overview of how science communication has developed in Taiwan. This will assist us in understanding how context has influenced production, and helps us identify the prominent actors. Second, the paper examines the mechanics of production and the products themselves. While both selected case studies are international collaborations, they represent
different formats of cooperation. *Bird without Borders*, directed by British documentary maker Dean Johnson, was proposed, financed and managed by Taiwan’s Public Television System (PTS); *Tomb Raptor*, directed by Taiwanese filmmaker Bruce Hsu Hong-long (a specialist in natural history photography), was co-funded by Taiwan’s Government Information Office (GIO, abolished in 2012) and enjoyed the creative leadership of the National Geographic (shortened as NatGeo). The paper proposes that a comparison of these two programmes helps refine our thinking about the dichotomy between local/national and international/global.

**Ece Algan**  
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*Limits of soft-power and nation-branding via media: The case of Turkish television*

This presentation will examine the ways in which Turkish television’s soft power in the region has been actively sought out and used by the current Turkish government to advance Turkey’s interests and nation branding efforts on a transnational scale. In 2013, Turkish television series alone grossed over 60 million dollars in revenue and were viewed in 40 countries, with a number of TV series breaking viewership records both inside and outside of Turkey. These programs opened up public debates on taboos pertaining to Ottoman history, nationalism, violence against women, secularism, and Islam etc. Turkish TV soaps’ popularity was seen responsible for improving Turkey’s image in the Middle East with 75% of Arabs across seven countries characterizing Turkey’s image positively in 2009 and 77% calling for a larger Turkish role in the region.

**Shearon Roberts**  
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*Mass Media Roles in Haiti’s Post-Earthquake Reconstruction: A Comparison of State-Owned & Mainstream Media*

Achieving success in Haiti’s stalled reconstruction can become a test case for poor nations around the globe. Haiti’s recent history has been
riddled with U.S. occupation, dictatorship, military coups, natural disasters, health disparities, ecological devastation, unemployment, and hunger and violence against women and children. Haiti is the Western Hemisphere’s moral test case. This study contrasts the ways in which Haiti’s government using state-owned media and how mainstream commercial news organizations have attempted to enter the conversation about the country’s future; a dialogue in which they have not always been equal parties at the table. Research conducted in Port-au-Prince, Haiti in 2013 and 2014 with 75 of Haiti’s leading mainstream journalists and news owners, and with Haiti’s state-owned media revealed a robust critique of the international aid community and its sidelining of the Haitian government and its people in the path forward for recovery. This study found distinctions between the mission and goals of using the state-owned media by the administration of President Michel Martelly and by a renewed alliance between mainstream and popular community media outlets.

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Radio Sawa: Changing the Arab World One Song at a Time

Radio Sawa continues US policy to “win the hearts and minds” of the Arab world. Habermas’ worst fears about the public sphere’s key institution, the press, are realized here. A blurring of the lines between news and public relations, between informed and staged public opinion, occurs. Like commercial radio, the goal of Radio Sawa is to sell a product. Key findings are that the decisions about Radio Sawa were made by an analogy of what appears to work for American audiences rather than from research that investigated the concerns of the listeners in the Middle East. Academicians in the US and in the Middle East debate whether public diplomacy can be effective when journalistic standards are compromised. The US Congress is more market driven. A paucity of information about who listens and whether the news attracts listeners is now starting to generate some questions from the U.S. Congress about whether Radio Sawa is cost effective. The author 1) chronicles the events leading up to the establishment of Radio Sawa, 2) examines
the political and programming considerations for this modified public diplomacy effort, and 3) evaluates the claims made by the supporters and opponents of Radio Sawa as to whether the programs are reaching their intended audience.

Panel 5: Nation Brands & Economic Development

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Nation Branding and the Neo-liberal State

This paper explores the intersection of state building, nation branding, and economic development by focusing on the case of post-war Kosovo, one of the youngest nations in the world. Kosovo, a former Serbian province, declared independence in 2008 after a protracted military conflict, which required UN and NATO intervention to be brought to an end. The analysis seeks to understand the various mechanisms through which commercial discourses and practices are implicated in Kosovo’s nation- and state-building project. The focus is more narrowly on how “nation branding” and “public diplomacy” efforts have been used in efforts to secure political legitimacy among Kosovo citizens and on the world stage. The paper uses a combination of data, including historical information, institutional data about several specific promotional campaigns, media coverage of Kosovo’s promotional initiatives, and qualitative interviews with some participants in the campaigns. Put briefly, the paper argues that Kosovo’s case offers a unique opportunity to observe the generative potential of what some scholars have called “commercial nationalism” (Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011) and examine its political implications. Furthermore, this case can be helpful in efforts to unpack current critiques—largely theoretical in nature—of nation branding and public diplomacy as tools of neo-liberal governance.

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Nation Branding in a Microcosm: Analysis of East Asian nations’ Public Diplomacy on a U.S. College Campus
Combining statistical analysis and case studies, this research examines public diplomacy activities by East Asian nations on a U.S. college campus. Results showed that there are significant variations in forms of activities, actors involved, and publicity they received. Events on behalf of China are largely in a one-way dissemination mode, using cultural promotion and language teaching as two major strategies. Continuity is the main pattern of message repetition. Japan’s activities are aimed at strengthening Japan-U.S. ally relationship, promoting exchanges between civilians, and promoting Japanese culture to young Americans. Its message repetition pattern is a combination of continuity and bursting. South Korea’s public diplomacy combines isolated events and sophisticated on-campus campaigns. Its goals include cultivating political relations with the United States and promoting Korean culture. Taiwan’s activities are aimed at promoting its achievements, such as films and the IT industry, as well as projecting its unique identity. Its message repetition pattern is a combination of continuity and massing. This research lays partial groundwork for theory building and effect analysis of grassroots public diplomacy.

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Understanding Citizen Diplomacy within Nation Branding Framework: Branding South Korea through Overseas Volunteers

In 2009, the South Korean government established the Presidential Council on Nation Branding to bolster the country’s national brand value that lagged far behind its OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development) counterparts. Among the 10-point action plan devised by the committee, commitment to overseas development assistance (ODA) appears first on the list. The prioritization of ODA reflects not only institutional pressure from OECD to increase the volume of aid but also the government’s determination to spread a uniquely ‘Korean model of development,’ a model that is allegedly proven by South Korea’s successful transition from an aid recipient to a donor country. This study seeks to investigate the discourse of South Korea’s foreign aid, critically
analyzing how assistance toward development is shaped and, at the same time, constrained by the nation branding framework. By doing so, this study seeks to contribute towards developing a more adequate understanding of development in the new context of neoliberal globalization.

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China’s dream and the Chinese dream: soft power as a political discourse and a public discourse

Current debates surrounding ‘China’s Dream’ mostly focus on the interpretation of Chinese official documents and little attention has been paid to the implication and relevance of ‘China’s Dream’ to the general public in the country. Starting with the research question: ‘how has Chinese public responded to China’s Dream as a dominant political discourse’, we employed critical discourse analysis (CDA) as the main research method, and compared the representation of ‘China’s Dream’ in mainstream media and the reception of ‘China’s Dream’ by Chinese general public via an examination of related discussion on Chinese social media.

Although the interpretations of ‘China’s Dream’ may vary among Chinese netizens, this study reveals a general gap between the messages delivered by the official media and that which is received by the public. Firstly, the official definition of ‘China’s Dream’ as ‘national rejuvenation’ is not fully accepted by the Chinese public. Although the Chinese public welcomes the anti-corruption campaign recently launched by the central government, they tend not to view China’s dream as closely connected with their livelihood. That is, ‘China’s dream’ is a top-down political discourse instead of an organically developed aspiration by and for the Chinese people. A frequent comparison of the ‘China’s dream’ to the ‘American Dream’ reveals the Chinese netizens discontent with the state-serving propaganda.
Authors’ Bios

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**Valerie Cooper** is a PhD student at Hong Kong Baptist University, where she is working on her dissertation concerning public diplomacy from the United States and China in sub-Saharan Africa. Her research interests include media development, communication for development, public diplomacy, and Chinese media on the African continent. She has presented her research at the International Communication Association conference in Puerto Rico and at the New Media Development and Sustainability in Africa conference in Switzerland. Previously, she taught communication for development at the Universidade Católica de Moçambique.

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Hyunjin Seo is an assistant professor of strategic communication in the William Allen White School of Journalism and Mass Communications at the University of Kansas. Seo’s research interests lie at the intersection of digital media, international communication, and strategic communication. She has conducted research on how social collaborative networks, often facilitated by digital communication technologies, catalyze social movements and address social issues at local, national, and international levels. Her research
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